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2008 DIGILAW 846 (RAJ)

Mata Deen v. B. O. R.

2008-03-19

M.N.BHANDARI, NARAYAN ROY

body2008
Honble BHANDARI, J.— All these appeals have been preferred to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18th September, 1997, whereby writ petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed. 2. The brief facts relevant to the present appeals are that a land measuring 512 Bighas in village Allawas was belonging to two brothers, namely, Chandi Dan and Suraj Dan, in their joint Khatedari. Chandi Dan had three sons, whereas Suraj Dan had no issue. Suraj Dan sold 400 Bighas of land to Amba Dan in the year, 1969, out of 512 Bighas of the total land of joint Khatedari. The share of Suraj Dan in the land was then challenged by Chandi Dan and his three sons, which was then finally decided by the Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated 8.9.1991. This was based on a compromise entered between Chandi Dan and his sons with that Suraj Dan and Amba Dan. Pursuant to the settlement, land came in the share of Chandi Dan and his sons also. After settlement and the compromise decrees passed by the Board of Revenue on 8.9.1971, Chandi Dan sold the land of his share, including that of his son vide the sale-deed dated 14.1.1974. Subsequently, land was also gifted and further sold by said Shri Chandi Dan and this is how all the appellants came in Khatedari Rights and even mutation entires were also opened in the name of the appellants subsequently. This is one part of the facts relevant to the case. 3. The second part relevant to the case is that pursuant to the sale of 400 Bighas of land by Suraj Dan to Amba Dan in the year, 1969, mutation entry was opened in the name of Amba Dan. Due to holding land of 400 Bighas by said Amba Dan, ceiling proceedings were initiated by the Government under the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 1955. However, the same were dropped by the authorized officer vide his order dated 28.1.1976. The matter did not come to an end here, because pursuant to the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973), ceiling proceedings were re-opened vide order dated 18th/26th April, 1980 and, thereupon, vide the order dated 20th April, 1989, Additional Collector passed an order for cancellation of Khatedari rights for 377.18 Bighas of land of Amba Dan. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Additional Collector, Amba Dan filed appeal before the Board of Revenue. The appeal so preferred by the appellant was then decided vide the judgment dated 5.5.1992. This is an important event for his case because dispute as has been raised herein arose as Amba Dan had surrendered land of the petitioner-appellants in the ceiling proceedings finally decided on 5.5.1992.The appellants could know about the order dated 5.5.1992 when they were sought to be evicted by the Government. The appellants, thereafter, moved review petition before the Board of Revenue, but the same was dismissed, being not maintainable in view of Section 86 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, because appellants were not the parties in the suit as well as appeal. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the review petition, the appellants preferred writ petitions to challenge the order dated 22.6.1992 passed by the Board of Revenue on their review petition, and also, the order dated 5.5.1992 wherein land was surrendered by Amba Dan which otherwise is belonging to the appellants. The appellants, in the writ petitions, also challenged the order of re-opening of the ceiling proceedings, as well as the order passed by the Additional Collector dated 20th September, 1989. 4. The writ petition was precisely filed, on the ground that the Board of Revenue passed an adverse order to the appellants on 5.5.1992 by accepting surrender of land belonging to the appellants, without providing an opportunity of hearing to them. More so, when in the ceiling proceedings, Amba Dan was required to first surrender the un-encumbered land belonging to him. The land belonging to the appellants was thus surrendered in violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 1973. Both the issues were raised on the ground that the appellants, being transferees of the land in dispute, thus, required to be heard before conclusion of the ceiling proceedings finally. More so, when land belonging to them was illegally being surrendered by Amba Danm and even the surrender was accepted by the Board of Revenue, though before passing of the order dated 5.5.1992 the land in dispute was already mutated in favour of the appellants. 5. More so, when land belonging to them was illegally being surrendered by Amba Danm and even the surrender was accepted by the Board of Revenue, though before passing of the order dated 5.5.1992 the land in dispute was already mutated in favour of the appellants. 5. The writ petition of the appellants was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, on the ground that a transferee has no right to intervene in the ceiling proceedings as held by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kesa vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 RLW 1, apart from the fact that petitioner is not even a transferee of land from Amba Dan against whom ceiling proceedings were initiated. The land in dispute was transferred to the appellant by Chandi Dan. Thus, appellants, being not the transferee of the land from Amba Dan, they cannot claim a right of hearing. It was further seen that even the issue pertaining to surrender of land by Amba Dan in violation of Sections 16 and 18 of the Act of 1973 is not available to the appellants as land was not encumbered due to sale or gift by Amba Dan against whom ceiling proceedings were initiated. So far as dismissal of review petition preferred by the appellants by the Revenue Board, the learned Single Judge held that the appellants had no right to file a review petition, in