Judgment : 1. This writ petition has been filed, praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus, forbearing the respondents from dispossessing the petitioner from the land and building in Survey Nos. 10/1 and 10/2 of Ramapuram Village except by due process of law. 2. According to the petitioner, the land in S. Nos. 10/1 and 10/2 of Ramapuram Village comprising an extent of 6,936 sq.ft. belongs to him, his brother and mother and the title to the said property is traceable from the year 1947. The land in S. No. 10 of Ramapuram Village originally belonged to one Nainiappa Naicker and Errappa Naicker. Under a registered partition deed dated 12.5.1947, the land to an extent of 1 acre 36 cents in S. No. 10 was allotted to Errappa Naicker. Of the said land, 66 cents was sold to one Pappathi Ammal on 9.8.1956 by a registered sale deed. Out of the said 66 cents, Pappathi Ammal sold 11 cents of land to Shenbagavalli Ammal and another 11 cents to Rajabathar on 9.7.1964 by way of two registered sale deeds. After the said transactions, S. No. 10 was subdivided into S. Nos. 10/1 and 10/2. The 11 cents purchased by Shenbagavalli Ammal was assigned S. No. 10/1 and the 11 cents purchased by Rajabather was assigned S. No. 10/2. Thereafter, Rajabather executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of one Natarajan for an extent of 51/2 cents (out of 11 cents) in S. No. 10/2 by a registered document on 4.5.1990. Similarly, Shenbagavalli Ammal also executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of Natarajan regarding her 11 cents in S. No. 10/1 on 26.9.1990 by a registered document. The Power Agent of Shenbagavalli and Rajabather sold the said 161/2 cents of land in favour of the petitioner, his brother and mother by way of three registered sale deeds dated 24.12,1990, 24.12.1990 and 31.12.1990 and from then onwards they have been in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said property. 3. The further case of the petitioner is that in the land purchased by him, there is a building, which is being used by him for doing business and the business tax is also being paid by him. 3. The further case of the petitioner is that in the land purchased by him, there is a building, which is being used by him for doing business and the business tax is also being paid by him. When that be so, the third respondent with his subordinates came to the premises and started threatening the petitioner, stating that the land belongs to Tamil Nadu Housing Board and that they would demolish the building. No notice has been issued either to the petitioner or his vendors, informing that the land has been acquired. He made a representation to the third respondent on 5.11.2007 but the third respondent has not so for furnished him any details and instead, the respondent is continuing to threaten him. The right to property is a constitutional right which cannot be taken away by the respondents without following the principles of natural justice. He has been in continuous possession of the property from the year 1990. As per Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, the original owner of the property has got a right to seek reconveyance. The Housing Board has never taken possession or utilised the land and premises at any point of time. In the given situation, if the respondents are allowed to disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner over his property, his right will be seriously prejudiced. Therefore, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, for the relief stated supra. 4. Respondents 2 and 3 have filed a counter affidavit, stating that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board had proposed to acquire the land in S. No. 10/1 etc. of Ramapuram Village, measuring an extent of 338.28 acres for forming Ramapuram Neighbourhood Scheme. The Government approved the 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No. 138, Housing Department, dated 14.5.1975 and the same was published in the Government Gazette on 11.6.1975. The above extent was split into 9 blocks for administrative convenience and the particular land in S. No. 10/1 and 10/2 comes under Block I. The Draft Declaration under Section 6 of the Act and a direction under Section 7 were submitted for an extent of 46.04 acres by the Land Acquisition Officer and the same were approved by the Government in G.O. Nos. 962 and 964, dated 7.6.1978. 962 and 964, dated 7.6.1978. Pursuant to the same, an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer vide Award No. 10/86, dated 23.9.1986. 5. It is further stated in the counter that notices under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act were sent to the land owners namely Shenbagavalli and Rajabather, but they did not appear for award enquiry and hence the compensation for the land was ordered to be kept in the Civil Court deposit under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Act. Subsequently, the land owner in S. No. 10/1 by name Shenbagavalli filed W.P. No. 11394 of 1990, challenging the land acquisition, and4he same was dismissed on 10.2.1999. The land in S. No. 10/1 measuring an extent of 11 cents was handed over to the Board on 6.11.2007, but the land in S. No. 10/2 is under due process of handing over. On verification of the site, it was found that the land in S. No. 10/1 measuring an extent of 11 cents was encroached by the writ petitioner