ALOK K. SINGH, J. Under challenge in this appeal is the judgment and order dated 3. 3. 1990, passed by III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kheri in Ses sions Trial No. 309/88, convicting the ap pellant Shiv Kumar (father-in- law), Smt. Kamla (mother-in-law), Avadhesh Kumar (husband), Kamlesh (servant) under sec tions 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 304-B/34, I. P. C. , 498-A, I. P. C. and section 201, I. PC. and sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for six months, 10 years, one year and one year respectively and at the same time acquitting them of the charges under section 306, I. P. C. and section 302/34, I. P. C. 2. Briefly stated the facts as born out from the record are that the complainants real sister namely Guddi was married to appellant Avadhesh Kumar about three years prior to the incident. Her in-laws used to say that why she does not end her life so that they may perform second mar riage of Avadhesh Kumar. Ultimately on 20. 9. 1984 all the appellants probably killed her by giving her poison and cremated her dead-body. They did not wait for the members of is mothers family and per formed her funeral. The brother of the deceased lodged a typed report whereupon the investigation started and finally the charge-sheet was submitted. The charges were framed against all of them under sec tions 3/4 D. P. Act, 306/498-A/201, I. P. C. and also additional charges under sections 302/34, I. P. C. and 201, I. P. C. to which they denied and claimed trial. In support of this case the prosecution examined following witnesses: PW 1, Jagdish Prasad, complainant of the case. PW2, Bipin Vihari. PW 3, Durga Prasad Awasthi, S. H. O. 3. In the statement under section 313, Cr. P. C. they said that witnesses have deposed due to enmity and it was also said that deceased died due to ailment of chol era and she was taken for treatment to Hargaon Hospital from where she was re ferred to Sitapur Hospital and while she was being taken to Sitapur Hospital she died on the way. By the time she was brought back to the village on a tractor trolley, it had become night. Therefore, in the early morning an information was sent to her mothers house through Sohan Lal (D. W. 2 ). By the time she was brought back to the village on a tractor trolley, it had become night. Therefore, in the early morning an information was sent to her mothers house through Sohan Lal (D. W. 2 ). They waited till late evening and when nobody came, they performed her funeral as the body was being decom posed. In defence D. W. 1, Hriday Behari Bajpai, D. W. 2 Sohan Lal, D. W. 3, Kamlesh Kumar and D. W. 4 Jagdev were examined. Besides two papers were also filed. D. W. 1 is the pharmacist who proved Ext. Kha-1. D. W. 2 Sohan Lal is the village barber who had gone to inform at her mothers house. He also told that the deceased died due to cholera. D. W. 3 Kamlesh Kumar is Village Pradhan who told that the deceased was suffering from cholera and that due to enmity with one Madan the appellants have been implicated. D. W. 4 Jagdav be sides proving an invitation card Ext. Kha-1 also told that the deceased was suffering from cholera. 4. After discussing the evidence the learned Court below convicted the appel lants in the aforesaid manner. Aggrieved with the judgment and order in question this appeal has been preferred. 5. Before entering into the merits of the case, it may be mentioned that ap pellant No. 2 Kamla, mother- in-law has already died and vide order dated 18. 2. 2003 this appeal has been abated in respect of her. 6. I have Sri Ashok Bajpai, learned Counsel for the appellants and Sri S. Husaki Abbas, learned A. G. A. and perused entire lower Court record. 7. At the out set it is submitted and rightly so by the learned Counsel for the appellants that it is a peculiar case in which neither any chik F. I. R. nor any G. D. has been either brought on record or proved. It is really surprising that neither of these documents were either brought on record or proved and no sincere efforts were made by the prosecution to bring these docu ments on record or to prove them. In ab sence of these documents the very incep tion of the prosecution case becomes doubtful. It is not proved that any criminal case was registered at the police station on the basis of the typed report (Ext. Ka-1 ). In ab sence of these documents the very incep tion of the prosecution case becomes doubtful. It is not proved that any criminal case was registered at the police station on the basis of the typed report (Ext. Ka-1 ). In fact only three papers have been proved in this case i. e. typed report (Ext. Ka-1) one parcha said to has been issued from a P. H. C. referring the patient to Sitapur Hospital (Ext. Ka-2) and charge- sheet (Ext. Ka-3 ). In respect of the typed report there a re several noteworthy points. Firstly there appears considerable unexplained delay. According to appellants case she was suf fering from the ailment of cholera and therefore, when her condition started deteriorating she was taken to the nearest Pri mary Health Center Augavan. Even the complainant (P. W. 1) has admitted that when he reached the village it was told by the villagers that his sister was suffering from cholera and she was taken by the members of in-laws family for treatment to Augavan and from there to Hargaon Hospital but unfortunately she died on the way on 20. 9. 1984, while being taken to Si tapur Hospital. Therefore, they came back to the village on a tractor trolley in the late evening and sent information through So han Lal, barber of the village (D. W. 2) to the complainant (PW. 1) on the next morning. According to D. W. 1 information was given by him around 9. 00-10. 00 a. m. to samdhin of appellant Shiv Kumar because at that time male members were not pres ent. He then came back to the village about 12. 00-12. 30 p. m. But till 500-5. 30 p. m. no body from her mothers house could reach. Therefore, funeral was performed in the evening of 21. 9. 1984 because the body was deteriorating as deposed by at least three defence witnesses of the village including the village Pradhan. The complainant Jag-dish Prasad, PW. 1 and his brother PW. 2 have admitted that the information regard ing death of their sister was given to them. But the complainant could reach there around 10. 