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Andhra High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 805 (AP)

M. A. E. Kumar Krishna Varma v. Ramoji Rao

2008-09-22

G.V.SEETHAPATHY

body2008
ORDER: This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 22-01- 2008 in I.A.No.794 of 2007 in O.S.No.212 of 2007, on the file of the VII Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, wherein the application filed by the revision petitioner/first defendant under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint, was dismissed. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/ first defendant and the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2/ plaintiffs. Perused the records. 3. Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed the suit O.S.No.212 of 2007, on the file of VII Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, for a direction to the petitioner/first defendant to renew the lease for a further period of 33 years on a rent of Rs.10,000/- per month initially or such other sum the Court may deem reasonable and also direct the first defendant to join the plaintiffs in applying for exemption granted in G.O.Ms.No.427 dated 1-3-1978 for a period co-terminus with the extended lease and for a direction that if the first defendant fails to join the plaintiffs in applying for exemption and register the lease, the Court itself may execute and register the lease deed at the expense of the first defendant. The suit is also filed for injunction restraining the first defendant, his agents and representatives from interfering with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and also injunction restraining the first defendant from creating third party interest in the suit schedule property. It is pertinent to note that the relief of specific performance and the releif of injunction are separately valued and separate court fee is paid thereon. 4. It is not disputed that the first defendant is the owner of the plaint schedule property of 11000 sq.yards of vacant site with a building thereon bearing No.51/1/4, situated in Sethammadhara, Visakhapatnam and the first plaintiff has taken the same on lease for the purpose of establishing a printing and publishing unit of Telugu daily newspaper through the second plaintiff company. It is also not disputed that having regard to the purpose for which the suit property was taken on lease, it was agreed that the period of lease be 33 years with a provision for renewal. It is also not disputed that having regard to the purpose for which the suit property was taken on lease, it was agreed that the period of lease be 33 years with a provision for renewal. Accordingly, a registered lease deed was entered into between the first plaintiff and the first defendant on 30-03-1974 wherein it was inter alia stipulated that the rent would be Rs.2,500/- per month for the first 14 years and Rs.3,000/- per month thereafter. It was further stipulated that at the option of the first plaintiff, the lease is renewable provided the first plaintiff exercised option six months in advance before the expiry of the lease period. The relevant Clause 3(vi) relating to the renewal, as incorporated in the lease deed, is as follows: "The lessee shall be entitled to renewal of this lease for a further period or periods subject to the terms and conditions regarding the rental and period of lease etc., as will be mutually agreed upon provided that the lessee gives notice to the lessor of his intention to renew, six months before the expiry of this lease. 5. The second plaintiff continued to be in possession of the property as sub-lessee, which is provided for under the terms of lease deed. As the lease period of 33 years was coming to a close, the first plaintiff exercised the option of renewal by giving a notice dated 27-09-2006 seeking renewal for a further period of 33 years and offering to pay rent at Rs.10,000/- for the first 14 years with escalation thereafter. The first defendant gave a reply dated 20-10-2006 rejecting the request for renewal on the ground that the option clause is vague and the offer of rent of Rs.10,000/- per month was ridiculous. The first plaintiff gave a rejoinder dated 13-03-2007. In view of the refusal by the first defendant to renew the lease, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 6. The first plaintiff gave a rejoinder dated 13-03-2007. In view of the refusal by the first defendant to renew the lease, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 6. The first defendant filed a written statement contending inter alia that the clause relating to renewal is not a concluded contract as there is no consensus adidem as to the basic terms of the lease like rental, period of lease etc., and admittedly no agreement was arrived at between the parties subsequent to the expiry of the original lease period and, therefore, the suit for specific performance is not maintainable as there was no concluded contract that can be enforced. It was further averred in para 9 of the written statement that the suit is, therefore, without any cause of action and the first defendant is filing a separate application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the said ground. 7. Subsequently, the first defendant filed I.A.No.794 of 2007 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is averred that the suit for specific performance is not maintainable as there is no contract between the parties, which can be specifically enforced insofar as the renewal of lease is concerned, no agreement having been reached between the parties regarding the essential terms of lease like the period or the rental. It was further averred that the plaintiffs' letter dated 27-09-2006 seeking renewal and offering to pay at Rs.10,000/- per month was merely a proposal which was rejected by the first defendant by his letter dated 20-10-2006 and thus there was no agreement reached regarding the renewal and in the absence of any such agreement, the question of seeking enforcement of the same, does not simply arise. 8. The first plaintiff filed a counter in I.A.No.794 of 2007 contending that the requirements of Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d) are not at all attracted and the lease deed contains a concluded contract insofar as the renewal is concerned and that too at the option of the plaintiffs and what is left to be negotiated is only the period and the rental. When once the plaintiff exercised his option by issuing a notice six months in advance expressing his intention for renewal, the rejection of the same by the first defendant gives rise to cause of action to enforce the first plaintiff's right of renewal under the lease deed. It is further asserted that the questions as to whether or not the renewal is proper and whether or not the refusal by the first defendant is valid, are all matters to be decided only on the conclusion of trial, but cannot be determined at the threshold. It is further averred in the counter that the affidavit filed in support of the petition proceeds on the footing that there is no cause of action and, therefore, the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) on the ground that there is no cause of action, does not arise. It is averred in the counter that the suit is not barred by any law and, therefore, the rejection of the plaint on that ground, also does not arise. 9. After hearing both sides, the learned Additional District Judge by the impugned order dismissed the application observing that the clause of renewal is an important provision in the lease deed and the validity of the said provision has to be decided in the trial of the suit and by using the expression 'shall' in the said clause, the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to seek renewal and the first defendant failed to establish that there was non-disclosure of cause of action in the plaint or that the suit is barred by any law. