JUDGMENT Rajesh Bindal, J 1. This is an unfortunate litigation between the State and important constitutional functionary in the State where the efforts of the State to investigate into the allegations of corruption against the then Chairman and members of the Haryana Public Service Commission (for short, `the Commission') are being objected to by the Commission. 2. The challenge in the present petition is to the order dated October 25, 2007 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar whereby application filed by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants was dismissed and order dated November 30, 2007 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Hisar upholding the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar. 3. The proceedings arise out of FIR No. 20 dated October 10, 2005 registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Police Station, State Vigilance Bureau, Hisar, 4. The primary allegation in the FIR is regarding misuse of his authority by K.C. Bangar, former Chairman of the Commission and/or its members. 5. Briefly the facts, as stated in the petition are that in connection with investigation of the case registered with State Vigilance Bureau, Hisar, notice under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( for short “the Code”) was issued to the Commission on December 21, 2006 for producing record regarding selection to various posts except that of lecturers. It was mentioned in the notice that prior to that vide various letters record was asked for but the same was denied by the Commission claiming privilege and stating the records to be of confidential nature which cannot be provided. The notice dated December 21, 2006 was replied to by the Commission vide communication dated January 4, 2007 objecting to the supply of the record claiming privilege. It was further stated in the reply that record of the cases which are already pending before this court and Hon’ble the Supreme Court cannot be supplied. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner filed application before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar for issuance of search warrants of the office of the Commission for taking the record as claimed by the petitioner for further investigation of the case. 7. The application was contested by the Commission with the averments that the same has been moved at the dictates of the political leaders with ulterior motive. 7. The application was contested by the Commission with the averments that the same has been moved at the dictates of the political leaders with ulterior motive. As regards the selection of Lecturers, this Court had directed enquiry by the Vigilance in a petition filed by one Sushil Kumar who was disputing his seniority fixed by the Commission while making recommendation for appointment. The direction by this Court regarding the Vigilance Enquiry in that case was stayed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. As regards the selection for HCS (Executive) by way of nomination is concerned, the direction of this Court for holding CBI enquiry into the selection by way of nomination was stayed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. As regards the selection and appointment of Pardeep Sangwan as Drug Inspector is concerned it was stated that on thorough investigation earlier conducted by the State Vigilance Bureau no element of corruption was found. As regards the selection and appointment of wife of K.C. Bangar as Lecturer in Guru Jambheshwar University, Hisar it was stated that the facts were wrong as she was never appointed as such. An application for issuance of search warrants for roving and fishing enquiry is not permissible. 8. On consideration of the application, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar rejected the same, inter-alia, opining that till date there was no specific evidence against the accused. General search for fishing enquiry is not authorized under the guise of Sections 91 and 93 of the Code. The Commission had claimed privilege against disclosure of certain official communications under Section 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short `the Act'). Regarding selection of Lecturers and HCS Officers (Executive Branch), there was already stay. 9. Aggrieved against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, the petitioner preferred revision petition before learned Sessions Judge, Hisar. 10. Objection about the maintainability of revision was raised by the respondent Commission but the same was considered and decided in favour of the petitioner. 11. On merits, the claim of the petitioner before the learned Sessions Judge, Hisar was that Civil Writ Petition No. 12593 of 2005 (Haryana Public Service Commission V. State of Haryana and others ) filed by the Commission has already been considered and rejected by this Court vide order dated August 12, 2005. 11. On merits, the claim of the petitioner before the learned Sessions Judge, Hisar was that Civil Writ Petition No. 12593 of 2005 (Haryana Public Service Commission V. State of Haryana and others ) filed by the Commission has already been considered and rejected by this Court vide order dated August 12, 2005. The contest in the petition was to the enquiry by the State Vigilance Bureau into the allegations against the officers/ officials or its members/ Chairman for acting on extraneous or illegal consideration for various selections made by the Commission. It was further submitted that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Commission against the aforesaid judgment of this court was dismissed as withdrawn on September 19, 2005. Relying upon the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid judgment and in addition thereto referring to the provisions of Section 123 and 124 of the Act, it was submitted that there was no application by the Commission before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar for claiming privilege and in the absence thereof and without satisfying the conditions there for such a claim could not be accepted. 12. The claim made by the petitioner was contested by the Commission before the learned Sessions Judge, Hisar. It was stated that a number of documents were supplied to the Vigilance Bureau after the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the Commission and privilege was claimed only with regard to certain confidential documents, which could not be supplied. Privilege was claimed in terms of provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Act stating that the Head of the Department is the final authority for the same. The entire effort of the prosecution is to put the Commission, a Constitutional authority, in a humiliating position. The prosecution wants to sit over the order of this Court upholding the selection of SDO (Environment) and SDO (Panchayati Raj) in writ petitions filed by unsuccessful candidates. As regards selection to the posts of SDO (Electrical) is concerned, the same is pending consideration before this Court. In the case of selection of HCS officers and lecturers, this Court directed investigation by the Vigilance Department and by the C.B.I. respectively, however, those directions were stayed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. 13. As regards selection to the posts of SDO (Electrical) is concerned, the same is pending consideration before this Court. In the case of selection of HCS officers and lecturers, this Court directed investigation by the Vigilance Department and by the C.B.I. respectively, however, those directions were stayed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. 13. After considering respective claims of the parties, learned Sessions Judge also did not find favour with the prayer made by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants primarily for the reasons that power under Section 93 of the Code is to be exercised sparingly. The allegations in the FIR were general in nature. There is no requirement under Sections 123 and 124 of the Act to file application supported by affidavit to claim privilege. In case the required documents are handed over to the Vigilance Bureau, the same will expose internal working of the Commission which may affect many selected candidates and result in litigation. However, it is noticed in the order that the Commission did not have any objection to supply any material except the answer sheets and interview proceedings signed by the members of the Commission. 14. The objection of the Commission to the effect that application under Section 93 (1) (c) of the Code was not maintainable as the same was applicable only with regard to enquiry, trial and other proceedings before the Court was accepted as it was opined that in the provision there was intentional omission of word ‘investigation’ which is there in Section 91 of the Code. The petitioner was at liberty to resort to provisions of Section 91 of the Code for getting the information which the Commission had offered to supply. However, the Commission was given liberty to claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Act. 15. It is in this factual matrix that the matter is before this Court. 16. I have heard Shri Sanjiv Bansal, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana appearing for the petitioner and Mr. N.S. Shekhawat, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and with their able assistance have gone through the paper book. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below rejecting the prayer made by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants are totally arbitrary. N.S. Shekhawat, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and with their able assistance have gone through the paper book. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below rejecting the prayer made by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants are totally arbitrary. The true import of the provisions of the Code has not been appreciated as Courts below have gone on wrong premise while rejecting the prayer. The prerequisite for exercise of power under Section 93 of the Code is:- (a) Where any Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under section 91 or a requisition under sub-section (1) of section 92 has been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons or requisition, or (b) Where such document or thing is not known to the Court to be in the possession of any person, or (c) Where the Court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection, it may issue a search-warrant; and the person to whom such warrant is directed, may search or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions hereinafter contained. 18. In the present case, petitioner had already issued many notices to the Commission for supply of documents in connection with investigation. On its failure, the petitioner did not have any other remedy except to approach learned Court below for issuance of search warrants, which is in larger public interest to investigate the allegations of corruption in selection for appointment to various public posts. The mere fact that the Commission is objecting to the production of record shows that the process adopted by the Commission for selection was not fair. Otherwise being a public authority it should not have any objection to the production of record. Transparency in the working is need of the hour. Observations by the learned Sessions Judge regarding maintainability of the application under Section 93 of the Code and observations regarding invoking the provisions of Section 91 of the Code are totally contrary to the plain language of the Act. Similar is the position with regard to allegations of roving enquiry. Transparency in the working is need of the hour. Observations by the learned Sessions Judge regarding maintainability of the application under Section 93 of the Code and observations regarding invoking the provisions of Section 91 of the Code are totally contrary to the plain language of the Act. Similar is the position with regard to allegations of roving enquiry. The FIR in question has been registered and some of the allegations are corroborated by various other factors especially an unprecedented move of the Commission to file writ petition before this court challenging investigation and enquiry against its the then Chairman and members, which was dismissed. Meaning thereby defence set up by the Commission was negatived. 