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2008 DIGILAW 818 (GAU)

Union of India v. Vision Ispat Pvt. Ltd.

2008-11-27

KETULHOU MERUNO, MAIBAM B.K.SINGH

body2008
JUDGMENT Maibam B.K. Singh, J. 1. These seven writ appeals being WA No. 31 (SH) 2008, WA No. 30 (SH) 2008, WA No. 32 (SH) 2008, WA No. 26 (SH) 2008, WA No. 27 (SH) 2008, WA No. 28 (SH) 2008 and WA No. 29 (SH) 2008, relate to WPC No. 279 (SH) 2007, WPC No. 280 (SH) 2007, WP (C) No. 281 (SH) 2007, WP (C) No. 282 (SH) 2007, WP (C) No. 283 (SH) 2007, WP (C) No. 284 (SH) 2007 and WP (C) No. 285 (SH) 2007 respectively. All the said seven writ petitions, which had been filed challenging the refusal of the Respondent authorities in the writ petitions to release to the writ Petitioners the financial assistance under the Scheme for promotion of Industries in the North East (SPINE) in terms of the letter dated 22.6.2006 of the Chief of Division, NEC Cell, Planning and Development Department, were disposed of by a Single Judge of this Court vide a common judgment dated 20.06.2008. Purportedly, being aggrieved by the said common judgment, the present writ appeals have been filed challenging its legality. Since similar facts and common question of law are involved in these writ appeals they are heard and proceeded together. 2. We have heard Mr. S.C. Shyam, learned CGC, appearing on behalf of all the Appellants and Mrs. N. Saikia, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of all the Respondents writ Petitioners. 3. While disposing of the said seven writ petitions, the learned Single Judge directed the concerned Respondents to process the applications of all the writ Petitioners for grant of subsidy under SPINE in accordance with law for sanctioning the same due to each of them without being influenced by the letter dated 5.2.2007 of the Secretary in the Ministry of DoNER within a period of 90 days from the receipt of the judgment. 4. On perusal of the records before the Court, we find that the learned Single Judge, after due hearing of the parties and consideration of their pleadings and materials before the Court, held to the effect that the Scheme known as "Scheme for Promotion of Industries in the North East" or in otherwise as SPINE was launched by the Respondent authorities to bring about speedy industrialization of the North Eastern Region through the NEC, that the policy decision of the Respondent authorities for subsidizing 25% of the project cost or Rs. 50 lakhs whichever was less subject to a maximum limit of Rs. 50 lakhs and as deemed proper by the recommending authority under the terms stipulated constituted a valid and unequivocal promise on the part of the Respondent authorities and that the Respondent authorities expected interested persons to act on the said promise. 5. Further findings of the learned Single Judge were to the effect that the writ Petitioners, relying on the said promise/assurance made under the SPINE, materially altered their respective position by investing a huge amount in connection with setting up of their respective new industrial units after taking huge amount of both secured and un-secured loans, that though the writ Petitioners submitted their respective applications in the prescribed form with all the necessary documents for assistance under the SPINE to the NEC through the Line Departments, the said applications were kept pending by the Secretary, NEC despite due recommendations by the Industries and Commerce Department, Assam, and that in case of not getting financial assistance under the SPINE, the said Industries would be facing closure. After referring to the letter dated 5.2.2007 of the Secretary in the Ministry of DoNER, in terms whereof the SPINE was alleged to have been withdrawn, the learned Single Judge held that there was nothing in the letter to indicate about the alleged withdrawal of the SPINE. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge, merely on the basis of the direction for stopping grant-in-aid under the Scheme pending inquiry about some irregularities, it could not be said that the Scheme had been withdrawn. Moreover, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge even assuming that the Scheme was withdrawn, the concerned Industries of the Petitioners had been started before the said withdrawn. After referring to the above said letter dated 5.2.2007 and minutes of the meeting, dated 21.2.2007, held to review the NEC's Scheme, the learned Single Judge held that the Respondent authorities had neither withdrawn the SPINE nor had they stopped release of investment subsidy to Industries under the SPINE and as such, there was no earthly reason for the Respondent authorities not to sanction the investment subsidy applied for by the writ Petitioners under the SPINE or at any rate not to process the said applications in accordance with law. 6. 6. The above said findings of the learned Single Judge are found to have been made after due consideration of the materials in the light of the submissions of the parties and as such, they are acceptable and they cannot be considered as perverse. No interference is called for in respect of the above said findings. 7. After making the above said findings and also after consideration about the applicability or otherwise of the principles', of promissory estoppel in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. (1987) 1 SCC 409, the learned Single Judge held in effect that the Respondent authorities were bound by their promise made in the SPINE on the principles', of promissory estoppel, In pursuance of the said decision, the learned Single Judge made the said directions already noted above. 