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, held that the plaint is not liable for rejection at the threshold stage and the various contentions raised by the parties have to be decided in the trial of the suit. Aggrieved by the said order, the first defendant filed the present civil revision petition. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/first defendant would contend that there is no contract, in fact or in law, whose specific performance could be enforced in the suit by the plaintiffs and hence the suit for specific performance lacks the foundation, as the plaint or the documents filed along with it do not disclose a concluded contract for renewal of the lease. He would further contend that the renewal clause being vague and uncertain is void in terms of Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act (for short 'the Act') and such void agreement is not enforceable in view of the definition of the expression 'void agreement' contained in Section 2(g) of the Act. He would further contend that if the plaint discloses a mere offer that has not been accepted, it is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non- disclosure of cause of action. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/ first defendant would further contend that the expression 'barred by law' occurring in Order VII Rule 11(d) would include the provisions of the Contract Act as well and hence the plaint which is based on an alleged agreement, which is void due to vagueness and uncertainty, is barred by law and, therefore, the plaint is liable for rejection. He would further submit that the Court below failed to appreciate the fact that the plaintiff did not disclose cause of action to seek the releifs prayed for, even going by the averments in the plaint, and erroneously dismissed the application. 11. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would, on the other hand, contend that the renewal clause in the lease deed being an important covenant has to be construed and interpreted by reading the entire lease deed duly considering the meaning and purpose for which the lease was entered into and the intention of the parties. He would, therefore, submit that the question as to whether or not the renewal cause is enforceable is a matter to be decided after necessary evidence is adduced by both sides at the time of trial, but not at this stage. He would further submit that the suit is not barred by any of the provisions of Specific Relief Act or Indian Contract Act and Section 2(g) read with Section 29 of the Act and Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act only give a right of defence to the petitioner, but do not bar the suit filed by the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent would further submit that the averments in the plaint certainly disclose cause of action for filing the suit as the assertion of the respondent regarding the renewal option available to him is denied by the petitioner, which constitutes a cause of action. The learned counsel for the respondent would further submit that the averments in the plaint certainly disclose cause of action for filing the suit as the assertion of the respondent regarding the renewal option available to him is denied by the petitioner, which constitutes a cause of action. He would further submit that there is difference between a situation where there is no cause of action and the situation where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and in the case of former, Order VII Rule 11 has no application. He would also submit that the expression 'bar of law' contemplated in Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 should be apparent from the averments in the plaint and not one arising out of judicial interpretation of a particular provision and even order XIV Rule 2 CPC would state that a bar created by law can be decided as a preliminary issue. He would, therefore, submit that the refusal of the first defendant to renew the lease gives rise to a triable issue, which can be decided only on conclusion of trial, but not at this stage. 12. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff also initially raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of present revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the availability of alternative remedy under Section 115 CPC, but the same is not pressed in view of the settled position that this Court has power to treat the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as one filed under Section 115 CPC (As held in SADHANA LODH V. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (2002) 3 SCC 524). 13. In COL.ANIL KAK V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, INDORE1, the Apex Court held as under: "The power of Court to treat the CRP filed under Article 227 as petition under Section 115 CPC, is not open to question" 14. The grievance of the revision petitioner is that the learned Additional District Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and, therefore, this Court's intervention is required in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It, therefore, makes no difference as to whether the petition is filed under Article 227 or under Section 115 CPC as the said grievance can be considered under either of the two provisions. 15. It, therefore, makes no difference as to whether the petition is filed under Article 227 or under Section 115 CPC as the said grievance can be considered under either of the two provisions. 15. The revision petitioner filed I.A.No.794 of 2007 under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC only. In para 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the said application also it is averred that in terms of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, there is no cause of action whatsoever for maintainability of the suit. In para 11 of the affidavit, it is stated that Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC squarely applies in the present case, inasmuch as it is clear and apparent that the plaint is barred by law. The question of bar of the suit by any law does not arise under Rule 11(a), but it is relevant only under Rule 11(d). There is no reference to the applicability of Clause (d) of Rule 11 either in the petition or in the affidavit. In the counter, the first respondent/plaintiff stated that requirements of either clauses (a) or (d) are not at all attracted. The learned District Judge, however, dealt with both the grounds under clauses (a) and (d) and dismissed the application regarding both. Arguments are advanced by the learned counsel for both sides pertaining to both clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 notwithstanding the fact that the application is filed under Order VII Rule 11(a). 