view of the provisions of Section 86 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the appellants are rightful transferees, pursuant to the sale deeds and gift made by Chandi Dan after compromise decree passed by the Board of Revenue on 7.9.1971 whereby dispute was settled between Chandi Dan with his three sons, Suraj Dan and Amba Dan. Thus, Amba Dan, being a party to the proceedings before the Board of Revenue, suppressed the fact while surrendering the land came in the share of Chandi Dan and his son in compromise decree and later on sold and gifted to the present appellants. The appellants on the aforesaid ground claimed that before passing the order dated 5.5.1992, being the transferee of land, they should have been heard by the Board of Revenue, more so, when the land in question was even mutated in the name of the appellants much prior to the order. The appellants on the aforesaid ground claimed that before passing the order dated 5.5.1992, being the transferee of land, they should have been heard by the Board of Revenue, more so, when the land in question was even mutated in the name of the appellants much prior to the order. The other ground raised by the appellants is that while invoking the provisions of Sections 16 and 18 of the Act of 1973, Amba Dan was under a legal obligation to first surrender unencumbered land, but in the present matter, Amba Dan, knowing about the compromise decree dated 7.9.1971, surrendered the land belonging to Chandi Dan and his son. Thus, the order dated 5.5.1992 was drawn in violation of the provisions of the Act of 1973 itself. The last argument was pertaining to the order passed on the review application of the appellants as the learned counsel for the appellants submits that even after bringing all the relevant facts in the notice of the Board of Revenue, their review petition was dismissed, only on the ground that appellants were not party to the suit and appeal before the Revenue Board. Though, the circumstances were explained as to why and at whose instance, the appellants could not be taken as a party in ceiling proceedings. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, not only the ceiling proceedings, but the order dated 5.5.1992 and the order dated 22.6.1992 deserve to be set aside so as the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the appellants do not fall in the category of transferee as it is not a case of sale or gift by Amba Dan against whom ceiling proceedings were initiated and even otherwise, transferee has no right of hearing in the ceiling proceedings, as has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kesa Ram (Supra). It was contended that the appellants are having no right to challenge the ceiling proceedings as the land in question was sold and gifted to the appellants subsequent to the cut off date fixed in the Act of 1973, prohibiting sale and gift of agricultural land. Hence, supporting the judgments of the Revenue Board dated 5.5.1992 and 22.6.1992, it was prayed that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality in passing the order impugned. Hence, supporting the judgments of the Revenue Board dated 5.5.1992 and 22.6.1992, it was prayed that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality in passing the order impugned. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. In our opinion, the main issue for consideration is as to whether a transferee has any right of hearing in the ceiling proceedings and also as to whether the surrender of land is made in violation of Sections 16 and 18 of the Act of 1973, by treating the land in dispute to be unencumbered land. Considering the first argument, judgment in the case of Kesa Ram (Supra) provides complete assistance, wherein Full Bench of this Court considering the provisions of the Act of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1955) and the Rajasthan (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) (Government) Rules, 1963 (for short, the Rules of 1963) held that scheme of the Act indicates intention of the legislature to ignore the unrecognized transferee and, thereby, considering the case of Nand Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1978 RLW p.198, it was held that as per the scheme of Chapter III B of the Act, legislature by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice in favour of transferee. The relevant paras 47, 48 and 55 of the judgment of Kesa are reproduced hereunder :- “47. The scheme of the Act indicates the intention of Legislature that unrecognised transfers are to be ignored. That the transferor is to prove that the transfer effected by him is recognizable. As stated earlier Legislature was conscious of the interest of the transferee and made provision that the transferee is entitled to reimburse and transferor is bound to restore him the advantage obtained by him and that the farmer can claim reimbursement from the compensation money payable to the transferor by the State Government under Section 30C of the Act. This being the Postiion of law it was held in Nand Lals case (1) that under the scheme of Chapter IIIB of the Act Legislature by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice regarding audi alteram partem in favour of the transferees and we fully agree with the opinion so expressed by the Division Bench of this Court. 48. 48. In order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties regarding the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem and the principle of natural justice and to strengthen the view expressed by us it would be profitable to refer to the various authorities cited from both the sides. 