19. Further besides referring to the observations made by this Court in the writ petition earlier filed by the Commission, learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the observations made by Hon’ble the Supreme court while deciding petition challenging the selection of HCS Officers (Executive Branch) in Civil Appeal No. 5803 of 2007 (Jitendra Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and another ) decided on December 11, 2007. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the order passed by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 15309 of 2002 where the issue under consideration before a Division Bench of this Court was regarding selection of HCS Officers (Executive Branch (direct recruits) ) where on a direction of this Court, the record of selection by the Commission was inspected by the learned counsel for the petitioners therein under the supervision of the Joint Registrar (Judicial) to assist the Court and a number of discrepancies were found. 21. Attacking the manner in which the Commission had claimed privilege for non production of the record in its possession and the same having been granted by the Court below, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Amar Chand Butail Vs. Union of India and others AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1658 to submit that claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Act should generally be made by the Head of the Department concerned with an affidavit filed in that behalf showing that each document in respect of which privilege has been claimed has been carefully considered and person making affidavit is bonafidely satisfied that its disclosure would lead to public injury. Further reliance has been placed on The State of U. P. Vs. Raj Narain and others (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 428 and S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India and another 1981 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 87. 22. Shri N.S.Shekhawat, learned counsel appearing for the Commission, controverting the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present petition. He submitted that order in the application filed by the petitioner was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar initially against which the petitioner filed revision before learned Sessions Judge, Hisar. Though the maintainability of the same was objected to by the Commission but the issue was decided against it. Once the petitioner had already availed of its remedy of revision, the second revision is specifically barred under Section 397 of the Code. Once the second revision is barred even a petition in the garb of quashing of order under Section 482 of the Code is also not maintainable. 23. He further submitted that the FIR in question was registered on 18.10.2005 on the basis of a source report stating that from the secret sources it had been found that the then Chairman of the Commission, K.C.Bangar had collected crores of rupees by selecting and appointing ineligible persons to various posts. Reference to some of the posts and the persons so selected in the source report was made. No progress in the investigation was made for nearly about two years. Vide communication dated 21.12.2006 (Annexure P-1) issued under Section 91 of the Code, the records of selection to various posts except that of lecturers was asked for, for the purpose of investigation of the FIR. The notice issued by the petitioner for supply of documents vide Annexure P-1 was duly replied to by the Commission vide its communication dated 4.1.2007 (Annexure R-2/4) claiming privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Act stating the record to be confidential. It was further claimed in the reply that the disclosure of any information relating to the selection may affect and jeopardise the interest of the selected candidates and also the unselected candidates who have already approached the Court challenging the selection. It was further claimed in the reply that the disclosure of any information relating to the selection may affect and jeopardise the interest of the selected candidates and also the unselected candidates who have already approached the Court challenging the selection. It was nearly after nine months of the reply sent by the Commission to the notice of the petitioner that application under Section 93 of the Code was filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate requiring the records only with regard to the selection and appointment to the posts of SDO (Panchayati Raj), SDO (Electrical) and SDO (Environment). He further submitted that the records to be produced by the petitioner would be voluminous and in fact the petitioner wants to hold a fishing enquiry. 24. Further submission is that the selection of SDO (Environment) has already been upheld by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6255 of 2005 (Ramphal Vashisth Vs. State of Haryana and others) decided on April 30, 2007. The selection of SDO (Panchayati Raj) was also upheld by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1101 of 2005 (Ajit Singh Vs. Haryana Public Service Commission) decided on November 11, 2005 and challenge to the selection of SDO (Electrical) is pending consideration before this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 7706 of 2007. Once the issue regarding selection has already been gone into by this Court, the Vigilance Bureau cannot reinvestigate the same as the same would be clearly contemptuous. The Investigating Officer of the police cannot hold the selections to be bad once those have been upheld by this Court. 25. Referring to the orders passed by this Court in the writ petition where under judicial scrutiny is the selection of HCS Officers (Executive Branch), the submission is that the same cannot be relied upon for the simple reason that this Court had issued direction therein in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereas in the present proceedings, the prayer is for issuance of search warrant. The Commission has no objection to the production of records in the Court, however, Constitutional authority should not be dragged in a police Station. 26. The Commission has no objection to the production of records in the Court, however, Constitutional authority should not be dragged in a police Station. 26. Further the submission is that the reliance on the judgment of this Court in Haryana Public Service Commission's case (supra) filed by the Commission and also Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Jitendra Kumar's case (supra) is totally misplaced for the simple reason that in both the cases the issue under consideration was neither for issuance of search warrants under Section 93 of the Code nor claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Act. 27. Still further learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the powers under Section 482 of the Code is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly under certain special circumstances and not in routine. He has relied upon State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Goloconda Linga Swamy and another 2004 (3) RCR (Criminal) 831 (SC), Manoj and others Vs. Prem Lal 2006 (3) RCR (Criminal) 941 (PH) and Hamida Vs. Rashid alias Rasheed and others (2008) 1 Supreme Court Cases 234. 28. Referring to the source report, the contention is that the only issue was relating to the selection for four posts to which later on the Investigating Agency has added 37 more complaints regarding various other posts which cannot be permitted. The petitioner cannot be permitted to enhance the scope of the present FIR as subsequently 3 more FIRs have been registered against the then Chairman and Members of the Commission at different places. Further it is submitted that the petitioner cannot pray for issuance of search warrant for record of selection to various posts which are not the subject-matter of the FIR initially registered. Before moving the application for issuance of search warrant in fact the petitioner had not done any home work by collecting sufficient material to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for issuance of search warrant as during the period of about two years after the registration of the FIR, only four statements were recorded out of which three persons had resiled from their complaints earlier made to the petitioner. Even the antecedents of the complainants have also not been verified. The statements of the accused have also not been recorded. It is further submitted that the for the purpose of investigation, the provision of Section 93(1)(c) of the Code cannot be invoked. Even the antecedents of the complainants have also not been verified. The statements of the accused have also not been recorded. It is further submitted that the for the purpose of investigation, the provision of Section 93(1)(c) of the Code cannot be invoked. The effect of issuance of search warrants against the Commission would be far-reaching and long lasting as regards the credibility and status of the Commission. In future for every selection, the Commission may be dragged to the Police Station by lodging various FIRs. Reliance has been placed upon Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab and another, 1978 Criminal Law Journal 1591, G. Subash Chandra Sabu v. H. Suresh Kumar, 2001 Criminal Law Journal 3258 and Kongini Balan v. M.Visalakshy, 1986 Criminal Law Journal 698. 29. Replying to the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the allegations are of corruption by the then Chairman and Members of the Commission on which the people have faith and which are prima-facie substantiated with the material already collected and also seeing their conduct in the other cases pending against them, it is a fit case where this Court should exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. The effort of the Commission to object to the production of record is only to save the illegally selected candidates. In fact the Commission is defending the cause of its the then Chairman and Members which has already been commented upon by this Court while dismissing earlier petition filed by the Commission. It is further submitted that initially the FIR was registered on the basis of source report, however, later on when complaints made to various authorities were forwarded to the Vigilance, the same were made part of the FIR which are now being investigated. 30. Explaining the delay in conduct of investigation, the submission is that the earlier incumbent, Shri S.P. Ranga, the then SP Vigilance, who was entrusted with the investigation of the case had refused to conduct the investigation. He remained seized with the job from 10.10.2006 to 13.07.2007. Nothing was done in his tenure. He was immediately placed under suspension on 13.07.2007 and was charge-sheeted. A new investigation team was formed on 13.08.2007. Thereafter, statements of four candidates and two officials of Commission were recorded. He remained seized with the job from 10.10.2006 to 13.07.2007. Nothing was done in his tenure. He was immediately placed under suspension on 13.07.2007 and was charge-sheeted. A new investigation team was formed on 13.08.2007. Thereafter, statements of four candidates and two officials of Commission were recorded. As on today, however, after the dismissal of the application for issuance of search warrants by the learned Sessions Judge, statements of 28 more witnesses have been recorded. It is further submitted that though in the earlier writ petitions filed by the Commission, the challenge was to the investigation being made, however, the claim of privilege under Sections 123, 124 of the Act was never pressed in that petition. In fact, the right of the petitioner to conduct investigation has already been decided by this Court in the earlier petition filed by the Commission and the only issue under consideration would be issuance of search warrants. This Court should not go into the sufficiency of the material before considering the claim of the petitioner for issuance of search warrants. It is further submitted that the investigation is being made step by step and presently it is only the record with regard to the selection of SDOs which is being asked for by way of issuance of search warrants without which, it will not be possible to conduct the investigation. 