8. Challenging the above said findings and directions of the learned Single Judge, Mr. S.C. Shyam, learned CGC, submits that since the subsidy under the SPINE was to be granted subject to availability of fund and fulfillment of other requirements under the Scheme, the promise or representation under the SPINE was conditional and not in absolute terms and as such, despite the findings about the alteration of the position of the writ Petitioners having taken place due to huge investment made by them in connection with setting up of their respective industries relying on the said promise, it was not legal on the part of the learned Single Judge to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the cases before him. 9. Clause C of para 1.4 of the relevant Scheme relating to "incentives for setting up of Industries "states" NEC will subsidize 25% of the project cost of Rs. 50 lakhs whichever is less subject to a maximum limit of Rs. 50 lakhs and as deem proper by the recommending authority subject to the following: (i) For the purpose of calculating the amount of subsidy eligible the following shall be taken into consideration (a) Land (b) cost of building (c) cost of plant and machinery (d) cost of miscellaneous fixed assets (e) where the total cost of project is below Rs. 25 lakhs, the preliminary and pre-operative costs. (ii) All sanctions and also the amount sanctioned will be subject to the availability of funds with the NEC for the purpose. 25 lakhs, the preliminary and pre-operative costs. (ii) All sanctions and also the amount sanctioned will be subject to the availability of funds with the NEC for the purpose. Many other conditions are specified in the other clauses of the above said para of the relevant Scheme. However, it is not the case of the Appellants that the writ Petitioners or any of them did not comply with any of the required conditions under the Scheme. According to the writ Petitioners, they submitted their respective applications along with relevant documents to the NEC through proper channel and their cases were already recommended by the concerned Department. In the facts and circumstances, we cannot accept the submission of the learned CGC to the effect that there was no clear and unequivocal promise from the side of the Respondent authorities knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisees/writ Petitioners. In our considered opinion, there was a clear and unequivocal promise from the side of the Respondent authorities regarding giving of subsidy to the extent and on fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in the said Scheme SPINE. What is required for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee, apart from the requirement of acting upon the promise by the promisee and thereby making it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise. By saying that the NEC would subsidize 25% of the project cost etc., subject to the conditions mentioned in the Scheme, there was clear and unequivocal promise regarding giving of subsidies. The limitations and conditions mentioned are relevant for determining if one has fulfilled the relevant conditions and if he is entitled to the benefit under the Scheme. As already noted above, it is not the case of the Appellants that the writ Petitioners or any of them did not comply with any of the required conditions and that no amount could be sanctioned in favour of the writ Petitioners or any of them due to non availability of funds with the NEC for the purpose. 10. In Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agency AIR 1968 SC 718 , the Apex Court held in page 728 para 23: 23. 10. In Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agency AIR 1968 SC 718 , the Apex Court held in page 728 para 23: 23. Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen. 11. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. (1979) 2 SCC 409 , was a case relating to a representation made by the State Government that the Petitioners' factory would be exempted from payment of sales tax for the period of three years from the date of commencement of production. It was proved that the Petitioner had, as a consequence of the representation, set up a factory in the State. But the State Government refused to honour its representation. It claimed sales tax from the period it had said that it would not. When the Petitioners went to Court, the State Government took the pleas: (1) in the absence of Notification under Section 4-A, the State Government could not be prevented from enforcing the liability of sale tax imposed on the Petitioner under the provisions of Sale Tax Act.; (2) that the Petitioners had waive their right to claim exemption; and (3) that there could be no promissory estoppel against the State Government so as to inhibit it from formulating and implementing its policies in public interest The Apex Court rejected all the three pleas of the Government. It reiterated the well known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine (1) a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promise; (2) such acting upon the promise by the promisee so that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise. 12. It reiterated the well known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine (1) a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promise; (2) such acting upon the promise by the promisee so that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise. 12. In the above said case, the Apex Court held, at page 442 para 24: The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. 