Judgment :- (This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to quash orders dated 25.8.2006 & 28.9.2006 vide Annexure-A & B respectively and etc.) Writ petition by an employee of the state government questioning the legality of the sanction orders issued by the first respondent-state for the purpose of the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for short, the Act]. 2. While Annexure-A and B produced along with the writ petition are identical sanction orders under the very provisions bearing two different dates viz., 25-8-2006 and 28-9-2006 and the petitioner had initially sought for quashing of these two orders, in view of further developments during the pendency of the writ petition, an additional prayer is added by way of amendment to call for the entire records relating to and connected with the charge sheet dated 23/27-12-2006 bearing No 3/2006 in Special Case No 33 of 2006 before the court of principal District & Sessions Judge, Dakshinakannada district at Mangalore. This amendment was sought for in the wake of the development that the sanction had been translated into filing of the charge sheet against the petitioner before the special court and the special court has also taken cognizance of the matter. 3. The writ petition is mainly on the ground that the so-called sanction orders at Annexure-A and B are not valid in law; that the very fact that there are two orders itself shows lack of application of mind on the part of the authorities; that in complying with the statutory requirements of Section 19(1) of the Act, it is well established on authority of law that want of sanction after due application of mind vitiates the proceedings for prosecuting a person; that the condition being prerequisite for the court to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, as alleged in the present case, the proceedings are without authority of sanction, a nullity in law and therefore not only the impugned sanction orders should be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari but also pending criminal proceedings before the special court. 4. Notices had been issued to the respondents and they have entered appearance. The first respondent-State, second respondent-additional inspector general of police attached to the Karnataka Lokayukta are represented by Ms. 4. Notices had been issued to the respondents and they have entered appearance. The first respondent-State, second respondent-additional inspector general of police attached to the Karnataka Lokayukta are represented by Ms. K. Sarojini Muthanna, learned Additional Government Advocate and the third respondent-drugs controller in Karnataka is represented by Sri B.A. Belliappa. 5. I have heard Sri Subramanya Jois, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, ms K. Sarojini Muthanna, AGA for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri B.A. Belliappa, learned counsel for the third respondent. 6. The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioner by Sri Subramanya Jois is that the sanction order is per se bad in law; that the very existence of two identical orders is proof of non-application of mind; that the petitioners had made a definite assertion in the writ petition that the so-called sanction in the signature of the under secretary is not a valid sanction in terms of Section 19 of the Act, as unless the government has sanctioned for prosecuting the petitioner, a mere signature at the end of the such order subscribing the name of the Under Secretary cannot constitute a valid sanction; that notwithstanding the averment that there is no proper sanction by the competent authority in accordance with the requisite procedure of rules of business as contemplated under the provisions of the Constitution of India, the respondents having not responded to the assertion that there is no valid sanction nor having placed the records before the court, the averments [in the writ petition] should be accepted at face value and a writ of certiorari as sought for should be issued. 7. 7. In this regard, learned senior counsel would submit that the state has not discharged its burden of satisfying the court that there was a valid sanction; that keeping quiet is not an answer nor amounts to substantiating the sanction order; that it is well established on authority of law that non-application of mind before passing an order in terms of Section 19 of the Act vitiates the sanction order; that in the present case, not merely the impugned sanction orders are bad due to non-application of mind but also for the reason that it was not a valid sanction order in the eye of law, in the sense, a signature by the Under Secretary will not constitute a sanction order by the appropriate government viz., the state government and therefore a writ of certiorari as sought for should be issued to quash the sanction orders and the proceedings, as sought for. 8. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs. M.M. Rajendran [ (1998) 9 SCC 268 ] and also the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Ameer Jan [2008 (1) KAR LJ 33(SC)]. Sri Subramanya Jois would submit that even after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab [2007 (1) KAR LJ 497 (SC)], it is still open to examine the validity of the sanction order in writ jurisdiction and it is not as though want of proper sanction cannot in any way affect the proceedings even though it may be a procedural aspect and prays for issue of writ of certiorari as sought for. 9. 9. One another development that is sought to be brought to the notice of the court is that this court at the initial stage granted stay of Annexure-A and B in terms of order dated 4-12-2006 and that interim order came to be extended further notwithstanding such an order of stay, the prosecuting authority having laid the charge sheet before the special court on 23/27-12-2006, it is virtually acting in disregard to the interim order and to compound the violation, the special court has also taken cognizance of the charge sheet, as is evident from Annexure-P and N produced along with the application for amendment and additional prayer etc., and therefore the proceedings having been initiated even in the wake of the interim order of stay, are to be quashed independent of the grounds urged for invalidating the sanction orders. 10. On behalf of the first respondent-state, while the sanction orders are defended, submission made Ms K Sarojini Muthanna, learned AGA is that it is a valid sanction order issued in the normal course and fully in terms of the procedure to be followed in this regard, learned AGA would also seeks support from the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal [supra] to submit that the question such as the present one raised to contend that it is not a valid sanction order is a question that can be raised during the trial and not at the threshold and it is therefore not necessary for this court to examine this question at this stage and it is open to the petitioner to raise such contentions before the trial court etc. 11. Appearing for the third respondent Sri B.A. Belliappa, learned counsel, while reiterates such submissions, has drawn attention of the court to paragraphs 29,47 and 48 in the case of Prakash Singh Badal [supra], and submits that the Supreme Court has made a clear distinction of the cases arising under the Act as to in what situation the question can be raised at the threshold of the proceedings and in what situations it may have to be raised at the stage of trial; that the petitioner seeking to examine the question at the threshold being not a