31. Relevant provisions of Sections 91 and 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are extracted below:- “Section 91: Summons to produce document or other thing:- (1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summon, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed- (a) To affect, sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), or the Bankers, Books Evidence Act, 1891 (13 of 1891) or (b) To apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority. Section 93: When search-warrant may be issued:- (1)(a) Where any Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under section 91 or a requisition under sub-section (1) of section 92 has been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons or requisition, or (b) Where such document or thing is not known to the Court to be in the possession of any person, or (c) Where the Court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection, It may issue a search-warrant; and the person to whom such warrant is directed, may search or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, specify in the warrant the particular place or part thereof to which only the search or inspection shall extend; and the person charged with the execution of such warrant shall then search or inspect only the place or part specified. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall authorize any Magistrate other than a District Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate to grant a warrant to search for a document, parcel or other thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority.” Section 123: Evidence as to affairs of State: No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit. Section 124: Official communication : No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.” 32. At the first place it is appropriate to refer to the observations and findings of this Court and Hon'ble the Supreme Court in earlier litigation between the parties and regarding other selections. Relevant observations of Division Bench of this Court in HPSC's case (supra), while dismissing earlier writ petition filed by the Commission, are extracted below:- “Through the present petition, an unfortunate attempt has been made by the Haryana Public Service Commission (hereinafter called the “Commission”) to thwart the efforts made by the State Vigilance Government to find out as whether in some of the past selections made by the Commission, its Officers and Officials, its Secretary, its Members and the past Chairman etc., had acted on some extraneous and illegal consideration. The Commission complaints that holding of the aforesaid Vigilance inquiries and summoning of the record of the aforesaid previous selections by the Vigilance Department was, in fact, an encroachment upon the independence and the constitutional status of the Commission. It is not in dispute that the enquiries now being conducted by the Vigilance Bureau pertain to certain past selection. From the communication received by the petitioner-Commission, it appears that the actions of the past Secretary, the past Chairman and certain other Officers/ Officials of the Commission, are being probed with regard to serious charges. Under any circumstances, the aforesaid enquiries cannot be taken to mean any erosion of the authority of the Commission or its independence. Even an expert and constitutional body like the Commission is supposed to perform its duties, fearlessly and carry out selections on the basis of the best merit available. However, if the aforesaid selections are alleged to be tainted and based upon consideration other than merit, the Commission cannot, in such circumstances, claim any immunity. No body has a vested right to perpetuate illegality or hide a scandal. All selection made by public servants are supposed to be based upon competence, merit and integrity. The allegations to the contrary would not only erode the public confidence in the Commission but would also result in merit being casuality. This is definitely contrary to the constitutional scheme enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. All selection made by public servants are supposed to be based upon competence, merit and integrity. The allegations to the contrary would not only erode the public confidence in the Commission but would also result in merit being casuality. This is definitely contrary to the constitutional scheme enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Commission, rather than making a complaint with regard to enquiries, should be rather over anxious to clear its fair name. We find that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel is also without any merit. There is no dispute with the preposition of law that while exercising the power of judicial review this Court would be slow in making a competitive comparison of the selected candidates vis-a-vis the unsuccessful candidates. To this extent reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of Jasjit Singh Sidhu's case (supra) is wholly justified. However, we express our inability to extend the aforesaid analogy any further to hold that even in the case of corruption charges, tainted selections, or any illegality, no investigation in the matter of selection, could be made. Accepting the aforesaid argument would be perpetuating the tainted selections. Neither any judgment of any court taking any such view has been cited or it is possible for us to lay down the aforesaid broad proposition. There considerations, while exercising the power of judicial review are wholly different. The said considerations are not relevant while amking an inquiry into corruption charges or scams. Therefore, the aforesaid arguments raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is also without any merit. Before parting with this order, we must comment upon a fact. There considerations, while exercising the power of judicial review are wholly different. The said considerations are not relevant while amking an inquiry into corruption charges or scams. Therefore, the aforesaid arguments raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is also without any merit. Before parting with this order, we must comment upon a fact. The prayer made by the petitioner-Commission in the present case is not only for quashing the requisitions made by the Vigilance authorities seeking certain record from the Commission but a specific prayer has been made that the aforesaid enquiries are “arbitrary, without jurisdiction, ultravires of the Constitution of India, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, suffers from vices for discrimination based on malice, contrary to the provisions of law and Constitution of India, amounts to abuse of authority and misuse of powers on the part of the respondents with a sole purpose to put the Chairman, members and employees of Haryana Public Service Commission to humilitation, indignity.” It is, thus, apparent that an effort has been made by the Commission to protect its Chairman and the members, who for undisclosed reasons have chosen not to directly approach this Court. The Commission which is a constitutional body has unnecessarily filed the present petition to which the interest of the Chairman and members, who have chosen to remain behind the curtain. The Commission cannot equate itself, nor under the Constitution of India can it be so equated with its Chairman and its members. The Commission has a distinct and a constitutional identity, independent of its Chairman and members,. It is, thus apparent that the present petition has been filed at the instance of the Chairman and members, although in the name of the Commission. We cannot put any seal of approval to this act of the Commission.” 33. Observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Jitendra Kumar's case (supra) are extracted below:- “In this batch of appeals, we are not concerned with the questions which have been raised by the State of haryana in its counter-affidavit in regard to the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Commission but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that there existed a cloud which is required to be cleared. Unsuccessful candidates have levelled serious allegations against the members of the Commission. They may or may not be correct. Unsuccessful candidates have levelled serious allegations against the members of the Commission. They may or may not be correct. The Vigilance Bureau has initiated an enquiry into the whole matter. Such an enquiry should, in our considered opinion, be allowed to be continued unless the State in terms of the report made by the Vigilance Bureau and upon making an enquiry of its own satisfied itself that the selection process was not tainted. We must before parting, notice a disturbing feature in this case. Whereas according to the Commission, the State has for all intent and purport made it a defunct body although no case therefore has been made out, the contention of the State, on the other hand, is that although in all the matters allegations made by the complainant have been found to be true but the enquiry cannot proceed as the Commission is not cooperating with the State Vigilance Bureau. Indisputably and as has been indicated hereinbefore, seven separate writ petitions were filed by unsuccessful candidates. Various complaints had also been received by the State. Four separate enquiries had been directed to be conducted by the State Vigilance Bureau. Allegations have also, rightly or wrongly, been made that the Commission had acted in undue haste. We although as it present advised do not intend to make any observations in regard to the allegations and counter allegations made by the Commission and State against each other, we only hope and trust that a Constitutional authority like the Commission should neither withhold any document nor refuse to cooperate with the State Vigilance Bureau in the matter of conduct of an enquiry. If the statements made by the Commission are correct, they have nothing to hide. It would be in the interest of all concerned including the appellants herein to see that the enquiry should be completed at an early date. We direct the State Government to take all steps in this behalf. We would also request the Commission to render all cooperation to the authorities of the State Vigilance Bureau.” 34. The issues which are raised by learned counsel for the parties in the present case, which require consideration by this Court, are as under:- (i) Whether the Public Service Commission is State entitled to claim privilege under Section 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? The issues which are raised by learned counsel for the parties in the present case, which require consideration by this Court, are as under:- (i) Whether the Public Service Commission is State entitled to claim privilege under Section 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? (ii) Whether Public Service Commission can claim privilege from production of documents/ record regarding selections made by it under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? (iii) Scope of Section 93 of Code of Criminal Procedure regarding issuance of search warrants. (iv) Maintainability of petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, once revision filed by the petitioner has already been dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. (v) Whether vigilance can go into the question of illegality committed in the selections with the allegations of corruption once the selection has already been upheld in writ jurisdiction of this Court? 35. The issues are now dealt with in detail. Whether the Public Service Commission is State entitled to claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? 36. The language of Section 123 of the Act shows that the record regarding which the privilege can be claimed should relate to the affairs of the State. The disclosure of the contents whereof should be against the public interest and may cause public injury. The word `State' has not been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. For the purpose thereof, reference can be made to provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The term `State' is defined in Section 3(58) thereof which is extracted below:- “Section 3(58) State-- (a) As respects any period before the commence of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B State or a Part C State; and (b) As respects any period after such commencement, shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union territory” 37. A perusal of the above definition of State shows that after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the State shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India and shall include a Union Territory. Haryana Public Service Commission does not find mention in the list of the States specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India. 38. Haryana Public Service Commission does not find mention in the list of the States specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India. 