by way of constructing a commercial building. Further, the writ petitioner and two others are the subsequent purchasers of the property in question from Shenbagavalli and therefore the claiming of ownership for the said property by them is absolutely null and void. The petitioner unauthorisedly encroached the Tamil Nadu Housing Board land and started constructing a commercial complex in the property, which is illegal. After passing of the award, the land in dispute belongs to TNHB and no person can claim or question the ownership and possession. The issue of show cause notice to the encroacher or a trespasser is not mandatory. The Land Acquisition Officer was empowered to take possession from the District Administration and hand over the same to the requisitioning body i. e., TNHB and accordingly the property was delivered to the Board on 6.11.2007. As per Section 48-B of the Act, reconveyance of-land is applicable only to the true land owners viz., Shenbagavalli and Rajabather and not to the writ petitioner, who is the subsequent purchaser and does not have any right or title over the property. The petitioner has deliberately taken risk in purchasing the property and constructing a commercial complex with an ulterior motive to grab the property of TNHB. Therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. The petitioner has deliberately taken risk in purchasing the property and constructing a commercial complex with an ulterior motive to grab the property of TNHB. Therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner is a purchaser of the land by virtue of a sale deed dated 24.12.1990 from one Shenbagavalli through her power agent; an extent of 338.28 acres of fund in Ramapuram village was acquired in the year 1975; the acquisition proceedings were initiated by issuing 4(1) Notification on 14.5.1975; thereafter, a declaration under Section 6 was made on 7.6.1978 and award passed on 23.9.1986, but the possession was not taken over by the Board and the petitioner is in possession of the property. It is his further contention that in respect of the total extent of the land, 11 cents alone has been taken possession and the remaining land has not been taken by the respondents. He vehemently contends that the respondents have not complied with the mandatory condition under Section 84 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, by not issuing a notice regarding taking over of the possession and instead adopted a discriminatory and vindictive approach towards the petitioner alone, where as in respect of other lands, the owners are subsequent purchasers and the occupants are being allowed to continue in possession, but this petitioner alone is singled out after a period of 33 years. 7. The learned senior counsel submitted that there is a building existing in the premises and the petitioner is doing business in the said premises. Patta, tax receipts, EB Card, telephone bills etc. would prove the existence of the building in the land. A Division Bench of this Court has already directed the Board to consider the applications seeking reconveyance of the lands covered by the building, if the applicants satisfy the requirements of the resolution No. 7/86, dated 2.7.1986, of the respondent Board. That being the position, the respondents cannot be allowed to take possession of 11 cents alone after a period of 33 years and that too without any notice to the person in occupation of the premises. That being the position, the respondents cannot be allowed to take possession of 11 cents alone after a period of 33 years and that too without any notice to the person in occupation of the premises. His further contention is that even an unauthorised occupant cannot be evicted without following the due process of law as per Section 84 of the Act and the petitioner, being a bona fide purchaser from his vendor and he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property, cannot be thrown out without following the principles of natural justice. 8. The learned senior counsel also contended that as the acquisition was made in the year 1975 and the lands are not utilised for the purpose for which they are acquired for the past 33 years, the petitioner is entitled to ask for re-conveyance under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, claiming that he is the owner of the land. He further added that as per the General Clauses Act, Owner would include the person claiming right under or through the person claiming right under or through the original owner. Also, when it is not in dispute that the petitioner- is a subsequent purchaser of the land from the original Owner, the contention of the respondents that re-conveyance would be given only to the original owner is not sustainable and in the absence of any procedure contemplated, the action of the respondents s tainted with mala fides and it is also discriminatory and vindictive and therefore, the writ petition has to be allowed. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied upon the following decisions: (i) Ram Ratan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh Ram Ratan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh Ram Ratan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1977 SC 619 : (1977) 1 SCC 188 : “A true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser, while the trespasser is in the act or process of trespassing and has not accomplished his possession, but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies available under the law.” “On facts, where the complainant even after encroachment had established his possession over the land in dispute for two to three weeks before the occurrence, for the purpose of criminal law, the complainant must be treated to be in actual possession of the land so as to have a right of private defence to defend his possession even against the true owner. The complainant, therefore, was fully justified in protesting to the accused when they tried to pass through his field and caused damage to the paddy crop by forcibly taking the bullocks through the field. In these circumstances, the appellants who were, undoubtedly the aggressors and had opened the assault could not claim any right of private defence either of person or property.” (ii) Rame Gowda ( Dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. and Another by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. and Another by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. and Another , AIR 2004 SC 4609 : (2004) 1 SCC 769 : “The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to taw. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one, acquiesced to by the true owner. There is a distinction between the trespasser in the process of acquiring possession and the trespasser who had already accomplished or completed his possession wherein the true owner may be treated to have acquiesced in. If the trespasser is in settled possession or effective possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the: law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession.” 10. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents would argue that the lands measuring 11 cents each comprised in S. Nos. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents would argue that the lands measuring 11 cents each comprised in S. Nos. 10/1 and 10/2 respectively in Ramapuram Village are the subject matter of acquisition made in the year 1975, for which award has also been passed in the year 1986 and therefore no one can purchase the land under acquisition proceedings after 4(1) Notification is issued. 11. The learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the original owners Shenbagavalli had earlier challenged the acquisition proceedings in W.P. No. 11394 of 1990 and the same was dismissed by this Court by an order dated 10.2.1999. The petitioner has purchased the land from the said Shenbagavalli, who suppressed from him the filing of the above writ petition and as such no other legal right is available to the petitioner to claim the subject land. 12. The quintessence of the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is that the possessory rights claimed by the writ petitioner are not sustainable in public law but is only a private law remedy under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), which applies between two private parties. In this regard, he relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 10.10.2007 made in W.A. Nos. 1270 to 1276 of 2007 in R. Premavathi and Others v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Another and also a ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others , AIR 1996 SC 866 : (1996) 7 SCC 269 . 13. 13. The further contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is that the writ petitioner is not even entitled to a notice under Section 84 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, as he is an encroacher and not an occupant whose initial occupation was legal, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 100 of 1994, dated 1.7.1997, and any order of status quo granted by this Court cannot be taken advantage of by the petitioner to develop the property even more and therefore this Court would not exercise the special original jurisdiction to protect such possession in respect of the lands which are acquired and for which compensation has been paid and further no equities can be pleaded in such acquisitions. He also contended that the reliance of the petitioner on a judgment in W.A. No. 630 of 1995 is of no avail, since in the said case, the Division Bench actually relied upon single judge and upheld the acquisition, while only giving the liberty to approach the Government for reconveyance. But, in the instant case, the petitioner cannot seek even reconveyance, as the Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the Tamil Nadu Act, contemplates reconveyance only at the instance and in favour of the original owner of the property and the petitioner being a subsequent purchaser cannot claim such a right under the amended Act. 14. To substantiate his contentions, the learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the, following decisions: (i) UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman v. Kalra Properties UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman v. Kalra Properties UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman v. Kalra Properties, AIR 1996 SC 1170 : (1996) 3 SCC 124 : “After the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the Gazette, any encumbrance created by the owner/does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. The sale is void against the State and the purchaser acquired no right, title or interest in the land. The sale is void against the State and the purchaser acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6.” “Therefore, the purchaser, as a person interested in the compensation, since he steps into the shoes of erstwhile owner, is entitled to claim such compensation.” (ii) State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Others ( supra) “9. …Possession of acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted form. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government….” (iii) Ajay Krishna Shinghal and Others v. Union of India and Others Ajay Krishna Shinghal and Others v. Union of India and Others Ajay Krishna Shinghal and Others v. Union of India and Others , AIR 1996 SC 2677 : (1996) 10 SCC 721 : “Subsequent purchaser has no right to challenge the validity of notification under Section 4(1) - At best, he is entitled to compensation based on vendors title.” (iv) Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others , (1996) 11 SCC 698 : “Any encumbrance created by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the State if the possession of the land is already taken over, after the award‘ came to be passed. The land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances under Section 16. Subsequent purchaser has no right to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings.” “Writ petition challenging acquisition proceedings long after passing of the award and vesting of the land in State is not maintainable.” 15. I have considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents and perused the documents annexed to the petition and also the authorities cited by them. 16. I have considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents and perused the documents annexed to the petition and also the authorities cited by them. 16. Admittedly, there were land acquisition proceedings for an extent of 338.28 acres for forming Ramapuram Neighbourhood Scheme and accordingly the Tamil Nadu Housing Board proposed to acquire the said land. The Government approved the 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No. 138, Housing Department, dated 14.5.1975, and the same was published in the Government Gazette on 11.6.1975. It is seen that the above extent of land was divided into 9 blocks for administrative convenience and the land situate in S. No. 10/1 and 10/2 comes under Block-I. The Draft Declaration under Section 6 of the Act and a direction under Section 7 were submitted for an extent of 46.04 acres by the competent Land Acquisition Officer and the same were approved by the Government in G.O. Ms. Nos. 962 and 964, dated 7.6.1978, and thereafter an award was passed in Award No. 10/86, dated 23.9.1986. It is also seen that notices under Section 9(3) and 10 of the Act were sent to the land owners namely Shenbagavalli and Rajabather, but they did not appear for award enquiry and therefore the compensation for the land was ordered to be kept in the Civil Court deposit under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Act. By that time, the land owner Shenbagavalli filed W.P. No. 11394 of 1990, challenging the acquisition, proceedings in respect of S. No. 10/1 and the same was dismissed on 10.2.1999. The said facts are clear from the materials available on record. 17. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is the subsequent purchaser. The Power Agent of Shenbagavalli and Rajabather sold the extent of 161/2 cents of land in favour of the petitioner, his brother and-mother by way of three registered sale deeds dated 24.12.1990, 24.12.1990 and 31.12.1990 and by virtue of the above sale deeds, the petitioner has been in possession of the land. The Power Agent of Shenbagavalli and Rajabather sold the extent of 161/2 cents of land in favour of the petitioner, his brother and-mother by way of three registered sale deeds dated 24.12.1990, 24.12.1990 and 31.12.1990 and by virtue of the above sale deeds, the petitioner has been in possession of the land. It is also seen that the land in Survey No. 10/1 measuring an extent of 11 cents was purchased by the petitioner wherein a building was in existence and the petitioner is doing business in the said premises, in respect of which building tax receipts, telephone bills, and EB Card are filed. 18. The original owner Shenbagavalli had challenged the above acquisition proceedings in W.P. No. 11394 of 1990 and this Court, by an order dated 10.2.1999, passed the following order: “This matter arises under the Land Acquisition Act. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner, except stating that the notification was issued by the Government under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Act, has not stated any other details of the proceedings. The allegations made in the affidavit are very vague. I see no merit in the writ petition and the relief prayed for cannot be granted. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 16920 of 1990 is dismissed.” 19. The acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 1975 and the award was passed in the year 1986. Thereafter, the said Shenbagavalli, knowing fully well that the award was already passed and the amount deposited in Award No.10 of 1986 dated 23.9.1986 to the Civil Court, sold the property to the petitioner herein, without disclosing the pendency of the writ proceedings. It appears that after the dismissal of the writ petition on 10.2.1999, the respondents have taken steps to take possession of the land in Survey No. 10/1, measuring an extent of 11 cents and the same was handed over to the Board finally on 6.11.2007. In respect of other Survey No. 10/2, the land was under the process of handing over. 20. A perusal of the entire records would indicate that the petitioner had purchased the property by way of a registered sale deed and he had been in possession of the same, which all happened after the award was passed on 23.9.1986. 