Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 831 (MAD)

E. Kumar v. P. Jothi & Others

2008-03-06

K.VENKATARAMAN

body2008
Judgment :- 1. The present Revision is directed against the order of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, dated 12. 2007 made in election Original Petition No.8 of 2007. 2. The third respondent in the said election Original Petition is the petitioner herein, the petitioner thereon is the first respondent and respondents 1, 2 and 4 in the said petition are respondents 2 to 4. 3. The short facts which are required for the disposal of the present Revision are set out here under: Election for electing Councillors for Tiruttani Panchayat Union was held on 110. 2006 and 12 Councillors were elected. All of them assumed office at 10.00 a.m. in the office of the Tiruttani Panchayat Union on 210. 2006. Election of Chairman of the Tiruttani Panchayat Union was announced to be held on 210. 2006 at 10.00 a.m. and election of Vice Chairman at 2.00 p.m. on the said date. The third respondent, the Returning Officer, who is holding the rank of Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruttani, distributed forms supplied by the State election Commission and the forms have been collected and filled up and submitted to the Returning Officer. Later, the Returning Officer announced the result. The petitioner herein was declared as elected as Chairman of the said Panchayat. The first respondent herein challenged the said election before the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, in O.P. No.117 of 2006. The petitioner herein filed Tr.C.M.P. No.152 of 2007 under Section 24 of Civil Procedure Code before this Court praying to withdraw the said election Original Petition from the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, and to transfer the same to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvannamalai. On 6. 2007, a consent order was passed by this Court transferring the said election Original Petition pending before the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. The Election Original Petition has been re-numbered as E.O.P. No.8 of 2007 before the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. The learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, allowed the election Original Petition declaring that the election of the petitioner held on 210. 2006 is void and also directed respondents 2 and 3 to conduct a fresh election for the said post according to law. The said order is under challenge in the present Revision. 4. Mr. The learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, allowed the election Original Petition declaring that the election of the petitioner held on 210. 2006 is void and also directed respondents 2 and 3 to conduct a fresh election for the said post according to law. The said order is under challenge in the present Revision. 4. Mr. K. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner broadly raised the following issues and contended that the order of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has to be set aside: (a) The learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has no jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition pertaining to the Chairman of the Tiruttani Panchayat Union, since the competent Court to decide the matter is the Principal District Court, Tiruvallur. (b) On merits, the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, went wrong in declaring that the election of the petitioner as Chairman in the said Panchayat Union as void. (c) On 210. 2006, the Returning Officer viz., the third respondent herein has found that the nomination of the petitioner alone was in order and hence the petitioner was declared as elected as Chairman of the said Panchayat Union and the same has not been properly considered by the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. 5. Per contra, Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent made the following submissions: (a) The Election Original Petition was originally filed before the Competent Court viz., Principal District Court, Tiruvallur, but, however, since the petitioner filed a Transfer Application in Tr.C.M.P. No.152 of 2007 praying for withdrawal of the Election Original Petition filed by the first respondent and to transfer the same to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvannamalai, and a consent order was passed by this Court transferring the election Original Petition from the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, to the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. Thus, after the consent order, the petitioner cannot urge that the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has no jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition filed by the first respondent. (b) The Returning Officer, the third respondent herein, refused to entertain the nomination form filled up by the first respondent, stating that the first respondent shall use the nomination form issued by the third respondent alone. (b) The Returning Officer, the third respondent herein, refused to entertain the nomination form filled up by the first respondent, stating that the first respondent shall use the nomination form issued by the third respondent alone. Later, the first respondent filled up the form issued by the third respondent, which is not the required form and which does not contain the Ward Number of Seconder. (c) Further, the first respondent filled up yet another nomination form and submitted the same to the Returning Officer, but both of them have been rejected on untenable grounds. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the rejection of the nomination forms submitted by the first respondent is on unsound reasons. The learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, considered every aspect of the matter in the election Original Petition and rightly allowed the same, which does not require any reconsideration by this Court. 6. Mrs. R. Revathy, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the Returning Officer distributed the forms that were earlier circulated to him by the State election Commission. The petitioner and the first respondent collected the said forms from the Returning Officer, filled up their respective forms and submitted to him. Before submitting his nomination to the Returning Officer, the first respondent questioned the Returning Officer regarding the non-printing of "Ward Number of Seconder" in the form circulated to him. The Returning Officer replied him stating that whatever form that was supplied by the State election Commission, has been given to the petitioner and the first respondent and the same shall be used by them. Thereafter, the Returning Officer contacted the Office of the District Collector and made enquiries about the query raised by the first respondent. The telephonic instruction came from the office of the second respondent is to the effect that the forms supplied to all the Panchayat Union Council election are one and the same and the same should be used. Thereafter, the Returning Officer announced the result at 10.30 a.m. on 210. 2006. The nomination form submitted by the petitioner was found to be in order, whereas in the nomination form filled up by the first respondent, the Ward Number of the seconder was missing and it contained only the signature in that column. Thereafter, the Returning Officer announced the result at 10.30 a.m. on 210. 2006. The nomination form submitted by the petitioner was found to be in order, whereas in the nomination form filled up by the first respondent, the Ward Number of the seconder was missing and it contained only the signature in that column. Thus, the petitioners nomination form was found to be valid and the same was accepted and the first respondents form was found to be invalid and hence, the same was rejected. After declaration of the result, the first respondent filled up yet another nomination form. Likewise, the fourth respondent D. Chandran has also filed his nomination form at the same time and the Returning Officer has to reject both the nomination forms since the same were handed over to the third respondent at 10.50 a.m. Thus, according to the learned Government Advocate, the third respondent has acted impartially and accepted the valid nomination form of the petitioner. However, the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, without considering those aspects, has allowed the election Original Petition and the same is liable to be set aside. 7. I have heard at length Mr. K. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent and Mrs. R. Revathy, learned learned Government Advocate, appearing for respondents 2 and 3. 8. Before adverting to the merits of the matter in issue, which has been dealt with by the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, I am constrained to decide the issue of jurisdiction raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. (A) (i) The first and foremost submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that Section 258 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1994 (herein after called as `the said Act) contemplates that Election Original Petition shall be tried by the District Judge of the District, in which the panchayat is situated. In the case on hand, with regard to the Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union, the concerned District Court is the District Court, Tiruvallur. While so, the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has no jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition, has passed orders and hence it is liable to be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel was more emphatic on the language used in Section 258 of the said Act. While so, the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has no jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition, has passed orders and hence it is liable to be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel was more emphatic on the language used in Section 258 of the said Act. Since the said Section reads that "no election of a President or a Chairman or a Member shall be called in question except by an election Petition presented to the District Judge of the District in which the panchayat is situated", according to the learned Senior Counsel, the District Judge, Tiruvallur, alone has got competency to decide the matter. (ii) In this connection, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner cited a decision reported in M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 , and submitted that if negative words are used in a provision, it shall be taken that it is prohibitory. The learned Senior Counsel was more emphatic about the expressions used by their Lordships in the said judgment viz., "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative". Since Section 258 of the said Act starts with "no election of a President", it shall mean there is a clear prohibition. (iii) Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied on the decision reported in Haridwr Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, AIR 1972 SC 1242 . Learned Senior Counsel was emphatic over paragraph 13 of the said judgment. It is useful to reproduce the said paragraph, which reads as follows: "13. Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory." (iv) emphasizing the above referred passages in the said judgment, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is a clear prohibition in filing election Original Petition before any other District Court apart from the District Court, Tiruvallur, the district in which the panchayat is situated. (v) Yet another decision that has been cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is Govindlal v. Agr. P.M. Committee, AIR 1976 SC 263 . Paragraph 66 of the said judgment, according to the learned Senior Counsel, clearly emphasis that if the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory. Thus, the sum and substance of the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that since Section 258 of the said Act reads that "no election of a President or a Chairman or a Member shall be called in question except by an election Petition presented to the District Judge of the district, in which the panchayat is situated", filing of election Original Petition before any other District Judge is prohibitory and since in the case on hand, the order in the Election Original Petition has been passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, the same has to be set aside in view of the fact that he has no competency to decide the said election Original Petition. (vi) In answer to the said contention, Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent contended that Section 258 of the said Act no doubt contemplates election Original Petition pertaining to the election of a President or a Chairman or a member shall be presented before the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated and the same was rightly filed before the competent District Court viz., learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur. But, however, the said Section does not contemplate that the same shall be tried by the same District Judge. The learned senior Counsel, while drawing my attention to Section 258 (1) of the said Act, has also drawn my attention to Clauses 5 and 6 of the said section to substantiate his contention. But, however, the said Section does not contemplate that the same shall be tried by the same District Judge. The learned senior Counsel, while drawing my attention to Section 258 (1) of the said Act, has also drawn my attention to Clauses 5 and 6 of the said section to substantiate his contention. (vii) On the basis of the above submissions, now let me decide the issue raised by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as first respondent section 258(1) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994, reads as follows: "No election of a President or a Chairman or a Member shall be called in question except by an election Petition presented to the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated, within forty-five days from the date of the publication of the result of the election under this Act." The said provision makes it very clear that election of a President or a Chairman or a Member has to be challenged by way of election Petition by presenting the same to the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated. On a curious look out of the said provision, it could be seen that it contemplates presenting the election Petition before the District Judge of the District in which the panchayat is situated. If the intention of the legislature is that the election Petition has to be presented and tried by the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated, the legislature could have framed the provision incorporating the words "presented and also tried". But, section 258(1) of the said Act stipulates only presentation to the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated and it does not state that it should be tried by the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated. (viii) In this connection, Clauses (5) and (6) of section 258 of the said Act can be usefully extracted here under: "(5) The trial of an election Petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interest of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the District Judge finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for the reasons to be recorded. (6) every election Petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the District Judge for trial". Clauses (5) and (6) of section 258 of the said Act, contain the words "trial" and "tried", whereas section 258 (1) of the said Act contains only the word "presented" and not "tried". Thus, a reading of section 258 of the said Act will clearly establish that the election Original Petition has to be presented before the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated, but it does not contemplate trying of the election Original Petition by the same District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated. (ix) Thus, the judgment relied on by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that since the negative words are used in section 258 of the said Act, the election Original Petition shall be tried by the District Judge of the District in which the Panchayat is situated, may not have any relevance for the purpose of the case on hand. (B) The second limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner on the question of jurisdiction is that if the words of any statute are themselves clear, precise and unambiguous, the words themselves in such cases will declare the intention of the legislature. While so, there need be no interpretation of the provision of the said statute. In this connection, the learned senior Counsel cited the decision reported in Govindlal v. Agr. P.M. Committee, AIR 1976 sC 263 . The learned senior Counsel was more emphatic regarding paragraph 13 of the said judgment, which is extracted here under: "Cranford on "Statutory Construction" (edn.1940, Art.261 