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2008 DIGILAW 816 (GAU)

Pannalal Ghosh v. Sunit Das

2008-11-26

B.D.AGARWAL

body2008
JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (briefly 'Code of Civil Procedure') has been filed by the Plaintiffs/decree holders assailing the legality and the correctness of the order dated 8-12-1999 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Execution (T)09 of 1999, whereby the executing court has frustrated the attempt of the Petitioners to get the decree passed in the year 1960 executed under the garb of amendment of the said decree by the trial court in the year 1990. By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge has dismissed the execution petition on two counts. Firstly, it has been held that the decree dated 21.11.1960 is now un-executable as the same is barred by limitation Secondly, the decree dated 21.11.1960 passed on the basis of original judgment dated 10.11.1960 was fully satisfied on 28.4.1964. 2. Heard Sri S.P. Dutta Purakayastha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners who are the legal heirs of the original decree holder, namely, late Akhil Chandra Ghosh. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are the legal heirs of the original tenant of the Plaintiff, namely, late Basanta Kumar Das. They are represented by Sri P. Chakraborty, learned Counsel. The Respondent No. 7 is the subsequent purchaser of the tenanted premises. Sri S. Deb, learned senior Counsel represented Her. 3. For effective disposal of this revision application, it is necessary to advert to the relevant facts which are as follows: The predecessor-in-interest of the Petitioner, namely, late Akhil Chandra Ghosh filed a suit against late Basanta Kumar Das for recovery of arrear rent seeking additional relief of his ejectment in the event the tenant fail to pay the arrear rent within a time, which may be fixed by the court. The suit was registered as Rent Suit No. 03 of 1960 in the court of Munsiff, Kailashahar. The suit was decided ex parte on 10.11.1960. Since the reliefs sought for by the Plaintiffs and the judgment passed by the trial court have a direct bearing in this revision application, those are being quoted in extensor: RELIEFS SOUGHT FOR (ka) To issue decree in favour of the Plaintiff to get from the Defendant, Rs. 25 as arrear rental for the jote in suit along with the interest along with proper costs of suit. 25 as arrear rental for the jote in suit along with the interest along with proper costs of suit. (kha) To issue decree allowing a period of time to the Defendant so that the claim be realized and if the payment be not made within the said period, then the Defendant be evicted from the jote land. (Ga) To issue decree in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant granting other relief or reliefs to the Plaintiff as deemed fit and proper by the court. JUDGMENT DATED 10.11.1960 This is a suit for realization of arrears of rent from the Defendant. For the years 1366-1369 T.E. Plaintiffs case has been proved by P.W. & Ext.P.1. Hence, it is Ordered That the suit be decreed ex parte against the Defendant with cost. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, the decree was prepared. In the decree, the Plaintiff's case, his prayers and the operative portion of the judgment were incorporated. The decree was put in execution vide execution case No. 45 of 1962. Having received the notice, the judgment debtor deposited the entire arrear rent as per the decree on 28.4.1964. On that basis, the executing court passed the following order: The decreetal dues have been deposited by JDs. Ordered That the execution case be disposed of on full satisfaction. 5. In the meanwhile the decree holder Akhil Chandra Ghosh died and on the basis of power of attorney, his estate was being looked after by the eldest son Sri Nani Gopal Ghosh. In the year 1988, other legal heirs of the decree holder came to know about the existence of the decree and they discovered that the decree was incomplete and at the same time their tenant had also sold out the suit premises. Accordingly, the legal heirs of Akhil Chandra Ghosh, except Nani Gopal Ghosh filed Title Execution No. 12 of 1989 for the eviction of the judgment debtor from the suit premises. Along with the execution case, the Petitioners also filed an application under Section 17(2) of the Limitation Act seeking extension of time for executing the decree. Parallaly, the Petitioners also filed an application in the trial court under Sections 151/152/153, Code of Civil Procedure seeking correction of the original decree so as to incorporate the declaration of ejectment of the judgment debtor. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 32 of 1999. Parallaly, the Petitioners also filed an application in the trial court under Sections 151/152/153, Code of Civil Procedure seeking correction of the original decree so as to incorporate the declaration of ejectment of the judgment debtor. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 32 of 1999. Since the original tenant/JD had died, his legal heirs were made party in Misc. Case No 32 of 1999. However, the subsequent purchasers of the tenanted premises were not impleaded in this application. While the second execution case was pending the original trial court amended the decree vide order dated 31.3.1990 allowing eviction of the original judgment debtor. However, by this time, the suit property was already sold out to 3 different persons. Be that as it may, the R-7 being the last purchaser filed an objection under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure informing the court that decree was already satisfied on 28.4.1964. At this stage, the execution case was transferred to the court of Sr. Civil Judge whereupon the case was renumbered as execution case No. 09 of 1999 and it came to be dismissed vide impugned order dated 8.12.1999. 