38. Article 315 of the Constitution of India provides for setting up of Public Service Commissions for Union and the States. Article 320 of the Constitution provides for functions of the Public Service Commissions wherein it provides that it shall be the duty of the Union and the State Public Service Commission to conduct examination for the appointment to the services of the Union and the State respectively. Further, it provides for certain functions for which the Commission is to be consulted on the issues mentioned therein on a reference made to it by the President or the Governor. Meaning thereby the Public Service Commission is merely an authority created under the Constitution with defined functions. The primary duty being to conduct examination for appointments to the services of the Union or the State. In the process written examination as well as interviews are conducted to enable the Commission to prepare comparative merit, to draw final seniority list of the candidates to be recommended for appointment. Though the Commission is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court being an authority discharging public function keeping in view Article 12 of the Constitution of India but certainly considering the definition of `State' as provided for under General Clauses Act, 1897 and also seeing the activities thereof, it cannot be opined that any of the activities of the Commission in any manner is related to the affairs of the State, the disclosure of which may result in public injury or would not be in larger public interest. The material/ document in possession of the Commission, for the production of which privilege is claimed by the Commission, is not such with which the security of the State is going to be effected. The citizens' right to know about the administration of the country and the process which is being followed for the purpose of appointment to various public posts, is one of the pillar of democratic set up. 39. The need for transparency in working has even been recognised by the Parliament with the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, `the 2005 Act') where the exemption from disclosure of information is provided for under Section 8 thereof which is in the following terms:- “8. 39. The need for transparency in working has even been recognised by the Parliament with the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, `the 2005 Act') where the exemption from disclosure of information is provided for under Section 8 thereof which is in the following terms:- “8. Exemption from disclosure of information. 39. The need for transparency in working has even been recognised by the Parliament with the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, `the 2005 Act') where the exemption from disclosure of information is provided for under Section 8 thereof which is in the following terms:- “8. Exemption from disclosure of information. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen, -- (a) Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence; (b) Information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court; (c) Information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature; (d) Information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; (e) Information available to a person, in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; (f) Information received in confidence from foreign government; (g) Information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; (h) Information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders; (i) Cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers: Provided that the decision of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed; (j) Information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has not relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that the information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweights the harm to the protected interests. (3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of subsection (1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeal provided for in this Act.” 40. Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the 2005 Act even gives overriding effect to the 2005 Act over the Officials Secrets Act, 1923 where public interest and disclosure overweights harms to the protected interests. Under Section 123, 124 of the Act, what the Commission has in possession is the requisition made by the Government or any appointing authority requiring the Commission to complete the process of selection for the purpose of recommendation for appointment to the posts, written tests/ interviews conducted in that process and/or the criteria adopted by the Commission for the purpose of recommendation. Any authority which is in possession of this record cannot in any manner is said to be in possession of the record which has anything to do with the affairs of the State. The privilege is sought to be claimed by the Commission only with regard to the answer-sheets and the interview proceedings. 41. The stand of the Commission is that in case the selections are challenged before any Court, the Commission does not have any objection to the production of record to justify the selection. This itself shows that the record is not of the nature as envisaged in Sections 123, 124 of the Act for which the privilege can be claimed. 42. The scheme of Sections 123, 124 of the Act does not envisage a situation where a person claiming privilege can state that he will object to the production of record before Authority `A' whereas he has no objection to the production of the same record before authority `B'. 42. The scheme of Sections 123, 124 of the Act does not envisage a situation where a person claiming privilege can state that he will object to the production of record before Authority `A' whereas he has no objection to the production of the same record before authority `B'. The protection has been given to the State to enable it to claim privilege for production of record with regard to the documents/material which may cause public injury. The public injury will be caused even if that document or information is furnished before any authority as in that case, the privilege is not sought to be enforced. The availability of the privilege under Sections 123, 124 of the Act is in its entirety with regard to a document or information with no distinction or classification of the authorities before whom the record is sought to be produced. 43. Accordingly, in my opinion under Sections 123 and 124 of the Act, the Commission is not State entitled to claim privileges as envisaged therein. 44. Similar view has been expressed by J & K High Court in M.A. Jauhari v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, 1971 Kashmir Law Journal 350. Regarding claim of privilege under Sections 123, 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 45. Before the claim made by both the parties on this issue is considered on merits, it would be appropriate to trace the history of judicial opinion on the same. 46. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Amar Chand Butail's case (supra) while dealing with the claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Act opined as under:- “10. The question as to the scope and effect of the provisions contained in S. 123 of the Evidence Act has been considered by this Court in State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, 1961-2 SCR 371 : (AIR 1961 SC 493). Section 123 provides that no one shall be permitted to give any evidence from any unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned who shall give or withhold such permission. Dealing with this problem in the case of the State of Punjab, 1961-2 SCR 371 : (AIR 1961 SC 493) this court has held that though under Ss. Dealing with this problem in the case of the State of Punjab, 1961-2 SCR 371 : (AIR 1961 SC 493) this court has held that though under Ss. 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act, the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question, that matter being left for the authority concerned to decide, the court is competent to hold a preliminary enquiry and determine the validity of the objection to its production and that necessarily involves an enquiry into the question as to whether the document relates to affairs of State under S. 123. In view of the fact that S. 123 confers wide powers on the head of the department, this court took the precaution of sounding a warning that the heads of departments should act with scrupulous care in exercising their right under S. 123 and should never claim privilege only or even mainly on the ground that the disclosure of the document in question may defeat the defence raised by the State. Considerations which are relevant in claiming privilege on the ground that the affairs of State may be prejudiced by disclosure must always be distinguished from considerations of expediency which may persuade the head of the department to raise a plea of privilege on the ground that if the document is produced, the document will defeat the defence made by the State. That is one important aspect of this problem which has been decided by this court in the case cited above. (Emphasis supplied) 11. The other aspect of the problem decided in that case relates to the manner in which privilege should be claimed. It was stated in that case that the claim should generally be made by the Minister-in-charge who is the political head of the department concerned and the affidavit made in that behalf should show that each document in respect of which the claim is made has been carefully read and considered, and the person making the affidavit is bona fide satisfied that its disclosure would lead to public injury. It is in the light of these two principles that the point raised by Mr. Setalvad before us falls to be decided. 13. But on the merits also we feel no doubt in rejecting the said claim. It is in the light of these two principles that the point raised by Mr. Setalvad before us falls to be decided. 13. But on the merits also we feel no doubt in rejecting the said claim. The statement made by the Home Minister does not show that he seriously applied his mind to the contents of the documents and examined the question as to whether their disclosure would injure public interest. We are constrained to observe that this case illustrates how a claim for privilege can be and is sometimes made in a casual manner without realising the solemnity and significance attached to the exercise of the power conferred on the head of the department to make that claim. As we will presently point out, one of the documents which was produced before us under our directions would tend to show that the sole reasons for claiming privilege in respect of that document was the fear rightly entertained that the disclosure of the said document would entirely defeat the whole of the defence made by respondents 1 and 2. Since it was necessary for us to consider whether the claim had been rightly upheld by the courts below, we directed respondents 1 and 2 to produce the said documents before us for our inspection. Accordingly such of the documents as were available have been produced before us and it is to one of them that we propose to refer. Having seen all the documents produced before us, we were satisfied that the claim for privilege made by respondent No. 2 was not justified at all and may even be characterised as not bona fide.” 47. In The State of U. P. Vs. Raj Narain and others (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 428, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined as under:- “42. It is now the well settled practice in our country that an objection is raised by an affidavit affirmed by the head of the department. The Court may also require a minister to affirm an affidavit. That will arise in the course of the enquiry by the Court as to whether the document should be withheld from disclosure. If the Court is satisfied with the affidavit evidence that the document should be protected in public interest from production the matter ends there. If the Court would yet like to satisfy itself the Court may see the document. If the Court is satisfied with the affidavit evidence that the document should be protected in public interest from production the matter ends there. If the Court would yet like to satisfy itself the Court may see the document. This will be the inspection of the document by the Court. Objection as to production as well as admissibility contemplated in Section 162 of the Evidence Act is decided by the Court in the enquiry as explained by this Court in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra). 