16. Order VII Rule 11 CPC dealing with rejection of plaint to the extent relevant for the present petition is as follows: "The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) xxxxxx (c) xxxxxx (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) xxxxxx (f) xxxxxx 17. The petitioner/first defendant who seeks rejection of the plaint has, therefore, to establish that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or that from the averments in the plaint it appears that the suit is barred by any law. There is vast difference between a case where there is no cause of action and the one where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. Clause (a) is not applicable to a case where there is no cause of action. There is vast difference between a case where there is no cause of action and the one where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. Clause (a) is not applicable to a case where there is no cause of action. It would be applicable only when the defendant is able to show that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. It is not the absence of cause of action for the suit that entails rejection, but the absence of disclosure of cause of action. Before seeking to establish that the plaint does not disclose cause of action, the first defendant has to plead the same at the first instance. The onus is on the defendant to establish that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. A perusal of either the written statement or the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.794 of 2007 does not disclose that any specific plea is raised by the petitioner/first defendant that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. On the other hand, in the written statement and also in the affidavit, the first defendant purported to plead that there is no cause of action for the suit. In para 7 of the affidavit, it is specifically asserted that in terms of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, there is no cause of action whatsoever for maintainability of the present suit. It is further averred therein that the suit, as framed and filed by the plaintiff, is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected as de void of any cause of action. The question as to whether or not there is cause of action for the suit, does not arise for consideration at this stage. The decision on the question as to the existence or otherwise of the cause of action depends not merely on the averments in the plaint, but also on the pleadings in the written statement and evidence. The said question is, therefore, to be decided only at a later stage, but not at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. What is required to be established for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC is non-disclosure of cause of action in the plaint. The said question is, therefore, to be decided only at a later stage, but not at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. What is required to be established for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC is non-disclosure of cause of action in the plaint. In order to ascertain whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the averments in the plaint have to be read as a whole and also in a meaningful manner. In STATE OF ORISSA V. KLOCKNER AND COMPANY AND OTHERS, the Apex Court held that rejection of the plaint is not proper when the Court does not maintain distinction between the plea that there was no cause of action for the suit and plea that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. In the above case it was found by the High Court that the case of the applicant therein was that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit and it was not specifically pleaded by the applicant that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. It was further held as under: "From the averments in the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has pleaded a cause of action for filing the suit seeking the reliefs stated in it. That is not to say that the plaintiff has cause of action to file the suit for the reliefs sought that question is to be determined on the basis of materials (other than the plaint), which may be produced by the parties at appropriate stage in the suit. For the limited purpose of determining the question whether the suit is to be wiped out under Order 7, Rule 11(1) or not the averments in the plaint are only to be looked into. The position noted above is also clear from the petition filed by defendant No.1 under Order 7, Rule 11 in which the thrust of the case pleaded is that on the stipulation in the agreement of 20-4- 82 the plaintiff is not entitled to file a suit seeking any of the reliefs stated in the plaint." 18. The above view of the High Court was accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The above view of the High Court was accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the present case also, there is no specific plea raised by the petitioner/D-1 that the plaint does not disclose cause of action and the thrust of the averments in the written statement and the specific averment in the affidavit are to the effect that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit. 19. In BRITISH AIRWAYS V. ART WORKS EXPORT LTD., AND ANOTHER, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held thus: "Under Cl.(a) of O.7 R.11, the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. The plea of the petitioner that there is no cause of action for the suit is not same as to say the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, which is a ground for the rejection of the plaint. Indeed, the plaint discloses a cause of action. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action is beyond the purview of Cl.(a) of O.7, R.11. It is not the case of the defendant petitioner that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action but, as stated already, its case is that there is no cause of action for the suit which is not a ground for rejection of plaint under O.7, R.11 of the Civil P.C. This view finds support from a Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Santi Ranjan Das Gupta v. Dasuram Mirzamal, AIR 1957 Assam 49, where it has been laid down that a plea that there was no cause of action for the suit is something different from saying that the plaint itself did not disclose any cause of action. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention made in the instant case on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Judge should have rejected the plaint on the ground that there is no subsisting cause of action for the suit." 20. In VIJAI PRATAP V. DUKH HARAN NATH4, while dealing with Order 33 Rule 5 (d) CPC, 1908 which is akin to Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, after amendment, the Apex Court held as under: "By the express terms of O.33 R.5 cl.(d), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. In VIJAI PRATAP V. DUKH HARAN NATH4, while dealing with Order 33 Rule 5 (d) CPC, 1908 which is akin to Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, after amendment, the Apex Court held as under: "By the express terms of O.33 R.5 cl.(d), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed; it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no cause is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown & the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him. By the statute, the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown; the jurisdiction does not extend to trial of issues which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the suit." 21. In SALEEM BHAI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, the Apex Court held as follows: "A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application there under are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purpose of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 or Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. The order, therefore, suffers from non-exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the court as well as procedural irregularity. The High Court, however, did not advert to these aspects. 22. In T.ARVINDANDAM V. T.V.SATYAPAL AND ANOTHER, the Apex Court held that "the trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful, not on a formal reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and merit less in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, the Court must nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist judge is the answer to irresponsible lawsuits". 