JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan) Aggrieved by the order, in W.P.No.13998 of 1999 dated 09.10.2001, the ISRO Drivers Association has preferred this appeal. The writ petition was filed by them to declare the action of the respondents in not treating their association as eligible to participate in the verification process for according recognition under the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1993 (hereinafter called the "1993 Rules"), as illegal and arbitrary and for a consequential direction to the respondents to permit their association to participate in the verification process for recognition under the said Rules. For convenience sake, parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as they are arrayed in the Writ Petition. The 3rd respondent - ISRO is under the control of the Department of Space, Government of India. The 2nd respondent, with the object of having a smooth and conducive machinery for settlement of disputes proposed a joint committee of the management and the staff called the "Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM) and compulsory arbitration scheme" which was brought into force in the year 1977. The Sriharikota High Altitude Range (SHAR) originally had two associations namely the petitioner association and the SHAR employees Association which were formed in the years 1970 and 1976 respectively. The petitioner was accorded ad hoc recognition in July 1980 subject to verification as per the norms prescribed under the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1959. After due verification the petitioner association and SHAR Employees Association were both permitted to nominate their representatives to the JCM. The JCM machinery is provided for at three stages (1) at the national level called the national council (2) at the department level called the departmental council and (3) at the regional level called the regional council. The 4th respondent is a region under the 3rd respondent which, in turn, is under the control of the Department of Space. Petitioner would contend that, after introduction of the JCM in the 4th respondent, verification for recognition and nomination to the JCM was made in the years 1980, 1983 and 1990 and that in all the three verifications they were accorded recognition and were consequently permitted to have their representatives in the regional and departmental councils. Petitioner would contend that, after introduction of the JCM in the 4th respondent, verification for recognition and nomination to the JCM was made in the years 1980, 1983 and 1990 and that in all the three verifications they were accorded recognition and were consequently permitted to have their representatives in the regional and departmental councils. According to the petitioner, there is no difference between the 1959 and 1993 rules except that the percentage of employees in a category, required for recognition, had undergone a change. The Department of Space issued proceedings dated 31.5.1999 directing the respective regions to conduct verification. According to the petitioner, in so far as the 4th respondent is concerned, only two associations were named and the petitioner association was eliminated from the zone of consideration for recognition. On a representation by the petitioner on 21.6.1999 the 4th respondent, while referring to the letter of the Department of Space dated 30.5.1996, rejected their claim. Petitioner would contend that their Association fell well within the ambit of both the 1959 and the 1993 rules, as it had a common interest, consisted of a homogeneous group with only drivers as its members, and their members constituted about 80% of the drivers as against the prescribed 35% under the 1993 rules. They would submit that they had been recognized ever since 1980, were represented in the JCM ever since it was constituted in the year 1990 and were continuing therein for the past 9 years. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 4, it is stated that earlier there were no formal rules regulating grant of recognition to service associations of central government employees and that, pending framing of fresh recognized rules, it was decided by the Government to grant ad- hoc recognition to service associations for the purposes of the JCM scheme if they fulfilled the major features of the 1959 Rules. Respondents would submit that, keeping in view the functional/administrative/organizational set up, the Department of Space had discussed the issue with the service associations and that all the recognized associations of the Department of Space, except the petitioner, were of the view that all employees covered by the JCM should be treated as a single category and, accordingly, a decision was taken that all employees covered by the JCM scheme in a centre/region should be treated as a single category. Reliance is placed on the proceedings dated 30.5.1996 to submit that Group-C and D employees and Group-B(Non-gazetted) employees holding the scale of pay of Rs.1640-2900 (Pre-revised) in one region are required to be treated as a single category, that an association exclusively formed by certain groups of employees based on jobs in the organization such as drivers, stenographers, tradesmen etc, did not qualify for recognition in view of the rules, that, in consonance with these provisions, the Department of Space had drawn up a list of the associations to be considered for recognition and, since the petitioner association consisted only of drivers as members, they were not included in the said list. According to the respondents, drivers alone, being members of the petitioner association, did not constitute a distinct category as defined by the Department of Space, that, as against 1515 employees in SHAR who were eligible for participation in the verification process, only 145 were drivers, that the petitioner's contention that they had 120 drivers as their members was not correct since 85 drivers had subscribed to other associations and that drivers who were members of the petitioner association appeared to be less than 60. Respondents would submit that the interests of drivers can as well be taken care of by the general associations recognized under the 1993 Rules and that they were free to choose one of the associations which were considered eligible for recognition. Reference is made to the recommendation of the Sub-Committee, constituted in the year 1983, that category based associations should not be permitted to form associations. Respondents