73. According to Wigmore, the extent to which this privilege has gone beyond “secrets of State” in the military or international sense is by no means clearly defined and therefore its scope and bearing are open to careful examination in the light of logic and policy. According to him, in a community under a system of representative Government, there can be only few facts which require to be kept secret with that solidity which defies even the inquiry of courts of justice. 74. In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil of secrecy, the common routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic routine.” 48. A Bench consisting of seven Hon’ble Judges in S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India and another 1981 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 87 while considering the issue of privilege under Section 123 of the Act opined as under:- “63. That takes us to the next question whether the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India is protected from disclosure under any other provision of law. That takes us to the next question whether the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India is protected from disclosure under any other provision of law. We do not have in India any common law protection under the label of “Crown Privilege” as it was known a decade ago and now called “Public interest immunity” as there is in England and the only provision of law under which such immunity can be claimed is Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore, it is this provision which we must now turn to consider. But, before we do so, we would like to indicate the socio-political background in the context of which this section has to be interpreted. It is true that this section was enacted in the second half of the last century but its meaning and content cannot remain static. The interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the requirements of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. The language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in a country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values and aggressive developmental strategies, so must the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is not an antique to be taken down, dusted, admired and put back on the shelf, but rather it is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reason of clash between conflicting interests. It is therefore intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function. It is therefore intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivery of justice. We need not therefore be obsessed with the fact that Section 123 is a statutory provision of old vintage or that it has been interpreted in a particular manner some two decades ago. It is not as if it has once spoken and then turned into muted silence. It is an instrument which can speak again and in a different voice in the content of a different milieu. Let us therefore try to understand what voice this statutory provision speaks today in a democratic society wedded to the basic values enshrined in the Constitution. 64. Now it is obvious from the Constitution that we have adopted a democratic form of Government. Where a society has chosen to accept democracy as its credal faith, it is elementary that the citizens ought to know what their Government is doing. The citizens have a right to decide by whom and by what rules they shall be governed and they are entitled to call on those who govern on their behalf to account for their conduct. No democratic Government can survive without accountability and the basic postulate of accountability is that the people should have information about the functioning of the Government. It is only if people know how Government is functioning that they can fulfil the role which democracy assigns to them and make democracy a really effective participatory democracy. “Knowledge” said James Madison, “will for ever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular Government without popular information or the means of obtaining it, is but a prologue to a force or tragedy or perhaps both”. The citizens’ right to know the facts, the true facts, about the administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of a democratic State. A popular Government without popular information or the means of obtaining it, is but a prologue to a force or tragedy or perhaps both”. The citizens’ right to know the facts, the true facts, about the administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of a democratic State. And that is why the demand for openness in the Government is increasingly growing in different parts of the world.” 49. In People's Union for Civil Liberties and another Vs. Union of India and others (2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 476, while considering the issue for determining the question of privilege, Hon’ble the Supreme Court opined as under:- “69. The legislative policy behind the aforementioned provisions is no longer res integra. The State must have the prerogative of preventing evidence being given on matters that would be contrary to public interest. 70. For determining a question when a claim of privilege is made, the Court is required to pose the following questions: (1) Whether the document in respect of which privilege is claimed, is really a document (unpublished) relating to any affairs of State; and (2) Whether disclosure of the contents of the document would be against public interest? 71. When any claim of privilege is made by the State in respect of any document, the question whether the document belongs to the privileged class has first to be decided by the court. The court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question. The claim of immunity and privilege has to be based on public interest. 72. The section does not say who is to decide the preliminary question viz. whether the document is one that relates to any affairs of State, or how it is to be decided, but the clue in respect thereof can be found in Section 162. Under Section 162 a person summoned to produce a document is bound to “bring it to the court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the court”. It further says that: “The court, if it seems fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.” 73. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the court”. It further says that: “The court, if it seems fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.” 73. In order to claim immunity from disclosure of unpublished State documents, the documents must relate to affairs of the State and disclosure thereof must be against interest of the State or public interest. 74. In Raj Narain1 the question was as to whether a BLUE BOOK, being rules and instructions for the protection of the Prime Minister when on tour or in travel, providing for mode and manner in which the security is to be provided to the Prime Minister is beyond the purview of Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act or not. The High Court held that no privilege can be claimed in relation thereto. 75. Ray, C.J. referring to a large number of decisions opined that even in an election petition privilege can be claimed. It was, however, held: (SCC PP. 442-43, Para 41) “41. The several decisions to which reference has already been made establish that the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act is the same as in English law. It is that injury to public interest is the reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed would injure public and national interest. Public interest which demands that evidence be withheld is to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should have the fullest possible access to all relevant materials. When public interest outweighs the latter, the evidence cannot be admitted. The court will proprio motu exclude evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest. It is in public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded. The reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents. Confidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. The court will proprio motu exclude evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest. It is in public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded. The reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents. Confidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the contents contain material which it would be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the documents would be of class which demand protection.” Mathew, J., however, in his concurring opinion opined that the question of national importance vis-à-vis administration of justice should be the criterion for determining the claim of privilege, stating: (SCC PP. 452-53, Para 71) “But the executive is not the organ solely responsible for public interest. It represents only an important element in it; but there are other elements. One such element is the administration of justice. The claim of the executive to have exclusive and conclusive power to determine what is in public interest is a claim based on the assumption that the executive alone knows what is best for the citizen. The claim of the executive to exclude evidence is more likely to operate to subserve a partial interest, viewed exclusively from a narrow department angle. It is impossible for it to see or give equal weight to another matter, namely, that justice should be done and seen to be done. When there are more aspects of public interest to be considered, the Court will, with reference to the pending litigation, be in a better position to decide where the weight of public interest predominates.” 77. It was opined that merely label given to an executive is not conclusive in the matter, observing: (SCC P. 456, Para 84) “The documents in this case, class documents though they may be, are in a different category, seeking protection, not as State documents of political or strategic importance, but as requiring protection on the ground that “candour” must be ensured.” 78. In S.P. Gupta this Court while upholding the aforementioned principles, however, was of the opinion that there can be a class of documents in respect whereof privilege can be claimed, stating: (SCC P. 279, Para 69) “In other words, if injury to public interest is the foundation of this immunity from disclosure, when once the court has inquired into the question and found that the disclosure of the document will injure public interest and therefore it is a document relating to affairs of State, it would in most cases be a futile exercise for the head of the department to consider and decide whether its disclosure should be permitted as he would be making an enquiry into the identical question.” 79. Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed: (SCC P. 279, Para 69) “The basic question to which the court would therefore have to address itself for the purpose of deciding the validity of the objection would be whether the document relates to affairs of State or in other words, it is of such a character that its disclosure would be against the interest of the State or the public service and if so, whether the public interest in its non-disclosure is so strong that it must prevail over the public interest in the administration of justice and on that account, it should not be allowed to be disclosed. The final decision in regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under Section 123 would always be with the court by reason of Section 162.” 80. Analysing the provisions of Sections 123 and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was opined: (SCC P. 284, Para 73) “The court has thus to perform a balancing exercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public interest against the other, decide where the balance lies. If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure, the court would uphold the objection and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the other hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interests lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interest has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class.” (Emphasis supplied).” 50. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India and others (1993) 4 Supreme Court Cases 119 opined as under:- “12. Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 postulates that “no one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit”. Section 124 provides that “no public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.” Section 162 envisages procedure on production of the documents that a witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to the Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. “The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court”. The Court, if it deems fit, may inspect the documents, unless it refers to matters of the State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility. 