6. Sri Dutta Purakayastha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners argued that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error inasmuch as the executing court has taken an erroneous view that the decree was hit by law of limitation. According to the learned Counsel since the original decree was amended and corrected on 31.3.1990 it got a fresh lease of life and as such the execution case ought not to have been closed on this ground. The learned Counsel also submitted that the executing court was beyond its competence to ignore the amendment of the decree passed by the original court. In other words, it was contended that the finding of the court that the decree was fully satisfied is not in conformity to the amended decree. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also attempted to defend the order dated 31.3.1990 passed by the trial court amending/correcting the original decree in exercise of powers under Section 151/152, - Code of Civil Procedure by submitting that even after passing of the decree the court does not become functus-officio to revisit the decree and the court is competent to correct the errors of the decree which are apparent on the face of the record. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel has relied upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Jai Narayan v. Cheeda Lal, AIR 1960 All. 385 ; judgment of Patna High Court rendered in the case of Shyamal Bihari Mishra v. Girish Narain Missir, AIR 1962 Pat. 116 ; judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court given in the case of Narayandas v. Vishnu, AIR 1963 MP 158 as well as the judgment of Gauhati High Court rendered in the case of Ashutosh Das v. Sushma Rani Das, AIR 2004 Gau 136 . 7. Sri Dutta Purakayastha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners also pressed into service two judgments of the hon'ble Supreme Court to buttress his contention that amendment of decrees are permissible and that the executing court cannot question the legality of the decree. The judgments are Jaichandra Mohapatra v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2005) 9 SCC 123 and Rafique Bibi v. Sayeed Waliuddin, (2004) 1 SCC 287 respectively. 8. While defending the amendment of the decree, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners also referred to the provisions of Landlord and Tenant Act, 1296 T.E. (now superseded). Section 52 of this Act prescribes passing of a decree of ejectment for non-payment of rent and the said provision of law being relevant for the purpose is also extracted below: 52. If in a suit for arrears of rent the rent is proved to have remained unpaid, the court shall, on the prayer of the Plaintiff, pass a decree for ejectment against the tenant and in such case the court shall fix a time for the payment of the decretal dues. Unless such decretal dues are paid within the time so fixed, the tenant shall be ejected in execution of the decree. 9. Per contra, Sri S. Deb, learned senior Counsel for R-7 raised a preliminary objection with regard to the admissibility of the revision application. Unless such decretal dues are paid within the time so fixed, the tenant shall be ejected in execution of the decree. 9. Per contra, Sri S. Deb, learned senior Counsel for R-7 raised a preliminary objection with regard to the admissibility of the revision application. According to the learned Counsel, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by jurisdictional error of the court below and the areas where the orders of the lower courts can be interfered with have been incorporated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, Citing a number of authorities from English Courts as well as Indian courts, Sri Deb, learned Counsel for R-7 submitted that Section115, Code of Civil Procedure does not envisage interfering with orders of court below unless it touches the question of non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in it; not exercising the vested jurisdiction or if the court has exercised a jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The authorities cited on behalf of R-7 are Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar 1917 JC 261; N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar, In re. 1949 JC 67; DLF Housing and Construction Co. v. Sarup Singh, (1969) 3 SCC 807 ; Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation (1978) 3 SCC 172 . On the basis of these authorities, Sri Deb submitted that since a competent court having jurisdiction to decide the execution case on merit has passed the impugned order, this Court is incompetent to go into the legality of the impugned order. 10. Sri Deb, learned Counsel for R-7 also dwelt upon the competency and legality of the order dated 31.3.1990 passed by the original court amending/correcting the decree and submitted that Section151 read with Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure do not confer any untrammeled power upon the court to alter or modify its judgment or decree which would ordinarily be within the province of the appellate court. In support of this contention, learned Counsel referred to the judgment of the Apex court rendered in the case of Dwarka Das v. State of M.P., (1999) 3 SCC 500 ; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 328 and Bijoy Kumar Saraogi v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 7 SCC 748 . 11. In support of this contention, learned Counsel referred to the judgment of the Apex court rendered in the case of Dwarka Das v. State of M.P., (1999) 3 SCC 500 ; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 328 and Bijoy Kumar Saraogi v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 7 SCC 748 . 