JUDGMENT Prabuddha Sankar Banerjee, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated June 21, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in connection with C.A No.493 of 2006, C. P. No.33 of 1988. 2. The instant appeal has got a chequered career. The fact leading to filing of the instant appeal may be summed up thus. 3. One company petition under sections 155, 397, 399, 402, 403 and 405 of the Companies Act, 1956 was filed by Hungerford Investment Trust Limited against Turner Morrison and others which was numbered as C.P.No.33 of 1988. In that petition Hungerford who claimed to be a member of Turner Morrison made allegation of oppression and mismanagement. By judgment and order dated June 23, 1993 the said company petition filed by Hungerford was dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order of dismissal, Hungerford preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. While the said appeal was pending; Turner Morrison as per requisition of Income Tax Department sent 22,08.300 Hungerford's shares to the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income Tax Department. Those were requisitioned by the Income Tax Department in connection with the proceeding for recovery of tax payable by Hungerford. Those shares were sold by holding a public auction on 27th May, 1994. After the said shares were sold by the Income Tax Department by holding a public auction, Turner Morrison filed an application in the appeal preferred by Hungerford against order of dismissal dated 23rd June, 1993 for dismissal of the said appeal on the ground that Hungerford was no longer entitled to proceed with the said appeal as the entire shares were sold away. In the meantime, Hungerford preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Appeal against order of Tax Recovery Officer. The Commissioner of Appeal by order dated 14th November, 1994 allowed the appeal preferred by the Hungerford. The Commissioner of Appeal set aside the order of Tax Recovery Officer by which the shares were sold in public auction. The Commissioner of Appeal directed the Tax Recovery Officer to proceed afresh. 5. Against the order of the Commissioner of Appeal dated 14th November, 1994, three writ petitions were filed by (i) Hungerford (ii) Times Construction and (iii) Sterling Securities which were numbered as W.P. No. 1082 of 1995, W.P. No. 1668 of 1995 and W.P. No. 661 of 1996, respectively. 5. Against the order of the Commissioner of Appeal dated 14th November, 1994, three writ petitions were filed by (i) Hungerford (ii) Times Construction and (iii) Sterling Securities which were numbered as W.P. No. 1082 of 1995, W.P. No. 1668 of 1995 and W.P. No. 661 of 1996, respectively. While the said writ petitions were pending, Hungerford's appeal against order dated 23rd June, 1993 was disposed of by the Division Bench. By its order dated 8th October, 1996, Their Lordships were of the opinion that the order appealed against (23rd June, 1993 dismissing the company petition) should be set aside but at the same time there was difference of opinion regarding appellant's entitlement to proceed further with the appeal. As a result the matter was referred to a third Judge who, opined by order dated 16th April, 1998 that Hungerford entitlement to proceed further with the appeal should be decided 'first. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the third Judge, Turner Morrison preferred Special Leave Petition which was dismissed summarily by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 13th July, 1998. It is to be mentioned that during pendency of the appeal preferred by the Hungerford against order dated 23rd June, 1993, the writ petition filed by the Times Construction as mentioned earlier came up for final hearing and the said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 23rd July, 1998. The order of the Commissioner of Appeal was set aside. Two other writ petitions were disposed of accordingly by order dated 11th August, 1998. No appeal was preferred by Hungerford against order of dismissal of W. P. No. 1082 of 1995. 7. However, Hungerford Investment Trust Limited who is appellant before us filed another application for recalling the order dated 23rd July, 1998 and the said application was disposed of by order dated 22nd December, 1999 and the Hon'ble Judge made some observations. Against the said observations, Turner Morrison and Times Construction preferred two separate appeals before the Division Bench. While the said two appeals were pending, the appeal preferred by Hungerford against order dated 23rd June, 1993 was allowed. Against the said order. Against the said observations, Turner Morrison and Times Construction preferred two separate appeals before the Division Bench. While the said two appeals were pending, the appeal preferred by Hungerford against order dated 23rd June, 1993 was allowed. Against the said order. Turner Morrison filed Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court which was decided on 11th December, 2002 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Division Bench was not correct in allowing Hungerford's appeal without deciding the question of law regarding entitlement of Hungerford to proceed further with the appeal. There was direction by the Apex Court upon the learned Single. Judge to decide the question of entitlement to proceed further with the company petition in view of subsequent events. In the meantime, the appeals preferred by Turner Morrison and Times Construction against observation made in the order dated 220d July, 1998 were allowed by the Division Bench by order dated 29th September, 2003. 