13. The above said principles of law were followed in many other subsequent cases. Keeping the above said well settled principles of law in view, in our considered opinion, no interference is called for in respect of the finding of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the essential conditions for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel were satisfied in all the cases before him. 14. Learned CGC submits that the said promise or representation regarding giving of subsidy under the said Scheme was of no legal effect as there was no statutory provisions under which such concessions could be granted. According to the learned CGC, the doctrine of promissory estoppels should not have been invoked in such a case. 15. We are not inclined to accept this submission. There is no legal requirement that for applying the said doctrine of promissory estoppel, the promise of the promisor should have been made under the provisions of any statue. The said policy decision regarding giving of subsidy was admittedly taken by the NEC which is a Statutory Regional Planning Body constituted under Section 3(1) of the North Eastern Council Act, 1971. The said policy decision regarding giving of subsidy was admittedly taken by the NEC which is a Statutory Regional Planning Body constituted under Section 3(1) of the North Eastern Council Act, 1971. That said policy decision was not taken by any unauthorised person beyond its power and there is no legally valid reason for not applying the said doctrine of promissory estoppel only on the ground that the promise was not one made under the provisions of any status. It is not also the case of the Appellants that making of the said promise regarding giving of subsidy was prohibited by any provisions of law or that it was beyond the power of the concerned authorities to take any policy decision for granting the subsidy. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Limited (supra) the Apex Court rejected the pleas of the State to the effect that in the absence of any Notification issued under Section 4-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, the State was entitled to enforce the liability to Sales Tax imposed on the Petitioners thereof under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and that there could be no promissory estoppels against the State so as to inhibit it from formulating and implementing its policy in public interest. 16. Further the learned CGC, submits that the writ Petitioners have no vested and enforceable legal rights and as such, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in the form of the writ of mandamus are not sustainable in the eye of law. 17. This submission is also not acceptable. The learned Single Judge made the said directions in order to enforce the promise of the concerned authorities by the force of the doctrine of promissory estoppel after making a finding about the applicability of the said doctrine in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is to be noted that the Apex Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Limited (supra) pointed out that in India not only has this doctrine been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been evolves by the Courts on the principles of equity to avoid injustice. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been evolves by the Courts on the principles of equity to avoid injustice. In the said cases before the learned Single Judge, on finding that the writ Petitioners have altered their respective positions by acting on the promise made by the concerned authorities and that the ingredients for the application of the said doctrine were satisfied, gave the said directions to enforce the rights of the writ Petitioners. The said directions are not directions to carry out a promise or representation which is contrary to law or which was outside the power of the concerned authorities. In our opinion, there was no illegality in issuing mandamus for enforcing promissory estoppel. 18. The learned CGC, submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the concerned authority could change its policy if the situation so warranted and merely because the subsidy was allowed for a particular period it did not mean that the concerned authority could not amend or withdraw the policy under any circumstances inasmuch as, if the party claiming the application of the doctrine acted on the basis of the notification, it should have known that such notification was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of time if the authority felt that it was necessary to do so in public interest and as such, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and quashed. Moreover, according to the learned CGC, the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the fact that the concerned authority was competent to rescind from the promise even if there was no manifest public interest provided no one was put in adverse situation which could not be rectified and as such, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with. 19. These submissions are not also acceptable. Uncontrovertible findings of the learned Single Judge are that neither the SPINE has been withdrawn nor has further release of the subsidy under the Scheme been stopped. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that the pendency of an enquiry which has no connection whatsoever with the writ Petitioners cannot be a ground for not processing the cases of the writ Petitioners warrants no interference. On perusal of the records, we also do not find anything to show any formal announcement or intimation regarding the alleged withdrawal of the said Scheme in connection with giving of subsidy. On perusal of the records, we also do not find anything to show any formal announcement or intimation regarding the alleged withdrawal of the said Scheme in connection with giving of subsidy. At the same time, we are of the view that though the concerned authority has power to withdraw the said Scheme of giving subsidy, the said power cannot be exercised in violation of the Rules of promissory estoppel. 