55. In view of the above discussion, we arrive at the conclusion that there is no provision in Chapter III B or the Rules framed under the Act for issuing notice to the transferees. The Act and the Rules framed thereunder by necessary implication exclude principle of natural justice in proceedings under Chapter III B of the Act and as such the transferee cannot claim notice in ceiling proceedings under Chapter III B of the Act.” 10. A look at the provisions of the Act of 1973 demonstrates that the Scheme of the aforesaid Act in regard to the transferee is one and the same as was of the Act of 1955 and Rules of 1963. Further the transfer of land herein is again after the cut off date fixed under Section 6 of the Act of 1973 being a sale and gift after 1st January, 1973. Section 6 of the Act of 1973 is quoted hereunder:- “Sec.6.Non-recognition of certain transfers. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any for the time being in force, every transfer of land whether by way of sale, gift, exchange, assignment, surrender, bequest, creation of trust or otherwise made on or after 26th September, 1970, except a bona fide transfer made before 1st January, 1973, shall be deemed to have been made in order to defeat the provisions of this Act and shall not be recognized or taken into consideration in determining the ceiling area applicable to a person. (2) The burden of providing the transfer to be bona fide shall be on the transferor.” 11. The question of violation of the principles of natural justice in the case of transfer of land, after the cut off date of 1st January does not arise being unrecognized transfer. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, referred judgment of the Honble Apex Court to show that the right of transferee has been recognized therein for providing opportunity of hearing. In that regard, the case of Escorts Forms Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Cumau Division, reported in AIR 2004 SC 2186 is relevant. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, referred judgment of the Honble Apex Court to show that the right of transferee has been recognized therein for providing opportunity of hearing. In that regard, the case of Escorts Forms Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Cumau Division, reported in AIR 2004 SC 2186 is relevant. Therein, the Honble Apex Court considering the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holdings Act of 1961 held that as per Section 5 (6), proviso (b) Explanation II, transferee are necessary parties and entitled to be heard to show that transfer of land was in good faith. In paras 59 to 64, the aforesaid issue was dealt by the Honble Apex Court in details. The perusal of those paras reveals that the said opportunity was given to the transferee, mainly to show that the transfers were made in good faith as specifically, the aforesaid issue was decided by referring to the provisions of Section 5 (6) of the Act under consideration therein. The case in hand does not involve the same issue as the said issue would have been there if sale is before 1st January, 1973 in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1973. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is reported in AIR 2002 SC 2543 , Shiv Singh vs. State of U.P. Therein, the Honble Apex Court held that if an application filed by the transferee against the determination of land to be surplus under ceiling laws, then, same should not have been dismissed on the ground of delay as the society and the transferees from society were unaware of the proceedings taken against its members. The Honble Apex Court gave a direction therein that the appellants, being party interested and as their land has been declared as surplus, they have a right of hearing. Again, the aforesaid judgment cannot be applied to the present matter as the appellants, not being the purchasers of the land before the cut off date, as provided under the Act of 1973 thus, have no right to challenge the issue regarding declaration of land to be surplus or not. Again, the aforesaid judgment cannot be applied to the present matter as the appellants, not being the purchasers of the land before the cut off date, as provided under the Act of 1973 thus, have no right to challenge the issue regarding declaration of land to be surplus or not. Thus, even considering the judgment of the Honble Apex Court, it cannot be said that taking into consideration the facts of this case, the appellants have a right of hearing in regard to the ceiling proceedings being purchaser or gift holder of the land subsequent to the cut off date thus, transaction is otherwise unrecognized under the Act of 1973. 12. It is, however, important to note that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that a transferee has a right of hearing, then also, the question comes for consideration in the present matter is, as to whether appellant can be considered to be a transferee under the Act of 1973 or not. For deciding the aforesaid question, it is necessary to look into the facts again. The facts clearly show that ceiling proceedings were initiated against Amba Dan and the land in dispute was not purchased by the appellants from the said Shri Amba Dan so as to consider the appellants to be transferee of the land from Amba Dan. It is admitted case of the parties that the land in dispute came to the appellants from Chandi Dan against whom, no ceiling proceedings were initiated, may it be for the reason that as per the provisions of the Act of 1973 on the relevant date for judging the ceiling case is 25.9.1970 and on which date, entire 400 Bighas of land was existing in the name of Amba Dan and the transfer of land in favour of appellant is after the aforesaid date rather even after 1st January, 1973, thus it becomes unrecognized transfer. It, however, becomes clear that the appellant cannot even be considered is not transferee of the land from and against whom ceiling proceedings were initiated. Hence, the appellant cannot, even be considered as a transferee, thus, on that score also, the appellant cannot claim a right of hearing in ceiling case being transferee. 13. It, however, becomes clear that the appellant cannot even be considered is not transferee of the land from and against whom ceiling proceedings were initiated. Hence, the appellant cannot, even be considered as a transferee, thus, on that score also, the appellant cannot claim a right of hearing in ceiling case being transferee. 