Judgement Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, C. J. :- This writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned orders contained in Notices dated 16-5-2008 (Annex-14); letter dated 21-7-2008 (Annex-16); and notice dated 21-8-2008 (Annex-19) by which the proceedings under the provisions of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") have been initiated and completed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that initiation of proceedings, continuance thereof and passing of the orders by the authority are totally illegal and in contravention of the statutory provisions and those are liable to be quashed. 3. On the other hand Mr. Tuna Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, bank has raised a preliminary objection that the petition has been filed without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, the petition should not be entertained and the petitioner should be relegated to the appellate forum. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner seriously objected to the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Tuna Sahu, learned counsel for the bank and submitted that it is not necessary for the petitioner to approach the appellate authority in case there has been violation of the statutory provisions and the principle of natural justice and Court should not relegate the petitioner to approach the appellate forum. In case the petitioner is forced to approach the appellate forum, this Court must protect him by granting interim relief till the matter is decided by the appellate forum. 5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection and on the issue that in case the parties are relegated to the statutory forum whether the writ Court is competent to protect the petitioner for the interregnum period by granting interim relief. 6. The issue of exhausting statutory remedy has been considered time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 7. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 207 , held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. 7. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 207 , held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425 , holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed upon that discretion. However, the power can be exercised alone with recognised line and not arbitrarily and the Court must keep in mind that the power shall not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensured or is likely to ensue and in other cases the parties must be relegated to the Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense. 8. Again a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Union of India v. T. R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , held that it is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. The Apex Court held that existence of an another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy is exhausted, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good grounds therefor. 9. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in State of U. P. v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would like provided there is no other equally effective remedy. 9. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in State of U. P. v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would like provided there is no other equally effective remedy. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice. Therefore, in a proper case, powers of writ can be exercised, but should not be exercised generally where other adequate legal remedy is available though it may not be, per se, a bar to issue a writ of prerogative. The Court held that the remedy, being discretionary, cannot be asked as a matter of right, even if the order is a nullity, on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice. The Court held as under :- "......save in exceptional cases, the Courts will not interfere under Article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal or revision. It is true that on a matter of jurisdiction or on a question that goes to the root of the case, the High Courts can entertain a petition at an early stage but they are not bound to do so and a petition would not be thrown out because the petitioner had done that which the Courts usually ask him to do, namely, to exhaust his normal remedies before invoking an extraordinary jurisdiction.......The petitioner would have been expected to pursue the remedies of appeal or revision and could not have come to the High Court in the ordinary way until he had exhausted them." 10. In N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 422 , and Siliguri Municipality and Ors. v. Amalendu Das and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 653 ; the Supreme Court held that where there is another remedy provided, the Court must properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court may interfere in exceptional circumstances with circumspection. 11. v. Amalendu Das and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 653 ; the Supreme Court held that where there is another remedy provided, the Court must properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court may interfere in exceptional circumstances with circumspection. 11. Remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil Court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. High Court cannot be justified to exercise its powers if an effective remedy is available to the party. (Vide State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai etc. etc., AIR 1964 SC 1006 ; Municipal Council, Khurai and Anr. v. Kamal Kumar and Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1321 ; S. T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 616 ; Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil and Ors. (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 ; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 695 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3032 ); Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1715 ; L. L. Sudhakar Reddy and Ors. v. State of A. P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 634 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3205 ); Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3982 ; G. K. N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 72 ; and Pratap Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 : AIR 2002 SC 3385 . 12. In Harbanslal Sahnia and Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 107 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2120 ), the Supreme Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the writ seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principle of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 13. 13. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 192 , held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained code and itself provides for appealable/revisable forum, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked generally in matters, relating to its provision. 14. Similar view has been reiterated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 330 ; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 294 ; and Shivgonda Anna Patil and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2281 ; C. A. Ibraham v. Income-tax Officer, Kottayam and Anr., AIR 1961 SC 609 and H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and Ors. v. M/s. Gopinath and Sons and Ors, 1992 (Suppl) 2 SCC 312; and Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Anr, AIR 1983 SC 603 . 15. In Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 74 ; and Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, AIR 1999 SC 2859, the Apex Court held that writ petition should not generally be entertained if statute provide for remedy of appeal or revision and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum. 16. In Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3208 ; the Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under :- "The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under S. 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act." (Emphasis added). 17. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja Mahendra Pal and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1786 while dealing with a similar issue the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- "It is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature and can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right.......The constitutional Court should insist upon the party (to avail of the efficacious alternative remedy) instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen in peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said Article." (Emphasis added) 18. In Govt. of A. P. and Ors. v. J. Sridevi and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1801 , the Apex Court held that where a authority is competent to determine the issue, "the High Court in a writ jurisdiction should have directed the authority only to take an appropriate decision. When the statutory authority is vested with the power to determine the question as to the applicability of the provisions of the Act, it is ordinarily desirable to leave the question to be decided by such authority. The aggrieved party can file appeal against the decision within the framework provided under the statute and the ultimate decision also could be challenged under judicial review, if permitted in law. 19. In the State of Bihar and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 206 , the Apex Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ Court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition. 20. 19. In the State of Bihar and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 206 , the Apex Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ Court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition. 20. In Champalal Binani v. The Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 645 , the Court observed as under :- "The assessee had an adequate remedy under the Income-tax Act which he could have availed of. He however, did not move the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which was competent to decide all questions of fact and law which the assessee could have raised in the appeal including the grievance that he had not adequate opportunity of making his representation and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. In our judgment, no adequate ground was made out for entertaining the petition........ . Where the aggrieved party has an alternative remedy, the High Court would be slow to entertain a petition challenging an order of a taxing authority which is ex facie with jurisdiction. A petition for a writ of certiorari may lie to the High Court, where the order is on the face of it erroneous or raises question of jurisdiction or of infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner. The present case was one in which the jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked." 21. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court deciding that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. In Seth Chand Ratan v. Pandit Durga Prasad and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2736 ; U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. U. P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karmachari Sangh (2004) 4 SCC 268 ; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. v. N. R. Vairamani and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 579 ( AIR 2004 SC 4778 ); Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2351 ; U. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264 ; and Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. Jabar Singh (2007) 2 SCC 112. 22. (2004) 8 SCC 579 ( AIR 2004 SC 4778 ); Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2351 ; U. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264 ; and Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. Jabar Singh (2007) 2 SCC 112. 22. Thus, generally the writ Court should not entertain a petition unless the parties have exhausted the statutory remedies. However, in exceptional circumstances if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant, the writ Court can entertain the petition. There can be no strait-jacket formula for this purpose, however, the rule of exclusion is a self imposed restriction of the Court. In a appropriate exceptional case, where the order is passed by an authority inherently lacking jurisdiction or order is passed in violation of principle of natural justice, the Court can always exercise its writ jurisdiction. 23. So far as issue No. 2 is concerned, no writ petition can be maintained for claiming the interim relief. 