JUDGMENT: The unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant. Her suit, being O.S.No.560 of 1977, on the file of the Court of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for declaration of title, possession and mesne profits in respect of property bearing Municipal No.22-7-514/3, situated at Miralam Mandi, Hyderabad (suit schedule property), was dismissed on 30.11.1987. Initially, the suit was filed against Riasatunnisa Begum, Bhagwan Das and Saleem (defendant Nos.1 to 3). During the pendency of the suit, defendant No.1 died and defendant Nos.4 to 13 came on record as legal representatives. Further, after death of defendant No.7, her legal representatives were impleaded as defendant Nos.14 and 15. In this judgment, parties are referred to by their status in the suit. Pleadings. The case of plaintiff in brief may be noticed. Plaintiff purchased suit schedule property known as Zanani Devdi or Mahal Sarai under registered sale deed dated 19.07.1960. After the purchase, plaintiff spent Rs.40,000/- for improvements and let out portions to tenants. She also collected rents from the tenants from the date of purchase till 05.02.1977. She also initiated eviction proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Rent Act, for brevity), and got evicted the tenants. She also filed suits for recovery of arrears of rents from the tenants. She obtained permit, dated 19.03.1968, from Hyderabad Municipal Corporation for improvements and has been paying property tax from 1965 to 1975. Defendant No.1 claimed suit schedule property as her own in partition suit among her children. By reason of the orders dated 25.03.1976 in C.R.P.No.198 of 1973, the plaintiff was impleaded in the partition suit. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 colluded, and in a fraudulent manner managed to take possession of suit schedule property by filing petitions under Rent Act without impleading the plaintiff. She, therefore, filed a claim petition under Rule 23(7) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Rules, 1961 (Rent Rules, for brevity). However, the same was withdrawn, as learned Rent Controller cannot decide the question of title. Defendant No.2 after getting an eviction order in collusion with defendant No.1 in a fraudulent manner got evicted tenants of the plaintiff on 05.02.1977. After dispossessing plaintiff, building was demolished. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 sold portions of Zanani Devdi under registered sale deed dated 20.10.1977 in favour of Aslam. Defendant No.2 after getting an eviction order in collusion with defendant No.1 in a fraudulent manner got evicted tenants of the plaintiff on 05.02.1977. After dispossessing plaintiff, building was demolished. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 sold portions of Zanani Devdi under registered sale deed dated 20.10.1977 in favour of Aslam. Thereafter, defendant No.2 sold plaintiff's property under registered sale deed dated 21.04.1977 in favour of defendant No.3 by annexing wrong plan with incorrect area and incorrect boundaries. As plaintiff's property was sold by defendant Nos.1 and 2, she is entitled for mesne profits and also damages for demolition of the property. Pleadings II Defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed separate written statements. Defendant Nos.14 and 15 filed a common written statement stating that they do not dispute the claim and interest of the plaintiff in the suit schedule property. Defendant Nos.4 to 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 supported plaintiff's case and filed a memo stating that they do not have any interest in the suit schedule property. Defendant No.2 opposed suit making the following allegations. Defendant No.1 sold the entire Zanani Devdi to defendant No.2 under registered sale deed dated 29.10.1956. The property was again let out to defendant No.1 for a monthly rent of Rs.200/- under rental agreement dated 29.10.1956. Rents were paid by her up to September 1960. The husband of the plaintiff was very much aware of the sale in favour of defendant No.2. When defendant No.1 committed default in paying the rents, defendant No.2 filed rent control case, being R.C.C.No.444 of 1961. The same was allowed on 20.03.1964, which was also confirmed by the appellate authority in R.A.No.75 of 1964. Defendant No.1's revision petition, being C.R.P.No.330 of 1965, was also dismissed on 25.08.1967. Eviction order could not be executed by defendant No.2, as defendant No.1 raised objections with regard to absence of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, another rent control case, being R.C.C.No.342 of 1972, was filed, which was allowed on 03.11.1976. The same was executed in E.P.No.6 of 1977, and possession was delivered to defendant No.2 by the learned Rent Controller. In the meanwhile, defendant No.1 got filed suit, being O.S.No.335 of 1967, on the file of the Court of the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for injunction, which was dismissed on 18.08.1969. The same was executed in E.P.No.6 of 1977, and possession was delivered to defendant No.2 by the learned Rent Controller. In the meanwhile, defendant No.1 got filed suit, being O.S.No.335 of 1967, on the file of the Court of the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for injunction, which was dismissed on 18.08.1969. There was a partition suit, being O.S.No.73 of 1958, in which Court Commissioner was appointed and property was custodia legis. Therefore, the plea of the plaintiff that she perfected her title by adverse possession is untenable. Defendant No.2 denied all other allegations made by the plaintiff regarding improvements made to suit schedule property, collection of rents from tenants and eviction of those tenants by plaintiffs. Defendant No.3 in his written statement denied title of the plaintiff. It is his case that he purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 21.04.1977 after taking reasonable care and after verifying title deeds and various judgments in favour of defendant No.2. He denied all other allegations made by plaintiff. Issues settled for Trial Trial Court framed the following issues for trial: 1) Whether plaintiff is owner and possessor of suit property and was she in possession exercising rights of ownership by carrying on construction, eviction etc.? 2) Whether defendant No.2 is the owner of the suit property and whether defendant Nos.1 and 2 had any right to sell the suit property to defendant No.3? 3) Whether defendant No.2 was in possession of the suit property under the alleged sale and had he exercised any rights of ownership? 4) Whether plaintiff is entitled for damages, if so, to what extent? 5) Whether plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits, if so, to what extent? 6) Whether plaintiff perfected her title by adverse possession? and 7) To what relief? Evidence before Trial Court During the trial, the husband of the plaintiff was lone witness for her. Exs.A1 to A37 were marked. Though defendant No.2 filed written statement, he did not come to the witness box. D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B1 to B11 were marked. The main documents relied on by the plaintiff are sale deed dated 09.07.1960, Ex.A2; Exs.A4 to A29, which are tax receipts; judgments passed by Small Cause Court, Electricity Board receipts, etc. Though defendant No.2 filed written statement, he did not come to the witness box. D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B1 to B11 were marked. The main documents relied on by the plaintiff are sale deed dated 09.07.1960, Ex.A2; Exs.A4 to A29, which are tax receipts; judgments passed by Small Cause Court, Electricity Board receipts, etc. Exs.A30 and A31 are the orders of the High Court, which arose out of the partition suit filed by children of defendant No.1. Ex.A32 is the notice issued by defendant No.2 in Urdu newspaper, 'Siasat', and Ex.A33 is reply by plaintiff. Pertinent 'B' series documents are Ex.B1 sale deed dated 29.10.1956 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. Ex.B3 dated 29.10.1956 is the rental deed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 and Ex.B7 is the registered sale deed dated 21.04.1977 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.3. Findings of Trial Court On consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court recorded the findings as follows: i) The plaintiff has no title to the suit property and she was never in possession of the suit property exercising rights of ownership by carrying construction etc. ii) Defendant No.2 was the real owner of the property and he had right to sell the property to defendant No.3. iii) The plea of adverse possession does not arise, as plaintiff was not in possession at any time within the statutory period. iv) After purchasing Zanani Devdi under sale deed, Ex.B2, defendant No.2 exercised rights of ownership, that he was in possession of the property from 1956 and that he got possession from defendant No.1 under Ex.B3. Additional Evidence During the pendency of the appeal before this Court the appellant filed two miscellaneous applications. Defendant No.3 also filed another miscellaneous application. These are filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking permission to bring on record additional documentary evidence. The documents, which are sought to be brought on record as additional evidence would allegedly change very basis of the case of the rival parties. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. T.N.Sahani1 and this Court in Mandala Madhava Rao v. Mandala Yadagiri2, the application filed by either parties to the appeal, under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC has to be considered along with the appeal. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. T.N.Sahani1 and this Court in Mandala Madhava Rao v. Mandala Yadagiri2, the application filed by either parties to the appeal, under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC has to be considered along with the appeal. If such application falls within the parameters of relevant rule and those documents are necessary to pronounce judgment, the Court can permit and mark additional evidence. The details of these three miscellaneous applications are as follows. i) C.C.A.M.P.No.11590 of 2004: Plaintiff/appellant filed this application (hereafter, first application) praying this Court to receive additional evidence and mark the documents as Exs.A38, A39 and A40. As the document, which is sought to be marked as Ex.A40 being registered sale deed dated 29.10.1956 in favour of defendant No.2 is already marked as Ex.B1, it is not necessary to again mark it. Be that as it is, the plaintiff in this application stated that defendant No.2 who had knowledge of the related transactions willfully and deliberately suppressed documents and played fraud on the Court. Plaintiff having learnt from adjacent owners that defendant Nos.1 and 2 executed several other documents, made elaborate searches from 1956 onwards with three Sub Registrar Offices and found these documents. According to the averments in the affidavit accompanying the miscellaneous application, on 29.10.1956 defendant No.1 simultaneously executed three documents. The registered sale deed dated 29.10.1956 marked as Ex.B1 in the suit, a rental deed dated 29.10.1956 marked as Ex.B3 and a registered conveyance agreement dated 29.10.1956 (registered as Document No.83 of 1956 in Book IV Volume I, 1956 at page 98 before Sub Registrar, Charminar). Under this, defendant No.2 while asserting that he purchased Zanani Devdi for a sum of Rs.10,000/- agreed to reconvey the property purchased, to defendant No.1 if an amount of Rs.12,000/- in lump sum or installments within a period of one year is paid. This document is sought to be brought on record as additional evidence as Ex.A38. The allegation of the plaintiff is that defendant No.2 deliberately suppressed the document from the Court. In pursuance of the reconveyance deed dated 29.10.1956, defendant No.2 executed a registered sale deed dated 13.11.1958 (registered as document No.1043/58- Book I Volume III of 1958 at page 342 before Sub Registrar Officer, Sultan Bazar). Under this document defendant No.2 conveyed 1565 square yards in favour of defendant No.1 after receiving total sale consideration. In pursuance of the reconveyance deed dated 29.10.1956, defendant No.2 executed a registered sale deed dated 13.11.1958 (registered as document No.1043/58- Book I Volume III of 1958 at page 342 before Sub Registrar Officer, Sultan Bazar). Under this document defendant No.2 conveyed 1565 square yards in favour of defendant No.1 after receiving total sale consideration. All rights in the property internally or externally were reconveyed to defendant No.1. This would show that whatever property was conveyed under Ex.B1 to defendant No.2 stood reconveyed back to defendant No.1 in 1958 whereafter defendant No.1 executed Ex.A2 sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. As the reconveyance deed was within the knowledge of defendant No.2 who suppressed the fact and withheld the document from the Court, plaintiff is entitled to bring additional evidence and mark the same as Ex.A39. Defendant No.3 filed a counter affidavit. The existence of registered reconveyance agreement and reconveyance deed is admitted. But the plan annexed to the reconveyance agreement is disputed. It is also alleged that the reconveyance sale deed dated 13.11.1958 is only in respect of part of the property and that defendant No.2 never reconveyed entire property, which was purchased by him under Ex.B1. Defendant No.3 also refers to two certified copies of registered documents annexed and prays to consider them as additional evidence. ii) C.C.C.A.M.P.No.403 of 2008: This is also an application (hereafter, second application) by the plaintiff under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC to receive two more documents and mark them as Exs.A40 and A41. The first document is a certified copy of the judgment in O.S.No.571 of 1972 in which the first defendant is arrayed as defendant No.3. The second document is certified copy of the sale deed dated 20.10.1977 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of Aslam, S/o.Abdul Gaffar, conveying land in an extent of 1604 square yards bearing Municipal No.22-7-514(A). From these two documents plaintiff wants to contend that the first defendant continued to exercise her ownership rights even after transactions covered by Exs.B1, B3, reconveyance deed in her favour dated 13.11.1958 (to be marked as Ex.A38), and sale in favour of Khoja Asna Ashri Jamaat (hereafter, Jamaat). iii) C.C.C.A.M.P.No.11610 of 2004: This is an application (hereafter, third application) filed by defendant No.3 in the suit. iii) C.C.C.A.M.P.No.11610 of 2004: This is an application (hereafter, third application) filed by defendant No.3 in the suit. He seeks permission to bring on record certified copy of registered sale deed dated 14.11.1958 and plan attached thereto as additional evidence, Exs.B17 and B18. Under the said document, defendant No.1 sold an extent of 1565 Sq.yards including houses in suit schedule property for an amount of Rs.15,600/- to Jamaat. Relying on this document, defendant No.3 contends that out of the property sold by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2, the latter reconveyed only 1565 Sq.yards. Learned Counsel for defendants do not seriously oppose first application. Likewise, learned Counsel for plaintiff does not seriously oppose second application. Therefore documents, which are sought to be marked as additional evidence in these applications, can be marked. Insofar as second application is concerned, learned Counsel for defendants do not seriously object to marking sale deed executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of Aslam, though they oppose marking certified copy of O.S.No.571 of 1972. The objection of defendants however has to be overruled because defendant No.1 is arrayed therein as defendant No.3. In addition to this, there are certain observations made therein regarding title and ownership of defendant No.1, which may, if needed, have some bearing on the issues involved in this appeal. Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow all the three applications. The two documents filed along with first application are marked as Exs.A38 and A39. The two documents filed along with second application are marked as Exs.A40 and A41. The sale deed and map filed along with third application are marked as Exs.B17 and B18. Submissions of Appellant Learned Senior Counsel for plaintiff/appellant submits that Exs.B1, B2, B3 and A39 are sham documents. Even after executing these documents, defendant No.1 was claiming ownership rights in Court proceedings as seen in Exs.A30 and A31. She also executed Ex.A41 sale deed in favour of Aslam and therefore the plea that defendant No.1 lost title cannot be accepted. He contends that plaintiff purchased suit schedule property under Ex.A2, obtained necessary permission from Municipality under Exs.A8 and A9, and made construction incurring expenditure of Rs.40,000/-. Exs.A12 to A23 would prove plaintiff's acts of possession and ownership. She also executed Ex.A41 sale deed in favour of Aslam and therefore the plea that defendant No.1 lost title cannot be accepted. He contends that plaintiff purchased suit schedule property under Ex.A2, obtained necessary permission from Municipality under Exs.A8 and A9, and made construction incurring expenditure of Rs.40,000/-. Exs.A12 to A23 would prove plaintiff's acts of possession and ownership. She was also collecting rent from the tenants, who filed suits for recovery of rents as evidenced by Ex.A5 (Panchanama), Ex.A6 (Warrant of delivery of possession), Ex.A7 (delivery of possession) and Exs.A24 and A25 (copies of judgments in small cause suits Nos.952 and 951 of 1975). Plaintiff has been exercising rights of ownership since 1960 from the date of Ex.A2 till she was evicted in 1977 by obtaining a collusive decree against defendant No.1. Therefore the finding of trial Court that plaintiff was never in possession is unsustainable. Secondly, he submits that trial Court overlooked the fact that as per Exs.A10 and A11, property was split and new number was given as 22-7- 514/3 and that her name was shown as owner of property in municipal record. Insofar as additional documents are concerned, learned Counsel would submit that defendants suppressed the facts from Court, and played fraud to defeat title of plaintiff. Developing further, he points out that on the day when defendant No.1 executed Ex.B1 sale deed and Ex.B3 rental agreement, defendant No.2 executed A38 reconveyance and in pursuance thereof, Ex.A39 sale deed was executed reconveying entire property covered under Ex.B1 in favour of defendant No.1. Therefore as on the date of execution of sale deed, Ex.A2, in favour of plaintiff, defendant No.1 had title. Thirdly he submits that conduct of Bhagwan Das is a factor which must go against defendants especially when he did not come to Court to give evidence and speak about contemporaneous documents that came into existence on the date of execution of Ex.B1 and thereafter. He would urge that second defendant deliberately withheld information about reconveyance deed Ex.A39 and registered conveyance agreement Ex.A38 and made the Court believe that he had prior sale deed in his favour which itself strengthens case of plaintiff. He placed reliance on Vidhyadhar v Manik Rao3, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v T.Venkata Padmavathamma4, Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v Mohamed Haji Latif5 and Habeeb Khan v Valasula Devi6. He placed reliance on Vidhyadhar v Manik Rao3, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v T.Venkata Padmavathamma4, Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v Mohamed Haji Latif5 and Habeeb Khan v Valasula Devi6. Nextly he submits that legal representatives of defendant No.1 admitted Ex.A2 and therefore though plea of adverse possession would not arise against them. But as against defendant No.2 and all those claiming through him, plaintiff perfected title by adverse possession before she was evicted in 1977 and therefore finding of trial Court on issue No.6 is erroneous. Lastly he submits that defendant No.3 is not bona fide purchaser and that Ex.B8 plan attached to Ex.B7 sale deed is misleading. When defendant No.3 purchased about 580 Sq.yards under Ex.B7, he is actually in possession of larger extent of land, which would probablise the case of plaintiff. Submission of defendants 2 and 3 Learned Counsel appearing for defendants 2 and 3 refute appellant's contentions. They point out that all along plaintiff was aware of sale deed Ex.A41 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of Aslam Gaffar and even according to plaintiff property under Ex.A2 was part of property sold to defendant No.3 under Ex.B7. Exs.A38 and A39 being registered documents, constructive notice has to be inferred. Defendants never misled anybody much less plaintiff because there was no necessity for defendant No.2 to make averments about reconveyance agreement, as its validity was restricted to one year. Second aspect highlighted by learned Counsel is question of title of plaintiff. They contend that defendant No.1 had no title to sell property to plaintiff. They also urge that Ex.A2 being certified copy of original sale deed, cannot be treated as secondary evidence unless foundation is laid for adducing secondary evidence, which plaintiff failed to do so. It is their submission that though plaintiff filed Ex.A37 claim petition in Rent Control Case, she withdrew the same and therefore her prayer for declaration of title is untenable because plaintiff cannot claim better title than real owner, defendant No.2, and subsequent purchaser, defendant No.3, or any other person claiming through him. According to learned Counsel, non-examination of defendant No.2 is not fatal and documents executed by defendants 1 and 2 between themselves and third parties are not sham and nominal documents. They are valid and are acted upon. According to learned Counsel, non-examination of defendant No.2 is not fatal and documents executed by defendants 1 and 2 between themselves and third parties are not sham and nominal documents. They are valid and are acted upon. They contend that plea of adverse possession cannot be permitted to be raised because suit itself is filed based on Ex.A2 title deed. Learned Counsel for defendant No.3 further points out that boundaries of property purchased by defendant No.3 and boundaries of property under Ex.A2 sale deed are altogether different and therefore as a bona fide purchaser his title cannot be defeated. Reliance is placed by defendants' counsel on Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer7, Jagannadha Rao v Y.Subba Rao8, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K. M. Krishnaiah9, Mahendra C. Mehta v M/s.Kousalya Co-op. Housing society Ltd.10, Karnataka Board of Wakf v Govt. of India11 and A.V.Papayya Sastry v Govt. of A.P.12. Points for consideration Though the core point for consideration is whether plaintiff is owner and possessor of suit schedule property, incidental issues and points connected therewith can be conveniently examined under different headings such as (i) Suppression of facts and fraud, (ii) Non-examination of defendant No.2, Bhagwan Das, (iii) Whether documents are sham and nominal, (iv) conveyance of valid title of defendant No.1 in favour of plaintiff; (v) acts of ownership and possession by plaintiff; (vi) plaintiff's plea of adverse possession; and (vii) validity of Ex.B7 sale deed in favour of defendant No.3. Admitted facts of the case An extent of about 4000 Sq.yards in premises bearing Door No.22-7-514 known as Zanani Devdi at Miralam Mandi in Hyderabad, is property of late Khan Khana. He gifted it to his daughter-in-law, Riasatunnisa Begum-defendant No.1. There was a dispute among children of defendant No.1, which culminated in a partition suit being O.S. No.74 of 1958. Defendant No.1 sold said property to Bhagwan Das