23. The above decision was relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner to buttress the contention that a clever drafting creating an illusion of existence of cause of action where, in fact, it does not exist, must entail rejection of the plaint so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the early stage. The above decision, however, makes it clear that if on a meaningful, but not a formal reading of the plaint it appears manifestly vexatious and merit less, then only the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is called for and that too duly taking care to see that the grounds mentioned therein are fulfilled. The above decision, however, makes it clear that if on a meaningful, but not a formal reading of the plaint it appears manifestly vexatious and merit less, then only the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is called for and that too duly taking care to see that the grounds mentioned therein are fulfilled. The above decision pertains to a case where the petitioner was indulging in a series of legal proceedings to thwart an eviction order passed against him and filed a suit for injunction to restrain execution of eviction order by pursing the matter up to the Supreme Court. On facts, it was found to be a frivolous and vexatious litigation launched by a cantankerous petitioner to somehow scuttle the execution of a valid decree for eviction passed against him. The principle laid down in the above decision that such gross abuse of the process of the Court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to must be condemned, cannot be disputed. On facts and in view of the conduct of the petitioner and in the backdrop of a series of litigation launched by him it was found to be a case of flagrant misuse of the mercies of law in receiving the plaints. The same does not apply to the facts of the present case where the plaintiff seeks to enforce the right of renewal, which according to him, is available under the terms of the lease deed. The present case cannot be considered to be manifestly vexatious or frivolous one in the sense that it does not disclose a clear right to sue, warranting exercise of power of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 24. In M/S CRESENT PETROLEUM LTD., V. M.V.MONCHEGORSK, it was held as under: "It is settled law that the plaint can be rejected as disclosing no cause of action if the Court finds that it is plaint and obvious that the case put forward is unarguable. The phrase "does not disclose a cause of action" has to be very narrowly construed. Rejection of the plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences for the plaintiff. This power has, therefore, to be used in exceptional circumstances. The Court has to be absolutely sure that on a meaningful reading of the plaint it does not make out any case. Rejection of the plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences for the plaintiff. This power has, therefore, to be used in exceptional circumstances. The Court has to be absolutely sure that on a meaningful reading of the plaint it does not make out any case. The plaint can only be rejected where it dies not disclose a cause of action or where the suit appears from the statements made in the plaint to be barred by any provision of the law. While exercising the power of rejecting the plaint, the cour5t has to act with utmost caution. This power ought to be used only when the Court is absolutely sure that the plaintiff does not have an arguable case at all." 25. In MAYAR (H.K.) LTD., V. OWNERS & PARTIES, VESSEL M.V.FORTUNE EXPRESS8, the Apex Court held thus: "From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the defendant in his written statement or in an application for rejection of the plaint. The court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the court exercising the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which has to be gathered on the basis of the averments made in the plaint in its entirety taking those averments to be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleadings relied on are in regard to misrepresentation, fraud, willful default, undue influence or of the same nature. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination by the court, the mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination by the court, the mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. In the present case, the averments made in the plaint, as has been noticed by us, do disclose the cause of action and, therefore, the High Court has rightly said that the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code cannot be exercised for rejection of the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants." 26. From the principles laid down in the above decisions, what emerges is: the question whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or not should be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint alone and in order to ascertain the same, the plaint has to be read as a whole in a meaningful manner and the Court cannot consider the merits of the matter at that stage and the onus is on the defendant to show that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action and the plaint is liable for rejection only if it does not disclose a cause of action, but not in a case where there is no cause of action and it is sufficient if the plaint discloses some cause of action and the weakness, if any, in the plaintiffs' case as perceived by the defendant or the remoteness of the chances of success for the plaintiffs are irrelevant. 27. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, it has now to be considered whether the plaint is liable for rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) on the ground that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. 28. In para 6 of the plaint, specific averments are made as to how and when and on what date, the cause of action had arisen in the following terms: "The cause of action for the suit arose on 30.03.1974 when the first plaintiff and the first defendant entered into a registered lease deed on 1st March 1978; when the State Government in G.O.Ms. exempted the schedule mentioned property from the operation of Urban Land Ceiling; on the date on which the first plaintiff granted a sub lease to 2nd plaintiff on 17.4.1985; when the State Government allotted a land of an extent of 872 sq.mts in Survey No.82 of Resapuvanipalem on the dates on which the rents are paid regularly by the 1st plaintiff on 27.9.2006 the 1st plaintiff exercised the option of renewal of the lease in terms of lease dt. 30.3.1974 seeking renewal on 27.09.2006 the defendant sent reply notice with untenable allegation on 13th March 2007; when a rejoinder was issued; in spite of it the 1st defendant failed to renew the lease within the jurisdiction of Honourable Court". 29. In the plaint, specific averments are made to the effect that as per the agreed terms of the lease deed, the plaintiff is entitled for renewal of the lease deed at his option by giving a notice expressing his intention to seek renewal six months before the expiry of the lease period. The renewal clause of course contemplated that the terms and conditions regarding the rental and period of lease etc., will be such as may be mutually agreed upon and the renewal would be subject to such terms and conditions. It is further averred in the plaint that in terms of the said renewal clause, the plaintiffs got issued a registered notice dated 27.09.2006 exercising option for renewal and the defendants issued a reply notice dated 10.10.2006 rejecting the plaintiffs' claim for renewal and the plaintiffs got issued a rejoinder dated 13.03.2007. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, there was a demand on their part for renewal of the lease in terms of the lease deed dated 30.03.1974 itself and rejection of the said demand by the 1st defendant has given rise to cause of action for filing the suit. The 1st defendant, on the other hand, would contend that as there was no mutual agreement arrived at between the parties regarding the essential terms of the lease, like the period or rental, there is no concluded contract and hence, the question of enforcement of non-existing contract by way of specific performance, does not arise. 