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2008 DIGILAW 84 (PAT)

Sudama Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar

2008-01-15

body2008
ORDER 1. Heard Dr. Ravi Ranjan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sudama Kumar Sharma, Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay, the learned A.P.P. for the State and Shri Umesh Prasad, the learned counsel for O.P. No.2. 2. The petitioner who is one of the F.I.R. named accused in Sessions Trial No. 718 of 1989, arising out of Fathua P.S. Case No. 322 of 1988, is aggrieved by order dated 2.9.2006 and 18.9.2006 passed therein by the learned Presiding Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Patna, whereby he has modified the charges by adding to the earlier charges of Sections 365 and 386 I.P.C., the charges also under Sections 364-A and 120-B LP.C. 3. On the basis of a written petition sent by one Rameshwar Prasad alias Ram Babu on 12.9.1988, inter alia alleging the abduction of his son, Mritunjay Kumar from 5.9.1988, while he was going to school from his house and that information thereof had been given to Khusrupur. It was further, alleged that thereafter two letters were found, on the door of his home on 12.9.1988 and in the said letters it was specifically mentioned to bring Rs. 1,20,000/- and reach at Bus Stand at Masaurhi wearing a white cap and to wait there failing which his son would be killed. 4. On the basis of the said written report, Fathua P.S. Case No. 322 of 1988 was registered under Sections 363 and 369 I.P.C. against unknown. After due investigation the police submitted a charge-sheet after recovery of the abducted boy and in the charge-sheet it was mentioned that although the case was registered under Sections 363 and 367 I.P.C., offences under Sections 363, 364, 365, 367, 387 and 120-B I.P.C. are also attracted. 5. After commitment the then Additional Sessions Judge-VIII who was then in seisin of the case framed charges on 12.12.1990 under two heads, namely, 365 and 386 I.P.C. but surprisingly the learned Presiding Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Patna, who later on came in seisin of the case, on 18.9.2006 added and framed further charges under Sections 364-A and 120-B I.P.C. 6 Aggrieved thereby the petitioner has filed this application. 7. 7. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the learned court failed to appreciate that even assuming though not admitting, the allegations as made out in the written report, the petition dated 1.6.1995 had been considered in the year 2006 when cognizance had already been taken and charges had been framed under Sections 365 and 386 I.P.C. and on the day of occurrence or framing of charge the offence under Section 364-A I.P.C. was not available in the Statute Book and, therefore, no charge under Section 364-A I.P.C. could possibly have been framed against the petitioner after the said section was added by way of the Amending Act 42 of 1993 with effect from 22.5.1993 and the provision was not retrospective. 8. There appears much force in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. Admittedly, Section 364-A I.P.C. was introduced in the Penal Code by Act 42 of 1993 with effect from 22.5.1993 which was on a date subsequent to the date of occurrence and framing of charge. That apart the offence under Section 364-A I.P.C. was not retrospective and could not have applied as an offence in respect of an occurrence which took place much prior to the provisions finding its way in the Statute Book. There is no dispute regarding the court having power under Section 216 Cr. P.C. to alter charges or modify charges but that does not give jurisdiction to the court to frame charge under an offence which was not available in the Statute Book on the date of occurrence. 10. Due regard being had to the facts and the circumstances of the case, the impugned orders dated 2.9.2006 and 18.9 2006 passed by the learned Presiding Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Patna, are quashed to the extent that the charge under Section 364-A I.P.C. shall be deleted from the charges framed against the petitioner. 11. In the result, the application is allowed to the extent, mentioned above.