20. In Bokul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 31 , the effect of two exemption notification made in exercise of Government's power under Section 49(2) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1960, was considered. In the said case, the Apex Court held to the effect that the State Government was under no obligation in any manner known to law to grant exemption and that it was purely within the Government's power to revoke the exemption by means of a subsequent notification. Further, as per decision of the Apex Court in the above case, if the exemption notification gave exemption from payment of tax for a particular period and an industry was commissioned after the date of the exemption order but before the exemption was withdrawn, the said industry would be entitled to the benefit of exemption for the period specified in the exemption order though the exemption was withdrawn before the expiry of that period if the industry could rely on any estoppels. The Apex Court at page 37 para 11 of the above said case held as follows: We must, however, observe that the power of revocation or withdrawal would be subject to one limitation viz. the power cannot be exercised in violation of the rule of promissory estoppel. In other words, the Government can withdraw an exemption granted by it earlier if such withdrawal could be done without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption from payment of tax under the said rule. If the Government grants exemption to a new industry and if on the basis of the representation made by the Government an industry is established in order to avail the benefit of exemption, it may then follow that the new industry can legitimately raise a grievance that the exemption could not be withdrawn except by means of legislation having regard to the fact that promissory estoppels cannot be claimed against a statute. 21. 21. In Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1989) 3 SCC 115 , on the basis of representation made by the State Government, the Petitioners set up industries in the State by making substantial investments. The Petitioners were invited to set up industries by assuring them supply of raw material. They changed their position on the basis of representations made by the State and when the factories were ready and they were in position to utilize the raw material, an Act being Governor's Act 7 of 1986 came into force to obliterate their rights and enabled the State to get out of their commitments. The Apex Court, observed at page 127 para 26 of the Judgment: 26....We are inclined to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners that the circumstances gave rise to a fact situation of estoppel, it is true that there is no estoppels against the legislature and the vires of the Act cannot be tested by invoking the plea but so far as the State Government is concerned the rule of estoppels does apply and the precedents of this Court are clear. 22. In the cases before us also we have ascertained that the uncontrovertible findings made by the learned Single Judge give rise to a fact situation for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in favour of the Petitioners in the writ petitions and as against the Respondents/Appellants. The Petitioners in the writ petitions, who acted in pursuance of the promise of the said authorities and incurred expenditure cannot be deprived of the benefits under the said Scheme simply by taking the plea that the Scheme has been withdrawn subsequently. The said withdrawal cannot be made in violation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The submission made by the learned CGC in this regard is not accepted. 23. In the result, these seven writ appeals are rejected as having no merit. The impugned common judgment dated 20.6.2008 is not interfered with. No order as to cost. The concerned authorities/Appellants will have to comply with the directions of the learned Single Judge within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of this judgment. 20. Mr. 23. In the result, these seven writ appeals are rejected as having no merit. The impugned common judgment dated 20.6.2008 is not interfered with. No order as to cost. The concerned authorities/Appellants will have to comply with the directions of the learned Single Judge within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of this judgment. 20. Mr. Goswami has further argued that even if the Court is to construe the writ petition as an individual writ petition on behalf of the members of the petitioner Association, the same will have no legs to stand. No names and particulars of the members of the petitioner Association have been disclosed. Though the petitioner Association has craved leave to submit such names and particulars to the Court at the hearing, the same has not been done. Who are the persons who were granted ILPs that have been refused to be renewed or extended? Who are the persons to whom Trade Licenses were granted by the erstwhile Mizo District Council? To which authority such Trade Licenses were submitted? The above and other connected facts are vital even for a consideration of the individual grievances of the members of the petitioner Association. In the absence of such particulars, adjudication of the writ petition will not be possible. Mr. Gosvami has lastly submitted that even if the writ petition is to be considered in a truncated form, at least the members of the petitioner Association may come within the purview of Clause 8 of the guidelines. However, the necessary facts to enable the Court to make the necessary determination are lacking. The restrictions imposed by Clause 8 of the administrative guidelines, which have been complained of, are reasonable restrictions and no prohibition has been imposed, it is submitted. Mr. Goswami in this regard has relied on a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hinsa Virodhak Sangha v. Minapur Moti Kuresh Jamat and Ors. reported in AIR 2008 SC 1892 . 