13. Now, comes the issue as to whether the land could have been surrendered by Amba Dan in ignorance of the provisions of Sections 16 and 18 of the Act of 1973 as, according to the appellants, land was not unencumbered, in view of the fact that the land so surrendered, was existing in the name of appellants, more specifically when Amba Dan was knowing all relevant facts in view of the compromise decree of the Revenue Board dated 7.9.1971. The perusal of the relevant provision of Sections 16 and 18 reveals that if the land is transferred by the land-holder against whom ceiling proceedings have been initiated, he is under an obligation to comply with the mandate of the provisions aforesaid, so that necessary compensation can be received, if at all, encumbered land is to be surrendered. However, as the appellants are not transferee of land from Amba Dan, they cannot take shelter of Sections 16 and 18 of the Act of 1973 and that being the position, they could not have filed the review petition before the Revenue Board. Section 16 (4) of the Act of 1973 is quoted hereunder for ready reference :- “Sec.16 (4). Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 18 or in any other provisions of this Act, where any transfer of land is not recognised or taken into consideration in determining the ceiling area applicable to the transferor under sub-section (1) of section 6, surrender of surplus land vesting in the State Government shall be made by the transferor out of the land remaining with him after the transfer and the balance of surplus land remaining, if any, shall be recovered from the transferee by his ejectment. In case surplus land or any portion of it is recovered from the transferee, the price paid by him for such land or portion thereof shall be deducted from the amount of acquisition payable to the transferor and shall be paid to the transferee to an extent not exceeding such amount of acquisition.” 14. In case surplus land or any portion of it is recovered from the transferee, the price paid by him for such land or portion thereof shall be deducted from the amount of acquisition payable to the transferor and shall be paid to the transferee to an extent not exceeding such amount of acquisition.” 14. The substance of the discussion above in reference to Section 16 (4) of the Act of 1973 is that so far as the appellants are concerned, they had even no authority to file a review petition before the Revenue Board and also the writ petition to challenge the ceiling proceedings, as well as the order of the Revenue Board. This is apart from the fact that as per Section 86 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, a review can be maintained by a party in the suit or in appeal. The appellants were not party to the suit as well as appeal. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants lastly submits that the appellants cannot be made remediless. The aforesaid argument was made in view of the judgment of the Board of Revenue, as well as the learned Single Judge, where rights claimed as transferee were not recognized, and appellants are non-suited. The argument aforesaid is raised in view of findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appellants could not have maintained the review petition so as the writ petition on the grounds raised. However, we have taken into consideration as to whether the appellants have become remediless on that count ? Considering the fact of the case again, it comes out that the appellants had purchased or gifted land in dispute from Chandi Dan and the land came in the share of Chandi Dan and his three sons pursuant to the compromise decree between Chandi Dan, Suraj Dan and Amba Dan, therefore, Amba Dan, being a party to compromise decree, was well aware of the fact that as to which part of land went to the share of Chandi Dan. That Amba Dan had surrendered the land which came in the share of Chandi Dan. That Amba Dan had surrendered the land which came in the share of Chandi Dan. Since Chandi Dan transferred the land to the appellants by way of sale and gift, the obvious consequence is that the appellants could have raised their claims by maintaining an appropriate suit to claim benefits arising out of sale and gift from Chandi Dan in reference to the compromise decree. The aforesaid aspect was considered by this Court in the case of Kastoor Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, 1984 RLR 1010. In para 3, it was held thus :- “3. So far as the petitioners are concerned, they do not claim to be transferees. They claim that they are the khatedars of the land and their predecessor-in-interest was one Ramnath. There exists a decree in their favour against Prabhu and Narain respondents No. 6 and 7, so their land is not at all liable to be resumed. Thus, first of all respondents No. 6 and 7 can be asked to surrender the excess land out of the land which is in their possession. If the obligation of respondents No. 6 and 7 for any reason cannot be enforced against them in respect of the land in their possession then it would be open to the petitioners to enforce their right by resorting to the remedy of a suit for declaration and injunction not only against the respondents No. 6 and 7, Prabhu and Narain, but also against the State of Rajasthan. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Court in Bhera Ram vs. The State of Rajasthan, W.L.N. 1979 Page 224.” 16. In view of the above, it cannot be said that appellants are made remediless in regard to their right, if any. It seems that appellants fail to make distinction between proceeding under the Act of 1973 and their right and rights otherwise under the Civil & Revenue Laws. 17. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the appeals for challenging the order of the Board of Revenue as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.