case which falls into the former category there is no need for this court to further examine this aspect. However, the learned counsel submits that the sanction order is valid and the authority has applied its mind and as is obvious from the reference made in the very sanction order that it was a case of petitioner being trapped in trap-operation and follow up action being taken etc. 12. While Sri Belliappa, by drawing attention to the provisions of Section 19(3) and 19 (4) of the Act submits that it is neither necessary for this court to examine the question raised in this writ petition nor is it necessary for this court to stay the criminal proceedings, Sri Subramanya Jois, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in reply has further submitted that the power of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine matters of this nature is in no way fettered by the provisions of Section 19(3)(b) of the Act, and so also the power for staying any proceedings as a consequence of such examination, notwithstanding Section 19(3)(c) of the Act. Specific attention is drawn to the explanation in sub-section (4) which makes it clear that even for answering the question as to whether a sanction order is vitiated or not due to any error or omission or irregularity etc. and such provision includes competency of the authority to grant the sanction is very relevant aspect and when the petitioner has contended that the authority which has granted the sanction, in the instance case is only the under secretary, it assumes importance and therefore the matter warrants examination for writ jurisdiction. 13. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the pleadings and the submissions at the Bar. 14. It is to be noticed in the first instance that Section 19 occurs in chapter V of the Act, which is essentially a procedural aspect and more in the nature of a safeguard provided to a public servant who is sought to be prosecuted. It is definitely not a substantial provision, though from the angle of a public servant it may be a substantial procedural safeguard. 15. It is definitely not a substantial provision, though from the angle of a public servant it may be a substantial procedural safeguard. 15. The Supreme Court has made a clear distinction of the cases that are required to be examined at the threshold and which are characterized as cases where there is a sanction at all or where it is contended there need not be any sanction and cases where the sanction orders are not meeting the requirements of law as asserted by a person like the petitioner. In all such cases, including the validity of such sanction, the Supreme Court has observed that it is a matter, which is required to be examined during the trial. 16. In the instant case, it cannot be contended that there is no sanction at all. In fact it is the very sanction order which is sought to be quashed by the petitioner, though on several grounds. It is for this reason, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the sanction of the nature at Annexure-A and B is not a valid sanction in the eye of law and therefore there is no sanction at all. That again is a question which can be answered only on further examination and as to whether it is a valid sanction or not. To say that it is not a sanction even before is begging the question. 17. Though it is sought to be contended that the sanction is only by an under secretary to the Government and therefore it is not a sanction in the eye of law as contemplated under the provisions, it is overlooking the very order which reads that it is ‘by order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka’. There is a presumption of official acts to have done in the proper manner and in accordance with the procedure. When the order itself recites that it is ‘by order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka’, there is no question of doubting the genuineness of such order by this court, unless something more is pointed out. I find the sanction order is one accorded by the Governor in the normal course of business transaction. When the order itself recites that it is ‘by order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka’, there is no question of doubting the genuineness of such order by this court, unless something more is pointed out. I find the sanction order is one accorded by the Governor in the normal course of business transaction. Therefore, I am of the view that this is a clear case of a sanction order being characterized as one invalid in law, in the sense it was not a valid sanction order. If it is so, it is a matter that is to be examined by the competent court during the trial stage. 18. While it is true that the court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can, notwithstanding the provision of Section 19(3) and (4) of the Act, nevertheless can exercise this jurisdiction to examine and scrutinize the record and if need be to issue a writ, it does not mean that in every case the power is required to be exercised only to show that the court has such a power! It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and in the instant case I am not impressed to interfere, particularly as the sanction orders does recite various developments and various statements that have been recorded etc., and the fact recorded etc., and the fact that the petitioner was found involved in a trap case is not even disputed anywhere in the petition. Prima facie, there was material and the authority with reference to that material has granted sanction. There is no reason for this court to doubt that sanction at the threshold. 19. While it is true that in the case of Ameer Jan [supra] the Supreme court did observe that the decision in the case of Prakash Singh badal [supra] is not an authority to hold that there need not be any examination of the validity of the sanction order and also that it can have a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings, it does not in any way dilute the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal [supra] indicating as to what questions can be examined at the threshold and what questions can be raised during the stage of trial. 20. 20. Even with regard to the explanation to sub-section (4), on which reliance is placed by Sri Subramanya Jois, learned senior counsel appearing for the petition, to indicate that the error which can be pointed out for the purpose of sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act, it can be one of competency of the authority to grant sanction, that again is a matter reflecting on the validity or legality of the sanction order and is a matter which can be raised at the trial stage. 21. The only other question raised is that of prosecution having begun even notwithstanding the interim order granted by this court etc. While it is true that no court, particularly a court subordinate to the high court can start any proceedings in contravention of the stay order, it is not established on record that the interim order had been brought to the notice of the court below before the proceedings began in that court, the order sheet indicates this court has subsequently stayed the prosecution proceedings and thereafter the proceedings have not gone on. But, I find that there is no need to hold up the proceedings, as this court is not pronouncing on the validity of the sanction order at this stage, but it is open to the petitioner to raise it at such stage as is available and as is advisable. 22. Without prejudice to such possibilities all earlier interim orders are vacated and this writ petition is dismissed.