24. The issue as to whether writ Court can grant interim relief for interregnum period while relegating a party to the statutory authority was examined by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 , wherein the Orissa High Court while dismissing the writ petition without entering into the merit of the case, relegated the petitioner therein to the Civil Court as the petition raised disputed questions of fact, had granted the interim relief for a limited period to facilitate the petitioner to approach the Civil Court and obtain interim relief. The Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the said order of the High Court observing that the writ was not maintainable only for the purpose of granting interim relief and in case the High Court did not entertain the case on merit and relegated the party to some other forum, it did not have a power to grant interim relief for the interregnum period. The Court held as under :- "The question which we have to determine is whether directions in the nature of interim relief only could be granted under Art. 226, when the Court expressly stated that it refrained from determining the rights of the parties on which a writ of mandamus or directions of a like nature could be issued. The Court held as under :- "The question which we have to determine is whether directions in the nature of interim relief only could be granted under Art. 226, when the Court expressly stated that it refrained from determining the rights of the parties on which a writ of mandamus or directions of a like nature could be issued. In our opinion, Art. 226 cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and final relief on the application as the High Court has purported to do. The directions have been given here only to circumvent the provisions of S. 80 Civil P. C., and in our opinion that it is not within the scope of Art. 226. An interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. If the Court was of opinion that there was no other convenient or adequate remedy open to the petitioners, it might have proceeded to investigate the case on its merits and come to a decision as to whether the petitioners succeeded in establishing that there was an infringement of any of their legal rights which entitled them to a writ of mandamus or any other directions of a like nature; and pending such determination it might have made a suitable interim order for maintaining the status quo ante. But when the Court declined to decide on the rights of the parties and expressly held that they should be investigated more properly in a civil suit, it could not, for the purpose of facilitating the institution of such suit, issue directions in the nature of temporary injunctions, under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the language of Art. 226 does not permit such an action. On that short ground, the judgment of the Orissa High Court under appeal cannot be upheld." (Emphasis added). 25. In our opinion, the language of Art. 226 does not permit such an action. On that short ground, the judgment of the Orissa High Court under appeal cannot be upheld." (Emphasis added). 25. The said judgment stood approved by a Seven Judges' Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745 , further placing reliance on Maxwel wherein it had been observed that when an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing of such acts or applying such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. 26. The ratio of the said judgment in Madan Gopal (supra) has consistently been approved and followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as is evident from the Constitution Benches decisions in Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1305 ; and State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev, AIR 1964 SC 685 . 27. In State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh "Balak", AIR 1966 SC 1441 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has made a similar observation observing that granting interim relief is permissible when the case is pending before the Court and if jurisdiction is conferred by the Statute upon a Court, the conferment of jurisdiction implies the conferment of power of doing all such acts or applying such means. 28. In the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , a similar view has been reiterated. 29. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maharaj Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 540 , entertained a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the question involved therein had been as to whether the Moti Moree held by the petitioner and his ancestors under a Grant was part of Jagir within the meaning of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagir Abolition) Act, 1954. The vires of the provisions of the Act had been challenged. The Hon'ble Apex Court subsequently came to the conclusion that the petitioner therein had to establish satisfactorily that the Moti Moree was not a Jagir within the definition given under the Act 1954 and the question required to be completely thrashed out and adjudicated upon by the Civil Court. The vires of the provisions of the Act had been challenged. The Hon'ble Apex Court subsequently came to the conclusion that the petitioner therein had to establish satisfactorily that the Moti Moree was not a Jagir within the definition given under the Act 1954 and the question required to be completely thrashed out and adjudicated upon by the Civil Court. The Court relegated the parties to the Civil Court and adjourned the case till that issue was decided by the Civil Court. However, the Court further granted the following interim relief :- "We, therefore, order that the petitioner do file the necessary suit within three months on this date and the petition do stand adjourned till after the hearing and final disposal of that Suit. The stay granted by this Court in this petition will continue in the meanwhile. We may record here that the learned Advocate General on behalf of State of Bombay has also given his undertaking not to take any steps against the petitioner in the meanwhile." 30. In the said case, though the parties therein were relegated to the Civil Court for adjudication of their rights by adducing evidence on facts but granted the interim relief till the disposal of the Suit for the reason that the matter remained pending before the Court to be decided after disposal of the Suit. Moreso, it contained an undertaking given by the Advocate General of the State of Bombay not to take any step adversely affecting the petitioner. 31. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court that the writ Court has a power to grant interim relief so long the case is pending before it. In a case where the writ Court refuses to entertain a petition and relegates the party to some other appropriate forum or the party itself withdraws the writ petition to approach another forum, as the case does not remain pending before the Court, the writ Court has no competence to issue any direction protecting the right of the petitioner interregnum, for the reason that writ does not lie for granting only an interim relief and interim relief can be granted provided the case is pending before the Court and rights of the parties are likely to be adjudicated upon on merit. 32. 32. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to approach the appellate forum. However, if the petitioner approaches the appellate forum and files an application for interim relief, we request the learned appellate authority to consider and decide the same in accordance with law. 33. B. N. MAHAPATRA, J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed.