JUDGMENT: 1. THIS application under Article 226 of the Constitution relates to the grievance of the petitioners in respect of the revised Policy and Rules for promotion from Non-Executive to Executive Cadre as contained in the Circular dated 1st April, 2008. The petitioners sought for a declaration that such Circular dated 1st April, 2008 cannot have any applicability so far as the petitioners or similarly situated employees of the respondent authorities, appointed prior to 1st July, 2008, are concerned. The petitioners sought for other consequential reliefs as well. 2. AT the very outset, Mr. Sengupta, appearing as learned Counsel for the respondent authorities, raised dispute regarding maintainability of the present proceeding on the ground that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ application. Mr. Anupam Chatterjee, appearing as learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, in this context, referred to the constitutional provision that the power conferred by Clause" (1) of article 226 of the Constitution to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 3. IT is, perhaps, needless to add that Clause " (1a), which had been inserted by the constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963, was renumbered Cl. (2), by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. 4. MR. Chatterjee further mentioned that there can be no scope for dispute that both the respondents also have their office at Kolkata within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It was further submitted that the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are also having their residence at kolkata and they are naturally concerned over such implementation of the Rules for promotion of the Non-Executive employees to the detriment of the existing terms and conditions. In response to this, Mr. Sengupta submitted that this by itself will not justify entertaining the writ application by this Court. 1 and 2 are also having their residence at kolkata and they are naturally concerned over such implementation of the Rules for promotion of the Non-Executive employees to the detriment of the existing terms and conditions. In response to this, Mr. Sengupta submitted that this by itself will not justify entertaining the writ application by this Court. Inviting attention of the Court to paragraph"10 of the writ application, it was submitted that the petitioners Association is a Registered Trade Union having its office at new Delhi and the said Association had been espousing causes of the employee members and it represented before the authorities and sent demands of justice as well. He invited attention of the Court to the Affidavit which was sworn on 27th day of June, 2008, while submitting that the deponent declared that he was then residing at Dhakuria, Kolkata, though in the cause title his address is indicated as Ballabhgarh, District- Faridabad, haryana. 5. IT was further submitted that the respondent No. 1 may have its office all over the country including State capitals. It may be that the Circular under challenge in the writ application has its impact on hundreds of other employees, who are residing in various places within the country. If such policy decision, as reflected in the impugned Circular, is permitted to be challenged in various High Courts, the complexion is likely to turn complicated and possibility of conflicting decisions cannot also be ruled out. It was categorically mentioned that for all practical and effective purpose, the respondent organization functions at its head office in New Delhi. The Circular in question dated 1. 4. 2008 was also issued from the office of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. at New Delhi. 6. IN such view of the matter, Mr. Sengupta submitted, that there can hardly be any rational justification for this Court to entertain the present application. Mr. Sengupta, in this context, sought to derive support and inspiration from the decision of the learned Single bench of this Court in the case of S. S. Jain and Co. and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1994 (1) CHN 445 . Mr. Sengupta, in this context, sought to derive support and inspiration from the decision of the learned Single bench of this Court in the case of S. S. Jain and Co. and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1994 (1) CHN 445 . The relevant observation of the learned Single Bench in the above case may be reproduced :- "the wording of Article 226 of the Constitution of India itself clarifies that the High Court would have jurisdiction in case even a part only of the cause of action arise, within its local limits. But there is nothing in that Article to show that if a part of the cause of action has arisen within such limits, the petitioner can approach that High Court as of right, and that the said High Court must, under the Constitution entertain the writ petition there. " 7. THE learned Bench further observed:-"there might well be cases where the distinction becomes too fine, and two High courts might both be said to have roughly similar connection with the cause of action. Making too fine, a distinction in these matters, moreover, would work injustice to the petitioner, and the Courts cannot deny relief to a petitioner upon too strict a decision in these matters. But if the cause of action is such as shows a preponderance of facts connected with the other High Court, and if the respondent authorities also happen to be within the local limits of that other High Court, than the High Court connected with only a small part of the cause of action should unhesitatingly refuse relief to the petitioner and send him elsewhere. It is a salutary principle to follow, as the prospective writ petitioners as well as the prospective respondents will know where approach is to be made, and none will try to by pass one High Court in preference for another. We, the Judges, look upon such preferment with suspicion, and deeply discourage any such tendency in any litigant. " 8. FOR the purpose of adjudication of the controversy as raised by Mr. Sengupta, it is certainly not necessary to discuss about the other aspects of jurisdiction i. e. pecuniary or jurisdiction relating to subject matter. The objection raised only relates to territorial jurisdiction. " 8. FOR the purpose of adjudication of the controversy as raised by Mr. Sengupta, it is certainly not necessary to discuss about the other aspects of jurisdiction i. e. pecuniary or jurisdiction relating to subject matter. The objection raised only relates to territorial jurisdiction. Deriving inspiration from the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Bench and having regard to the subject matter of controversy raised in the writ application, I find it difficult, if not impossible, to brush aside the objection as raised on behalf of the respondents. 9. IN such circumstances, the present writ application does not deserve to be entertained by this Court and is, thus, disposed of " without, of course, deciding the matter on merits. Needless to add, the petitioners will be certainly at liberty to raise the grievances as ventilated in the present application before appropriate Court. There is no order as to costs.