p.516) sets out the following passage from an American case approvingly: "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other". The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other". Thus, the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word `shall or `may is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature." The answer to this submission made by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that as already discussed, section 258(1) is very clear that the election Original Petition shall be presented before the District Judge of the District where the Panchayat is situated which shall mean only presentation and does not mean it shall be decided by the same District Judge. The provision under section 258(1) of the said Act is very clear and it does not require any other interpretation. Hence, the judgment cited by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in fact supports the case of the first respondent rather than the petitioner. (C) (i) The third limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that consent of the parties will not confer jurisdiction. Hence, the judgment cited by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in fact supports the case of the first respondent rather than the petitioner. (C) (i) The third limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that consent of the parties will not confer jurisdiction. The reason for such submission is that though the first respondent has chosen to file an Election Original Petition before the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, the petitioner herein has chosen to file a Transfer Application before this Court in Tr.C.M.P. No.152 of 2007 under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for withdrawal of the Election Original Petition filed by the first respondent herein in O.P. No.117 of 2006 before the said Court and to transfer the same to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvannamalai. A consent order was passed by this Court in the said Transfer Petition on 6. 2007 transferring the said election Original Petition filed by the first respondent herein pending before the learned_ Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, to the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. In view of the said stated position, the learned senior Counsel contended that even the consent of both parties will not confer jurisdiction to a Court, which has no competency to decide the matter. The learned senior Counsel, in this connection, cited a decision reported in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswa, AIR 1954 SC 340 . The learned Senior Counsel has emphasized on paragraph 6 of the said judgment, which is extracted here under: "The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertains a suit or an Appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of section 11 of the suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceeding. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceeding. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." (ii) The fourth limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that a consent cannot cure defect and for that proposition, the learned senior Counsel relied on the decision reported in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Rain Bohra, 1990 (1) CC 193. (iii) Thus, the sum and substance of the argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has no jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition pertaining to the election of the Chairman in respect of Tituttani Panchayat Union, which falls within the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge, Tiruvallur. The consent will not confer jurisdiction. (iv) I am unable to accept the said contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner since the petitioner himself has filed an Application for transferring the election Original Petition pending before the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur, to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvannamalai. Having filed such an Application and having given consent for transfer of the said election Original Petition to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, can it be open to him to contest that the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the election Original Petition, has no competency to decide the same. It is one thing to say that he was responsible for the transfer of the matter, which has been filed before the competent Court, viz., Principal District Court, Tiruvallur, to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. secondly, having given consent, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the competency of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the election Original Petition. Thirdly, he has waived his right to question the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the Election Original Petition. secondly, having given consent, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the competency of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the election Original Petition. Thirdly, he has waived his right to question the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the Election Original Petition. In this connection, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied on a decision reported in Rosily Mathew and others v. Joseph, AIR 1987 Ker. 42 , and submitted that when once the petitioner herein sought for transfer from the District Judge, Tiruvallur to the file of the another District and having consented for transfer before the learned District Judge, Vellore, later, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the learned District Judge, Vellore has no jurisdiction to hear the election Petition. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: "19. …….A question then would arise whether the Court can have such deviation from the usual procedure (cursus curiae) and decide the issue before it and whether such orders will legally be binding on the parties. It is by now well-established that Courts can adopt a procedure to settle the dispute `extra, cursus curiae, provided the parties to the dispute have either consented to the said course or have acquiesced in the said procedure. A party thereto thereafter cannot turn round and say that the Court alone is to be blamed for adopting the said procedure. This is based on the Doctrine of estoppel. But that does not mean that the Court by deviating from the `cursus curiae can assume jurisdiction which it does not possess. It is equally well established that if the Court with the consent of the parties or with their acquiescence departs from the usual course of procedure (governing the case) and decides a question of fact, the said decision is not even Appealable because "it is incompetent for the parties afterwards to assume that they have an alternative mode of proceeding and to treat the matter as if it had been arrived in due course." (Vide Burgress v. Morton, 1896 AC 136). For the same reason it is also not reviewable. For the same reason it is also not reviewable. The parties are bound by the order which in the circumstances of the case partakes of the character of a consent decree." (v) Thus, when an Application has been filed at the instance of the petitioner and when consent has been given for transferring the matter from the learned Principal District Judge, Thiruvallur to the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, it is not open to the petitioner to contest that even the consent cannot cure the defect. The judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner reported in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswa, AIR 1954 SC 340 , may not be relevant for the purpose of the case since in the foregoing paragraphs 1 have held that the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has got jurisdiction to decide the matter. (D) (i) The fifth limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that section 24(b)(ii) of Civil Procedure Code gives power for transferring a matter pending before the subordinate Courts to any other competent Court to try and dispose of the same. Thus, the general power of transfer as enumerated under section 24 of Civil Procedure Code, gives power to the High Court to transfer a matter from a subordinate Court to other Competent Court to try and dispose of the same. In the case on hand, according to the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the High Court while passing orders on the Transfer Application of the petitioner, has transferred