21. Public interest litigation is a judicial innovation; the product of judicial engineering, designed and aimed at securing social and economic rights of the teeming millions. In a country where the huge majority lives below even an inaccurately drawn poverty line and education is a far cry, approach to the courts has remained an illusion. 21. Public interest litigation is a judicial innovation; the product of judicial engineering, designed and aimed at securing social and economic rights of the teeming millions. In a country where the huge majority lives below even an inaccurately drawn poverty line and education is a far cry, approach to the courts has remained an illusion. Conscientious judicial opinion therefore has evolved a vehicle by which the Courts could be approached on behalf of groups of "little Indians" by any person seeking to espouse such a cause. Such an innovative process necessarily had to part company with the traditional concept of locus standi and person aggrieved. This innovative process which reached full bloom in the early 1980's, however, was accompanied by a parallel note of caution putting the Court to guard against possible misuse of the innovation. The possibility of abuse being immense and the sources from which such abuse could come being many the caution laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 23 in S.P. Gupta and Ors. (supra) can only be understood to be illustrative and not exhaustive. While by and large public interest litigations have withstood the test of time and in many cases have proved to be an effective instrument of securing social justice to a huge number of deprived citizens, Courts have been flooded, from time to time, with evil designed and camouflaged litigations under the garb of PJL so much so that even the Apex Court has been constrained to observe that care must be taken to ensure that public interest litigation does not generate into "publicity interest litigation", "private interest litigation", "politics interest litigation" or "paisa income litigation" (Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal) AIR 2004 SC 280 . It is keeping in mind the above that this Court must venture to answer the first question that arises in the writ petition i.e. whether the same ought to be treated as a PIL. 22. We have given our anxious consideration to the above issue that has arisen in the present case before us. Having considered all such facets of the issue that could be perceived of by us to be relevant we are of the view that our answer to the above question must be in the negative. 22. We have given our anxious consideration to the above issue that has arisen in the present case before us. Having considered all such facets of the issue that could be perceived of by us to be relevant we are of the view that our answer to the above question must be in the negative. The members of the petitioner Association, on its own admission, are non-Mizo/non-Tribal traders of the Barak Valley districts having business interest in Mizoram for years. It is claimed that they or their predecessors were holding valid inner line permits which have not been renewed of late. The members of the petitioner association or their predecessors, it is also claimed, were holders of valid trade licenses granted by the erstwhile Mizo District Council which have also not been re-granted or renewed. If the members of the petitioner Association belong to the class of non-Mizo/non-Tribal businessmen, as claimed, their entitlement to inner line permits will be regulated by Clause 8 of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006. As already discussed, Clause 8 of the aforesaid Administrative Guidelines deal with a special class of persons who and their family members are entitled to be granted inner line permits for an indefinite duration though such inner line permits have to be renewed every year. Holders of permanent trade licences granted by the erstwhile Mizo District Council could also sponsor 3 non-indigenous inhabitants for the purposes connected with the business. The aforesaid class of people, whom the petitioner Association claim to represent, are not the same 10 would be covered by the provisions contained in Clause 1(1)(3) of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006. The aforesaid provisions of the guidelines i.e. Clause 1(1)(3), in our considered view, would cover cases of persons who want to enter Mizoram, inter alia, to set up business there. In such cases the guidelines require the cases of such persons to be sponsored by a non-indigenous inhabitant whereupon inner line permits can be granted for six months with two renewals of equal duration. It is not the case of the petitioner association, as pleaded in the writ petition, that any of its members fall within the aforesaid class of persons. It is not the case of the petitioner association, as pleaded in the writ petition, that any of its members fall within the aforesaid class of persons. Rather, the pleaded case is that all members of the petitioner Association have subsisting business interest in Mizoram for generations and they or their predecessors were granted inner line permits as well as trade licences which have not been renewed. If that be so, the members of the petitioner Association would fall within the purview of the cases required to be dealt with by Clause 8 and not by Clause 1(1)(3) of the Administrative Guidelines dated 1.9.2006. 