JUDGMENT : 1. Heard argument from the parties and the Criminal Appeal is disposed of in the following manner. 2. Five accused persons (including the present Appellant) faced the trial in Sessions Case No. 51 of 1996 in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Jeypore. Charge under Sections 148/302/149, I.P.C. was framed and at the end of the trial only accused-Appellant Basu Bhainsa was found guilty of the offence of murder of deceased Sub ash Bhainsa and accordingly he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Appellant challenged the order of conviction on various grounds, but at the time of hearing of the appeal argues on the discrepancies said to be existing in the evidence available in the lower Court's record. Before we deal with that aspect, it is appropriate to note the facts involved in the case. 3. According to the prosecution, on 01.11.1995 in village Nilagada under Jeypore Sadar Police Station the villagers were enjoying 'Diwali' celebrations. At about 8.00 p.m. accused-Appellant Basu Bhainsa without any rhyme or reason, being armed with a knife attacked and injured the deceased by inflicting injuries on his belly, chest, hands and legs. P.W.11, Burunda Bhainsa, the elder brother of the deceased together with Budu Harijan, P.W.15 and some others shifted the deceased to the Jeypore Sub-divisional Hospital. While proceeding to the hospital on a rickshaw, on being asked by P.W.11, the deceased told that it was the accused-Appellant who dealt the stab blows by the use of a knife. After leaving the deceased in the hospital, at about 9.30 p.m. P.W.11 went to the police station and lodged F.I.R., Ext.12. On receipt of that F.I.R. the O.I.C. of Jeypore Sadar P.S. registered a P.S. Case and took up the investigation. In course of the investigation, he reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased and that statement has been marked Ext.13. After being admitted to the hospital, ultimately on 12.11.1995 the deceased succumbed to the injuries. Therefore, the police case which was initially registered for the offence u/s 307, I.P.C. was treated as a case for the offence punishable u/s 302, I.P.C. The further investigation was accordingly taken up and ultimately charge-sheet was filed against the Appellant. After being admitted to the hospital, ultimately on 12.11.1995 the deceased succumbed to the injuries. Therefore, the police case which was initially registered for the offence u/s 307, I.P.C. was treated as a case for the offence punishable u/s 302, I.P.C. The further investigation was accordingly taken up and ultimately charge-sheet was filed against the Appellant. In the meantime mother of the deceased filed a complaint case registered as I.C.C. No. 90 of 1995, implicating not only the Appellant but also the other accused persons (who faced the trial and were acquitted), describing herself to be an eye-witness to the occurrence. After submission of the charge-sheet against the Appellant, that complaint was treated as protest petition and enquiry u/s 202, Code of Criminal Procedure was undertaken by the Learned Magistrate. On completion of the inquiry, Learned S.D.J.M. found a prima facie case against the co-accused persons and accordingly by a single commitment order he committed the case to the Court of Sessions forwarding the Appellant and other coaccused persons for trial. On the basis of the commitment order, the charge-sheet and the order of cognizance, Learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charge for the offences punishable under Sections 148/302/149, I.P.C. against all the accused persons. All the accused persons denied to the charge and claimed for trial. 4. To substantiate the charge, prosecution examined 18 witnesses and relied on the documents marked Exts.1 to 18 besides the knife, M.O.-I. In their common defence the accused persons examined two witnesses including one of the acquitted accused Laxman Harijan as D.W.2. That Laxman Harijan is none other than the brother-in-law of the deceased, being the husband of his sister namely Pratima Bhainsa. 5. In course of the trial, P.W.1 Nakul Hial, P.W.3 Manohar Naik, P.W.4 Pichan Harijan, P.W.6 Ghasi Bagh and P.W.13 Pratima Bhainsa did not support the prosecution case as eye-witnesses to the occurrence and each of them with the permission of the Court was put leading questions and was confronted with the previous statement made before the police. Similarly, P.W.2 Haribandhu Naik, P.W.5 Lada Harijan, P.W.7 Dhana Bhainsa did not support the prosecution case as post-occurrence witnesses. Similarly, P.W.2 Haribandhu Naik, P.W.5 Lada Harijan, P.W.7 Dhana Bhainsa did not support the prosecution case as post-occurrence witnesses. P.W.9 Parsuram Pangi and P.W.10 Ramesh Pujari, the two witnesses to the previous incident on that date between the accused and deceased, also did not support the prosecution and they were confronted with their previous statement made u/s 161, Code of Criminal Procedure On the other hand, P.W.11 Burunda Bhainsa, the informant in this case and brother of the deceased and also a post-occurrence witness and P.W.14 Chintamani Bhainsa, the widow of the deceased as an eyewitness to the occurrence and P.W.15 Budu Harijan as a post-occurrence witness to the occurrence supported the prosecution. Amongst them P. Ws.11 and 15 also stated about the oral dying declaration which they gathered from the deceased while in the process of removing him from the occurrence village to the hospital. P.W.16 is the doctor, who held autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and proved the post-mortem report, Ext 8 and the Opinion Report, Ext 9 by opining that the stab injuries found on the dead body of the deceased are possible by weapons by M.O.