would contend that, except the petitioner, no other association representing employees based exclusively on designation was in existence in any of the centres/units of DOS/ISRO and that existence of associations based on designations may not be conducive to harmonious relationship among different groups/sections. Respondents would contend that, except the petitioner, no other association representing employees based exclusively on designation was in existence in any of the centres/units of DOS/ISRO and that existence of associations based on designations may not be conducive to harmonious relationship among different groups/sections. They would reiterate that the Department of Space had defined all employees in a region covered by the JCM scheme to be a single category with a view to avoid multiplicity of associations, possibility of group rivalry and the need to develop and maintain harmonious relationship among all sections of employees, that if many categories were allowed in each region/center , many associations would be represented under each category in the consultative council which would be in violation of the rules, that associations which did not fall within a distinct category as defined by the Department of Space could not participate in the process of verification for the purpose of recognition and that Rule 5(d) was only a restrictive clause for the purpose of according recognition. The learned Single Judge, in the order under appeal, noted that the object of the scheme was to protect the common interest of the employees in the entire establishment and, while the petitioner represented the interest of drivers and their service conditions, the service association as such should have members of all trades and groups for the purpose of recognition and this was the clarification issued by the Government in its Memo dated 30.05.1996. The learned Single Judge noted that the area of "distinct category" was left open to be described precisely depending upon the circumstances existing in the Ministry or Department, that, basing on such directions, the 4th respondent had again clarified the issue after consultation with all other unions operating in the Space Department and had decided that associations and unions formed on the basis of their job description or trade would not qualify for recognition under the new Rules. The Learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner had not challenged the proceedings dated 30.05.1996 and it was only the consequential order passed by the Department rejecting their claim for recognition which was the subject matter of challenge. The Learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner had not challenged the proceedings dated 30.05.1996 and it was only the consequential order passed by the Department rejecting their claim for recognition which was the subject matter of challenge. The learned Single Judge held that the decision taken by the department was in consultation with other unions operating in the center and that such a decision had to be respected unless it was challenged by other persons under the provisions of the relevant Act or under Constitutional provisions. The Learned Single Judge concluded by holding that, as long as the decision taken by the management to exclude such unions subsisted, the petitioner could not claim the right of recognition. Before us, Sri M.Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner- association, would submit that, as long as the petitioner satisfied the conditions for recognition specified in the 1993 rules, the respondents could not rely on the proceedings dated 30.05.1996 to deny the petitioner the rights conferred on them by the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel would point out that the petitioner was an association of government servants who were discharging duties as drivers, that they formed a distinct category of government servants under the 1993 Rules, that, even under the government memo dated 22.04.1994, it was clarified that the expression "distinct category" meant an association whose membership had a commonality of interest and functioned as a homogenous group and it was merely the responsibility of certifying a distinct category which had been entrusted to the concerned Ministry/Department. He would submit that the petitioner was governed by separate bye-laws, they had been formed with the object of promoting the common service interests of all drivers employed in ISRO, that membership to their association was restricted only to a "distinct category of government servants" i.e, drivers all of whom had a common interest, and who were all eligible to be members of their association, that they represented 120 out of 150 drivers of ISRO and formed more than 35% of the membership required and that the functions discharged by drivers in ISRO were different from the functions discharged by employees working in other categories of posts. Learned Counsel would submit that the test to determine a "distinct category of government servants" was homogeneity and commonality of interest and, since the petitioner was an association of drivers which had a commonality of interest, and was a homogenous group, they constituted a distinct category of government servants and were entitled to be recognized as an association exclusively of drivers. Learned Counsel would further submit that the petitioner had submitted their application for recognition within time, that the right conferred on them under the 1993 Rules could not be denied or curtailed by way of a memo issued for the ostensible purpose of clarifying the Rules and that they could not be denied the benefit of being subjected to the process of verification. On the other hand, Sri A.Rajasekhara Reddy, learned Assistant Solicitor General, would contend that, while the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, cannot be supplanted, administrative circulars could, nonetheless, be issued to supplement the Rules and that the unoccupied gaps in the Rules could be filled up, that the expression "distinct category" has not been defined in the Rules, that the Government, vide its clarificatory Memo dated 22.04.1994, had entrusted this responsibility to the concerned Ministry/Department, that it was for the Department of Space to decide whether drivers constituted a distinct category and, as the respondents had come to the conclusion that they did not and had clarified that, what the Rules meant by "distinct category" was all the employees in a