8. It is to be mentioned that against the order passed by the Division Bench dated 29th September, 2003, Hungerford filed SLP before the Apex Court which was dismissed summarily by order dated 12th April, 2004. 9. Being armed with the order of the Apex Court in the SLP application (order dated 12th April, 2004) Turner Morrison filed application for disposal of the company petition on the ground that after sale of the entire shares of Hungerford~ the company petition• has become infructuous. 10. It is worth mentioning that some interlocutory applications were filed in Civil Appeal No. 213 of 2000 which were decided by the Apex Court by order dated 11th December, 2002 and all the interlocutory applications were disposed of by order dated 18th July, 2006 and liberty was given to file application before the Company Judge. 11. On the basis of such liberty, Turner Morrison filed the application which is numbered as CA No.493 of 2006. 12. The case was assigned to Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court who took up the matter and passed some orders. 11. On the basis of such liberty, Turner Morrison filed the application which is numbered as CA No.493 of 2006. 12. The case was assigned to Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court who took up the matter and passed some orders. In the meantime, Turner Morrison preferred appeal before the Division Bench against order dated 18th December, 2006 passed by the learned Single Judge and the appeal was disposed of on consent of parties on March 9, 2007 by the Division Bench wherein request was made to dispose of the application filed by the appellant Turner Morrison and immediately thereafter, the learned Single Judge was asked to take up the company petition under section 397 of the Companies Act. 13. On the basis of the same, the Hon'ble Single Judge heard the matter and passed order allowing the company application filed by Morrison and dismissing the company petition against which this appeal has been preferred. 14. It is clear from the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge that though there was specific direction by the Division Bench to dispose of the application filed by Turner Morrison regarding maintainability of the company petition first, the appellant contended before the Hon'ble Single Judge that the application and the company petition should be heard and disposed of simultaneously. 15. Before us Mr. Hoon in person argued the case for days together. It is worth mentioning that without pointing out the alleged mistakes committed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, Mr. Hoon preferred to attack the role of the Judges of this Court. Even the sitting Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not spared in course of his argument. Time and again we requested him to confine his argument regarding alleged error in the impugned judgment but he hardly paid any heed to our requests. In fact, he never traversed the impugned judgment to point out the alleged mistakes. 16. Mr. Utpal Bose who appeared for the respondents drew attention of the Court in course of his argument that though Mr. Hoon argued the case for days together, he never pointed out the mistakes allegedly committed by the learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment. Mr. 16. Mr. Utpal Bose who appeared for the respondents drew attention of the Court in course of his argument that though Mr. Hoon argued the case for days together, he never pointed out the mistakes allegedly committed by the learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment. Mr. Bose further argued that the fact that Hungerford ceased to be a shareholder of the Turner Morrison has attained finality and as such, the company petition filed by Hungerford for claiming relief under section 397 of the Companies Act, 1956 has become infractuous and the learned Single Judge rightly observed the same. 17. In support of his contention Mr. Bose drew attention of the Court to the order dated September 29, 2003 passed by a Division Bench of this Court. Against the said order, the present appellant filed special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed by order dated April 12, 2004. As such, it was the contention of Mr. Bose that the order dated 29th September, 2003 passed by the Division Bench has attained finality. Mr. Bose further contended that all the shares held by the appellant were put in auction by Income Tax Department and the writ petition challenging the said auction sale by the present appellant was dismissed on August 11, 1998 upholding the sale of all the shares of the appellant and against that order no appeal was preferred by the present appellant. 18. Mr. Bose further drew attention of the Court to the observation made by the Hon'ble Judge of this Court on recalling application against which, the respondents preferred appeals and the said observation made by the Single .Judge was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated December 22, 1998. The special leave application by the present appellant against the said order was dismissed on April 12, 2004. 19. Accordingly, it was the submission of Mr. Bose that as the present appellant ceased to be a shareholder of the respondent No.1, he has no locus to continue with the company petition which was filed in the year 1988 and accordingly, he supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 20. On the basis of material on record we are of the view that pleas as taken by Mr. Bose are to be accepted. 