the matter to the file of learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has no competency to try and dispose of the same. Hence, the order of transfer made by this Court transferring a matter to a Court, which has no competency, cannot be taken advantage of by the first respondent and contend that in view of such transfer, the District Court at Vellore, has acquired jurisdiction. The learned senior Counsel, in this connection, has drawn my attention to the judgment reported in Lakshmi Narain v. First Addl. Dist. Judge, AIR 1964 SC 489 . The learned senior Counsel attempted to lay his hand on paragraph 6 of the said judgment, which is extracted here under: "With all respect, the High Court has completely misdirected itself in interpreting the provisions of section 3(1) of the Act, which must govern this case. Dist. Judge, AIR 1964 SC 489 . The learned senior Counsel attempted to lay his hand on paragraph 6 of the said judgment, which is extracted here under: "With all respect, the High Court has completely misdirected itself in interpreting the provisions of section 3(1) of the Act, which must govern this case. That section runs as under: "Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt, decree, liability, or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court." The High Court has not given effect to the words "any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court". Now, giving full effect to the words just quoted of section 3(1) of the Act, the High Court and the High Court alone would be competent to hear and decide the Appeals pending before it. In other words, the District Courts were not competent to hear such Appeals, and therefore, the High Court could not have transferred those Appeals to be heard by the District Judge or Additional District Judge, inasmuch as section 24 postulates that the Court to which the suit or Appeal or other proceeding is transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. On the date the Appeal in question was preferred in the High Court, the District Courts were not competent to hear such a case. The competency of those Courts to hear such cases arises by virtue of the amendment to section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, aforesaid. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving clause, like the one introduced by section 3 (1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving clause, like the one introduced by section 3 (1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in the face of section 3(1) of the Act, it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear Appeals of the valuation of ten thousand rupees or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and Appeals from which were pending before the High Court." The answer to the said contention is that the election Original Petition has been decided by the District Judge and not by any inferior Court. The learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, is competent to decide the election Original Petition, but he may not have territorial jurisdiction. Territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are one thing and subject matter is another thing. Territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction can be waived or acquiesced and it cannot be said that it is void. But, however, the subject matter cannot stand in the same footing. In the case on hand, the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, may not have territorial jurisdiction to decide the election Original Petition pertaining to the election of chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union. But the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has competency to decide the election Original Petition pertaining to the election of a president or a chairman or a member of the panchayat. That is to say he has got competency to decide the subject matter, but he may not have territorial jurisdiction. In this connection, it will be useful to refer the judgment of the Honble Apex Court reported in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., & another, 2005 (5) CTC 133: 2005 (7) SCC 791 . The Honble Apex Court has considered whether the amendment could have been allowed raising objection to the territorial jurisdiction. In paragraphs 30, their Lordships have held as follows: "We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a Court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is a nullity." Yet another decision that has been cited by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent reported in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Natlz, AIR 1962 SC 1999. Paragraph 4 of the said judgment can be usefully extracted hereunder: 4. The only ground on which the decision of the High Court is challenged is that the suit instituted on the original side of the Bombay High Court was wholly incompetent for want of territorial jurisdiction and that therefore, the award that followed on the reference between the parties and the decree of Court, under execution, were all null and void. strong reliance was placed upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Ind. App. 134 (P. C.). In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Bombay High Court where the suit was instituted by the plaintiff-decree holder. The Plaint had been filed after obtaining the necessary leave of the High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Whether the leave obtained had been rightly obtained or wrongly obtained is not a matter which can be agaitated at the execution stage. The Plaint had been filed after obtaining the necessary leave of the High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Whether the leave obtained had been rightly obtained or wrongly obtained is not a matter which can be agaitated at the execution stage. The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizin of the case because subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit in over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of 13 hid. App. 134 (P. C.) is an authority for the proposition that consent or waiver can cure defect of jurisdiction but cannot cure inherent lack of jurisdiction. In that case, the suit had been instituted in the Court of the subordinate Judge, who was incompetent to try it. By consent of the parties, the case was transferred to the Court of the District Judge for convenience of trial. It was laid down by the Privy Council that as the Court in which the suit had been originally instituted was entirely lacking in jurisdiction, in the sense that it was incompetent to try it, whatever happened subsequently was null and void because consent of parties could not operate to confer jurisdiction on a Court which was incompetent to try the suit. That decision has no relevance to a case like the present where there could he no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the sense that the Bombay High Court was incompetent to try a Suit of that kind. The objection to its territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the Court and can, therefore, be waived. The objection to its territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the Court and can, therefore, be waived. In the instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him. When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through Court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, raised by him in his written statement. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try case. Competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having consented to have the controversy between the parties resolved by reference to arbitration through Court, the defendant deprived himself of the right to question the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the Arbitrator. He is equally estopped from challenging the authority of the Arbitrator to render the award." (ii) The learned senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent also placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in P. Madhavan Unni v. M. Jayapandia Nadar, 1985 LW 606 . He is equally estopped from challenging the authority of the Arbitrator to render the award." (ii) The learned senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent also placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in P. Madhavan Unni v. M. Jayapandia Nadar, 1985 LW 606 . In the said judgment their lordships have referred to the decision reported in Karuppiah Ambalam v. Ayyn Nadar, 1965 (1) MLJ 75 , wherein it has been held as follows: Next, to restrict the meaning of the words competent to try or dispose of the same used in section 24(1)(b)(ii), C.P.C. to territorial jurisdiction over the property of the judgment-debtor or the residence qualification of the judgment-debtor would lead to grave anomalies and failure of justice. Thus, if the presiding officer of the executing Court happens to be the judgment-debtor himself and owns the property in his jurisdiction which is being proceeded against, or if he has taken a prejudicial attitude to one party and that iks urged as a ground for transfer of the execution proceeding it will be impossible to transfer the execution proceeding to any other subordinate Court, if the restricted meaning above sought to be given to the word competency is to be accepted. It appears to us that the word competency used in the above section cannot be used to restrict the power of the District Court or the High Court under section 24, C.P.C. to transfer the execution proceedings only to a Court which has territorial competency or jurisdiction over the place where the judgment debtor resides or works for gain. It has to be given a sufficient wide interpretation to include each and every Court within the jurisdiction of the superior Court, empowered to deal with such execution." After considering the above passage, their Lordships have held as follows: We respectfully agree with the above observations of the learned Judge. We consider that the power of transfer, under section 24 of the Code, of a suit, Appeal or other proceedings, by a High Court or a District Court to a Court within their respective jurisdiction is a very effective remedy and no fetters should be placed upon it on grounds of want of territorial jurisdiction of the transferee Court. We consider that the power of transfer, under section 24 of the Code, of a suit, Appeal or other proceedings, by a High Court or a District Court to a Court within their respective jurisdiction is a very effective remedy and no fetters should be placed upon it on grounds of want of territorial jurisdiction of the transferee Court. Thus, it cannot be said that the Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur alone has competency to decide the matter and no other District Judge has power to decide the election Petition. Further, the decision cited above will clearly establish that restrictive meaning of the words "competent to try or dispose of the same" used in section 24(1)(b) (ii), C.P.C cannot be pleaded while the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 24 to transfer the election O.P. from one Court to another Court in the given situation. (iii) Thus, the foregoing discussions will amply establish that the District Court, Vellore, has got competency to decide the said matter, but however, it may not have territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction has been conferred in view of the order of transfer passed by this Court in an Application preferred by the petitioner seeking such transfer. Further more, the petitioner has given consent for transferring the matter to the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore. Hence, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in this regard has to be rejected in toto. (E) (i) The sixth limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner on the question of jurisdiction is that omission by a party to raise objection with regard to the jurisdiction at the inception will not confer jurisdiction on a Court, which has no jurisdiction. expanding the submission, the learned senior Counsel submitted that though the question of jurisdiction has not been raised before the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, who has decided the election Original Petition, the same could be raised for the first time in this Revision. Further, according to the learned senior Counsel, the question of jurisdiction is a question of law, which can be raised at any time. In this connection, the learned Senior Counsel relied on a decision reported in Pioneer Traders v. Chief Controller Imp. & Exp., AIR 1963 SC 734 . Further, according to the learned senior Counsel, the question of jurisdiction is a question of law, which can be raised at any time. In this connection, the learned Senior Counsel relied on a decision reported in Pioneer Traders v. Chief Controller Imp. & Exp., AIR 1963 SC 734 . The learned senior Counsel emphasized on paragraph 31 of the said judgment, wherein Their Lordships have held as follows: “... Where an authority whether judicial or quasi-judicial, has in law no jurisdiction to make an order the omission by a party to raise before the authority the relevant facts for deciding that question cannot clothe it with jurisdiction". Thus, according to the learned senior Counsel, when the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, has no jurisdiction to make an order in the election Original Petition, the omission on the part of the petitioner to raise the question of jurisdiction before the said learned Judge cannot clothe it with jurisdiction. (ii) The seventh limb of argument of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the plea of jurisdiction can be raised at any time and for this proposition, the learned senior Counsel has cited a decision reported in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, 2006 (5) SCC 566 , and emphasized on paragraph 15 of the said judgment for the said proposition, which is extracted hereunder: "It is no doubt that the landlords did not contend either before the first Appellate Court or before the High Court that the Appeal against the consent decree was not maintainable. This contention is urged for the first time in this Court. The contention relates to jurisdiction of the Appellate Court and is evident from the record. Such a plea does not require any evidence. Further, being a contention relating to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, it does not require any `pleading. Though this Court will not normally permit a new plea to be raised at the hearing of the special Leave Petition or an Appeal under Article 136, where such plea does not involve any question of fact or amendment of pleading and is purely one of law, particularly relating to jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, it can be entertained by this Court. " (iii) The answer to the said contention is that the petitioner who has not raised the want of territorial jurisdiction before the District Judge, Vellore cannot be heard to urge before this Court raising the territorial jurisdiction of the learned District Judge, Vellore in deciding the election Petition. The earliest opportunity of putting forth the question of territorial jurisdiction was not availed of by the petitioner and he cannot be heard to say that after the disposal of the election Petition by the learned District Judge, Vellore, that he has no jurisdiction to decide the election Petition. In this connection learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied on a decision reported in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, 2005 (11) SCC 486 , and paragraph 4 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: "4. Under section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, want of territorial jurisdiction in the Trial Court must be pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues were settled, at or before such settlement and even then an appellate or Revisional Court would not upset the order or decree passed by the Trial Court unless it is satisfied to hold that there has been a consequent failure of justice." It is one thing to say that the petitioner who had opportunity to raise the plea of jurisdiction at the first instance, has not availed the opportunity. The other thing is that the petitioner, who was responsible for transfer of the election Original Petition from the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Thiruvallur, to the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Vellore, cannot be heard to say that the said Court has no jurisdiction. (F) The other reason which makes me to reject the contention raised on the side of the petitioner is that the election Original Petition shall be presented and tried only by the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated. If for any reason, if a relative or a friend of a District Judge contested the election and if he or she were to be a party in the Election Original Petition, still could it be said that the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated, has to try the election Original Petition. If for any