particular region and not an association based on trade, the members of the petitioner association, all of whom were drivers, did not constitute a "distinct category of government servants" under the Rules and were rightly held not entitled for recognition. Learned Assistant Solicitor General would further submit that the expression "distinct category of government servants" must necessarily be construed to mean government servants employed in ISRO at a given location and any further sub- classification among them would defeat the very purpose and object for which these rules were made. Learned Assistant Solicitor General would further submit that the expression "distinct category of government servants" must necessarily be construed to mean government servants employed in ISRO at a given location and any further sub- classification among them would defeat the very purpose and object for which these rules were made. He would contend that, if the interpretation placed by the petitioner were to be accepted, it would then result in administrative chaos since every group of employees, based on the job/duties discharged by them, would claim recognition and consequently the membership of the Joint Consultative Committee and its composition would become large and unwieldy thereby defeating the very purpose for which such a committee was constituted. He would submit that the interpretation placed by the Department of Space on the expression 'distinct category of government servants" merited acceptance and that the order of the learned Single Judge did not necessitate interference in appeal. Before examining the rival contentions, it must be noted that, in its O.M. dated 22.4.1994, the Government had clarified that, what was meant by a distinct category, was an association whose members had a commonality of interest and functioned as a homogenous group. The Government, however, left the responsibility for certifying a "district category" to the concerned Ministry/department. In its proceedings dated 30.05.1996, the Department of Space observed that, after examination of the rules for implementation in the Department of Space for recognition of service associations under the JCM Schemes, in consultation with the JCM Staff side, and also after getting further clarifications from the Department of Personnel and Planning in this regard, it had been decided to implement the rules in the Department of Space, as per the provisions given in Annexure-I. The 4th respondent, vide letter dated 29.06.1999, informed the petitioner that, in terms of para 3.1(f) of the Annexure of the Department of Space letter dated 30.05.1996, any association/union exclusively formed by a group of employees based on jobs in the organization such as Drivers, Stenographers, Tradesman etc. would not qualify for recognition in the Department under the CCS (RSA) Rules, 1993 and, as such, the petitioner was not eligible for consideration for recognition thereunder. would not qualify for recognition in the Department under the CCS (RSA) Rules, 1993 and, as such, the petitioner was not eligible for consideration for recognition thereunder. It is no doubt true that Rule 10 of the 1993 Rules provides that, if any question arises as to the interpretation of any provision of the Rules, it shall be referred to the Government whose decision shall be final. It must, however, not be lost sight of that, what has been entrusted to the concerned department, by the Central Government in its O.M. dated 22.04.1994, is the responsibility of certifying a "distinct category" and not the interpretation to be placed on the expression 'distinct category' in Rule 5(c) of the 1993 Rules. In the discharge of its responsibility of certifying a "distinct category", neither the Department of Space nor the third respondent was entitled to assume the power to interpret the expression 'distinct category' nor would such an interpretation bar this Court from construing the said expression, for the interpretation of laws is the proper and peculiar province of the judiciary. It belongs to the judiciary to ascertain the meaning of the laws enacted by the legislature. (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India1). Just as exercise of a statutory right cannot be circumscribed, limited or restricted by subordinate legislation, (Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India2), the Government, by an executive order, cannot also override the requirement of a statute, (Sales Tax Officer v. Shree Durga Oil Mills3), or a statutory rule. Interpretation placed by the Government/ department cannot have a material bearing on the construction of the Rules when the matter reaches the Court. It is for the Court to consider the rule fairly, taking into account the spirit underlying the Rule and the object intended to be achieved by it. (State of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das4). While the interpretation placed on the rules by the Government, in exercise of its powers under Rule 10 of the 1993 Rules, may, in the absence of a challenge thereto, bind the Department, once the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked seeking implementation of the Rules, it is for the Court to construe these provisions and the construction placed thereupon by the respondents would not constitute contemporaneous exposition of the rules. The doctrine of contemporaneo expositio cannot be extended to make the proceedings dated 30.5.1996, interpreting the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules 1993, binding on the employees of ISRO, including the petitioner herein, for its is well settled that contemporaneous exposition has value only when there has been a general acquiescence in the course adopted or the action taken by the executive authority. (R.P.Kapur V. Pratap Singh5). The doctrine of contemporaneo expositio applies in cases where the plea is that, though the language of the statute may appear to seem applicable against the subject in particular situations, the State itself-which was the progenitor of the statute-has not understood it in that way. But to apply the doctrine to restrict the ambit of the statutory language would mean that the State can determine the interpretation of a statute by its ipse dixit. That certainly is not, and cannot be, the scope of the doctrine. The doctrine can be applied to limit the State to its interpretation in favour of the subject but not to claim its interpretation in its own favour to be conclusive. (State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills6). The