JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—As agreed upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the appeal is heard on informal papers. Now let us consider the merit of the appeal. 2. The following reliefs are prayed in the suit before the Court below : “(a) That through the decree of this Court it’s be declared that the name of the defendant so included in the transfer deed dated 5.10.1982 executed by Sarva Shri Gianendra Singh, Yogendra Singh and Satendra Singh sons of Dr. D.P. Singh as benami and the defendant has no right or title of whatsoever nature in plot No. KD-17 Ashiana, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad alongwith all the construction standing thereon the boundaries of which are given at the foot of this plaint and the plaintiff is its sole owner with leasehold rights. (b) That through the decree of this Hon’ble Court, a permanent prohibitory injunction be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant whereby defendant be permanently restrained from transferring, selling any share or a particular portion of the property in suit and from parting with the possession of the portion which is in his occupation with any person except to the plaintiff. (bb) That by the order of this Hon’ble Court, the defendant be directed to hand over the physical and vacant possession of the ground floor of house No. KD-17, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad except one last room towards North and one Southern garage out of 2 garages and he also be directed to leave the joint use of the open space, drive any passage situated at ground floor of the said house, to the plaint within the time fixed by this Hon’ble Court and in case the defendant fails to comply with the said order of the Court, the same be executed, Hon’ble Court. (bbb) That a decree of Rs. 1,80,000/- (Rupees one lac and eighty thousand only) be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant as the damages for use and occupation for the last three years from the date of filing of the suit. (bbbb) That future and pendente lite damages for use and occupation be also awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant Rs. 10,000/- per month, upto the date of the actual delivery of the possession to the plaintiff. (c) That the cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendant. (bbbb) That future and pendente lite damages for use and occupation be also awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant Rs. 10,000/- per month, upto the date of the actual delivery of the possession to the plaintiff. (c) That the cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendant. (d) That any other relief which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendant.” 3. Initially, suit was filed with prayers in terms of (a) and (b). Appropriate Court-fees were paid by the appellant in the Court below. However, when his further prayers were added by way of amendment particularly prayer (bb) as above, as per the office note, an ad valorem Court fees were directed to be paid under the order impugned of the Court below. 4. Being aggrieved by and/or dissatisfied with the order of the Court below, the appellant preferred this appeal. 5. Mr. Murlidhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended before this Court that the right of the defendant/respondent, if any, in respect of the property is not more than a licensee. Therefore, as per interpretation of law by the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1985 SC 857 , Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, after termination of the licence, the licensee is under a clear obligation to surrender his possession to the owner and if he fails to do so, the licensee will be compelled to discharge such obligation by way of mandatory injunction under Section 55 of the Specific Relief Act. Even under the English law the same principle is available, therefore, when a licensor approaches the Court for an injunction within a reasonable time after the licence is terminated, he is entitled to the injunction. On the other hand, if the licensor causes huge delay the Court may refuse the discretion to grant an injunction on the ground that the licensor had not been diligent, and in that case the licensor will have to bring a suit for possession which will be governed by Section 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act. 6. From the arguments, as advanced by Mr. 6. From the arguments, as advanced by Mr. Murlidhar, it appears to us that when a licensor proceeds against licensee diligently within the reasonable time then the relief of injunction has to be granted as incidental relief because it is obvious outcome of primary relief for which no Court fees are required to be paid. 7. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant/respondent, contended before this Court that the suit was filed in terms of prayers (a) and (b) initially. Court fees were paid accordingly. There is no objection in entertaining the suit with such prayers. The prayer (a) is made to declare the name of the defendant/respondent as ‘Benami’ not for determination of licence. As soon as decree was passed for such declaration, prohibitory injunction in terms of prayer (b) is obvious. But prayer (bb), which is incorporated by way of amendment, is apparently consequential relief for which Court required ad valorem Court-fees to be paid. The suit is not dimissed on such ground. The order has been passed on the basis of the valuation report. There is a difference between applicability of law regarding licence and declaration of ‘Benami’. Therefore, he cited a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 , Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and others, to establish that the Court in deciding the question of Court-fees should look into the allegation in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief sought for. He also relied upon Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1970 All 488 , Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Laxmi Narain, (FB) to explain that the words “consequential relief” have not been defined in the Court-fees Act. The meaning which should be given to a word or expression not defined in an enactment should be its ordinary dictionary meaning or a meaning which is necessary to be implied by the context in which it is used or by the object of the provisions or by the scheme of the enactment. 8. According to the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of Laxmi Narain (supra) Court Fees Act is a fiscal statute like identical legislation. 8. According to the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of Laxmi Narain (supra) Court Fees Act is a fiscal statute like identical legislation. Its provisions and connotations must be construed in strict sense. However, in 2008 (1) ADJ 449 (DB), Her Highness Maharani Rewa v. Sangam Upnivesh Awas and Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. and others, this Division Bench held as follows : “According to us, The Court Fees Act, 1870 is enabling provision but not debarring provision. It only debars unscrupulous litigants. Therefore, the Court has to see that a litigant can come forward by playing decent Court-fees for the purpose of administration of justice. However, it should also be remembered that the payment of Court-fees cannot be the earning of the State. In a judgment of Supreme Court reported in (1996) 1 SCC 345 , Secretary to Govt. of Madras v. P.R. Sriramulu, it was held as follows : “However, the administration of justice is a service which the State is under an obligation to render to its subject. The amount raised from the suitors by way of fee should not normally exceed the cost of the administration of justice because, possibly there could be no justification with the State to enrich itself from High Court fees or to secure revenue for general administration. The total receipts from the Court fees should be such as by and large can cover the cost of administration of justice. There should also be some measure of uniformity in the scales of Court fees throughout the country as there appears to be a vast difference in the scales of Court fees in various States of the country. The feasibility of a fixed maximum chargeable fee also deserves serious consideration.” 9. However, in this case the issue is whether the prayer, as made by way of amendment, seems to be bare incidental or substantively consequential or not to pay the Court fees in accordance with existing law. 10. Section 7 (iv)(c) speaks that to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, plaintiff will have to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Similarly, under Section 7(v) in suits for the possession of the land, houses and gardens etc. it will be on the basis of the subject matter. 11. 10. Section 7 (iv)(c) speaks that to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, plaintiff will have to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Similarly, under Section 7(v) in suits for the possession of the land, houses and gardens etc. it will be on the basis of the subject matter. 11. According to us, in this case the consequential relief cannot be said to be bare and mere incidental relief but a substantive relief in respect of the land in question. It is rightly held that ‘Benami’ means one is accepting anybody’s substantive right in the property then seeking to dispossess him. This is not a bare relief to dispossess a licensee as per claim. It may be that the same is hidden course but we have to go by the plaint. 12. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in passing the order by the learned Judge of the Court below directing the plaintiff/appellant to pay the ad valorem Court fees. 13. Thus, in totality we cannot allow the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed without imposing any cost. Court fees, as directed by the Court below be deposited as early as possible but not beyond the period of fortnight from the date of communication of this order. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————