reason, if a relative or a friend of a District Judge contested the election and if he or she were to be a party in the Election Original Petition, still could it be said that the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated, has to try the election Original Petition. In the given instance, could it be said that the election Original Petition cannot be transferred to another District Judge to try the same. If in the given situation, it is, but natural, the same District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated cannot be called upon to decide the election Original Petition. The legislature would have given a thought to it and hence section 258(1) of the said Act reads that the election Original Petition shall be presented before the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated and it does not say "shall be tried by the District Judge of the district in which the panchayat is situated". (ii) Finally, Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers upon the High Court a power of supervision over all judicial matters decided by any Court or Tribunal within the state and in a fit and proper case in which if the High Curt exercises its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the matter has been transferred on such orders from one jurisdiction of a Court to another and the transferee Court has decided the matter one way or other, an aggrieved party cannot be heard to say that the transferee Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. In this connection it will be useful to refer the judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent reported in Rajeswarai v. United India Insurance Co., AIR 1984 Mad. 170 . Paragraphs 7, 8 and 11 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder: Learned counsel for the petitioner would then refer to Maharaja Kumar Gaibir Singh v. Sathir Singh, AIR 1968 Punj. and Har. 301, which took the view that, even assuming that section 24, C.P.C. cannot be invoked, for transfer of a case to another Court. High Court has got ample powers under Article 227 to transfer the same. 8. and Har. 301, which took the view that, even assuming that section 24, C.P.C. cannot be invoked, for transfer of a case to another Court. High Court has got ample powers under Article 227 to transfer the same. 8. In Pyda Venkatanarayana v. Thota Ramaswami, AIR 1955 A.P. 40, Article 227 was held to be entirely distinct and different from Article 226 and that Article 227 confers upon High Court a power of supervision over all judicial matters decided by any Court or Tribunal within the state, and therefore, in that case, it was held that it was eminently a fit and proper case in which power of superintendence should be exercised for transferring the election Petition to another Deputy Registrar for disposal. 11. In AIR 1968 SC 1481 above referred to, it has been clearly held that the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals under Article 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the Legislature. When it has been repeatedly held by supreme Court that the power of superintendence is both judicial and administrative, to proceed on the basis that for exercising powers under Article 227, one should look to the legislature because exercise of powers under the said Article in a particular manner would go against the substantial provisions of the enactment; overlooks the fact that the power exercised under Article 227 is a constitutional power, and no legislative enactment can take away or circumscribe or nullify the exercise of supervisory powers conferred by the Constitution on High Courts. In the light of what has been held by the supreme Court, as above referred. when the power of transfer of proceedings within its jurisdiction is part of its supervisory jurisdiction. absence of any provision having been made in Motor Vehicles Act for transfer to be effected would not deprive the High Court of the power to transfer pending proceedings from one Tribunal to another, if circumstances warrant. This judgment was followed by His Lordship M. srinivasan, J. (as he then was) in the judgment reported in Kanniammal and another v. P. Narayanan and another, AIR 1989 Mad. 350 , and paragraph 9 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: "9. even assuming that section 24 of Civil P.C. is not applicable, transfer could be ordered under Article 227 of the Constitution. 350 , and paragraph 9 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: "9. even assuming that section 24 of Civil P.C. is not applicable, transfer could be ordered under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power of this Court conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution has not been taken away or curtailed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which fix the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted thereunder. A constitutional provision cannot be defeated by an ordinary legislation enacted by the Parliament. I do not agree with the view expressed by Balasubramanyam, J. in Annamalai s case, 1982 (95) Mad. LW 687. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter as sathiadev, J. has pointed out that the decision of Balasubramanyan, J. is not correct in view of the decision of the supreme Court referred to above. Hence, a transfer could be ordered under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also in this matter. Thus, when this Court exercised its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in transferring the election Original Petition from one District to another District, the transferee Court acquires jurisdiction. 9. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, it could be safely concluded that the petitioner who had filed the Transfer Petition before this Court for transferring the election Petition that has been filed by the first respondent herein before the District Judge, Tiruvallur to be transferred to the other District Judge and having consented for an order transferring the Election Petition from the file of the Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur to the file of the District Judge, Vellore, after the election Petition was allowed in favour of the first respondent herein, cannot be heard to say that the District Judge, Vellore has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. 10. If the argument raised by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is accepted it would stultify the process of law and render negatory provisions relating to transfer. Thus the argument on the side of the petitioner is untenable and the stand taken by the petitioner in this connection has to be rejected in toto. 11. Coming to the merits of the matter, it is the case of the first respondent, the petitioner in Election Petition in brief as follows: He has contested and elected as an independent candidate from Ward No.7. 11. Coming to the merits of the matter, it is the case of the first respondent, the petitioner in Election Petition in brief as follows: He has contested and elected as an independent candidate from Ward No.7. He had the majority support of the elected councillors. He had obtained nomination form from the second respondent herein, duly filled it and submitted the same to the returning officer, the third respondent. His nomination was proposed by councillors Mrs. K. Prema from ward No.1 and seconded by councillor B. Kumari from Ward No.4. However, the Returning Officer, the third respondent refused to receive the said nomination form, which was obtained from the second respondent and handed over a form from his file and asked the first respondent to fill it up. The said form did not contain the column of the ward number of the seconder from which either he or she was elected. However, the petitioner herein and also the fourth respondent filled up their nomination forms provided by the third respondent, the Returning Officer and the same have been received by him. Thereafter, the Returning Officer, the third respondent announced that only the nomination filed by the petitioner herein is valid and rejected the other nomination forms. 12. Thus, the petitioner was elected as Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union unopposed. The Returning Officer thus colluded with the petitioner herein and announced the result. The furnishing of defective and inherent form by the third respondent, at the time of conducting the election, resulted in rejecting his nomination form. Therefore, the Returning Officer, the third respondent has committed a fraud by exercising his official power. Hence he has come forward with the election Petition to declare the election of the petitioner herein as Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union election as void. 13. Counter affidavit had been filed by the third respondent herein reveals the following facts: The election was conducted as per election Rules on 210. 