relief sought for in the writ petition is to declare the action of the respondents in not treating the petitioner - association as eligible to participate in the verification process for according recognition under the 1993 Rules, as illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner has sought a consequential direction to the respondents to permit them to participate in the verification process for recognition under the said Rules. It is, therefore, necessary for this Court to examine whether the petitioner is eligible to participate in the verification process on their being accorded recognition under the said Rules, for it is only if the Rules confer on them such a right, would they be entitled for the declaration and the consequential relief sought for. It is, therefore, necessary for this Court to examine whether the petitioner is eligible to participate in the verification process on their being accorded recognition under the said Rules, for it is only if the Rules confer on them such a right, would they be entitled for the declaration and the consequential relief sought for. While examining whether the petitioner has a right under the Rules made under Article 309, the scope and ambit of the expression used therein is for the Courts to consider and the mere fact that the Department of Space had decided on 30.5.1996 that associations and unions, formed on the basis of job descriptions or trades, are not qualified for recognition under the Rules or that the decision was not challenged in the writ petition would not bar this Court from examining the true scope and purport of the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Since the petitioners' legal rights, if any, under the Rules cannot be denied by the decision taken on 30.5.1996, the mere fact that the said decision was not subjected to challenge is of little consequence. Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 partake the characteristics of a legislative power. (B.S. Yadav Vs. State of Haryana7). The general principles of statutory interpretation which apply to legislation would apply to them also. Even otherwise, in statutory interpretation, Courts, generally, show no disposition to distinguish between enactments and delegated legislation. Delegated legislation is construed on lines similar to those applicable in the case of enactments and is taken to have the same general intention as statutes. The same rules, principles, presumptions, linguistic canons and general common law principles of interpretation apply to them as in the case of statutes. (F.A.R.Bennion: Statutory Interpretation (Second Edition). Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The legislature, after enacting a law or an Act, becomes functus officio in so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. (J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan8). No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. (J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan8). It is an elementary rule of construction to assume that the words and phrases of a legislation/rule are used in their ordinary meaning and that phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. It is desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of a statute/rule giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed. The rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed". The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature but such intention must be deduced from the language used. (Maxwell ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES : 12th edition) What has, therefore, to be examined is whether the petitioner association is entitled to participate in the verification process for being accorded recognition under the 1993 Rules. Since the conditions for recognition are those spelt out in Rule 5, service associations which fulfill the said conditions are entitled to be recognized by the Government. Clause (a) of Rule 5 requires the Service Association to have its own memorandum of association, constitution and bye-laws. Clause (b) requires the service association to be formed primarily with the object of promoting the common service interest of its members. Under Clause (c) membership of the Service Association is restricted to a distinct category of Government servants having common interest and all such Government servants being eligible for membership of the Service Association. Under Clause (d), the Association representing a minimum of 35 per cent of the total number of a category of employees and, in case there is only one association which commands more than 35 percent membership, another association with second highest membership, although less than 35 percent, if it commands at least 15 percent membership, are entitled for recognition. Clause (e) requires such associations to have, both as its members and office bearers, government employees who are in service. Clause (f) prohibits the service association from being formed to represent the interest or on the basis of any caste, tribe or religious denomination. Clause (e) requires such associations to have, both as its members and office bearers, government employees who are in service. Clause (f) prohibits the service association from being formed to represent the interest or on the basis of any caste, tribe or religious denomination. Under Clause (g), the executive committee of the Association has to be appointed from among the members only. Clause (h) requires the funds of the service association to consist exclusively of subscription from the members and grants, if any, made by the Government. It also requires the funds to be applied only in furtherance of the objects of the association. Compliance of these requirements would entitle a service association for recognition under the Rules. The controversy centers, mainly, around Rule 5 (c) and, more particularly, to the expression "distinct category of government servants" used therein. The expression "distinct category" is not defined in the 1993 Rules. In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words "distinct" and "category", reference may usefully be made to dictionaries and Law Lexicons. The word "distinct" means separate, different, well defined, definite, distinguished. Chambers Dictionary defines "Category" to mean what may be affirmed of a class; a class or order of things, people etc., possessing similar characteristics. Websters Dictionary defines "Category" as a class, division or group in any