30. It cannot be disputed that a clause for renewal of the lease contained in the lease deed is an essential term of the lease deed itself. 30. It cannot be disputed that a clause for renewal of the lease contained in the lease deed is an essential term of the lease deed itself. The importance of such clause assumes significance in the context of the purpose for which the original lease deed was executed and the period of lease stipulated therein. The other terms of the lease deed would also indicate the intention of the parties behind incorporating the clause for renewal. Admittedly, the plaintiffs took the lease of the suit premises for the purpose of establishing and running a printing and publication unit of the daily newspaper. The period originally stipulated was 33 years. A perusal of the terms of the lease deed shows that the lessee was entitled to alter or improve the existing structures as he may find it necessary in his sole and absolute discretion, without however, claiming any compensation for such alterations or improvements. The lessee was permitted to put up such structures permanent or temporary in his sole and absolute discretion. The lessee was at liberty to give the property on sub-lease. It is not disputed that an application was made to the Urban Ceiling Authorities for grant of exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Ceiling Act and the same was granted in G.O.Ms.No.427 dated 01.03.1978. The plaintiffs contend that they invested heavily in raising the permanent structures and installing machinery for running printing press and publication of the newspaper in legitimate expectation of renewal of the lease for further period or periods in terms of the lease deed. The question as to whether or not the plaintiffs were justified in having such legitimate expectation cannot be considered at this stage. The fact, however, remains that the lease deed does stipulate that the lessee shall be entitled to renewal of the lease for further period or periods. The use of the mandatory expression 'shall' in Clause 6 of the lease deed is indicative of conferment of a right on the lessee to have renewal at his option. When once option is exercised by him in the manner stipulated i.e., by giving a notice expressing his intention to renew, six months before the expiry of the lease deed, his claim for renewal becomes absolute, but such renewal would be subject to the terms and conditions that will be mutually agreed upon regarding rental and period of lease. When once option is exercised by him in the manner stipulated i.e., by giving a notice expressing his intention to renew, six months before the expiry of the lease deed, his claim for renewal becomes absolute, but such renewal would be subject to the terms and conditions that will be mutually agreed upon regarding rental and period of lease. The clause of renewal, therefore, entitles the lessee for renewal by issuing a notice in advance and also stipulates that the terms of the renewal will be mutually agreed upon regarding rental and period of lease. No doubt, the said terms pertaining to rent and period of lease are important terms of any lease, but the fact that they are not specified in the renewal clause itself does not render the said clause inchoate or incomplete. It would not be possible to contemplate the period and rental in the event of renewal at the time of the execution of the original lease deed itself, when such renewal is to take place 33 years later. 31. As seen from Clause 12 of the lease deed, the lessor and lessee agreed that the rent of Rs.2,500/- per month for the first 14 years and Rs.3,000/- per month thereafter, was fair and reasonable, having regard to the present valuation of the properties and rental being fetched in the locality and giving importance and development of the area. What would be a fair and reasonable rent that the property could fetch after 33 years, cannot be expected to be perceived or stipulated at the time of the original lease deed itself. Hence, it was contemplated that the terms regarding rental and period of lease on such renewal will be mutually agreed upon. The plaintiffs proposed the further period of renewal as 33 years and also proposed rent of Rs.10,000/- per month initially. It was straight away rejected by the first defendant, as can be seen from the notices exchanged between the parties. The question as to whether or not the plaintiffs' offer was bona fide and 1st defendant's rejection of the same is justified cannot be gone into at this stage. The fact remains that the demand made by the plaintiffs by issuing a notice and rejection of the said demand by the 1st defendant had certainly given rise to a dispute. The original lease deed dated 30.03.1974, admittedly, represents a concluded contract. The fact remains that the demand made by the plaintiffs by issuing a notice and rejection of the said demand by the 1st defendant had certainly given rise to a dispute. The original lease deed dated 30.03.1974, admittedly, represents a concluded contract. Every term of the said lease deed is a part and parcel of a concluded contract. The term relating to renewal incorporated in Clause 6 is also part of a concluded contract. The said term mandates that the lessee shall be entitled for renewal. It further stipulates that such renewal shall be for such period and rental that will be agreed upon mutually. Insofar as entitlement of the plaintiffs for renewal of the lease is concerned, it cannot be said that there was no concluded contract. The 1st defendant cannot possibly contend that the plaintiffs are not entitled for renewal at all. The lease deed is silent as to course of action to be adopted in the absence of mutual agreement regarding rental and period of renewal. The language and the expression used in the renewal clause clearly reveal that the matter of renewal at lessee's option was agreed upon and what remains to be mutually agreed upon was only the rental and period, as no stipulation regarding the same could have been made at that point of time. It is significant to note that the renewal clause does not say that there shall be renewal, if only the period and rental are agreed upon. On the other hand, it states that the lessee shall be entitled to renewal and the terms regarding rental and period will be mutually agreed upon. The clause, therefore, enjoins upon the parties to agree upon mutually regarding rental and period of lease when once the lessee exercised his right of option for renewal. What consequences would follow in the absence of such mutual agreement is a different aspect. The plaintiffs seek the intervention of the Court for the said purpose. 32. In 'KHIVRAJ CHORDIA VS. E.S.EASTERN INC., the Division Bench of the Madras High Court while interpreting a renewal clause couched in similar terms, held that 'the mandate of the covenant is that the parties shall mutually agree for the payment and acceptance of the rent, which has to be fixed with reference to the rent prevailing in the locality. 32. In 'KHIVRAJ CHORDIA VS. E.S.EASTERN INC., the Division Bench of the Madras High Court while interpreting a renewal clause couched in similar terms, held that 'the mandate of the covenant is that the parties shall mutually agree for the payment and acceptance of the rent, which has to be fixed with reference to the rent prevailing in the locality. It cannot be said that such rent cannot be found or it would be impossible for the parties to agree upon the rent so found'. 33. In the above case also, the lease was renewed on the same terms and conditions with the reservation that the rent was to be mutually agreed between the parties, due regard being paid to the rents then prevailing in the same locality. The dispute was whether the agreement was specifically enforceable or it was void under Section 29 of the Contract Act, the rent-clause being vague. It was held that 'in determining objections founded on the alleged uncertainty of a term in a contract the test is not whether the term is in itself certain but whether it is capable of being made certain.' It was further held that 'the renewal clause in the present lease means that the parties should examine the data relating to the prevailing rents and agree upon a fair rent. If the parties are unable to agree or violently differ, then the Court would determine the matter'. 