59. If public interest immunity under Article 74 (2) or Section 123 of Evidence Act is claimed, the Court would first consider it in camera and decide the issue as indicated above. The immunity must not be claimed on administrative route and it must be for valid, relevant and strong grounds or reasons stated in the affidavit filed in that behalf. Having perused the file and given our anxious considerations, we are of the view that on the facts of the case and in the light of the view we have taken, it is not necessary to disclose the contents of the records to the petitioner or his counsel. 51. Having perused the file and given our anxious considerations, we are of the view that on the facts of the case and in the light of the view we have taken, it is not necessary to disclose the contents of the records to the petitioner or his counsel. 51. In the present case, the privilege was claimed by the Commission before the Court below merely by filing reply to the application filed by the State for issuance of search warrant under the signature of the Secretary to the Commission. The application was not supported by any affidavit. There is no averment that the entire record, the privilege regarding which had been claimed, relates to the affairs of the State and had been examined by the Head of the Department and he was satisfied that the disclosure thereof would be against the public interest and will cause public injury. Still learned Courts below had opined that privilege was rightly claimed by the Commission regarding documents mentioned in the application. The claim in the application filed by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants was with regard to records for selection of SDO (Environment), SDO (Electrical) and SDO (Panchayati Raj). 52. While considering the claim of privilege of the documents, this Court has to consider as to whether the record for which the privilege is claimed, the production thereof will result in public injury or the larger public interest will suffer. If the record/ documents relate to the affairs of the State or the security of the State is involved as has been opined by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Raj Narain's case (supra), where privilege was claimed regarding the Blue Book for the protection of the Prime Minister when on tour or in travel, the privilege could be claimed. However, if the matter merely relates to the selection of the candidates by an authority against which certain allegations were made, the privilege claimed merely on the basis of the fact that it would disclose working of the Commission or the candidates who have been selected or who are already in Court may be affected, may not be justifiable reason to claim privilege. Transparency in the working and accountability of any institution discharging public functions in a democratic set up is need of the hour. Transparency in the working and accountability of any institution discharging public functions in a democratic set up is need of the hour. In case the requisite records are furnished by the Commission for the purpose of investigation, the same would not have any effect on the security of the State in fact the Commission had nothing to hide regarding the process of selection followed by it and the same will result in building confidence of the public at large in the functioning of the Commission whereas on the other side if the claim of the Commission for privilege is accepted, the same would be contrary to the public interest. 53. Accordingly, in my considered opinion, no privilege could be claimed for the record of selections made by the Commission. Regarding issuance of search warrant 54. Section 93 of the Code enables the Court to exercise power for issuance of search warrant. The same can be exercised where the Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a notice is issued for production of a document will not or would not produce the document or thing required by the summons or where such document or thing is not known to the Court to be in possession of any person or where the Court considers that the purposes of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code will be served by a general search or inspection. The material must have some nexus with the objects ought to be achieved. The sufficiency of material is not to be seen by the Court. The exercise of powers under Section 93 is co-related with Section 91 and 92 of the Code. Under Section 91, for the purpose of investigation etc., any Court or any officer in charge of the Police Station can issue notice to any person to produce any document or thing as specified in the notice. On failure to comply with the notice under Section 91, a request can be made to the Court for issuance of search warrant. The discretion has been conferred on the Magistrate to issue search warrant as is evident from the word `may'. The discretion is not unfettered. It is a judicial discretion guided by the law. Reasons are to be recorded for taking un-usual step of issuing a search warrant. 55. The discretion has been conferred on the Magistrate to issue search warrant as is evident from the word `may'. The discretion is not unfettered. It is a judicial discretion guided by the law. Reasons are to be recorded for taking un-usual step of issuing a search warrant. 55. The challenge to the power of search was repelled by a Bench of 8 Judges of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in M.P.Sharma v. Satish Chandra (AIR 1954 SC 300), with the following observations:- “A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to Constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume that the constitutional protection under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches.” 56. For carrying out the search, various precautions have been provided in Chapter `C' of the Code in Section 100. The language used in Section 93 of the Code is almost similar to the language used in Section 132 of Income Tax Act, 1961 where also an authority defined therein having reason to believe has been authorised to issue search warrant. The object of the section is to take out certain information or documents which either is not being supplied by the person in possession thereof inspite of notice having been issued for the purpose or where the Court considers that for the purpose of enquiry, trial or other proceeding, issuance of general search warrant would be appropriate. Meaning thereby the object is to take certain document/ information from the possession of a person who is not voluntarily offering the same for the purpose of investigation or inquiry. 57. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in V.S. Kuttan Pillai Vs. Ramakrishnan and another (1980) 1 SCC 264 while considering the issue of search warrants under Section 93 of the Code, has opined as under:- “11. 57. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in V.S. Kuttan Pillai Vs. Ramakrishnan and another (1980) 1 SCC 264 while considering the issue of search warrants under Section 93 of the Code, has opined as under:- “11. If summons as hereinbefore discussed cannot be issued to an accused person under Section 91(1), ipso facto a search warrant contemplated by Section 93(1)(a) cannot be issued by the Court for the obvious reason that it can only be issued where the Court could have issued a summons but would not issue the same under the apprehension that the person to whom such summons is issued will not or would not produce the thing as required by such summons or requisition. A search warrant under Section 93(1)(a) could only be issued where a summons could have been issued under Section 91 (1) but the same would not be issued on an apprehension that the person to whom the summons is directed would not comply with the same and, therefore, in order to obtain the document or thing to produce which the summons was to be issued, a search warrant may be issued under Section 93(1)(a). 12. Section 93, however, also envisages situations other than the one contemplated by Section 93(1) (a) for issuance of a search warrant. It must be made distinctly clear that the present search warrant is not issued under Section 93(1)(a). 13. Section 93(1) (b) comprehends a situation where a search warrant may be issued to procure a document or thing not known to the Court to be in the possession of any person. In other words, a general search warrant may be issued to procure the document or thing and it can be recovered from any person who may be ultimately found in possession of it and it was not known to the Court that the person from whose possession it was found was in possession of it. In the present case the search warrant was to be executed at the office of the Sabha and it can be said that office-bearers of the Sabha were the persons who were in possession of the documents in respect of which the search warrant was issued. Therefore, clause (b) of Section 93(1) would not be attracted. 14. In the present case the search warrant was to be executed at the office of the Sabha and it can be said that office-bearers of the Sabha were the persons who were in possession of the documents in respect of which the search warrant was issued. Therefore, clause (b) of Section 93(1) would not be attracted. 14. Section 93(1)(c) of the new Code comprehends a situation where the Court may issue a search warrant when it considers that the purpose of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code will be served by a general search or inspection to search, seize and produce the documents mentioned in the list. When such a general search warrant is issued, in execution of it the premises even in possession of the accused can be searched and documents found therein can be seized irrespective of the fact that the documents may contain some statement made by the accused upon his personal knowledge and which when proved may have the tendency to incriminate the accused. However, such a search and seizure pursuant to a search warrant issued under Section 93(l)(c) will not have even the remotest tendency to compel the accused to incriminate himself. He is expected to do nothing. He is not required to participate in the search. He may remain a passive spectator. He may even remain absent. Search can be conducted under the authority of such warrant in the presence of the accused. Merely because he is occupying the premises which is to be searched under the authority of the search warrant it cannot even remotely be said that by such search and consequent seizure of documents including the documents which may contain statements attributable to the personal knowledge of the accused and which may have tendency to incriminate him, would violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination because he is not compelled to do anything. A passive submission to search cannot be styled as a compulsion on the accused to submit to search and if anything is recovered during such search which may provide incriminating evidence against the accused it cannot be styled as a compelled testimony. This is too obvious to need any precedent in support. The immunity against self-crimination extends to any incriminating evidence which the accused may be compelled to give. This is too obvious to need any precedent in support. The immunity against self-crimination extends to any incriminating evidence which the accused may be compelled to give. It does not extend to cover such situation as where evidence which may have tendency to incriminate the accused is being collected without in any manner compelling him or asking him to be a party to the collection of the evidence. Search of the premises occupied by the accused without the accused being compelled to be a party to such search would not be violative of the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 20(3). 