21. In respect of other Survey No. 10/2, the land was under the process of handing over. 20. A perusal of the entire records would indicate that the petitioner had purchased the property by way of a registered sale deed and he had been in possession of the same, which all happened after the award was passed on 23.9.1986. 21. Now, the questions which arise for consideration are, whether the petitioner is entitled for a notice before taking possession of the land and whether the mandamus prayed for can be granted in favour of the petitioner. 22. To consider the above questions, I have given my careful attention to the dates and events of the acquisition proceedings, which are way back in the year 1975 and thereafter the award was passed on 23.9.1986. 23. The petitioner claims that he had purchased the land from the original owner Shenbagavalli by a registered sale deed dated 24.12.1990 and he had been in possession of the same. But, the above said purchase was made only after the land was acquired for a public purpose and after issuance of 4(1) Notification and passing of award. 24. It is a settled law that after the Notification under Section 4(1) is published in the Gazette, any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. 25. In this case, the petitioner purchased the property after issuance of 4(1) Notification and as such the sale is void against the State and it would acquire no right, title or interest in the land. In this respect, the petitioner being a subsequent purchaser of the land in S. No. 10/1 cannot have any right to possess the land after the land in question was taken over by the respondents and the possession was also vested with them. In respect of the land in Survey No. 10/2, the same is under the due process of handing over. Therefore, the argument of the learned senior counsel on the said score cannot have legs to stand and the same is rejected. 26. The learned senior counsel, in his second limb of argument, has made a contention that the petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1990 and a building was in existence, in proof of which tax receipts, telephone bills, EB Card etc. 26. The learned senior counsel, in his second limb of argument, has made a contention that the petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1990 and a building was in existence, in proof of which tax receipts, telephone bills, EB Card etc. are available and therefore the petitioner is entitled for a notice under Section 84 of the Act. 27. As stated supra, the petitioner had occupied the land in question, which was acquired for a public purpose and also after passing of the award. A Division Bench of this Court in a decision in W.A. No. 100 of 1994, dated 1.7.1997, held as follows: “The further challenge, apart from claiming relationship of dependency, is on the basis that there has been violation of sub-section (2) of Section 84 of the Act, in that no proper notice as enjoined therein has been given. We are of the view that unauthorised occupation visualised in Section 84(1)(b) of the Act for the purpose of Section 84(2) of the Act is of a person, whose initial occupation was legal, but subsequently has become unauthorised for any one of the defaults committed as provided in the other limbs of Section 84, and not to an utter stranger so far as the property of the Housing Board is concerned. Such a person who is an encroacher so to say cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act…” 28. A careful analysis of the above decision would make it clear that if the petitioner was in lawful occupation and then he has been made as an encroacher, he would have been entitled for a notice under Section 84(1) and (2). In other words, the encroacher cannot have right to claim such notice, as contemplated under the Act. 29. In this case, the petitioner has been in possession of the land, which was acquired for a public purpose and the same was completed by passing an award. After passing the award, any person, who has been in occupation of that land, would not be entitled for a notice, as he cannot claim himself as a legal occupant. 29. In this case, the petitioner has been in possession of the land, which was acquired for a public purpose and the same was completed by passing an award. After passing the award, any person, who has been in occupation of that land, would not be entitled for a notice, as he cannot claim himself as a legal occupant. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that no notice was served on the petitioner before taking possession of the land fails, the reason being, as on the date of 4(1) Notification, the original owner of the land was Shenbagavalli and not the petitioner, who is only the subsequent purchaser. 30. The next point for consideration is, whether the petitioner can ask for protection under Section 48-B of the Act, as amended by the Tamil Nadu Act, which contemplates reconveyance if the land acquired for a public purpose is not utilised. 