under Ex.B1 dated 29.10.1956. On the same day, defendant No.1 executed a rental agreement Ex.B3 in favour of defendant No.2 agreeing to pay Rs.200/- per month. Yet another registered document came into existence on the same day, which is now marked as Ex.A38. This is registered reconveyance agreement by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1, under this, defendant No.2 agreed to reconvey the property to defendant No.1, if she pays Rs.12,000/- in lump sum or in instalments at any time within a period of one year. This is registered reconveyance agreement by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1, under this, defendant No.2 agreed to reconvey the property to defendant No.1, if she pays Rs.12,000/- in lump sum or in instalments at any time within a period of one year. It appears that original owner paid back part of agreed amount and second defendant executed Ex.A39 which is a sale deed by defendant No.2 alienating part of property. Though defendants 2 and 3 filed separate written statements, they did not refer to Exs.A38 and A39, which now have been brought on record by plaintiff. After obtaining Ex.A39 sale deed from defendant No.2, defendant No.1 executed two sale deeds. She along with defendant No.2 executed another sale deed and defendant No.2 alone executed yet another sale deed. Chronologically these are Exs.B17 dated 14.11.1958 in favour of Jamaat by defendant No.1, Ex.A2 dated 19.7.1960 in favour of plaintiff by defendant No.1, Ex.A41 dated 20.10.1976 in favour of Aslam by defendants 1 and 2 and Ex.B7 dated 21.4.1977 in favour of defendant No.3 by defendant No.2. It is also an admitted fact that the legal heirs of defendant No.1 filed memo before trial Court admitting Ex.A2. Yet another admitted fact is that there was eviction petition by defendant No.2 against defendant No.1 and in execution of eviction order, portion of property/ building, which is subject matter of Ex.A2, was also delivered possession to defendant No.2. That plaintiff also filed petitions for eviction of tenants and small cause suits for recovery of rents from defaulting tenants is yet another aspect of the case. (i) Suppression of facts and fraud Plaintiff contends that though defendant No.2 was very much aware of Ex.A38 (registered reconveyance agreement) and Ex.A39 his conveyance to defendant No.1 as well as Ex.A41 (sale deed in favour of Aslam), he suppressed the facts and misled the Court, which has resulted in diverting course of justice. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel would urge that on that ground alone plaintiff's cause must be accepted. Reliance is placed on the following observations of Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath13. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Reliance is placed on the following observations of Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath13. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property- grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal- gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. ... ... ... ... ... A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. There cannot be any doubt that a person seeking justice must be fair to the Court and other stakeholders in administration of justice. He has to disclose all the material and must not hide anything from Court. It does not mean that a person, who is dragged to the Court as a defendant, must disclose all necessary unnecessary, irrelevant and unconnected facts and documents when plaintiff possibly is aware of defence of defendants. Indeed this is what is submitted by learned Counsel for defendant No.2. To appreciate contention, pleadings may be noticed. Plaintiff's averment in paragaraph 6 of plaint is as follows. That Defendants 1 and 2 have recently sold portions of the Devidi as per registered sale deed bearing document No.538 of 1977 dated 20.10.1977 in favour of one Aslam and thereafter Defendant No.2, strangely enough, sold the suit property belonging to the plaintiff per document No.1104 of 1977 dated 21.4.1977 in favour of one Saleem, Defendant No.3 by annexing a wrong plan with incorrect area and incorrect boundaries. Xerox copy of the above referred sale deeds and plans are filed and marked as VII, VII(a), VIII & VIII(a). In addition to the above in paragraph 8 of the plaint, she also averred that long before her eviction some portion was sold to Aslam and possession was delivered under the deed (Ex.A41). Xerox copy of the above referred sale deeds and plans are filed and marked as VII, VII(a), VIII & VIII(a). In addition to the above in paragraph 8 of the plaint, she also averred that long before her eviction some portion was sold to Aslam and possession was delivered under the deed (Ex.A41). In his written statement, defendant No.2 while asserting that he purchased property under Ex.B1 sale deed, that he filed eviction petition R.C.No.343 of 1996 and got defendant No.1 evicted from the premises and therefore she was mere tenant not having any title, also adverted to different cases between defendants 1 and 2 asserting that he is absolute owner of property. The allegations made by plaintiff in paragraphs 6 and 8 that property was sold by defendant No.2 under Ex.B7 and that defendants 1 and 2 sold property to Aslam are admitted and nothing was concealed. Mere non-mentioning of reconveyance agreement, Ex.A38, and sale deed, Ex.A39, do not amount to suppression of facts and fraud on the Court because under either Ex.A39 or Ex.A2 sale deed entire Zanani Devdi was not conveyed. In any event, portion sold under Ex.A2 is not clear. P.W.1 (husband of plaintiff) also does not give details of portion, which was sold by defendant No.1 under Ex.A2. This only leads to an inference that entire property was sold to defendant No.2 under Ex.B1 and when he projected same case in pleadings, it does not amount to suppressing facts. The following would also support above conclusion on the question of suppression of facts. Plaintiff is aware of sale in favour of defendant No.3 and Aslam under Ex.B7 and Ex.A41 respectively. P.W.1 admitted that property conveyed under Ex.A2 was part of property sold under Ex.B7, and nothing is shown by plaintiff as to how she was misled by defendant No.2. There is not even an allegation or statement in P.W.1's evidence that defendant No.2 represented to her about existence or non-existence of facts. Furthermore, Exs.A38 and A39 being registered documents, they amount to constructive notice under Section 3 of Registration Act 1908, and as a prudent buyer it was minimum expected of plaintiff that she should verify particulars of title to property she purchased under Ex.A2. The submission of learned Counsel cannot be accepted. Furthermore, Exs.A38 and A39 being registered documents, they amount to constructive notice under Section 3 of Registration Act 1908, and as a prudent buyer it was minimum expected of plaintiff that she should verify particulars of title to property she purchased under Ex.A2. The submission of learned Counsel cannot be accepted. Here a reference may be made to S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd., v State of Bihar14 wherein Supreme Court laid down as follows. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken. (emphasis supplied) (ii) Non examination of defendant No.2 Bhagwan Das It is true that defendant No.2 is best person to speak about the events and circumstances before and after execution of Exs.B1, B3, A38 and A39. Though he filed written statement, he did not choose to come to Court to give evidence but he actively participated in trial. He engaged counsel, cross-examined witnesses and made efforts to disprove case of plaintiff. Learned Counsel however submits that silence of Bhagwan Das is intentional and therefore adverse inference should be drawn. He seeks to derive support from Vidhyadhar (supra). It was a suit for redemption of mortgage by conditional sale or in alternative for specific performance of contract for repurchase. The subject matter of property was subsequently transferred to defendant No.2 in the suit but defendant No.1, mortgagee, did not come to witness box though he contended that the sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in favour of plaintiff was fictitious and bogus transaction. He did not even state the facts pleaded in written statement on oath. The subject matter of property was subsequently transferred to defendant No.2 in the suit but defendant No.1, mortgagee, did not come to witness box though he contended that the sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in favour of plaintiff was fictitious and bogus transaction. He did not even state the facts pleaded in written statement on oath. In that background, Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of reported judgment (AIR) held that, "where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct ... ... ... ... when party abstains from entering witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him." Whether abstinence of Bhagwan Das is of any help to plaintiff for drawing adverse inference as suggested by the Counsel. The answer must be in the negative for two reasons. P.W.1 (husband of plaintiff) himself admitted that defendant No.1 sold property under Ex.B1 to defendant No.2. He further admitted that suit schedule property is also included in the plan, Ex.B2, which relates to property sold by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. Therefore whatever Bhagwan Das pleaded is admitted by plaintiff and there was no necessity for him again to come to witness box. When whatever defendant No.2 pleaded in his written statement was admitted by P.W.1, it is basic rule of evidence that what is admitted need not be proved. Secondly all the documents referred to herein above are public documents and they were already on record marked by plaintiff through P.W.1. In addition to this, by the time suit was filed defendant No.2 sold property to defendant No.3 and in that view of the matter the interest of defendant No.2 is negligible. As already pointed out supra, the non-mentioning of Exs.A38, A39 and A41 would not amount to suppression of facts. (iii) Whether documents are sham and nominal Exs.B1, B3, A38 and A39 are registered documents. There is no denial that parties to these transactions acted upon and discharged mutual obligations. All these are registered documents of more than 30 years and therefore they carry presumption that they are valid documents, legally executed and acted upon by the parties to the document. There is no denial that parties to these transactions acted upon and discharged mutual obligations. All these are registered documents of more than 30 years and therefore they carry presumption that they are valid documents, legally executed and acted upon by the parties to the document. Hence they cannot be treated as sham and nominal. Plaintiff as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for defendants has not let in any evidence to show that these documents are nominal and sham. (iv) Conveyance of title in favour of plaintiff When trial was conducted Exs.A38, A39, A41 and B17 were not before trial Court. These documents certainly have a bearing on issues 1 to 3. The trial Court did not have advantage of appreciating these four documents, which have now been marked in appeal suit as additional evidence. It is for this reason that trial Court on issues 1 to 3 held that by the time defendant No.1 executed Ex.A2 in favour of plaintiff, former had already conveyed title to defendant No.2 under Ex.B1 and that plaintiff cannot have better title than defendant No.1 herself who parted with her title in favour of defendant No.2 under Ex.B1. The trial Court also held that pursuant to Ex.A2 plaintiff was never in possession of suit schedule property and defendant No.1 herself was evicted from suit schedule property pursuant to Rent Control proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel however submits that though on Ex.B1, defendant No.1 sold property in favour of defendant No.2, the latter reconveyed entire property under Ex.A39 dated 13.11.1958 and therefore Ex.A2 sale deed is validly executed. Plaintiff filed suit without describing extent and area of portion of Zanani Devdi. Though boundaries are given in plaint, no plan is filed along with plaint and exact measurements of all the boundaries are absent. Under Ex.A2 defendant No.1 sold western portion of house bearing Municipal No.22-7-514 along with land admeasuring 890 Sq.yards. Which part of the land in western portion is sold? This is not clear either in Ex.A2 or in plaint plan. P.W.1 in his evidence admits that under Ex.A2 entire Zanani Devdi was not purchased but a part of property was purchased. He also admitted that Ex.B2 plan attached to Ex.B1 sale deed is entire property and property purchased under Ex.A2 forms part of it. He was not able to give exact area purchased by plaintiff under Ex.A2. P.W.1 in his evidence admits that under Ex.A2 entire Zanani Devdi was not purchased but a part of property was purchased. He also admitted that Ex.B2 plan attached to Ex.B1 sale deed is entire property and property purchased under Ex.A2 forms part of it. He was not able to give exact area purchased by plaintiff under Ex.A2. The boundaries in Ex.A2 and plaint are as follows. Boundary Ex.A2 Plaint East Portion of house of vendor, plan Open yard of house No.22-7-514, Zanani Devdi owned by defendant No.1 West Road and lane of Murag Khana Murag Khana road North Public road Main road (Shah-Rai-Amma) South House of Sarfuraz Ali Khan Saheb House No.22-7-514/4 of Farhad Jaha Begum As rightly pointed out by learned Counsel there is variation in southern boundary. Admittedly total extent of Zanani Devdi is about 3979 or 4000 Sq.yards. When a portion was conveyed under Ex.A2 unless and until there are clear demarcations on the ground which are reflected in document of title, it is very difficult to correlate the said document with the ground position or with property which is subject matter of other such documents of conveyance. Secondly, original of Ex.A2 was not filed in the Court. Ex.A2 is certified copy of original sale deed and as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for other side, foundation was not laid nor permission of Court was taken to adduce secondary evidence. It is very doubtful whether based on certified copy of a document, a plaintiff can claim declaration of title. In addition to this except examining her husband as P.W.1, no other witness was examined to corroborate evidence. Plaintiff probably was under the impression that Ex.A2 being registered document, her case would pass test of probabilities. As already mentioned, she herself admitted in paragraph 6 of plaint that defendants 1 and 2 executed other registered documents in favour of others and therefore she should have been more cautious to dispel all such doubts pertaining to competency of defendant No.1 to sell property to plaintiff after losing her title under Ex.B1 in favour of defendant No.2, which was the case set up at the trial. Exs.B1, B3, A38, A39 and B17 form one group of documents. All these- except Ex.B3-are registered documents and therefore they have greater evidentiary value. Ex.B1 sale deed was executed by defendant No.1 alienating entire Zanani Devdi Haveli. It is an absolute sale deed. Exs.B1, B3, A38, A39 and B17 form one group of documents. All these- except Ex.B3-are registered documents and therefore they have greater evidentiary value. Ex.B1 sale deed was executed by defendant No.1 alienating entire Zanani Devdi Haveli. It is an absolute sale deed. It does not contain any binding covenant obliging vendee to reconvey property to vendor. After purchasing property, defendant No.2 let it out to defendant No.1 under Ex.B3 rental agreement for monthly rent of Rs.200/-. On the same day, i.e., 29.10.1956, defendant No.2 executed Ex.A38. Under this, defendant No.2 agreed to reconvey property purchased under Ex.B1 on condition that defendant No.1 should pay an amount of Rs.12,000/- within a period of one year. It is very certain that within one