15. It was, however, urged that Section 93(1)(c) must be read in the context of Section 93(1)(b) and it would mean that where documents are known to be at a certain place and in possession of a certain person any general search warrant as contemplated by Section 93(1)(c) will have to be ruled out because in such a situation Section 93(1) (a) alone would be attracted. Section 93(1)(b) comprehends a situation where the Court issues a search warrant in respect of a document or a thing to be recovered from a certain place but it is not known to the Court whether that document or thing is in possession of any particular person. Under clause (b) there is a definite allegation to recover certain document or thing from a certain specific place but the Court is unaware of the fact whether that document or thing or the place is in possession of a particular person. Section 93(l)(c) comprehends a situation where a search warrant can be issued as the Court is unaware of not only the person but even the place where the documents may be found and that a general search is necessary. One cannot, therefore, cut down the power of the Court under Section 93(1)(c) by importing into it some of the requirements of Section 93(1)(b). No canon of construction would permit such an erosion of power of the Court to issue a general search warrant. It also comprehends not merely a general search but even an inspection meaning thereby inspection of a place and a general search thereof and seizure of documents or things which the Court considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. It also comprehends not merely a general search but even an inspection meaning thereby inspection of a place and a general search thereof and seizure of documents or things which the Court considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. The High Court accordingly sustained the general search warrant in this case under Section 93(l)(c).” 58. In Shyam M. Sachdev Vs. The State and anr. 1991 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 312, a Bench of Delhi High Court considering the issue of search warrant opined that search is one of the steps of the investigation. The investigation is defined in Section 2 (h) of the Code to include all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person ( other than a Magistrate ) who is authorized by a Magistrate. Referring to earlier judgments in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh Vs. State of Delhi, ( 1955 ) 1 SCR 1150 and State of U.P. Vs. Bhagwat Kishore Joshi (1964) 3 SCR 71, it was held that the investigation consists generally of the following steps:- “Proceeding to the spot; Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender; Collection of evidence relating to the commission of offence which may consist of : (a) The examination of various person including the accused and the reduction of their Statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit; (b) The search of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial; and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so, taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge sheet under Section 173.” 59. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Subash Chandra Babu Vs. Suresh Kumar 2001 (3) RCR (Criminal) 492 opined that a Court has to be cautious in issuing search warrants under Section 90(1)(c) of the Code. Before issuing a warrant under Section 91(1)(c) of the Code there should be sufficient material for issuance thereof. 60. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Subash Chandra Babu Vs. Suresh Kumar 2001 (3) RCR (Criminal) 492 opined that a Court has to be cautious in issuing search warrants under Section 90(1)(c) of the Code. Before issuing a warrant under Section 91(1)(c) of the Code there should be sufficient material for issuance thereof. 60. If the facts of the present case are examined, it is borne out from record that inspite of various notices issued by the petitioner, the Commission did not furnish complete record for the purpose of investigation of the case. The objections raised were two fold, namely – claim of privilege under Sections 123. 124 of the Act and that the petitioner had not collected sufficient material before requesting for issuance of search warrants. 61. As far as first issue is concerned, this Court has already found that neither the Commission can invoke provisions of Sections 123, 124 of the Act to claim privilege from production of record nor the record is such for which privilege could be claimed. 62. Objection on the ground of sufficiency of material before issuance of search warrants in the present case will also be of no help to the respondent for the reason that from the previous litigation by the Commission it is evident that the effort some how or the other is to object to the investigation of the allegations by the petitioner against the then Chairman and Members of the Commission for various acts of omission and commission. The allegations are serious in nature. The Commission which has a separate legal entity from its Chairman and Members is in fact fighting a proxy litigation not to save the institution but to put a protective umbrella on the alleged misdeeds of its earlier Chairman and Members. If the selections were conducted in a fair and impartial manner, the Commission has nothing to hide. Rather under such circumstances it is desirable that such a public institution should rise above the interest of its Chairman and Members and protect its own credibility and image in public by cooperating with investigation but the Commission is not moving in that direction for the reason that it is claimed that the Commission is now headed by one of the then Member against whom allegations are being investigated. 63. 63. It is further evident from the pleadings that the Commission was issued various notices by the petitioner for production of record, however, the same was objected to by the Commission by filing reply from time to time. On receipt of various notices for investigation of the charges against them, the Commission approached this Court by filing C.W.P. No. 12593 of 2005 even though it did not have any concern with the inquiry against its Chairman and members. The primary grouse made in the petition was regarding holding of various vigilance enquiries and summoning of record of the selections made by Commission. However, the Commission failed in its effort when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 12.10.2005. The relevant passages of which have already been extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. Even Special Leave Petition filed by the Commission against the judgment of this Court was dismissed as withdrawn. In reply dated 04.01.2007 filed to the notice (Annexure R.2/4) issued by the petitioner on 21.12.2006, the production of record was objected to on various grounds including the claim of privilege under Sections 123, 124 of the Act. Meaning thereby that the notices issued by the petitioner for production of documents as was required for the purpose of investigation in terms of provisions of Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not complied to by the Commission in its true spirit. Faced with the situation, the petitioner filed application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for issuance of search warrants under Section 93 of the Act. 64. The contention of learned counsel for the Commission that the application filed by the petitioner has to be considered under Section 93(1) (c) of the Code which provide for issuance of search warrant for general search or inspection has to be considered and rejected. The submission is that for the purpose of investigation, provisions of Section 93(1)(c) of the Code cannot be invoked as the word investigation is missing therein which finds mentioned in Section 91 of the Code where wide powers have been given to summon the record even for the purpose of investigation. The submission is that for the purpose of investigation, provisions of Section 93(1)(c) of the Code cannot be invoked as the word investigation is missing therein which finds mentioned in Section 91 of the Code where wide powers have been given to summon the record even for the purpose of investigation. The contention is misconceived for the reason that firstly the application filed by the petitioner did not mention that the same was being filed under Section 93(1)(c) of the Code, secondly it is a case where the Commission has been found to have not complied with the summons issued to it for production of record under Section 91 of the Code for the purpose of investigation of the case registered against the then Chairman and Members of the Commission. The notice was issued to the Commission as the record required for the purpose of investigation of the allegation against the accused in the FIR, is in possession of the Commission. The plea set up by the Commission claiming privilege under Sections 123, 124 of the Act has been found to be meritless. Keeping that in view and also the previous litigation where the effort of the Commission was to scuttle the investigation by filing petition before this Court, the application filed by the petitioner squarely falls within the ambit of Section 93(1)(a) of the Code as from the facts of the case what can reasonably be inferred is that the Commission is objecting to the production of the record/ documents which are required to be produced in terms of the summons/ notices issued to it under Section 91 of the Code. Accordingly, I find that the application filed by the petitioner for issuance of search warrants was clearly maintainable under Section 93(1)(a) of the Code. 65. As far as issuance of search warrants is concerned, the right of the petitioner to ask for the documents/ information from the Commission is not in dispute. The right of the petitioner to investigate into the allegations against the then Chairman and members of the Commission has already been gone into in earlier writ petition filed by the Commission in HPSC's case (supra). The right of the petitioner to investigate into the allegations against the then Chairman and members of the Commission has already been gone into in earlier writ petition filed by the Commission in HPSC's case (supra). Even Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Jatinder Kumar's case (supra) while noticing the factum of enquiry in the matter of selection by the Vigilance opined that such enquiry should be allowed to be continued and that the constitutional body like Commission should neither withhold any document nor refuse to cooperate. 66. In the matter of conduct of enquiry into the serious allegations against the then Chairman and members of the Commission cannot in any manner be considered as erosion of the authority and dignity of the Commission. Persons may come and go but the existence of the Commission is in perpetuity. The Commission is an institution created under Article 315 of the Constitution of India which has its separate status and identity distinct from its Chairman and Members. It is desirable for the Commission to have absolved itself from the allegations levelled against its Chairman and members by producing the records and cooperating with the investigation. But by raising all types of objections, the effort of the Commission to protect the guilty and help in perpetuating the illegality which will have the result of erosion of the public confidence in the Commission. The Commission should have arisen above the interest of its Chairman and members. 67. In view of the above discussions and also the fact that Commission's claim of privilege has been found to be meritless and that the Commission was not supplying the documents asked for investigation, this Court finds sufficient material was available to invoke jurisdiction for issuance of search warrant under Section 93(1)(a) of the Code. 68. In the present case, at the stage of consideration of application for issuance of search warrant, the person from whose possession, the record was to be obtained after search, was heard. As to whether any notice is required to be issued to a person whose premises are required to be searched is another question which arises for consideration in the present case? However, as no arguments were addressed by counsel for the parties on this issue, this Court is not expressing any opinion thereon. Scope of Vigilance Enquiry once selections have already been upheld by this Court:- 69. However, as no arguments were addressed by counsel for the parties on this issue, this Court is not expressing any opinion thereon. Scope of Vigilance Enquiry once selections have already been upheld by this Court:- 69. As regards, the contention raised by learned counsel for the Commission that once the selections have already been upheld, the Investigating Officer of the Vigilance Bureau cannot opine that the selections were bad. The issue before the Vigilance Bureau is not as to whether the selections are valid or not rather it is for investigation into the allegations of favoritism or corruption made against the then Chairman and members of the Commission. 