34. In the present case also, a perusal of Clause 12 of the lease deed would reveal that the rent fixed at that time at Rs.2,500/- per month for the first 14 years and Rs.3,000/- per month, thereafter, was considered to be fair and reasonable, having regard to the then valuation of the properties and rentals being fetched in the locality and giving importance and development of the area. It was only, but natural, that the fairness and reasonableness of the rent to be stipulated for the renewal period was proposed to be considered at the time of renewal and accordingly fix the same upon mutual agreement. The question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are justified in seeking court's intervention in the face of first defendant's refusal and whether or not the Court is liable to intervene in the absence of mutual agreement, are matters, which arise for consideration at a later stage, but not at the threshold. 35. The question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are justified in seeking court's intervention in the face of first defendant's refusal and whether or not the Court is liable to intervene in the absence of mutual agreement, are matters, which arise for consideration at a later stage, but not at the threshold. 35. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs, if the terms of the renewal like period and rental were also stipulated at the time of original lease itself, there was no occasion for raising any dispute. According to the plaintiffs, the cause of action for the suit arose only because of the 1st defendant's refusal to honour the commitment to renew the lease as part of concluded contract in the original lease deed and his refusal to come forward to mutually agree upon the period and rental for the renewal. Again the question as to whether or not the said cause of action affords sufficient foundation for maintainability of the suit is a matter to be considered at a later stage. In the context of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it would b suffice to show that the plaint does disclose a cause of action for filing the suit. In fact, the onus is on the 1st defendant to establish that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and therefore, it is liable for rejection. His plea, as already stated, has been that there is no cause of action, but not that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. The question as to whether or not, there is a cause of action and the plaintiffs would succeed or not on the basis of the alleged cause of action, are not germane for consideration in the present proceeding. A meaningful reading of the whole of the plaint together with the documents filed along with it, would prima-facie disclose the existence of cause of action for filing the suit and on the other hand, the first defendant failed to establish that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. 36. A meaningful reading of the whole of the plaint together with the documents filed along with it, would prima-facie disclose the existence of cause of action for filing the suit and on the other hand, the first defendant failed to establish that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. 36. It is to be noted that apart from the relief of seeking a direction to the first defendant to renew the lease, the plaintiffs have also prayed for injunction restraining the first defendant and his men from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the property and further restraining him from creating a third party interest in the suit property. Even assuming for a moment that the plaintiffs are not entitled for renewal of the lease, still, he cannot be dispossessed by the first defendant, without due process of law. It is stated that the first defendant has already filed a petition for eviction in RC No.41 of 2007 before the Rent Controller, Visakhapatnam. Till such time the plaintiffs are duly evicted by due process of law, they would be entitled to seek protection of their possession by way of an injunction against any attempts of highhanded dispossession. The reliefs of injunction are separately valued and separate court fee is also paid thereon. The grant or refusal of the said reliefs of injunction, is also a matter to be considered at the time of trial. 37. In LIVERPOOL & LONDON S.P. & I ASSOCIATION LTD., VS. M.V.SEA SUCCESS I AND ANOTHER10, the apex Court held as follows: "Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the Court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown. In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the Court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown. So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars." 38. In the circumstances, the 1st defendant, having failed to establish that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, he is not entitled to seek rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. 39. The next ground urged by the revision petitioner is that the suit is barred by law and, therefore, the plaint is liable for rejection under Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11. According to the revision petitioner, there is no concluded contract between the parties insofar as renewal is concerned and clause (6) of the lease deed is void because of vagueness and uncertainty and hence, the same is not enforceable in view of the provisions contained in Section 29 of the Contract Act read with Section 2 (g) of the Act and Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner-first defendant would further contend that the renewal clause contained in lease deed being in the nature of contingent contract as defined under Section 31 of the Contract Act, is also unenforceable, the contingency contemplated not having been materialized as there was no mutual agreement regarding terms of the renewal. 40. Section 29 of the Contract Act states 'Agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void'. Section 2 (g) defines 'Void agreement - an Agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void' Section 10 of the Contract Act states that 'All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.' 41. Insofar as the right of the plaintiff to seek renewal is concerned, Clause-6 of the lease deed states that the lessee shall be entitled for such renewal. To that extent, there is a concluded contract between the parties. The said clause further stipulates that the terms as to the rental, the period of lease of such renewal will be mutually agreed upon. The said stipulation is also part of the concluded contract contained under the lease deed. What remains to be ascertained or made certain is the period of lease and the rental regarding renewal. These factors are capable of being made certain, though they were not made certain at the time of entering into the lease in 1974. The mode of making those aspects of renewal period or rental certain is also indicated in the lease deed i.e., by way of mutual agreement. What is to happen in the event of absence of mutual agreement regarding the period and rental and whether or not the court can intervene in such matters is a question to be considered at a later stage, but not at the threshold. The failure of the parties to mutually agree upon the period of lease and rental does not render the plaint itself liable for rejection under Order VII Rule l1 CPC, when once it is shown that the agreement is not void, as the meaning of its terms is capable of being made