23. The petitioner Association, in addition to the specific issues pertaining to its members, details of which need not be repeated, have also sought to raise questions with regard to the validity of the inner line regulations (subsequently abandoned) as well as the validity of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 as a whole. Such questions do not directly concern the members of the petitioner Association. However, the aforesaid extension of the parameters of the writ petition has been sought to be made by terming the same as a public interest litigation. 24. The guidelines dated 1.9.2006 (except Clause 8) and the actions of the authorities of the State thereunder which have been complained of in the present writ petition do not deal with the class of persons to which the members of the petitioner association claim to belong. There is no averment in the writ petition that such other persons are also members of the petitioner association. The identity of the aforesaid persons, their number and other relevant particulars are not before the Court. Admittedly, the members of the petitioner Association have direct interest involved in the writ petition. In such a situation and keeping in mind that such grievances are over and above those which concern the members of the petitioner association, we are of the view that the extension of the frontiers of this writ petition under the garb of public interest litigation should not be permitted and the writ petition should not be considered by us as a public interest litigation. 25. 25. The next question that confronts the Court is whether having held the writ petition not to be maintainable as a public interest litigation the Court should treat the same as a normal adversarial litigation involving the rights of the members of the petitioner association or whether the writ petition should be refused to be adjudicated by us. It is our considered view that it is the first course of action which should be adopted in the present case instead of the second. Such a course of action would not only take care of the specific grievances highlighted, which, if unattended to, may cause serious miscarriage of justice. That apart, it would be a contradiction in terms if the writ petition is to be refused adjudication on the ground that the petitioner has highlighted grievances over and above that those pertaining to its members and for doing so, even the specific grievances of the members of the petitioner Association should not be entertained. 26. Our decision to treat the present writ petition not as a PIL but as a normal adversarial writ petition insofar as the grievances of the members of the petitioner association are concerned, has, as it is bound to, considerably reduced the scope and ambit of the issues before us. The truncated version of the writ petition that will now require our consideration really would require the Court to determine whether the members of the petitioner Association would fall under Clause 8 of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 and, if so, whether the aforesaid Clause 8 has the effect of imposing any prohibition or unreasonable restriction on the rights of the members of the petitioner Association to carry on their trade, occupation or business within the territories of the State of Mizoram. 27. Clause 8 of the administrative guidelines dated 1.9.2006 deals with special arrangements to be made for the non-indigenous persons who are running shops/business by virtue of trade licences, either permanent or temporary, granted to them by the erstwhile Mizo District Council and the autonomous district councils of Lai, Chakma and Lakher. While holders of permanent as well as temporary trade licenses issued are entitled to receive inner line passes/permits for any period between 1-3 years, renewable annually, it must be noticed that such entitlement has also been conferred by Clause 8 on the members of the family of such license holders. While holders of permanent as well as temporary trade licenses issued are entitled to receive inner line passes/permits for any period between 1-3 years, renewable annually, it must be noticed that such entitlement has also been conferred by Clause 8 on the members of the family of such license holders. In addition, holders of permanent trade licences have been allowed to sponsor three non-indigenous employees for the purposes of carrying on their business. Such inner line permits to be granted under Clause 8 to the special category of persons are not limited by any duration of time save and except that such permits can be initially granted for any period between 1 to 3 years, whereafter, such permits are required to be renewed every year. If the claim that the members of the petitioner Association had been granted Trade Licenses is correct they will fall within the category of persons contemplated by Clause 8 of the guidelines. If that be so, there can be no valid grievance that under the guidelines inner line permits can be granted for a maximum period of 18 months, as has been contended. The contention of the petitioner association that the limitation on the number of