00 p. m. after the performance of funeral. The complainant stayed in some other house during that night and on the next day i. e. 22. 9. 1984 he got a report typed. 2 have admitted that the information regard ing death of their sister was given to them. But the complainant could reach there around 10. 00 p. m. after the performance of funeral. The complainant stayed in some other house during that night and on the next day i. e. 22. 9. 1984 he got a report typed. But at another place he concedes to have met one Ram Magan Sharma, M. L. A. on 23. 9. 1984 and after that he got it typed. That means the report was typed on 23. 9. 1984 and not on 22. 9. 1984. He subse quently himself admitted that date 22. 9. 1984 mentioned in the report was wrongly typed. This makes the date of the report doubtful. Not only this the com plainant has further told that he met the Superintendent of Police after two days i. e. on 24. 9. 1984. A close scrutiny of the typed report (Ext. Ka-1) reveals that there is an endorsement made on 24. 9. 1989 on the top right corner in red ink allegedly signed by the Superintendent of Police directing the S. O. concerned for making enquiry. But it has not been proved that this endorsement was indeed made by the Superintendent of Police in his hand-writing. There is another endorsement of S. O. dated 28. 9. 1984 direct ing his subordinate to get the case regis tered under section 306, I. P. C. This en dorsement has also not been proved. Thus the report itself was got typed with an un explained delay of one or two days and that too after consultation with an M. L. A. Even if it was got typed on 23. 9. 1984 then why it was given to Superintendent of Po lice on 24. 9. 1984, it has not been explained. If there was an order of Superintendent of Police on it then why after a long gap of 4 days the S. O. concerned came into action. All these factors make the entire F. I. R. doubtful. It goes without saying that a F. I. R. is supposed to be the foundation of a prosecution case and if it becomes doubt ful, the entire case becomes doubtful. All these factors make the entire F. I. R. doubtful. It goes without saying that a F. I. R. is supposed to be the foundation of a prosecution case and if it becomes doubt ful, the entire case becomes doubtful. Learned Counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the case of Mahendra Singh v. The State 1991 LLJ134 wherein it was laid down that when the F. I. R. is not written at the time stated in it (as in the present case) it loses its importance and the case of the prosecution falls to the ground only on this count. In fact the entire fabric of the instant prosecution case collapses due to aforesaid factors. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the F. I. R. is to rely upon the po lice information regarding the circum stances in which the crime was committed. Delay in lodging the F. I. R. often results in embellishment which is creator of an after thought. In the present case in the name of F. I. R. only a typed paper has been proved (Ext. Ka-1 ). Neither any chick F. I. R. nor any G. D. has been brought on record or proved. The typed F. I. R. itself shows that even the alleged endorsement made by the Superin tendent of Police and the S. H. O. are quite delayed by about 8-10 days. It is not certain that even thereafter when the case was ul timately registered on the basis of which the State machinery came into action. The important and valuable evidence of chick F. I. R. and G. D. etc. has been withheld in this case. The learned Court below has not discussed all these points in a convincing and satisfactory manner in its judgment. 8. It is also noteworthy that the learned Court below has wrongly con victed the appellants under section 304-B, I. P. C. This section itself was inserted in the Indian Penal Code vide amendment dated 19. 11. 1986 while the alleged incident of death is of two years before i. e. of 20. 9. 1984. It has wrongly cited one case law of Honble Apex Court i. e. State of Punjab v. Amarjil Singh, 1988 (25) ACC 425 (SC ). to justify the conviction of the appellants under section 304-B, I. P. C. I have carefully gone through this entire case law. 9. 1984. It has wrongly cited one case law of Honble Apex Court i. e. State of Punjab v. Amarjil Singh, 1988 (25) ACC 425 (SC ). to justify the conviction of the appellants under section 304-B, I. P. C. I have carefully gone through this entire case law. It has nowhere been observed that the amended section 304-B, I. P. C. has any ret rospective effect. Therefore, conviction un der section 304-B, I. P. C. cannot be upheld. 9. Then coming on the points of al leged demand of dowry and harassment the learned Counsel for appellants submits that though the complainant had sufficient time to include even concocted version and false allegations in his typed F. I. R. but even then he did not make even a whisper re garding alleged demand of dowry either at the time of marriage or even thereafter. In their statements under section 161, Cr. P. C. also it has not been alleged by the com plainant and witnesses. Both the brothers i. e. P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 made this allegation for the first time during their examination before the Court below. It is very difficult to believe that if there was really any de mand of dowry at any point of time then the complainant would not mention such an important allegation in his report even when it was got written after consultation with an M. L. A. Therefore, the allegation of alleged demand of dowry becomes doubt ful and therefore conviction and sentence under section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act also cannot be sustained. 