JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.C. Kandpal, J. This appeal has been filed by the United India Insurance Company Ltd. against the judgment and order dated 14.12.2006 passed by M.A.C.T./District Judge, Champawat in M.A.C.P. No. 06 of 2006, Smt. Sushela Devi & others Vs. Smt. Meena Devi & others whereby the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 5,28,400/- in favour of the respondents/claimants. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the deceased – Nar Bahadur Buda was working as cleaner in Truck No. UA03/1884. On 24.03.2006, he was going to Marorkhan from Lohaghat in the said truck. The truck in question was being driven rashly and negligently by its driver. On account of the rash and negligent driving, the driver of the truck in question lost control over the vehicle and the same fell down into a ditch of 200 deep. In this accident, the claimant received grievous injuries and at first was admitted at Community Health Centre, Lohaghat but being financially weak, the claimants had to go to Nepal. At the time of the accident, the deceased was 28 years of age and was earning a sum of Rs. 4,500/- per month, therefore, the claimants filed claim petition for compensation to the tune of Rs. 21,00,000/-. 3. The owner of the truck – Smt. Meena Devi has contested the claim petition by filing the written statement, wherein it has been stated that the amount of claim is excessive. Further it has been stated that the accident had taken place due to technical fault in the truck in question and not because of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the truck. It has further been stated that at the time of the accident, the truck in question was having valid driving licence. It has further contended that at the time of the accident, the truck in question was insured with United India Insurance Company Ltd., therefore, the liability to pay compensation is of insurer. 4. The United India Insurance Company Ltd. has also contested the claim petition by filing a written statement wherein it has been stated that the additional pleas in the claim petition has been filed on conjectures and surmises and facts have been concealed. 4. The United India Insurance Company Ltd. has also contested the claim petition by filing a written statement wherein it has been stated that the additional pleas in the claim petition has been filed on conjectures and surmises and facts have been concealed. It has further been pleaded that at the time of the accident, the truck was not having effective and valid papers and the driver of the truck was also not holding the valid driving licence. It has further been pleaded that the amount claimed towards compensation is too excessive. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal has framed relevant issues, which were discussed at great length. 6. The learned M.A.C.T./District Judge after going through the material available before him and hearing learned counsel for the parties, awarded a sum of Rs. 5,28,400/- in favour of the claimants along with interest @ 6% from the date of filing the claim petition. 7. Heard Sri Manish Dalakoti holding brief of Sri D.S. Patni, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Yogesh Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents/claimants and perused the record. 8. While deciding the Issue No. 1 as to whether on 24.3.2006 at about 8.30 p.m. at Lohaghat Marorkhan Road, District Champawat, an accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Vehicle No. U.A. 03-1884, in which 28 years of age Nar Bahadur Buda died on the spot, the claims tribunal has relied upon the statement of P.W.1-Smt. Sushila Devi and P.W.3 – Ganesh Bahadur, the claims tribunal has recorded a finding that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Truck in question, in which Sri Nar Bahadur Buda died. This issue has been decided accordingly. 9. While deciding the Issue No. 2 as to whether the driver of the truck in question was having valid driving licence at the time of the accident, the claims tribunal has relied upon the photocopy of the Driving Licence Paper No. 31Ga1 supplied by the opposite party no. 1/respondent No. 5, which shows that the same was valid at the time of the accident. 10. 1/respondent No. 5, which shows that the same was valid at the time of the accident. 10. While deciding the Issue No. 3 as to whether at the time of the accident, the truck in question was not validly and effectively insured with the United India Insurance Company, the claims tribunal has relied upon the photocopy of the cover note of the Insurance Policy Paper No. 28Ga1/1 to 28Ga1/3, which shows that at the time of accident, the truck in question was validly and effectively insured with the United India Insurance Company Limited. This issue has been decided accordingly. 11. While deciding the Issue No. 4 as to whether at the time of accident, the truck in question was being driven against the terms and conditions of the Permit, the claims tribunal has relied upon the photocopy of the permit Paper No. 29Ga, which shows that the same was valid at the date and time of the accident and the truck in question was being driven in compliance of the terms and conditions of the policy. This issue has been decided accordingly. 12. While deciding the Issue No. 5 with regard to quantum of compensation, the claims tribunal has taken into consideration the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 3,600/- per month. In this way, his annual income was Rs. 3,600/- x 12 = Rs. 43,200/-. The tribunal has further recorded that if, he would have spent 1/3 on himself then the dependency on him comes to Rs. 28,800/-. The Tribunal has assessed the age of the deceased between 25 to 30 years and adopted the multiplier of 18 then it comes to Rs. 5,18,400/-. The Tribunal has recorded a finding that the claimants are entitled to get the aforesaid amount as compensation. Apart from that the claims tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 3,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 5,000/- towards love and affection for children and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. Thus, the claims tribunal has awarded a total sum of Rs. 5,28,400/- towards compensation along with simple interest @ 6% per annum. 13. On behalf of the Insurance Company Sri Vijay Singh was examined, who has denied his entitlement for indemnifying the award. Not a single word has been stated in the statement that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger. 14. 5,28,400/- towards compensation along with simple interest @ 6% per annum. 13. On behalf of the Insurance Company Sri Vijay Singh was examined, who has denied his entitlement for indemnifying the award. Not a single word has been stated in the statement that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger. 14. Counsel for the appellant Sri Manish Dalakoto holding brief of Sri D.S. Patni has stated that since extra premium has not been paid, therefore, the Insurance Company is not responsible to indemnify the award given by the Claims Tribunal. 15. A perusal of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act provides as under : “(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily [injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;” 16. As will appear from the aforesaid provision that against any liability, which may be incurred by him instead of death of or bodily injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle. 17. According to the statement of the claimants, they were authorized representative as they were the family members and the deceased was traveling in the said truck as a employer and as such Section 147 covers the case of the authorized representative as well. 18. In the case of National Insurance Company Vs. Baljeet Kaur (2004) 2 SCC 1, similar controversy was involved. The Apex court has referred Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act and has defined any person. The observations are quoted below : “15. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 44(1), 4th Edn. Reissue, para 1474, pp. 906-07, it is stated : “Parliament intends that an enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered : (1) what was the common law before the making of the Act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; (3) what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and (4) the true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall : (a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and (b) suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro privato commodo (for private benefit); and (c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro publico (for the public good).” 16. Heydon’s rule has been applied by this Court in a large number of cases in order to suppress the mischief which was intended to be remedied against the literal rule which could have otherwise covered the field. (See, for the example, Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661 and Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1990) 2 SCC 71). 17. By reason of the 1994 amendment what was added is “including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle”. The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried on the vehicle besides the third parties. The intention of Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words “any person” occurring in Section 147 would cover all persons who were traveling in a good carriage in any capacity whatsoever. The intention of Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words “any person” occurring in Section 147 would cover all persons who were traveling in a good carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention, there was no necessity of Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as the expression “any person” contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorized representative besides the passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise. …………..We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in terms whereof, it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.” 19. Counsel for the appellant has also referred Ramashray Singh Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others (2003) 10 Supreme Court Cases 664 to the following effect : “10. The appellant’s first submission was that Shashi Bhushan Singh was a passenger. The appellant’s submission that the phrases “any person” and “any passenger” in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b) to Section 147(1) are wide amplitude, is correct. (See : New India Assurance Co. V. Satpal Singh (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130) However, the proviso to the sub-section carves out an exception in respect of one class of persons and passengers, namely, employees of the insured. In other words, if the “person” or “passenger” is an employee, then the insurer is required under the statute to cover only certain employees. V. Satpal Singh (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130) However, the proviso to the sub-section carves out an exception in respect of one class of persons and passengers, namely, employees of the insured. In other words, if the “person” or “passenger” is an employee, then the insurer is required under the statute to cover only certain employees. As stated earlier, this would still allow the insured to enter into an agreement to cover other employees, but under the proviso to Section 147(1)(b), it is clear that for the purposes of Section 146(1), a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of any employment of the person insured unless : first, the liability of the insured arises under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and second, if the employee is engaged in driving the vehicle and if it is a public service vehicle, is engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, if the employee concerned is neither a driver nor conductor nor examiner of tickets, the insured cannot claim that the employee would come under the description of “any person” or “passenger’. If this were permissible, then there would be no need to make special provisions for employees of the insured. The mere mention of the word “cleaner” while describing the seating capacity of the vehicle does not mean that the cleaner was therefore a passenger. Besides, the claim of the deceased employee was adjudicated upon by the Workmen’s Compensation Court which could have assumed jurisdiction and passed an order directing compensation only on the basis that the deceased was an employee. This order cannot now be enforced on the basis that the deceased was a passenger. 11. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court relied on by the appellant in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Philomina Mathew 1993 ACJ 1166 (Ker) (FB) was based on a construction of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the corresponding section to which under the present Act is Section 147. The relevant provisions of the two sections which are otherwise in pari material are materially different in one respect. Section 95 covered a fourth category of employee after the three now mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) viz. The relevant provisions of the two sections which are otherwise in pari material are materially different in one respect. Section 95 covered a fourth category of employee after the three now mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) viz. “Where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by person of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arise.” 12. So a person carried in pursuance of a contract of employment would be a passenger and would be covered as such. The exclusion of this clause in the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) of the present Act bolsters our reasoning that employees other than the three mentioned are not covered by Section 147(1)(b). 13. The appellant’s next submission was that the employee concerned was a “conductor”. It is doubtful whether a “Khalasi” and a conductor are the same. But assuming this were so, there is nothing to show that the appellant had paid any additional premium was paid for 13 passengers and 1 driver. There is no payment of premium for a conductor. 14. The appellant’s final submission was that as the policy was a comprehensive one, it would cover all risks including the death of the Khalasi. The submission is unacceptable. An insurance policy only covers the person or classes of persons specified in the policy. A comprehensive policy merely means that the loss sustained by such person/persons will be payable upto the insured amount irrespective of the actual loss suffered. (Sec: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C.M. Jaya (2002) 2 SCC 278; Colinvaux: Law of Insurance (7th Edn. Pp. 93-94).” 20. The facts of the present are quite different. In the present case from statement of the P.W.2, it is evident that the deceased was a cleaner and was authorized representative of the owner of the vehicle and he was getting salary from the work of the owner and he was going in connection with the business work of the owner, as such present case is fully distinguishable. In the present case from statement of the P.W.2, it is evident that the deceased was a cleaner and was authorized representative of the owner of the vehicle and he was getting salary from the work of the owner and he was going in connection with the business work of the owner, as such present case is fully distinguishable. Even in paragraph 10 of the Ram Ashrey it has been stated that Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act carves out an exception in respect of one class of passenger namely employees of the insured. 21. The Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Swaran Singh and others (2004) 3 SCC 297 has laid down that the insurer can not avoid its liability unless there is any fundamental breach. The observations are quoted below:- (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.” 22. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.” 22. In the light of the aforesaid fact and circumstance, it cannot be said that it was a case of violation of policy under Section 149(2) of the motor Vehicles Act. The claims tribunal has rightly awarded a sum of Rs. 5,28,400/- towards compensation. 23. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. 24. The statutory amount, if any, deposited by the appellant before this Court at the time of filing the appeal be remitted to the Tribunal concerned.