non-indigenous employees that can be sponsored for the purpose of business by the holder of a permanent trade licence i.e. three, amounts to an unreasonable restriction cannot be appreciated and accepted by us. Though the aforesaid contention of the petitioner is sought to be substantiated by reference to voluminous case-laws, details of which had to be noticed to make the record full and complete, our decision in holding that the said restriction is a reasonable one has been rather effortless and spontaneous. Anon-indigenous businessman having a shop or business in Mizoram can always induct members of the local workforce, if required, and if the three non-indigenous employees that can be sponsored by him proves to be inadequate. Allowing an unlimited number of non-indigenous persons to be sponsored for the purpose of business of a non-tribal may have the effect of disturbing the delicate balance that has been sought to be achieved by introduction of the inner line regulations which have continued to remain in operation in the territories of present day Mizoram for nearly a century now, the challenge to which though made has been abandoned. The balance between the rights of non-indigenous persons to do business in Mizoram with the help of persons familiar to him and similar in language and culture has to be maintained with the need of protection of the tribal population of Mizoram which has been sought to be achieved by the inner line regulations. 28. The rights and obligations of the respective parties for grant of inner line passes/permits to permanent/temporary trade licence holders has already been noticed. It has also been noticed by us that such mutual rights and obligations exists even in the case of family members of such licence holders. If mutual rights and obligations have been created by the Administrative Guidelines brought into force to give effect to the provisions of the inner line Regulation, it is only fair that the parties should be bound by such mutual rights and obligations created. The provisions contained in Clause 8 of the Regulations needs no further elaboration or reiteration. Members of the petitioner association, if they can establish that they belong to the special class of persons covered by Clause 8 of the guidelines, are entitled to receive inner line permits along with their family members for the purpose of carrying on their business in Mizoram. A parallel obligation has been cast upon the State by Clause 8 to grant inner line permits to persons covered by Clause 8 of the Guidelines provided satisfaction can be generated by the State that the persons claiming inner line permits under Clause 8 falls within the category of persons enumerated therein. 29. In the present case the petitioner association has not made available to the Court a list of its members along with other particulars to show that such members fall within the category of persons enumerated in Clause 8 of the guidelines. In the writ petition filed it has been stated that the petitioners have not so acted as disclosure of the names and particulars of such members may expose them to acts of violence, threat and intimidation. Even if the aforesaid stand of the petitioner is accepted to be true there is nothing that prohibited the association from presenting a list of its members along with their necessary particulars to the Court in a sealed cover. Even if the aforesaid stand of the petitioner is accepted to be true there is nothing that prohibited the association from presenting a list of its members along with their necessary particulars to the Court in a sealed cover. It is but inevitable that at some stage, may be even at the stage of grant of the inner line permits, the names and particulars of the members of the petitioner association will have to be disclosed. However, though we do not appreciate the manner in which the petitioner association has kept the names and particulars of its members away from the Court, we do not propose to penalize the petitioner association on the said count. 30. Accordingly and in the light of the foregoing discussions we are of the view that this writ petition should be disposed of in the following terms : (1) The petitioner Association will file before the competent authority of the State of Mizoram the list of its members along with all particulars including the particulars of the trade licences/inner line permits granted to them or their predecessors. (2) The said competent authority of the Govt. of Mizoram will verify the names and particulars contained in the said list with reference to the official records including the list of members submitted by the petitioner Association at the time of registration of the petitioner Association or thereafter. (3) If any member of the petitioner association is found to be covered by the provisions of Clause 8 of the Administrative Guidelines dated 1.9.2006 inner line permits will be granted to such members in accordance with the provisions contained in the aforesaid Clause 8. (4) It will be desirable for the State of Mizoram to complete the aforesaid process as expeditiously as possible. During the interregnum i.e. till the process is complete, the existing business of the members of the petitioner Association shall be allowed to be continued and all such persons shall not be expelled from the State. The aforesaid interim exercise will be performed by the State of Mizoram on the basis of prima facie proof of the legitimacy of the entry of the concerned person into Mizoram and his stay there for the purpose of conduct of his business. 31. The writ petition shall stand disposed of in terms of the above directions.