10. The learned Court below has also convicted the appellants under section 498-A, I. P. C. , which deals with the husband or relatives of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. The only allegation in this regard which has come in the F. I. R. is that the members of her in-laws family used to say that she may die so that they may per form second marriage of appellant Awadhesh Kumar. But why without any reason any of the members of in-laws family will say so. The only allegation in this regard which has come in the F. I. R. is that the members of her in-laws family used to say that she may die so that they may per form second marriage of appellant Awadhesh Kumar. But why without any reason any of the members of in-laws family will say so. Further merely this bald allegation cannot bring it within the periphery of the provisions of section 498-A, I. P. C. , which reads as under: "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with im prisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means - (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or death (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful de mand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. " From perusal of the above provisions, it appears that there has to be some wilful conduct which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life. But there is no such alle gation in the present case. In the alternative there has to be some harassment of a woman with a view to coercing here or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable se curity or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such de mand. As said earlier no such demand of dowry is mentioned either in the typed report (Ext. Ka-1) or in the statements un der section 161, Cr. P. C. This tutored ver sion has been made for the first time by the complainant in the Court. Therefore, truth fulness of the allegation becomes doubtful. As said earlier no such demand of dowry is mentioned either in the typed report (Ext. Ka-1) or in the statements un der section 161, Cr. P. C. This tutored ver sion has been made for the first time by the complainant in the Court. Therefore, truth fulness of the allegation becomes doubtful. Had there been any truth in the allegation, it would have certainly found place in the typed report and also in the statement un der section 161, Cr. PC. The learned Court below has also not dealt with these points elaborately. Therefore, conviction under section 498-A, I. P. C. is also not sustainable. 11. The appellants case is that the de ceased was suffering from the ailment of cholera for which she was taken to P. H. C. /hospital and as admitted by P. W. 1 this fact was told to him also by the villag ers at the Lime of his visit in the village im mediately after the death of his sister. D. W. 2 Sohan Lal, the barber of the village, Vil lage Pradhan, Kamlesh Kumar (D. W. 3) as also another villager Jagdev Prasad (D. W. 4) have also corroborated that the deceased was suffering from cholera but she could not be saved though she was taken by her in laws for treatment. These witnesses have been cross-examined at length but nothing could come on record to create any doubt in on their credibility. Further D. W. 1, Hriday Behari, the then Compounder posted at the P. H. C. on the basis of the entries made in the relevant register has also sub stantiated the fact that the lady was brought there for the treatment of cholera and she was referred for further treatment. One Parcha has been filed by the com plainant (Ext. Ka-2) saying that " it was given to him by his Samdhi, appellant Shiv Kumar in the village. It is pointed out by learned A. G. A. that on this Parcha the name of the patient is mentioned as Kamla (the name of her mother-in-law) whereas the name of the deceased is Guddi. Further 30 years of age is mentioned while the de ceased was younger. It is pointed out by learned A. G. A. that on this Parcha the name of the patient is mentioned as Kamla (the name of her mother-in-law) whereas the name of the deceased is Guddi. Further 30 years of age is mentioned while the de ceased was younger. There may have been some confusion in this regard amongst the rustic villagers and it is quite possible that the mother-in-law Kamla might have also accompanied her daughter-in-law and her name was mentioned in this parcha as said by Court below. But this is not of much importance because even otherwise the factum of the deceased having been suffer ing from the ailment of cholera and carry ing her for treatment by her in-laws has been duly proved by other cogent and reli able evidence mentioned above. This was followed by bona fide conduct of sending immediate information regarding her death to her mothers place. Hence, there was no question of causing disappearance of any evidence of offence by the appellants to search themselves and therefore their con viction under section 201, I. P. C. is also not sustainable. 12. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the appellants have already been acquitted from the Court below under sec tions 302/34, I. PC. and 306, I. P. C. and those acquittals have not been challenged by the State. The learned A. G. A. submits that presumption should be taken against the appellants under section 113-A of the Evidence Act. This section reads as under: "section 113-A. Presumption as to abet ment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her hus band or such relative of her hus band had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. " From perusal of the above provision it is clear that in case where a married woman has committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage then there can be such presump tion. " From perusal of the above provision it is clear that in case where a married woman has committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage then there can be such presump tion. But in the present case as has been noted above, the appellants have already been acquitted of the charge under section 306, I. P. C. for abetment of suicide. Other wise also neither it was a case of prosecu tion nor it could be proved that the de ceased committed suicide and there was any abetment for the same. 13. Finally therefore, the appeal is al lowed. The conviction and sentence of all the three appellants under section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 304-B/34, I. P. C. , 498-A, I. P. C. and section 201, I. P. C. are set aside. They are on bail. They need not sur render. Their sureties are discharged. Appeal Allowed. .