31. In this connection, it shall be stated that the petitioner is a subsequent purchaser from the original owner Shenbagavalli, who challenged the Notification by filing a writ petition and the same was dismissed on 10.2.1999. The very object of the amended Act under Section 48-B makes it abundantly clear that when the Government are satisfied that the land vested in the Government under this Act is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired, or for any other public, the Government may transfer such land to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him under this Act for the acquisition of such land inclusive of the amount referred to in sub-section (1-A) and (2) of Section 23, if any, paid under this Act. Therefore, the said provision gives the benefit of reconveyance of land only to the original owner and not to the subsequent purchaser, who has no manner of right in purchasing the land after 4(1) Notification and also after passing of the award. 32. The decisions cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are of no use, as they stand entirely on a different footing. 33. The last and important question is, whether this Court can go into the claim of the petitioner and consider the same after passing of the award in the land acquisition proceedings. 34. It is not disputed that the award was passed as early as, 23.9.1986. 33. The last and important question is, whether this Court can go into the claim of the petitioner and consider the same after passing of the award in the land acquisition proceedings. 34. It is not disputed that the award was passed as early as, 23.9.1986. It is well settled in the ruling of the Supreme Court in Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab , AIR 2003 SC 2414 : (2003) 4 SCC 485 : (2003) 2 MLJ 132 that writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings should not be entertained after the award has been passed. The same was also followed by the First Bench of this Court in the decision in S. Harshavardhan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu S. Harshavardhan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu S. Harshavardhan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu , 2005 (3) CTC 691 . Referring to the Supreme Court ruling, the First Bench held that in any event, after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed, challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder. 35. The mandamus sought for in this writ petition is not to dispossess the petitioner except under due process of law. Admittedly, the petitioner has purchased the property after 4(1) Notification was published and, therefore, the title he claims is not a valid one. Further, the award was passed as early as in the year 1986, whereas the purchase of the property took place in the year 1990. If we apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of U. P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman v. Kalra Properties ( supra) and Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others Star Wire India Limited v. State of Haryana and Others ( supra), referred above, to the facts of the present case, what comes to be known is that the petitioners claim for a right over the property in question after 4(1) Notification and also after passing of the award cannot be acceded to. 36. In the light of the above propositions and on a perusal of the material records, I hold that the petitioner has not made out a case to grant such a relief of mandamus. 36. In the light of the above propositions and on a perusal of the material records, I hold that the petitioner has not made out a case to grant such a relief of mandamus. While doing so, this Court is conscious that though the petitioner had purchased the property after passing of the award and during the pendency of the writ proceedings and he constructed a building and was carrying on business activities in that building, I feel, he, being a subsequent purchaser, is interested in the compensation, since he too steps into the shoes of erstwhile owner and is entitled to claim compensation. In this regard, the petitioner is directed to make a representation to the respondents, seeking for compensation, in which event, the respondents shall determine a reasonable and appropriate compensation, taking note of the various circumstances under which the petitioner had been put in possession and he was continuing there till the possession was taken, and pay the same to the petitioner. 37. With the above observation and direction, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P. No. 1 of 2008 is also dismissed. W. P. No. 2198 of 2008 Per V. DHANPALAN, J. 38. After pronouncement of the order, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has expressed that the respondents may demolish the building in a minutes time, as the same is existing in the subject land. Therefore, he made a consistent plea that this order may be suspended for a period of one week, to enable the petitioner to file an appeal. He relied on a decision of this Court in W.P. No. 30499 of 2004, dated 10.5.2005, wherein the order, was suspended for a period of two weeks to enable the first respondent to file an appeal, if he chooses to do so. 39. Therefore, this order shall remain suspended for a period of one week from today, to enable the petitioner to file an appeal, if he so chooses.