Judgment Barin Ghosh and J.N.Singh JJ. 1. Since two writ petitions filed by the appeals in the above mentioned two were decided by a common judgment and order dated 5th November, 1999 assailed in these appeals, we propose to dispose of both the appeals by this common judgment and order. 2. On 13th April, 1989 by one single order both the appellants were suspended in contemplation of initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Proceedings were thereupon initiated and an Enquiry Officer was appointed. Subsequent thereto on 22nd May, 1989 the second Enquiry Officer was appointed. The second Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 4th July, 1989 and thereby reported that the charges of absence from duty, as were levelled against the appellants, in the circumstances mentioned in the enquiry report, are not sub- stantiated. Thereupon on 11th December, 1989 by a common order both the appellants were punished, whereby two yearly increments of the appellants had been stopped with cumulative effect. On 24th October, 1997 by an appeal the appellants challenged the said punishment order dated 11th December, 1989. On the ground of limitation the appeal was dismissed. In order to apply limitation the appellate authority took recourse to the Bihar Taken Over Primary School Teach- ers (Transfer and Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1994, which came into effect on 16th June, 1994. 3. Challenging the said order dismissing the appeal, the appellants filed two writ petitions. By the common judgment and order under appeal those two writ petitions have been dismissed. 4. Before the writ court it was urged by the appellants successfully that Bihar Taken Over Primary School Teachers (Transfer and Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1994, were prospective and, accordingly, provisions contained in the said Rules had no effect in relation to the appeal preferred by the appellants. The learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petitions, felt that in asmuch as the said Rules came into effect after the punishment order had been passed, provisions contained in the said Rules had no application in relation to the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging the punishment order but still then, dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of delay. 5. There is no dispute that Rule 10 of the said Rules prescribes a period of thirty days to prefer an appeal against a punishment order. 5. There is no dispute that Rule 10 of the said Rules prescribes a period of thirty days to prefer an appeal against a punishment order. There cannot be any dispute that the said Rules having not been expressly given effect to from a date anterior, the same had prospective operation. However, after the said Rules had come into force, an appeal against a punishment order could only be preferred in terms of the said Rules. In such situation, the limitation prescribed in the said Rules became applicable. Inasmuch as the punishment order was passed on a date prior to the date of coming into force of the said Rules, it was well within the competence of the appellants to prefer the appeal, which they preferred on 24th October, 1997, within thirty days from the date of coming into force of the said Rules. Inasmuch as the said appeal was not preferred within thirty days from the date of coming into force of the said Rules, the appeal stood barred by limitation. 6. We do not accept the proposition as contained in the order under appeal that an appeal can be dismissed by an appellate authority on the ground of delay. Right to appeal is not an inherent right. Such right is created by Statute. Once Statute has granted right to prefer an appeal, unless the appeal is barred by limitation the appellate authority cannot shirk of its obligation to hear and decide the appeal on the ground of delay. However, inasmuch as the appeal was not preferred within the time prescribed by law and the same was preferred much beyond the period of limitation prescribed by law and there being no provision authorizing the appellate authority to condone the delay in preferring the appeal, we feel that, in the circumstances, the appellate authority had no other option but to dismiss the appeal only on the ground of limitation. 7. In the circumstances, we would not interfere with the ultimate conclusion of the learned Judge, but for reasons, as above. The appeals fail and the same are dismissed.