certain. When once the plaintiff prima-facie shows that under the terms of the lease he is entitled for renewal, he is certainly entitled to seek enforcement of such right of renewal, which has accrued to him under the lease deed, which is a concluded contract. The terms of such renewal relating to period or rental, capable of being made certain and there being admittedly no uncertainty regarding other terms, the said clause of renewal does not become void or unenforceable. The question of suit getting barred by any law does not therefore arise. In fact, neither the Contract Act nor Specific Relief Act contains any statutory bar against maintainability of the present suit. It is not the case of the petitioner/first defendant that the suit is barred by law of limitation or because of any statutory provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or for want of any statutory notice required to be given under any provision of law. 42. It is not the case of the petitioner/first defendant that the suit is barred by law of limitation or because of any statutory provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or for want of any statutory notice required to be given under any provision of law. 42. In PREM LALA NAHATA V. CHANDI PRASAD SIKARIA11, the Apex Court held as follows: "Order VII Rule 11 (d) speaks of the suit being "barred by any law". According to Black's Law Dictionary, bar means, a plea arresting a lawsuit or legal claim. It means as a verb, to prevent by legal objection. According to Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, "bar" is that which obstructs entry or egress; to exclude from consideration. It is therefore necessary to see whether a suit bad for mis- joinder of parties or of causes of action is excluded from consideration or is barred entry for adjudication. As pointed out already, on the scheme of the Code, there is no such prohibition or prevention at the entry of a suit defective for misjoinder of parties or of causes of action. The court is still competent to try and decide the suit, though the court may also be competent to tell the plaintiffs either to proceed at the instance of one of the plaintiffs or to proceed with one of the causes of action. On the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot therefore be held that a suit barred for misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is barred by a law, here the Code. This may be entrusted with the failure to comply with section 80 of the Code. In a case not covered by sub-section (2) of Section 80, it is provided in sub-section (1) of Section 80 that "no suit shall be instituted". This is therefore a bar to the institution of the suit and that is why courts have taken the view that in a case where notice under Section 80 of the Code is mandatory, if the averments in the plaint indicate the absence of a notice, the plaint is liable to be rejected. For, in that case, the entertaining of the suit would be barred by Section 80 of the Code. For, in that case, the entertaining of the suit would be barred by Section 80 of the Code. The same would be the position when a suit hit by Section 86 of the Code is filed without pleading the obtaining of consent of the Central Government if the suit is not for rent from a tenant. Not only are there no words of such import in Order I or Order 2 but on the other hand, Rule 9 of Order I, Rules 1 and 3 of Order I, and Rules 3 and 6 of Order 2 clearly suggest that it is open to the court to proceed with the suit notwithstanding the defect of misjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action and if the suit results in a decision, the same could not be set aside in appeal, merely on that ground, in view of Section 99 of the Code, unless the conditions of Section 99 are satisfied. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, can a suit bad for misjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action be held to be barred by any law within the meaning of Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code." 43. In the present case, there is no statutory bar that obstructs the entry or egress. May be ultimately, the plaintiff, in the event of not establishing his claim, the suit may result in dismissal, but there is no statutory bar prohibiting institution of the suit, contained either in Specific Relief Act or Indian Contract Act. 44. Learned counsel for the petitioner-first defendant would contend that the renewal clause being in the nature of the contingent contract and the future event of fixing rental and period of renewal upon mutual agreement not having taken place, the said contract is not enforceable under Section 32 of the Contract Act and the suit is not maintainable. 45. Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act defines, 'contingent contract as a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract does or does not happen.' Section 32 states that 'contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened and if the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void'. 46. 46. The renewal clause in the lease deed does not say that the renewal would be contingent upon entering into an agreement regarding rental and period of renewal. The renewal clause is not coached in such terms as to render renewal itself depend upon the fixation of rental and period. In other words, it is not the purport of the said clause that in the event of failure to agree upon the rental and period, there shall be no renewal at all. On the other hand, the renewal clause states that lessee shall be entitled for renewal of the lease for further period or periods. However, such renewal would be subject to the rental and period that will be agreed upon mutually. To say that there shall be renewal only in the event of an agreement regarding the rental and period of renewal is one thing and to stipulate that there shall be renewal for a further period or periods, but the rental and the period of renewal will be such as mutually agreed upon, is a different thing. Thus, it cannot be said that the renewal clause contained in the lease deed is in the nature of a contingent contract in terms of Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act. Even other wise, the plea of the petitioner-first defendant that the contemplated future event not having taken place and fixing rental and period of renewal by mutual agreement having become impossible, the contract has become void and unenforceable, may serve as a good ground of defence in the suit, but certainly does not constitute a bar against the maintainability of the suit so as to reject the plaint under clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 47. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act states 'Except as otherwise provided herein, where any relief is claimed under this chapter in respect of a contract, the person against whom the relief is claimed may plead by way of defence any ground which is available to him under any law relating to contracts'. 48. A perusal of the above provision would reveal that the defendant may plead by way of defence any ground, which is available to him under the law of contracts. 48. A perusal of the above provision would reveal that the defendant may plead by way of defence any ground, which is available to him under the law of contracts. It is, therefore, open for the petitioner-first defendant to plead by way of defence that the renewal clause is unenforceable because of uncertainty, there being no mutual agreement over the period and rental and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek specific performance. What all contentions the petitioner-first defendant has raised in the present proceedings are available to him by way of defence pleas in the suit by virtue of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, but, however, there is no bar contained either in Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act or Section 29 of the Contract Act, prohibiting the institution of the suit. The bar contemplated in Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 is a statutory bar, which prevents the entry and the very institution of the suit and not a legal objection, which may subsequently be upheld rendering the suit not maintainable. 