21. 20. On the basis of material on record we are of the view that pleas as taken by Mr. Bose are to be accepted. 21. It is clear from the order of the Division Bench as well as the Apex Court that there was clear direction upon the learned Single Judge to decide the entitlement of the Hungerford to proceed further with the company petition in view of subsequent events including the fact that sale of 22,08,300 shares of Hungerford in Turner Morrison has reached its finality. 22. The learned Single Judge in his judgment discussed the said point and came to the conclusion that "......... there is no scope for anyone to say that Hungerford did not cease to be a member of Turner Morrison and hence the question whether it ceased to be a member of Turner Morrison can no longer be a matter in issue in the company petition. What emerges from all these is that today there is no scope to give any relief to Hungerford by making order under section 397. Even if all the problems are allowed, it will not be benefited in any way. As a result if it is held that company petition should be proceeded with for giving a decision on merits, in my view it will produce only an academic decision. As is known, no Court is to permit litigants to pursue any litigation inviting decision on academic question." 23. On the basis of said observation and also the reasons as stated by the Hon'ble Single Judge he dismissed the company petition also. 24. It is to be mentioned that in course of his entire argument, Mr. Boon who conducted the case in person contended before us that all the orders passed in favour of Turner Morrison were obtained by practising fraud upon the Court by Khaitan & Company. 25. With a heavy heart we must say that sanctity and decorum of a Court was lowered in the esteem of common people by Mr. Hoon who 'attacked not only the Judges by name (even sitting Judges of this Court and the Apex Court) but also the judiciary as a whole. It is needless to mention that to establish the case of practising fraud, cogent evidence is to be established. In the instant case Mr. Hoon who 'attacked not only the Judges by name (even sitting Judges of this Court and the Apex Court) but also the judiciary as a whole. It is needless to mention that to establish the case of practising fraud, cogent evidence is to be established. In the instant case Mr. Roon failed to produce any such cogent evidence wherefrom we can accept his plea that fraud was practised upon the Judges and the Court, specially by Khaitan & Co. in obtaining favourable orders. . 26. In the evidence Act, "fraud" has not been defined. Fraud has been defined under section 17 of the Contract Act. As per interpretation of statute, two kinds of fraud are mentioned (i) actual or positive fraud which includes cases of intentional and successful employment of any cunning deception, or artifice, used to circumvent, cheat or deceive another (ii) constructive or legal fraud includes such contracts or acts as though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a fraud yet, by their tendency to deceive or mislead the others, or to violate private or public confidence, are prohibited by law (Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence by Justice Story). 27. In course of his argument Mr. Roon time and again used the language "fraud" practised specially by Khaibin & Co. and by some lawyers, but he failed to impress upon us regarding definite case of fraud practised by the said persons in obtaining favourable orders. 28. Though Mr. Hoon in course of his long argument contended that the Hon'ble Single Judge did not implement the direction 'passed by the Division Bench and the Apex Court, he failed to place before us any such direction of the Apex Court or the Division Bench which was ever violated by the Hon'ble Single Judge. On the contrary we have seen that not only the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court but also the Division Bench of this Court followed the direction passed by the Apex Court. 29. In view of our discussions above and also on the basis of materials on record, we are of clear opinion that the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in passing the order impugned and accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said findings. We also hold that there is no merit in this appeal. 29. In view of our discussions above and also on the basis of materials on record, we are of clear opinion that the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in passing the order impugned and accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said findings. We also hold that there is no merit in this appeal. In our opinion it is a fit case where exemplary cost should be imposed. 30. It is worth mentioning that Hon'ble Apex Court recently directed the present appellant to pay exemplary cost of Rs. 1 lac (copy of the order dated 18th June, 2008 was placed before us). However, the Apex Court reluctantly allowed the present appellant to withdraw the said application. It was disclosed after conclusion of the hearing by Mr. Hoon himself that he is now 86 years old. In view of the same, we restrain ourselves from passing any exemplary order of cost. 31. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal but without any cost. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the connected applications have become infructuous and are dismissed accordingly. 32. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order be given to the parties within 15 days from the date of this judgment on proper application. Appeal dismissed.