2006 at about 10.10 a.m. Two nominations were received from the petitioner and the first respondent. The nomination of the first respondent was rejected, since the seconders Ward Number was not mentioned. However, the nomination filed by the petitioner herein was perfectly in order and hence he was declared elected as Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union. 14. 2006 at about 10.10 a.m. Two nominations were received from the petitioner and the first respondent. The nomination of the first respondent was rejected, since the seconders Ward Number was not mentioned. However, the nomination filed by the petitioner herein was perfectly in order and hence he was declared elected as Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union. 14. The petitioner being the third respondent in the election petition had filed the counter affidavit, wherein he has set out that the nomination papers submitted by the first respondent herein had been rejected on the ground that seconders Ward Number was not furnished. Thus, he did not comply with the Rule 75 of the Tamilnadu Panchayat (election) Rules, 1995. Hence, the Returning Officer, the third respondent declared the result holding that the petitioner herein was elected as Chairman since there was no other contestors. 15. On the above pleadings, the first respondent herein had filed proof affidavit and examined himself as P.W.1. The Returning Officer, the third respondent was examined as R.W.1 and the petitioner herein was examined as R.W.2. On the side of the first respondent Exs.P1 to P6 have been filed and marked. On the side of the petitioner as well as the third respondent, Exs.R1 to R6 have been filed and marked. 16. (1). The first and foremost point that has to be seen is that it is the case of the first respondent that he has obtained nomination form from the office of the second respondent viz., the District Collector and presented it to the third respondent, the Returning Officer, who refused to receive the same on the ground that the said form has not been supplied by him. R.W.1 has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that the first respondent herein had filled up the Form 27A, ex.P3 , but he has refused to receive the said Form on the ground that the first respondent has to fill up the nomination form supplied by him only. The evidence of R.W.1 is extracted in english hereunder: "The petitioner filled up the Form 27-A in the election room and gave it to me. The evidence of R.W.1 is extracted in english hereunder: "The petitioner filled up the Form 27-A in the election room and gave it to me. But I refused to receive that and stated that the petitioner should only fill up the form in which I have put my initial." Nowhere the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 prescribes that the persons, who intend to contest the election for the post of Chiarman, Town Panchayat have to fill up the nomination form given by the Returning Officer alone. If there is no prohibition, then the rejection of the nomination form presented by the first respondent herein to the Returning Officer, the third respondent herein is totally unacceptable. One could understand that if there is some provision in the Act or the Rules which prescribes that the persons, who intend to file their nominations have to fill up the nomination papers submitted by the Returning Officer only after making initial in the said form, then the rejection of the nomination form by the Returning Officer is proper and valid. In fact R.W.1 had stated in cross examination as follows: "There is no provision of law in the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (elelction) Rules or election Commission to show that the nomination has to be filed only in the form in which I have signed." Thus, it is crystal clear that the first respondent herein has presented the nomination form, that too a correct nomination form as prescribed in Form 27-A to the Returning Officer in time filling up other columns of it. The rejection of the nomination form of the first respondent by the Returning Officer R.W.1 is totally, as I stated already, erroneous and on misconception. The first respondent herein cannot be blamed for the same. (II). The second aspect is that Rule 75 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Election) Rules, 1995 prescribes about the presentation of nomination. The said Rule reads as follows: 75. Presentation of nomination.— (I) every candidate for election as Chairman must be nominated in Form 27-A in writing. The nomination paper must be signed by two ward members present at the meeting as proposer and seconder and delivered to the Returning Officer. The nomination shall also contain a declaration in writing expressing the candidates willingness to be elected as Chairman and signed by the candidate. The nomination paper must be signed by two ward members present at the meeting as proposer and seconder and delivered to the Returning Officer. The nomination shall also contain a declaration in writing expressing the candidates willingness to be elected as Chairman and signed by the candidate. Where the office of the Chairman is reserved under section 57 of the Act to persons belonging to scheduled Castes or scheduled Tribes the candidate shall give in writing a further declaration that he or she belongs to the scheduled Caste or scheduled Tribe as the case may be. All the nominations filed and found to be valid under these rules shall be accepted. All the nominations, which are not found valid shall be rejected. The Returning Officer shall record in writing his orders of such rejection with reasons therefore: (Provided that in the case of Panchayat Union Councils or District Panchayats, where the total number of ward member are five or less than five, the nomination paper may be signed by one ward member present at the meeting as proposer and seconder is not necessary. (2) The Returning Officer shall record in the minutes book of the Panchayat the names of all the validly nominated candidates so proposed and seconded. This Rule stipulates that every candidate for election as Chairman shall file nomination presoribed in Form 27-A in writing. The nomination paper must be signed by two ward members present at the meeting as proposer and seconder and delivered to the Returning Officer. Rule 75 thus contemplates that every candidate for election as Chairman shall file nomination prescribed in Form 27-A in writing. Form No.27A, is extracted hereunder. TABLE The said Form 27A contains the word "member from Ward No." This is the prescribed form that has to be supplied to the candidates by the Returning Officer. But unfortunately, the said prescribed form has not been supplied either to the first respondent or the petitioner herein. It is the clear admission of R.W.1 the Returning Officer that the nomination form of the first respondent was rejected on the sole ground that he did not mention the Ward Number of the seconder. If the form that has been supplied by the Returning Officer does not contain the word "Member from Ward No." the first respondent cannot be blamed for not filling up the ward number of the seconder. If the form that has been supplied by the Returning Officer does not contain the word "Member from Ward No." the first respondent cannot be blamed for not filling up the ward number of the seconder. Thus, it could be safely concluded that the rejection of the nomination form of the first respondent is totally illegal and there is no justifiable reason whatsoever. Had the form contained "member from ward No." and still if it has not been filled up by the first respondent herein, the first respondent could have been blamed for the same. (iii) The third aspect which has to be considered is that through ex.R5, R.W.1 informed the elected councillors that the election for the post of Chairman, Tiruttani Panchayat Union will be held on 210. 2006. Therefore, he informed all the Councillors to assemble on that date by giving the said notification under ex.R5. The said notification discloses that the election for the post of Chairman Tiruttani Panchayat Union will be held at 9.30 a.m. on 210. 