11. Referring and adverting to the pleadings and reliefs sought for in the suit as well as the judgment dated 10.11.1960, Sri Deb, learned Counsel for R-7 submitted that the suit was virtually a suit simpliciter for recovery of arrear rent and the relief was granted accordingly. The learned Counsel further contended that the trial court did not accede to the additional relief for eviction of the tenant in the event of nonpayment of rent and as such it has to be presumed that the said prayer was turned down. Learned Counsel further submitted that if there was any error or mistake in the judgment and decree it should have been brought to the notice of the court promptly and having not done so by the original Plaintiff himself during his life time it has to be held that the Plaintiff was satisfied with the decree and its satisfaction. On these premises, it was urged that neither was there any necessity to amend the decree nor the same was legally justified and consequently the impugned order dismissing the execution petition does not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error. 12. The admitted facts are that the original Plaintiff remained alive nearly for a period of 4 years from the date of the decree passed in R.S. No. 3 of 1960. At no point of time, the Plaintiff filed an application for review of the judgment. Had the Plaintiff been aggrieved by the judgment he could have also assailed the same by filing an appeal, It has already been noted earlier that the judgment was ex parte in his favour. Besides this, filing of the execution case on the basis of the decree prepared in pursuance of the judgment also indicates that the Plaintiff was satisfied with the nature of the relief given to him. It has also been noted earlier that the decree was recorded to be fully satisfied on 28.4.1964 and the Plaintiff/DH died on 29.12.1964. Besides this, filing of the execution case on the basis of the decree prepared in pursuance of the judgment also indicates that the Plaintiff was satisfied with the nature of the relief given to him. It has also been noted earlier that the decree was recorded to be fully satisfied on 28.4.1964 and the Plaintiff/DH died on 29.12.1964. Even during this 8 months period, the decree holder did not raise any objection with regard to the sufficiency of the reliefs granted in his favour or about any ambiguity or error or mistake in the decree. Nearly after 24 years of the satisfaction of the decree one group of the legal heirs of the decree holder attempted to revive the issue. 13. Apparently revisional jurisdiction of High Court centers round proper exercise or non-exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it. Nearly six decades ago in the case of Balakrishna Udayar (supra), the hon'ble Court of Judicial Commissioner held that the Revisional jurisdiction is not intended to make a roving enquiry as regards the correctness of the conclusions of the lower court on facts or law. I am tempted to quote one passage from the aforesaid judgment which is as below; It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. And if the Appellant's contention be correct, then if the civil court should absolutely and whimsically decline to exercise its jurisdiction and refuse to make any orders as to the filling up of vacancies, no matter how many existed there would not, in a case such as the present, be any remedy available under this section and no appeal would lie. 14. The aforesaid authority was reiterated by the court of Judicial Commissioner in the case of N.S. Venkatagiri (supra) and by the hon'ble Supreme Court of India in DLF Housing (supra) and Sher Singh (supra). The Apex Court of India has also summed up the law of revision in the following language: 5. 14. The aforesaid authority was reiterated by the court of Judicial Commissioner in the case of N.S. Venkatagiri (supra) and by the hon'ble Supreme Court of India in DLF Housing (supra) and Sher Singh (supra). The Apex Court of India has also summed up the law of revision in the following language: 5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact, however, gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with.... 15. I am also fortified with the observations regarding the parameters of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sher Singh (supra). The relevant observations are as below: 12. 15. I am also fortified with the observations regarding the parameters of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sher Singh (supra). The relevant observations are as below: 12. The position that emerges from these decisions is that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters: (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and failed to do so and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied that there is no error in regard to any of these three matters, it has no power to interfere merely because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. A distinction must be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding questions of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions of jurisdiction of the said courts, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. An erroneous decision on a question of fact or of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to question of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115. 16. In the case before me, there is no iota of allegation from the Petitioners that the impugned order was passed by a court having no jurisdiction or about improper exercise of jurisdiction. In other words, the impugned order has been assailed on the legality of the conclusion about the satisfaction of the decree, which in my opinion is not directly within the ambit of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. 17. In other words, the impugned order has been assailed on the legality of the conclusion about the satisfaction of the decree, which in my opinion is not directly within the ambit of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. 