49. Learned counsel for the petitioner-first defendant would rely upon INDIAN OIL CORPORATION V. KAREEM ZAHEER YAR JUNG & ANOTHER; NAVEENCHAND & ANOTHER VS. NAGARJUNA TRAVELS & HOTELS (P) LTD., AND SHANTI PRASAD DEVI & ANOTHER VS. SHANKER MAHTO & OTHERS, in support of his contention that there should be an agreement with regard to period and also rent in order to seek enforcement of contract for renewal. It can be seen that in the above cases, the suits were dismissed on merits after trial and none of them is a case of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 50. In HARDESH ORES (P) LTD., VS. HERE & COMPANY, the Apex Court held as follows: "The language of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr. Nariman did not dispute that "law" within the meaning of clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. Nariman did not dispute that "law" within the meaning of clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint, if taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. As observed earlier, the language of clause (d) is quite clear but if any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the judgments of this Court in 'Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I ( (2004) 9 SCC 512 ) and Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. ( (2005) 7 SCC 510 )." 51. In the above decision it was also held that 'the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when the right to claim renewal was denied by the respondents. However, on facts, it was found that the claim for renewal was barred by law of limitation, as the plaintiff failed to take appropriate proceedings to get the right of renewal declared and enforced by a Court of law and/or to get a declaration that the agreement stood renewed for a further period of 5 years upon the appellant's exercising their option to claim renewal under the original agreement within three years from the date of the denial by the defendants'. As it appeared from the averments in the plaint that the claim is barred by limitation, it was held in the above case, that 'rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was justified.' 52. The other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner/first defendant i.e., T.ARIVANDANDAM V. T.V.SATYAPAL16; ITC LTD. VS. DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL & OTHERS; M/S OM BUILDERS PVT. LTD. VS. M/S EDWARD KEVENTER (SUCCESSORS) PVT. LTD. AND SOPAN SUKHDEO AND OTHERS v. ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS are the cases, where the suits were found to be in the nature of frivolous and vexatious litigation and hence, they are not attracted to the facts of the present case. 53. When the suit is filed for enforcement of a right, which according to the plaintiff has accrued to him under the terms of the lease deed, the questions as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for renewal of the lease as claimed by him and whether the defendant is justified in refusing the renewal do arise for consideration as triable issues and they cannot be disposed of at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, especially, when from the averments in the plaint, it does not appear that the suit is barred by any law. 54. The decision in 'M/S OM BUILDERS PVT. LTD.,' (17 supra), was a case where an oral agreement of sale of a value of Rs.24.50 crores was sought to be enforced and it was found to be barred under the provisions of the Income Tax Act and held to be patently vexatious suit. 55. In GADIYARAM PADMAVATHI VS. ADDEPALLI HANUMANTHA RAO20 this Court was dealing with a case where it was found that the plaint was not disclosing any real cause of action and an illusory cause of action was created by clever drafting when the suit was filed more than three decades after accrual of the alleged cause of action. It was observed in the above decision that 'rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is an exceptional and drastic exercise of power'. 56. It was observed in the above decision that 'rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is an exceptional and drastic exercise of power'. 56. Order XIV Rule 2 CPC states that 'where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. Thus even assuming that there is any bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, the same can be tried as a preliminary issue and for that purpose, the court may postpone the settlement of other issues and deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. The question as to whether or not, there is a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force is a matter to be considered with reference to the pleadings of both parties. Insofar as rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC is concerned, it should appear from the averments in the plaint itself that the suit is barred by any law. 57. In the present case, the averments in the plaint by themselves do not disclose that the suit appears to be barred by any law. It is only the defendant's contention that the suit for specific performance is bad because, there is no concluded contract of renewal. The said contention has to be considered only at a subsequent stage, but not at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 58. In a recent decision in KAMALA & ORS. VS. K.T.ESHWARA SA & ORS.21, the Apex Court held as follows: "Under VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code has limited application. It must be shown that the suit is barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the averments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order VII, Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. It must be shown that the suit is barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the averments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order VII, Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for invoking clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 1 of the Code is the averments made in the plaint. For that purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. Absence of jurisdiction on the part of a Court can be invoked at different stages and under different provisions of the Code. Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is one, Order XIV, Rule 2 is another. For the purpose of invoking Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code, no amount of evidence can be looked into. The issues on merit of the matter, which may arise between the parties, would not be within the realm of the Court at that stage. All issues shall not be the subject matter of an order under the said provision." 59. For the foregoing reasons and in the circumstances of the case, the ingredients of either clause (a) or clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are not attracted to the present case so as to render the plaint liable for rejection. The learned VII Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam on due appreciation of the material available on record and after considering the contentions of both the parties, has rightly dismissed the application filed by the first defendant for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 60. It is made clear that the observations made herein above are confined only to this civil revision petition and they shall not in any way influence further proceedings in the suit. It is open to the petitioner-first defendant to raise all such defences and contentions permissible under law in further proceedings in the suit. 61. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.