system of classification. Cambridge Dictionary defines "Category" to mean a group of people or things of a similar type. P.Ramanatha Aiyer, The Law Lexcon defines 'Category' as a class, group or classification of any kind. Thus, a separate class of government servants, or a separate group or division of government servants would constitute a 'distinct category' under Rule 5(c) of the Rules. That drivers can also constitute a "distinct category of government servants", does not lend itself to doubt, for they are a separate class of government servants discharging functions as drivers. They possess similar characteristics which are distinct from others in the nature of the job they perform. There is nothing in the 1993 rules which prohibits formation of unions on the basis of the jobs/functions discharged by them. In their counter-affidavit, the respondents have relied on the recommendations of the sub-committee, constituted in the year 1983, that category based organizations should not be permitted to form associations. There is nothing in the 1993 rules which prohibits formation of unions on the basis of the jobs/functions discharged by them. In their counter-affidavit, the respondents have relied on the recommendations of the sub-committee, constituted in the year 1983, that category based organizations should not be permitted to form associations. The very fact that Rule 5 (c) restricts membership of the service association to a "distinct category of government servants" itself shows that the 1983 sub-committee's recommendations did not find acceptance and, hence, the deviation in the 1993 Rules. It must, therefore, be held that category based unions/bodies are not precluded from forming associations or from being recognized as such under the 1993 Rules. The contention that government servants employed in ISRO at a given location alone form a "distinct category of government servants", and that any further sub-classification is impermissible, does not merit acceptance. While employment at a given location may also form the basis for classification, the 1993 Rules do not place any such restriction. The limitation in Rule 5 (d) of a total number of two associations is with respect to each category of employees. It is evident from the counter affidavit that the 3rd respondent is a department and the 4th respondent is a region. If, indeed, the 1993 Rules contemplated a maximum of two associations in each region, nothing prevented the rule making authority from restricting the number of associations to two in each region instead of two in each category. The meaning of the word "category" is not the same as the word "region" and, hence, the decision taken, vide proceedings dated 30.05.1996, classifying all groups 'C' and 'D' employees and non-gazetted Group 'B' employees in a region as a single category, is not in conformity with the 1993 Rules. In the absence of any prohibition under the 1993 Rules, the difficulty which the 3rd respondent may face in having a large number of associations would not justify denying the petitioner their right to be recognized as a service association under the 1993 Rules. The doomsday scenario put forth in opposition to the interpretation placed by the petitioner, and the plea of administrative chaos, is only to be noted to be rejected. If, indeed, the 1993 Rules intended to place any such restriction nothing prevented the rule making authority from providing for such a restriction in the rules itself. The doomsday scenario put forth in opposition to the interpretation placed by the petitioner, and the plea of administrative chaos, is only to be noted to be rejected. If, indeed, the 1993 Rules intended to place any such restriction nothing prevented the rule making authority from providing for such a restriction in the rules itself. While the interpretation now placed by us may well result in multiple associations being formed, the grievance in this regard can only be addressed by an amendment of the rules and not by placing a construction thereupon which would fall foul of the language used therein. While the 1993 rules, made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, can always be amended by the rule making authority, the rule as it stands does not support the interpretation sought to be placed thereupon by the Learned Assistant Solicitor General. Since the Government Memo dated 22.4.1994 had merely entrusted the task of certifying the "distinct category" to the concerned department, neither the Department of Space nor the third respondent could have assumed the power to interpret the words "distinct category of government servants" as used in Rule 5 (c) of the 1993 rules, under the guise of certification. The proceedings dated 30.05.1996 is merely a decision and cannot, as is sought to be contended by the Learned Assistant Solicitor General, be elevated to an executive order under Article 73 of the Constitution of India. The decision of the third and fourth respondents, in holding that associations based on the jobs discharged by them cannot be recognized as service associations under the 1993 Rules, must, therefore, be rejected. That, by itself, would not justify grant of the relief sought for by the petitioner, for this Court, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not, ordinarily, issue a mandamus that a service association be accorded recognition. It would suffice if this Court were to declare that associations formed on the basis of job description such drivers etc., also constitute a 'distinct category of government servants' under Rule 5(c) of the 1993 Rules. The respondents shall examine whether the petitioner satisfies the other conditions prescribed under the 1993 Rules and, thereafter, take a decision whether or not the petitioner should be subjected to the verification process for being accorded recognition under the 1993 Rules. The respondents shall examine whether the petitioner satisfies the other conditions prescribed under the 1993 Rules and, thereafter, take a decision whether or not the petitioner should be subjected to the verification process for being accorded recognition under the 1993 Rules. Since the dispute is pending before this Court for nearly a decade, ends of justice would be met if the respondents were directed to complete the process and take a decision, in accordance with the aforesaid Rules, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Writ Appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside. However, in the circumstances, without costs.