17. With regard to the powers of the court to amend or correct the decree in exercise of powers conferred under Section 152 Code of Civil Procedure, the hon'ble Supreme court has repeatedly held that after passing of the judgment and preparation of the decree the courts become functus officio and are not competent to vary the terms of the judgment, decrees and orders passed by it. According to the Apex court, the corrections contemplated under Section 152 must relate to clerical and arithmetical mistakes or errors on the face of the record (See Dwarka Das, supra). In the case of Darshan Singh (supra), the Apex Court further went to clarify that the corrections contemplated under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure are only accidental omissions or mistakes and not to correct the judgment by way of passing effective judicial orders. Their Lordships have held that corrections which go to the merit of the case is beyond the ambit and scope of Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Bijoy Kumar Saraogi (supra) the hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that Section 152 cannot be invoked for claiming substantive relief which was not granted earlier or as a pretext to get the order altered, which has attained finality. 18. What emerges from the aforesaid authorities is that the powers conferred under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure should be exercised sparingly and the amendments and corrections in the judgment/decree are permissible practically to erase the clerical or arithmetical errors. In other words defects and deficiencies, which might have been left-out by the court, consciously or unconsciously, while passing the judgment are beyond repair by the same court. I am also of the view that if this provision of law is considered and applied liberally it would dilute the very existence of statutory provisions of review and appeal. I have already mentioned earlier that during four and a half years of passing of the judgment and satisfaction of the decree, the original Plaintiff did not think that inadequate reliefs were not granted to him nor in his opinion was there any error in the judgment and decree. 19. I have already mentioned earlier that during four and a half years of passing of the judgment and satisfaction of the decree, the original Plaintiff did not think that inadequate reliefs were not granted to him nor in his opinion was there any error in the judgment and decree. 19. The authorities sought on behalf of the Petitioners are distinguishable on facts. In the case of Jai Narayan (supra), the decree was allowed to be amended so as to correct the map of the decretal land. In the case of Shyamal Bihari Misra (supra) the question of calculation of the cost of the suit was involved and the same was allowed without diluting or amending the judgment. The only judgment cited on behalf of the Petitioners is the case of Jaichandra Mohapatra (supra) wherein there appears to be amendment of land acquisition award by the reference court thrice. Sri Dutta Purakayastha, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that he reference court amended the award even after the original award had attained finality upon dismissal of the appeal by the State and the said action of the reference court was not interfered with by the High Court and the hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, in the opinion of the learned Counsel from this judgment it can be inferred that amendment of the judgment is permissible. After going though the judgment, I find that the amendments were necessary to give statutory rates of solatium and interest. 20. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, under the Tripura Landlord and Tenant Act, 1296 T.E. also the Plaintiff was statutorily entitled to a decree of ejectment of the Defendant. However, since the said statutory relief was left out by the court unnoticed, the same was corrected vide order dated 31.3.1990 and the trial court was within its jurisdiction to amend the decree: In my considered opinion, the question was not that simple before the trial court to amend the judgment and more particularly, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. First of all, there was no specific prayer for grant of ejectment decree in the original suit. After going through the cause title of the plaint, averments made therein and the reliefs sought for it appears to me that the suit was basically for recovery of arrear rent and not for ejectment of the tenant. First of all, there was no specific prayer for grant of ejectment decree in the original suit. After going through the cause title of the plaint, averments made therein and the reliefs sought for it appears to me that the suit was basically for recovery of arrear rent and not for ejectment of the tenant. Secondly, if the judgment was incomplete in terms of reliefs it was open for the Plaintiff to seek review of the same or challenge the same before a competent appellate court. Thirdly, before amending the judgment and decree the court ought to have applied the litmus test to. ascertain whether the decree was in conformity to the judgment or not. The court should not have ventured to modify the judgment presumably to grant statutory relief of ejectment inasmuch as there is a fine distinction between a decree in conformity to judgment and perverse to statute, while entertaining a prayer under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. 21. Now I turn to the applicability of ratio of the case of Jai Chandra Mohapatra, highly relied on by the Petitioner. In this case it appears to me that the amendment of the land acquisition award has been made primarily under review jurisdiction and not simpliciter under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. 22. Whether a judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court is a judgment on law and has binding force has to be deduced upon the facts and law decided in that particular case. It is the settled principle of law that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and the ratio of law must be clear and deducible from such authority. In the case of Ambika Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213 , the Apex Court has observed as below: The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said a long time ago that the case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. 