2006 and for the post of Vice Chairman at 2 p.m. on the same date. Ex.R5 thus does not disclose the duration and time for the election process of filing nomination, scrutiny and withdrawal of the nomination form. even, R.W.1 admits that those aspects are relevant materials to be mentioned in Ex.R5. However, those particulars have not been mentioned in ex.R5. While so, the question that arises is when P.W.1, the fist respondent herein had pointed out to R.W.1 that the nomination form supplied by him is defective since the same does not contain the particulars regarding the ward number of the proposer and the seconder and when admittedly R.W. 1 had contacted P.A. To Collector at 10.25 a.m. on the said date and P.A. to Collector informed R.W.1 that the form that has been supplied to him has been supplied to all the Panchayats and the conversation ended at 10.28 a.m., it is not known why the results have been announced at 10.30 a.m. itself. One could understand, if in ex.R5 notification, if it has been stated about the time of receipt of the nomination form, scrutiny and withdrawal of the nomination form within a particular time, R.W.1 would be justified in announcing the results at 10.30 a.m. This makes it clear that R.W.1 was in a hurry to declare the election of the petitioner herein as Chairman of Tiruttani Panchayat Union. (iv) Ex.R4 is the second nomination form filled up by the first respondent herein, which has got the initial of R.W.1 said to have been received at 10.15 a.m. It is the case of R.W.1 that the second nomination form of the first respondent had been rejected, since it was received at 10.50 a.m. after the declaration of the results. The question that arises is when results have been announced, why R.W.1 has received the second nomination form of the first respondent herein. R.W.1 deposes that he received the said nomination form submitted by the first respondent herein at 10.50 a.m. since six or seven persons were present in the Room and encircled and intimidated him to receive the same and he has received the second nomination from the first respondent herein. The Deputy Superintendent of Police was present in the room at that time. But R.W.1 had not informed him that he is being threatened by six or seven persons. But, unfortunately, in the counter affidavit filed by the Returning Officer, the third respondent herein such things have not been mentioned. This clearly shows that R.W.1 is deposing falsely stating the circumstances under which he has received the second nomination form from the first respondent herein. (V). Further, it has to be seen that the ward number of the seconder has been mentioned in Ex.R1 in writing with pen, which is the nomination form submitted by the petitioner herein. If the form does not contain "Member from ward No." , it is not known how the petitioner herein alone, who was declared to have been elected has filled up " Ward No." This has also created a doubt in the mind of the learned Judge while disposing of the Election Petition, which appears to be a reasonable one. 17. If the form does not contain "Member from ward No." , it is not known how the petitioner herein alone, who was declared to have been elected has filled up " Ward No." This has also created a doubt in the mind of the learned Judge while disposing of the Election Petition, which appears to be a reasonable one. 17. The discussions made above would result in the following irresistible conclusions: (i) section 258(1) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act contemplates only the presentation of the election Petition before a District Judge of the District in which the panchayat is situated and it does not contemplate that the Election Petition shall be tried by the District Judge of the District in which the Panchayat is situated. (ii) Even, if it could be said that the District Judge, Vellore has no territorial jurisdiction to try the Election Petition, but in view of the fact that the petitioner invited such position by filing an Application for transfer and given consent for transferring the election Petition that was presented before the District Judge, Tiruvallur to be transferred to Vellore, he cannot be heard to say that the District Judge, Vellore has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. Thus the petitioner volunteered himself and subjected to the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Vellore and now at this point of time he cannot be heard to say that the District Judge of Vellore has no jurisdiction to decide the O.P. (iii) It cannot be said that the District Judge, Vellore has no competency to decide the election Petition. The subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Vellore also. If it is contended that the District Judge, Vellore cannot decide the election Petition because of incompetency one could understand that the deciding of the election Petition by him is without jurisdiction. But that is not the case herein. (iv) The petitioner, who has consented for such transfer to the District Judge, Vellore has not raised the point of jurisdiction at the time of trial before the District Judge, Vellore. Not even the said ground has been raised in the present Revision. However an affidavit had been filed later after the revision was taken up for hearing, raising the question of jurisdiction. Not even the said ground has been raised in the present Revision. However an affidavit had been filed later after the revision was taken up for hearing, raising the question of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter could be taken up at any time, but the jurisdiction with regard to the territorial jurisdiction should have been taken at the inception. (v) The first respondent herein, who was the petitioner in the election O.P admittedly submitted the nomination form as prescribed in Form No.27-A to the Returning Officer R.W.1 in time and the same has been rejected by R.W.1 on the ground that the said form has not been supplied by him and the same does not contain his initial. even as per R.W.1s own evidence, nowhere the Panchayat Act or the Rules, prescribes that the nomination shall be filled up and presented only in the form supplied by the Returning Officer. While so, the rejection of the nomination form presented by the first respondent herein by R.W.1 is totally erroneous. (vi) The form that has been supplied by R.W.1, the Returning Officer to the first respondent as well as the petitioner herein who has been declared as Chairman in the election is not the prescribed form. R.W.1 has clearly stated that the form supplied to the first respondent and the petitioner does not contain the word "member from ward No." When such defective form has been supplied by the Returning Officer R.W.1, the rejection of the nomination of the first respondent herein on the ground that ward number has not been filled up as regards the seconder is totally unjustified. (vii) R.W.1s evidence clearly disclose that when it has been pointed out by the first respondent herein that the form that has been supplied by him is defective, he contacted P.A. to Collector at 10.25 a.m. and the conversation was over by 10.28 a.m. Thereafter, the declaration seems to have been made at 10.30 a.m in such an urgency without even disclosing what has transpired between him and the P.A. to Collector. (viii) It is the case of the first respondent that later he has filled up the form giving ward number of the seconder and submitted to the Returning Officer R.W.1 and the same seems to have been rejected by the Returning Officer stating that it has been submitted beyond the time. (viii) It is the case of the first respondent that later he has filled up the form giving ward number of the seconder and submitted to the Returning Officer R.W.1 and the same seems to have been rejected by the Returning Officer stating that it has been submitted beyond the time. since the form that has been supplied by the Returning Officer R.W.1 was defective R.W.1 should have received the nomination form filled up by the first respondent herein giving the ward number of the seconder. Thus, the rejection made by the Returning Officer is totally unjustifiable, which creates a suspicion about the genuineness of the Returning Officer. 18. The reasons enumerated above constrains me to hold that R.W.1 has not conducted himself fairly in an unbiased manner and the rejection made by him is totally unjustifiable. 19. In the result the order of the Principal District Judge, Vellore, dated 12. 2007 made in Election Original Petition No.8 of 2007 setting aside the election of the petitioner is confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected M.P. is closed. No costs.