year after Ex.A38, defendant No.1 did not pay Rs.12,000/- to defendant No.2 nor she made any attempt to obtain a sale deed reconveying property to her. There is no evidence as to what happened between 29.10.1956 (when Ex.A38 was executed) and 30.11.1958 (when registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs.2,000/- was executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1). Ex.B17 dated 14.11.1958 which is a sale deed by defendant No.1 in favour of Jamaat holds key for resolving dispute as to whether defendant No.2 reconveyed entire property forming part of Zanani Devdi or only a part of it. Exs.A38 and A39 are filed as additional evidence by plaintiff and Ex.B17 is filed in this Court as additional evidence by defendant No.3. Ex.A38 which is registered reconveyance agreement refers to Ex.B1. Executant under this, agreed that he purchased entire Zanani Devdi under Ex.B1 for Rs.10,000/-, that he is in possession and enjoyment of the same and that he would get the property registered in favour of defendant No.1 if at any time within a period of one year she pays Rs.12,000/- in lump sum or in instalements. Ex.A39 registered sale deed dated 13.11.1958 is executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1. A perusal of Ex.A39 would show that for a sale consideration of Rs.2,000/-, vendor (defendant No.2) conveyed open land in Zanani Devdi admeasuring 1,565 Sq.yards in favour of defendant No.1. It is therefore certain that defendant No.2 did not reconvey entire Zanani Devdi under Ex.A39, and that what was reconveyed is only 1565 Sq.yards of open land. A perusal of Ex.A39 would show that for a sale consideration of Rs.2,000/-, vendor (defendant No.2) conveyed open land in Zanani Devdi admeasuring 1,565 Sq.yards in favour of defendant No.1. It is therefore certain that defendant No.2 did not reconvey entire Zanani Devdi under Ex.A39, and that what was reconveyed is only 1565 Sq.yards of open land. The very next day, after obtaining Ex.A39, defendant No.1 sold 1565 Sq.yards of open land to Jamaat under registered sale deed, Ex.B17, for a consideration of Rs.15,600/-. A perusal of boundaries of property demised under Ex.B1, A39 and B17 would prove that defendant No.2 did not reconvey entire property under Ex.A39 as pleaded and contended by plaintiff. These boundaries for ready reference are extracted as follows. Boundary In Ex.B1 In Ex.A39 In Ex.B17 East Public road Haveli Kadim Cement road Main cement road Haveli Kadim West Murag Khana House of vendor Mahal Sarai North Road and walls of Nawab Qadeer Jung Bahadur Passage and Police Headquarters Road leading to Police Commissioner's office South Passage for entrance and exist House of neighbour Building of Sri Aga Mehdi and Mahal Sarai. If only defendant No.2 had reconveyed entire Zanani Devdi under Ex.A39 boundaries would have been the same in Ex.B1 as well as Ex.A39. It is not so. Secondly the fact that boundaries under Ex.A39 and under Ex.B17, which are the same, would give indication that defendant No.1 obtained Ex.A39 sale deed in respect of 1,565 Sq.yards of open land and within a day sold the same to Jamaat under Ex.B17 dated 14.11.1958. The inference is irresistible that the property sold under Ex.B17 to Jamaat is the same property which was reconveyed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 under Ex.A39. It also leads to a conclusion that under Ex.A39 defendant No.2 did not reconvey entire Zanani Devdi to defendant No.1 and title of defendant No.2 under Ex.B1 except the extent of property covered by Ex.A39 remained intact and effective. Even after Ex.A39, defendant No.2 alone continued to be absolute owner and possessor of property though he parted with an extent of 1,565 Sq.yards under Ex.A39 which was transferred by way of a sale under Ex.B17 by defendant No.1. This becomes clear when one appreciates boundaries under Ex.A39. Even after Ex.A39, defendant No.2 alone continued to be absolute owner and possessor of property though he parted with an extent of 1,565 Sq.yards under Ex.A39 which was transferred by way of a sale under Ex.B17 by defendant No.1. This becomes clear when one appreciates boundaries under Ex.A39. The western boundary is shown to be house of vendor which means that it is house of defendant No.2, who executed Ex.A39 in favour of defendant No.1. Secondly when sale consideration under Ex.B1 was Rs.10,000/- and under Ex.A38 defendant No.2 agreed to reconvey if defendant No.1 pays Rs.12,000/-, the sale consideration under Ex.A39 is only Rs.2,000/-. From this the probabilities which may be inferred are two. First for a period of two years after executing Ex.B1, defendant No.1 could not arrange Rs.12,000/- as a result of which sale under Ex.B1 became absolute in favour of defendant No.2. However when Jamaat came forward to buy a part of property, it appears in all probability, there was some sort of understanding between defendants 1 and 2 and Jamaat. As a result of that, for a sale consideration of Rs.2,000/- defendant No.2 reconveyed 1,565 Sq.yards to defendant No.1 for a consideration of Rs.2,000/-, which she in turn sold to Jamaat under Ex.B17. Probably she might have thought that this modus of getting back a part of Zanani Devdi and selling same, is more profitable to her than paying Rs.12,000/-. Getting back entire Zanani Devdi into her fold would not have been possible because for a period of two years she could not arrange Rs.12,000/-. Another probability might be that when defendant No.2 executed Ex.A39 reconveying 1,565 Sq.yards only, defendant No.1 did not protest nor demur and after selling the same under Ex.B17, she might have started dispute for getting back entire property from defendant No.2 in which she was unsuccessful. It is agreed by all the parties that in 1967 she filed a suit being O.S.No.335 of 1967 on the file of the Court of II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, against defendant No.2 and the same was dismissed on 18.8.1969. Learned Senior Counsel however submits that even after execution of Exs.B1 and Ex.A39, defendant No.1 continued to claim ownership rights in legal transactions as well as Court proceedings. He relies on Exs.A30, A31 and A41 in support of the same. Ex.A30 is copy of order of this Court dated 25.3.1976 in C.R.P.No.198 of 1973. Learned Senior Counsel however submits that even after execution of Exs.B1 and Ex.A39, defendant No.1 continued to claim ownership rights in legal transactions as well as Court proceedings. He relies on Exs.A30, A31 and A41 in support of the same. Ex.A30 is copy of order of this Court dated 25.3.1976 in C.R.P.No.198 of 1973. A reading of the same would show that plaintiff herein filed I.A.No.1154 of1971 in I.A.No.897 of 1970 in O.S.No.74 of 1958 to get impleaded as party to the proceedings. It was dismissed by Court of Additional Chief Judge on 08.9.1972, aggrieved by which, plaintiff herein filed C.R.P. This Court allowed C.R.P. directing impleadment of plaintiff herein in the said proceedings. This Court also observed that when plaintiff purchased property from defendant No.1, who was agreed to have separate and exclusive right over Zanani Devdi, plaintiff herein is necessary party. Ex.A31 is copy of order in I.A.No.760 of 1975 in I.A.No.552 of 1975 in O.S.No.74 of 1958 on the file of the Court of Additional Chief Judge allowing plaintiff's application ordering restitution of certain amounts to plaintiff. Ex.A41 is registered sale deed dated 20.10.1976 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of Aslam alienating an extent of 1,604 Sq.yards and building bearing Municipal No.22-7-514(A) for a consideration of Rs.70,000/-. Whether these documents support plea of plaintiff that even after executing Exs.B1 and B39, defendant No.1 continued to claim ownership rights? The answer must be in the negative and against plaintiff for reasons more than one. Even though plaintiff was impleaded as a party to proceedings in partition suit among plaintiff and her children, there is no evidence on record to show that portion of property covered by Ex.A2 was allotted to her in final decree proceedings. Ex.A39 reconveyance deed executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 would show that only an extent of 1,565 Sq.yards was conveyed which in turn was alienated by defendant No.1 in favour of Jamaat under Ex.B17. Ex.A41 is a joint sale deed in favour of Aslam executed by Bhagwan Das (vendor No.1/defendant No.2) and Riasatunnisa Begum (vendor No.2/defendant No.1). It contains the following recitals. Ex.A41 is a joint sale deed in favour of Aslam executed by Bhagwan Das (vendor No.1/defendant No.2) and Riasatunnisa Begum (vendor No.2/defendant No.1). It contains the following recitals. Whereas the vendor No.2 was the owner of the Building bearing Municipal No.22-7-514(A) and (B) on land measuring 2512 Sq.yards and compound wall situated at Mandi Mir Alam, Hyderabad, A.P., being her exclusive property gifted to her by her father-in-law Late Khan Khana the exclusive ownership of Smt.Riasathunnisa Begum to this Building was disputed by me heir of her late husband Nawab Kamal Yar Jung in succession proceedings and her title of the property was clouded as such. This question of absolute ownership of Smt.Riasathunnisa Begum to the said building was ultimately set at rest by the Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated 26.12.1974. While dividing the batch of appeals C.C.A.No.114 of 1970, C.C.A.No.68 of 1972, C.M.P.No.72 of 1975, C.M.P.No.73 of 1975, C.M.P.No.74 of 1975 and C.C.A.No.16 of 1975 and their lordships declared said building No.22-7-514 shall exclusive property and that none of the parties in the said appeals before the Hon'ble High Court shall have any claim in respect thereof. That during the pendency of various litigations in the City Civil Court rent court, small causes court, in the High Court, the said vendor No.2 was in dire of substantial amount for meeting the necessary expenses of the litigation. This in the year 1956 vendor No.2 be executing a registered sale deed dated 29.10.1956 Document No.987 page 21 to 23 Book No.1, Volume No.V of 1956 on 10.11.1956. Thus the vendor No.1 became the absolute owner of the said entire building subsequently there was litigation between the vendor No.1 and 2 in the City Civil Court in the Court of the rent controller Chief Judge Small Causes Court and Hon'ble High Court and though the said matters were decided in the court in favour of vendor No.1but now being mutual agreements the vendor No.1 and vendor No.2 have settled disputes amicably the purchaser instead that vendor No.2 be made a party to this deed of sale so what vendor No.2 or any person claiming through her may not raise any objection in respect of this in future. The above document is self-explanatory. The above document is self-explanatory. Defendant No.1 admitted that by virtue of Ex.B1 sale deed, defendant No.2 became absolute owner and that she sold the property to him as she was in dire necessity of substantial amounts to meet necessary expenses of litigation in various Courts. When there is a clear admission in Ex.A41 that it is defendant No.2 who is absolute owner of property, Zanani Devdi, it is futile for plaintiff to contend that even after execution of Ex.B1, defendant No.1 continued to have title when she executed Ex.A2 sale deed in favour of plaintiff. By the time, the said document was executed, as admitted by defendant No.1 in Ex.A41, even also on 29.10.1956 (date of Ex.B1) she had no title and therefore no title would pass to plaintiff under Ex.A2. As already pointed out that plan attached to Ex.B2 tally with the plans attached to Exs.A41 and B17. This would show that it is Bhagwan Das who is absolute owner and defendant No.1 had no subsisting right over property as she had already conveyed the same to defendant No.2 under Ex.B1. In a suit for declaration of title to immovable property, plaint plan with reference to suit schedule property becomes very important. It enables Court as well as parties to suit to identify property in respect of which declaration is sought. Even if plaintiff does not give correct boundaries of property, the defect can be cured subsequently. It was so held in Pratibha Singh v Shanti Devi Prasad15. Relevant paragraph reads as under. When the suit as to immovable property has been decreed and the property is not definitely identified, the defect in the court record caused by overlooking of provisions contained in Order 7 Rule 3 and Order 20 Rule 3 CPC is capable of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to Section 152 or Section 47 CPC depending on the facts and circumstances of each case - which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under Section 152 CPC by the court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under Section 152 CPC by the court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Alternatively, the exact description of decretal property may be ascertained by the executing court as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of Section 47 CPC. A decree of a competent court should not, as far as practicable, be allowed to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission. Plaintiff did not take any steps to rectify defect and give exact description and correct boundaries of property she allegedly purchased under Ex.A2. Thus on this point, it must be held that defendant No.1 had no title and she could not have alienated suit schedule property under Ex.A2 to plaintiff. (vii) Validity of Ex.B7 sale deed in favour of defendant No.3 The effect of documents subsequent to Ex.B1 has been considered in detail supra. Therefore it is not necessary again to repeat the same. Except to the extent of 1,565 Sq.yards which defendant No.2 conveyed to defendant No.1, defendant No.2 continued to be the owner of property on the date of execution of Ex.A41 as well as Ex.B7 dated 21.4.1977 in favour of defendant No.3. Defendant No.1 has nothing to do with entire property (except portion covered by Ex.A39) and therefore sale under Ex.B7 in favour of defendant No.3 is valid. Why, then, defendant No.1 joined Ex.A41 sale is also explained in the said document to the effect that defendant No.1 agreed to become a party to the said sale and that out of sale consideration of Rs.70,000/-, a sum of Rs.45,000/- has to be paid to her. In all probability, defendant No.2 wanted to purchase piece by paying substantial part of sale consideration under Ex.A41 to her. Therefore it must be held that Ex.B2 in favour of defendant No.2 executed by defendant No.1 is valid. (v) Acts of ownership and possession by plaintiff and (vi) Plaintiff's plea of adverse possession Both these can be considered together. Plaintiff's case is that possession of suit schedule property was delivered to her on the date of Ex.A2. She obtained Municipal permission under Exs.A8 and A19 and made constructions incurring a sum of Rs.40,000/-. (v) Acts of ownership and possession by plaintiff and (vi) Plaintiff's plea of adverse possession Both these can be considered together. Plaintiff's case is that possession of suit schedule property was delivered to her on the date of Ex.A2. She obtained Municipal permission under Exs.A8 and A19 and made constructions incurring a sum of Rs.40,000/-. When tenants did not pay rents, she filed small cause suits as well as rent control cases for evicting defaulting tenants where she was successful. Exs.A5 to A7 and A24 to A36 are rent control or suit proceedings. It is also alleged by her that she paid electricity bills under Exs.A17 to A23 and municipal tax under Exs.A4, A28, A29 and B9. She purchased portion of property of Zanani Devdi admeasuring 890 Sq.yards. In the sale deed, the property is described as premises No.22-7-514. It is curious that when she purchased a portion of Zanani Devdi under Ex.A2 schedule does not specifically say particulars except mentioning premises No.22-7-514, in plaint property is described as House No.22-7-514/3. Plaintiff's witness-P.W.1-explains that under proceedings, Exs.A10 to A12, the premises number was split and new number was given, which was mentioned in plaint. Whether