23. It has been said a long time ago that the case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. 23. In the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill, (2003) 2 SCC 111 , it has been observed that "it is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision." The observations of the House of Lords made in the case of Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495 are more relevant for the purpose, which are also reproduced below: 8. Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only as authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. 24. The aforesaid legal principle has received approval of the hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a recent judgment in the case of Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra, (decided on 12.11.2008). 25. In view of the aforesaid authorities, I hold that Jai Chandra Mohapatra (supra), the judgment heavily relied upon by the Petitioners, is basically a judgment on facts. It appears to me that the Apex court has not dwelt upon the contours of Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure nor any law in this regard has been laid down. Hence, the judgment cannot be read in favour of the Petitioners. 26. It appears to me that the Apex court has not dwelt upon the contours of Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure nor any law in this regard has been laid down. Hence, the judgment cannot be read in favour of the Petitioners. 26. Sri Dutta Purakayastha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners also raised a question that the decree in pursuance of the judgment dated 10.11.1960 was not drawn up properly as required under Order 20, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure read with Rule 127 of the Civil Court Rules and Orders. In the aforesaid provisions it has been mandated that the decree shall agree with the judgment and clearly specify the relief granted or the determination of the suit. In the case before me, I notice that the decree contains the Plaintiff's case; reliefs prayed by him as well as operative portion of the judgment. A comparison of the decree vis-avis the judgment does not indicate that the decree is in conflict with the judgment. It is true that the learned Munsiff would have done well had he precisely setout the reliefs granted and refused in the judgment. However, confining the judgment to the relief covered under Clause (ka) is sufficient to hold that other reliefs were refused. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also cited the judgment of the Gauhati High Court given in the case of Ashutosh Das (supra) wherein the correction of decree under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure was permitted. In this case, the suit was filed for partition amongst joint possessors. The suit was disposed of with the words "decreed on contest with costs". Since the question of right to execute the decree by one of the joint possessors of the land was involved the High Court interfered with the order of trial court refusing to amend the decree and directed to clearly specify the relief in the judgment in exercise of powers under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the case before me, the judgment dated 10.11.1960 was a precise one running into few lines and there was no confusion in the judgment or the decree. The fact that the decree was successfully executed itself is a good proof that the decree was in consonance of the Rules. 27. However, in the case before me, the judgment dated 10.11.1960 was a precise one running into few lines and there was no confusion in the judgment or the decree. The fact that the decree was successfully executed itself is a good proof that the decree was in consonance of the Rules. 27. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners lastly contended that since the judgment debtors did not assail order dated 31.3.1990, the order of amendment of the decree the executing court had no authority to hold that the decree was fully satisfied. The submission of the learned Counsel appears to be technically sound but difficult to be accepted in practice. In the application for amendment of the decree vide Misc. Case No. 32 of 1989 the last purchaser, namely, Smt. Hemlata Dhar, R-7 was not made a party although she had filed an objection petition under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure in the executing court in execution case No. 12 of 1989. Besides this, while browsing the order dated 31.3.1990, a copy of which was supplied by the learned Counsel during hearing, I found that there was no reference of execution case No. 45 of 1962 and also about the order dated 27.4.1964 regarding full satisfaction of the decree. In this way, the fact of execution of the decree by the original decree-holder was suppressed by the Petitioners in their application under Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure. Above all, the second execution case being execution case No. 12 of 1989 was filed prior to the passing of the order dated 31.3.1990 and on that ground also, the execution case was not maintainable. At any rate, I have already discussed the contours of Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure which limits the powers of the court to correct clerical mistakes in the judgment and not beyond that. Hence, in exercise of powers under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, I hold that the amendment of the decree under order dated 31.3.1990 is contrary to express provisions of law and it was a sheer abuse of the process of the court. Consequently, the aforesaid order is also hereby set aside. 28. In the result, the revision petition stands dismissed. Petition dismissed