70. I have perused the files of C.W.P. No.1101 of 2005, where, the challenge was to the selection for the posts of S.D.O (Panchayati Raj), C.W.P. No.6255 of 2005 regarding challenge to the selection for the posts of S.D.O. (Environment) and C.W.P. No.7760 of 2007, where the challenge is to the selection for the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical). 71. As far as, C.W.P. No.1101 of 2005, pertaining to the selection of S.D.O. (Panchayati Raj) is concerned, the only prayer made in the petition was for disclosure of marks obtained by the petitioner therein, for which without issuing notice to the respondents this Court vide order dated 20-01-2005 directed the Commission to supply the marks obtained by the petitioner therein. However, on an application filed by the Commission, relying upon a Judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6265 of 1997, decided on 12-09-1997, this Court recalled the earlier order directing the Commission to supply the marks obtained by the petitioner therein vide order dated 11-11-2005. 72. In C.W.P. No.6255 of 2005, regarding challenge to the selection of SDO (Environment), the prayer was for a direction to select the petitioner therein. There were no allegations of mala fide. The issue was of inter-se seniority amongst the selected and non selected candidates. The stand of the Commission was that preference was given to the candidates, having experience, in terms of the advertisement and the petitioner had secured less marks than the candidates selected. Keeping these facts in view, this Court refused to go into the question of inter-se merit of the candidates as this Court was not sitting in appeal against the selections. 73. Keeping these facts in view, this Court refused to go into the question of inter-se merit of the candidates as this Court was not sitting in appeal against the selections. 73. Civil Writ Petition No.7760 of 2007, where the challenge is to the selection for the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical), again the issue is regarding inter-se merit and the writ petition is still pending consideration. In the earlier writ petition by the respondent-Commission before this Court, the challenge was with a view to throttle the efforts being made by the State Vigilance to find out as to whether in some of the selections made by the Commission, its Chairman and Members had acted on some extraneous and illegal consideration. The plea was sought to be raised with the arguments that Chairman and Members of the Commission at that time had been appointed by a party which is not in power now and for that reason, it is the party in power now, which is harassing the Chairman and the Members, with an object not only to cause embarrassment to them personally but even to the Constitutional Body i.e. the Commission. 74. Important fact to be noticed from the earlier petition filed by the Commission, namely C.W.P. No.12593 of 2005 is that including various other notices issued by the Vigilance Department, one of the impugned notice therein was Annexure P-15 dated 25-04-2005, issued by the State Vigilance Bureau, Hisar (respondent No.6 in the aforesaid petition). The prayer was for restraining the respondents therein from interfering in the functioning of the Commission and not to probe the selections made by it. Further, it was prayed that the respondents be prohibited from initiating or proceeding with any enquiry relating to the matters of selection to various posts made by the Commission. Though, various notices issued by the Vigilance Bureau, their right to investigate the matter was under challenge and no claim of privilege from production of documents/record under Sections 123 and 124 of the Act was made. Reference was also made in the petition regarding selection to the post of SDO (Environment), for which, the investigation in the FIR registered at State Vigilance Bureau, Hisar is in progress. Writ Petition was dismissed upholding the right of the petitioner to conduct investigation. 75. Reference was also made in the petition regarding selection to the post of SDO (Environment), for which, the investigation in the FIR registered at State Vigilance Bureau, Hisar is in progress. Writ Petition was dismissed upholding the right of the petitioner to conduct investigation. 75. In fact the issue raised now has already been considered by this Court in Haryana Public Service Commission's case (supra) wherein it was opined that at the time of exercise of the power of judicial review this Court would be slow in making a competitive comparison of the selected candidates vis-a-vis the unsuccessful candidates. Where the charges are of corruption, tainted selections, or any illegality, such analogy cannot be applied as the same would amount to perpetuate the tainted selections. Relevant para of the judgment in HPSC's case (supra) is extracted below:- “We find that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel is also without any merit. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that while exercising the power of judicial review this Court would be slow in making a competitive comparison of the selected candidates vis-a-vis the unsuccessful candidates. To this extent reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of Jasjit Singh Sidhu's case (supra) is wholly justified. However, we express our inability to extend the aforesaid analogy any further to hold that even in the case of corruption charges, tainted selections, or any illegality, no investigation in the matter of selection, could be made. Accepting the aforesaid argument would be perpetuating the tainted selections. Neither any judgment of any Court taking any such view has been cited nor is it possible for us to lay down the aforesaid broad proposition. There considerations, while exercising the power of judicial review are wholly different. The said considerations are not relevant while making an inquiry into corruption charges or scams. Therefore, the aforesaid arguments raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is also without any merit.” Regarding maintainability of petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 76. Learned counsel for the respondent-Commission had raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition under Section 482 of the Code where the petitioner had already availed of the remedy of revision before the learned Sessions Judge against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Learned counsel for the respondent-Commission had raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition under Section 482 of the Code where the petitioner had already availed of the remedy of revision before the learned Sessions Judge against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The submission is that once second revision is specifically barred under Section 397 of the Code, the provisions of Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked for the purpose. However, the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent is to be considered and rejected at the threshold for the simple reason that there is no absolute bar for entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Code even if revision filed by a person before the Court below has been dismissed. 77. Section 482 of the Code provides extra-ordinary powers to the Court which though should be exercised sparingly but in case of miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of Court or where mandatory provisions of law have not been complied with the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C can certainly be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the Courts below. In the present case as the facts of the case speak for themselves both the Courts below though have chosen to write lengthy orders but the approach was casual. The real issues on facts as well as on law were not addressed to. Where the Courts below have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them in its true letter and spirit, the error committed will have to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to avoid miscarriage of justice. In view of the material on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the case in hand is fit where keeping in view the intricate questions of law involved, the issues of general importance having been raised and allegations in the FIR, for the investigation of which the search warrant was sought to be issued, this Court should exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 78. In support of the above proposition, reference can be made to judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and another, 1997(1) Recent Criminal Reports 724. In support of the above proposition, reference can be made to judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and another, 1997(1) Recent Criminal Reports 724. Relevant passage therefrom is extracted below: “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person – accused/ complainant-cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397. (1) Read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted. 79. In Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and another, (2005) 2 SCC 571, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined as under: “5. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted. 79. In Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and another, (2005) 2 SCC 571, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined as under: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. Ganesan said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court. 6. In State v. Navjot Sandhu the power of the High Court under Section 482 came up for consideration and it was held as under: (SCC P.657, Para 29) “29. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words `Nothing in this Code'. Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma case this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice.” (Emphasis supplied) 80. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Manoj and others v. Prem Lal, 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 941 (P&H). 81. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice.” (Emphasis supplied) 80. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Manoj and others v. Prem Lal, 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 941 (P&H). 81. In view of my above discussions, answers to the questions considered by this Court is as under:- (i) Public Service Commission cannot be considered to be State for the purpose of claiming privilege for production of records/ documents under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (ii) Public Service Commission cannot claim privilege for production of record/ documents under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (iii) There is sufficient material on record to justify the issuance of search warrant under Section 93(1)(a) of Cr.P.C in the present case. (iv) Even if the selections have been upheld by this Court in its writ jurisdiction, the allegations of corruption and illegality in the selections made for extraneous reasons can certainly be gone into by the Vigilance in the process of investigation of FIR. (v) Even if a person has already availed of his remedy of revision in spite of the fact that a second revision is barred under Section 397 Cr.P.C., this Court can exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C where there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of Court or where mandatory provisions of law have not been complied with or where the legal issues of general importance are raised or when in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court feels that inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the Courts below. 82. Having opined that the petitioner has right to get the record from the Commission for the purpose of investigation and on its failure, the provisions of Section 93 of the Code were rightly invoked, however, still keeping in view the fact that the Commission is a constitutional authority and it would not be in the fitness of the things that a search is conducted in its office though such a situation has been created by it. Liberty is granted to the Commission to produce the record before the Investigating Officer, namely, Inspector General of Police (Vigilance), Ambala Range who is heading the special investigation team within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment failing which the petitioner shall be at liberty to carry out search at the office of the Commission to take the relevant records. 83. The impugned orders passed by the Courts below are set aside. 84. The petition is disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs. Petition disposed of .