these documents are of any help to plaintiff to show that she was in possession exercising ownership rights? This Court is afraid, evidentiary value of all these documents is weak. In the proceedings to split property for tax assessment, Municipal authorities did not give any notice either to defendant No.1 or defendant No.2 as required under relevant Municipal Corporation Rules16. Secondly, none of the officials connected with these proceedings was examined nor plaintiff was able to extract favourable reply from defendants' witnesses. After purchasing property under Ex.B1, Bhagwan Das let out Zanani Devdi to defendant No.1 under Ex.B3 rental agreement. Alleging that defendant No.1 did not pay rents regularly, defendant No.1 filed eviction petition before Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad, in which eviction order was passed. On 03.11.1976, order for execution was passed in E.P.No.6 of 1977, pursuant to which defendant No.1 was evicted and possession was delivered to defendant No.2 on 05.2.1977. When defendant No.1 was evicted by virtue of eviction order passed by Rent Controller, the same can be executed against a person against whom order was passed and also any other person claiming through such person. When defendant No.1 was evicted by virtue of eviction order passed by Rent Controller, the same can be executed against a person against whom order was passed and also any other person claiming through such person. Even assuming that plaintiff's tenants were in possession of a portion of Zanani Devdi, by reason of Rule 23(5) of Rent Rules, plaintiff was also bound and therefore delivery of possession of entire property to defendant No.2 is legal and justified. Immediately after eviction on 05.2.1977, plaintiff filed an application (claim petition) being E.A.No.77 of 1977 under Rule 23(7) of Rent Rules praying restoration of premises No.22-7-514/3. As per Rule 23(7) of Rent Rules, Rent controller has to hold summary enquiry into facts of case and if satisfied that claim petitioner was in possession on his own account in good faith, may disallow execution against such person. Curiously plaintiff did not pursue said claim petition. She withdrew the same and filed the suit. Under Section 16 read with 20(4) of Rent Act, decision of Rent Controller or appellate authority shall be final. As plaintiff did not pursue and did not produce any evidence to show that she was in possession in her own right, it must be held that withdrawal of Ex.A37 claim petition from Rent Controller is fatal to her case. This would certainly diminish value of her evidence under various documents referred to herein above. Furthermore, there is a clear admission in plaint itself that defendants 1 and 2 sold portions of Zanani Devdi under registered sale deeds. Plaintiff did not even choose to approach defendant No.1 and raise her objection. Therefore, this coupled with the fact that she withdrew Ex.A37 claim petition would improbabilise her case that she was personally in possession of property. There is no such evidence on record to show that at any point of time after Ex.A2 till possession was delivered to defendant No.2 on 05.2.1977, plaintiff was actually in physical possession of property. In the background as above, plea of adverse possession is misconceived for the following reasons. Plaintiff's suit is based on Ex.A2 sale deed dated 19.7.1960. She alleged that from the day the said document was executed she had been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment and exercising rights of ownership. Admittedly she was evicted on 05.2.1977 and possession was handed over to defendant No.2. Plaintiff's suit is based on Ex.A2 sale deed dated 19.7.1960. She alleged that from the day the said document was executed she had been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment and exercising rights of ownership. Admittedly she was evicted on 05.2.1977 and possession was handed over to defendant No.2. When documents relied on for acts of possession during the period from 1960-1977 are not believed, whether plaintiff can take plea of adverse possession. She filed suit on 05.8.1977 within six months after possession was delivered to defendant No.2. It is not her case that de hors Ex.A2 sale deed she perfected title by adverse possession. The foundation for her case is Ex.A2 sale deed. When the plaintiff seeks a declaration of title based on a transaction evidenced by a registered document, can he also take the plea of adverse possession to succeed in the suit? This question is no more res integra. In P.Periasami v P.Periathambi17, and Mohan Lal v Mirza Abdul Gaffar18, the Supreme Court laid down thus: Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property. The failure of the plea has obvious results. If the parties herein were co-owners of that property and the said property had been purchased from the income derived from joint property, then obviously the same has to be accounted for as joint property and not as joint Hindu family property. It was like property jointly purchased by co-owners without attracting the rule of succession by way of survivorship. On this clarification, the judgment of the High Court is cleansed of the little vagueness about this particular, which accidentally seems to have crept in while dealing with this aspect of the case. (emphasis supplied) In Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra), the Supreme Court summarized law in the following terms. A plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. (See S.M.Karim v Bibi Sakina19.) In P.Periasami v P.Periathambi (supra) this Court ruled that: (SEE p.527, para 5) "Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property." The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v Mirza Abdul Gaffar (supra) that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: (SCC pp.640-41, para 4) 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant. (emphasis supplied) Learned Counsel for plaintiff however submits that though plea of adverse possession was not available as against defendant No.1, plaintiff can raise such plea as against other defendants. He points out that heirs of defendant No.1 admitted execution of Ex.A2 and therefore plaintiff can take the plea as against defendant No.2 and others claiming through him including defendant No.3. This submission cannot be accepted in view of findings on first question that first defendant had no title to execute Ex.A2 sale deed in favour of plaintiff. Secondly total extent of Zanani Devdi is about 4000 Sq.yards. Under Ex.B17 an extent of 1,565 Sq.yards was alienated to Jamaat. The balance area was in the ownership and possession of defendant No.2 as seen from Ex.A41 to which defendant No.1 is signatory. That being so, it is quite improbable as to how plaintiff could have been in possession of 890 Sq.yards, which is the subject matter of Ex.A2 sale deed. All these remain unexplained and plaintiff failed to discharge burden, which lies on her heavily. The plea of adverse possession is palpably incorrect and is rejected. As has been already adverted to in this judgment, there is no serious objection for marking the documents filed as additional evidence, except objection raised with regard to marking certified copy of judgment in O.S.No.571 of 1972 filed along with C.C.C.A.M.P.No.403 of 2008. The plea of adverse possession is palpably incorrect and is rejected. As has been already adverted to in this judgment, there is no serious objection for marking the documents filed as additional evidence, except objection raised with regard to marking certified copy of judgment in O.S.No.571 of 1972 filed along with C.C.C.A.M.P.No.403 of 2008. However having regard to the facts that defendant No.1 was a party to the said judgment, the objection is overruled. C.C.A.M.P.Nos.11590 of 2004, 11610 of 2004 and 403 of 2008 are accordingly ordered and documents filed along with them are marked as indicated in the body of judgment. In the result, for the above reasons, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.