-I. He also proved the bed-head ticket, Ext 10 in respect of admission and treatment of the deceased in the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jeypore. P.W.18 is the Investigating Officer. The Inquest Report, Deadbody Chalan, seizure of the weapon of offence at the behest of the accused-Appellant, seizure list prepared relating to seizure of the blood stained earth and other incriminating materials, etc. have also been marked as different Exhibits. 6. As noted above, in furtherance of their denial plea, accused persons examined two witnesses and they stated that no such incident took place. No further oral or any documentary evidence was adduced from the side of the accused. 7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge examined the evidence of P.W.16, the post-mortem report and the Bed-head Ticket and concurred with the opinion of P.W.16 that deceased suffered homicidal death because of the ante-mortem homicidal injuries caused by M.O.-I, and that accordingly prosecution has proved that the deceased suffered homicidal death. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, on perusal of the other evidence on record, found that the dyeing declaration of the deceased proved by P. Ws.11 and 15 so also by P.W. 18 vide Ext. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, on perusal of the other evidence on record, found that the dyeing declaration of the deceased proved by P. Ws.11 and 15 so also by P.W. 18 vide Ext. 13 lent abundant corroboration to the evidence of P.W.13, who, as an eye-witness to the occurrence, described that it was the Appellant who dealt the stab blows. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge found such evidence to be credible and acceptable notwithstanding non-examination of the complainant in the complaint case and also absence of any allegation against the co-accused persons and the hostileness to the host of witnesses examined by the prosecution. Regarding such finding the Trial Court found the Appellant guilty of the offence of murder, whereas he found that in the absence of any evidence the other accused persons are entitled to acquittal. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that the oral dying declaration proved by P. Ws. 11 and 15 should not have been accepted in as much as there is no whisper in the F.I.R. about the deceased making such a dying declaration. Repelling to that argument, Learned Standing Counsel contends that the purpose of F.I.R. is to intimate the police authorities about a cognizable offence being committed and the manner in which it was committed and by whom it was committed and, therefore, all details need not be mentioned in the F.I.R. Looking to the sequence in which the event happened and to the narration in the F.I.R. we find that non-mention of the fact of oral dying declaration of the deceased before him (P.W.11) and P.W.15 is not at all fatal to the prosecution, in as much as F.I.R. need not be an encyclopedia on every minute details from the time of occurrence till the time of reporting. On the other hand, on perusal of the evidence of P. Ws.11 and 15, we find that they are the relevant witnesses who could have proved the dying declaration, because they were carrying the deceased to the hospital. In that process P.W.l accompanying P.W.15 was driving the rickshaw. Their close relationship with the deceased is not a reason to discard their evidence, because there could not have been an attempt by these two witnesses to protect the real offender and to bring false accusation against an innocent person. Apart from that, in the present case, Ext. In that process P.W.l accompanying P.W.15 was driving the rickshaw. Their close relationship with the deceased is not a reason to discard their evidence, because there could not have been an attempt by these two witnesses to protect the real offender and to bring false accusation against an innocent person. Apart from that, in the present case, Ext. 13 is the statement of the deceased which is admissible as evidence in view of the provision in Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, and in that statement whatever has been stated by the deceased is corroborated from the evidence of P. Ws. 11 and 15 relating to the dyeing declaration. Above all, the evidence of the eye-witness, i.e., P.W.13 also runs corroborative about the author of the injuries so as to lend credibility to this dying declaration evidence. Thus, mere absence of the factum in the F.I.R. about the deceased making dying declaration before P.W.ll in course of the transit from the occurrence village to the hospital is not a ground to discard the evidence of P. Ws. 11 and 15 and the dying declaration. It is more so when the accused persons did not dispute to the fact that on the date and time of occurrence the deceased suffered injuries which could have been caused by a stabbing instrument, and in that respect the evidence of P.W.16 and his opinion regarding homicidal death has remained unchallenged before us. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that when the father of the deceased, i.e., P.W.12 has declined to support the prosecution on dying declaration and also did not state anything about the occurrence, when the sister of the deceased, i.e., P.W.13 also resiled from the prosecution as an eye-witness to the occurrence, therefore, in such a situation non-examination of the mother of the deceased, who lodged the complaint and roped in other accused persons, is fatal for the prosecution. The aforesaid argument is found to be fallacious in as much as attempt, which the mother of the deceased took, was to rope in some more persons as the accused and those persons have been acquitted by the Trial Court and there is nothing on record that the evidence which was tendered in course of the trial that the mother of the deceased figured as eye-witness to the occurrence. For the sake of discussion if we assume that she figured as a witness to the occurrence, then also her non-examination cannot be fatal to the prosecution, because P.W.13 has been examined as one of the eye-witness to the occurrence. It is the quality and not quantity of evidence which counts for determining whether the offence is proved or not. Appellant does not say as to in what manner he has been prejudiced for non-examination of that complainant. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the aforesaid contention so as to interfere with the impugned Judgment. 10. Apart from the above, we also find that P.W.13 had a reason not to support the prosecution, because her husband Laxman Harijan was an accused in this case. Therefore, no adverse view should be taken against the prosecution only because she did not support the prosecution. Similarly, P.W.12 - the father of the deceased also did not support the prosecution on the dying declaration, because he was truthful in as much as he did not support the prosecution blindly and declined to speak about dying declaration because he had not heard it. Under such circumstance also no adverse view is to be taken against the prosecution. 11. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that in course of the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses several contradictions were confronted to them and the Trial Court did not take account of that while assessing the evidence of P. Ws.11, 14 and 15. We do not find any merit in that argument in as much as none of those contradictions were on material aspect, and apart from that in course of the cross-examination of P.W.18 the defence did not take care to confront such confronted statements and to extract any answer. When P.W.18 was not cross-examined in that respect, mere confrontation of previous statement to the other witnesses is not sufficient to draw adverse inference. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further argues that the evidence of D. Ws.1 and 2 remains unimpeachable relating to their innocence and no involvement with the crime. 12. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand argues that such evidence adduced by the defence is of no use besides being selfservicing in nature. On a reference to the evidence of D.W.1, we see that he stated that I know all the accused persons in dock. 12. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand argues that such evidence adduced by the defence is of no use besides being selfservicing in nature. On a reference to the evidence of D.W.1, we see that he stated that I know all the accused persons in dock. My village Nuagada situates adjacent to village Nilagada. All the accused persons belong to village Nilagada. The accused persons lives on cultivation and they are not involved in any criminal activities. Cross-examination by Prosecution I do not know anything about any such occurrence.'' The above-quoted evidence of D.W.1 is hardly relevant to consider in proof or non-proof of charge. Accused Laxman as D.W.2 stated that he accompanied when the deceased was taken to hospital and at that time he was unconscious. That evidence has rightly been rejected as selfserving. In that respect, on a reference to the evidence of P.W.16, we find that in course of the cross-examination he replied that, "If a person would sustain the injuries as per Ext.8, he would have his sense." The above opinion of P.W.16 is good enough to take care of the circumstance that deceased could make a dying declaration while in transit from his village to the hospital being accompanied by P. Ws.11 and 15. 13. Lastly, Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that keeping in view the confronted statement to P. Ws.9 and 10 about the preceding incident resulting the occurrence, it may be treated as an act of retaliation under grave and sudden provocation by the accused-Appellant and, thus, when the deceased could survive for twelve days after sustaining the injuries, therefore the conviction may be u/s 304, Part I, I.P.C. instead of u/s 302, I.P.C. 14. Learned Standing Counsel does not subscribe to that idea and reiterates that conviction u/s 302 is justified. At this stage, we refer to the evidence of P.W.16 and the Post-mortem Report, Ext.8. P.W.16 stated that the deceased suffered the following external injuries. 1. Stab injury right flank of abdomen 2" above the iliac crest of size 1" x 1/2'' depth up to abdominal cavity. 2. Stab injury on the back 1 1/2'' above the posterior part of iliac crest on the right side - 1" x 1/2'' depth upto abdominal cavity. 3. Stab injury on the right buttock upper part of size 1" x 1/2'' x 2". 4. 2. Stab injury on the back 1 1/2'' above the posterior part of iliac crest on the right side - 1" x 1/2'' depth upto abdominal cavity. 3. Stab injury on the right buttock upper part of size 1" x 1/2'' x 2". 4. Stab injury over the right lower part at the level of 10th inter costal space of size 1'' x 1/2'' x 1/2". 5. Stab injury over the middle chest just above Xiphister-mum 1" x 1/2'' x 1/2". 6. Stab injury along the left anterior axillary line over 10th inter costal space directing down and inwards of size 1" x 1" x abdominal cavity. 7. Stab injury along the posterior axillary line over 8th inter costal space 1" x 1" x depth thoracic cavity. 8. Stab injury over medial aspect of left elbow of size 1" x 1/2''x 1/4". 9. Stab injury over right thigh 8" below the anterior superior iliac spine 1" x 1/2'' x 1/4". On dissection of chest, on the left side left lung was injured. He also opined that cumulative effect of all such injuries can cause death of a person in ordinary course of nature. 15. Under such circumstance, we do not find the case of the Appellant being covered by any of the five exceptions as provided in Section 300, I.P.C. so as to construe the act of assault made by the Appellant on the deceased as a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and therefore we also do not accept that argument of the Appellant. 16. No other point is canvassed by either of the parties. 17. For the reasons recorded above, we do not disturb the order of conviction and sentence and accordingly dismiss the Criminal Appeal. Final Result : Dismissed