JUDGMENT By the Court.—In the instant writ petition the petitioner has questioned validity of the notice dated 20-3-2007 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) issued under Section 3 of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (in short the Act). 2. We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-respondents. 3. It is submitted that the petitioner is an Advocate of the District Court, Muzaffarnagar, and has no criminal antecedent, inasmuch as, he has not been involved in any criminal case nor any anti social activity except the incident mentioned in the impugned notice as Case Crime No. 75 of 2005, under Sections 186, 353 and 504-IPC, Police Station Civil Lines, District Muzaffarnagar and thus, he does not come within the meaning of Goonda, as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Act. It is submitted that the petitioner is co-owner of a large number of properties and some of them are under the tenancy of various departments of the State Government. It is stated that one of the house known as ‘Sheronwali Kothi’ situated in City Muzaffarnagar is under the tenancy of the State Government. However, when there was default in the payment of rent S.C.C. Suit No. 1 of 2001 (Yatendra Kumar Jain and others v. State of U.P. and another) was filed for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent, which was allowed and decreed vide judgment dated 30-8-2003. It is stated that the above judgment has also been affirmed by the High Court in Civil Revision No. 758 of 2003 vide judgment dated 22-10-2003. Similarly, in another house, in which police club was inducted as tenant by original tenant Harish Tayal, an application was moved for enhancement of rent. The said application was partly allowed vide judgment dated 23-9-2002 and the tenants were directed to pay Rs. 2,76,000/- towards annual rent. The enhancement of rent was challenged before this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 40467 of 2006 and 40470 of 2006. It is further submitted before us that in the aforesaid writ petitions the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar appeared in person and gave undertaking to vacate the premises by 31st December, 2006. It is submitted that the local administration was having grudge and prejudice against the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned notice has been issued only to harass and put pressure on him. It is submitted that the local administration was having grudge and prejudice against the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned notice has been issued only to harass and put pressure on him. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relying on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others, (1984) 3 SCC 14 , submitted that the alleged single incident, mentioned in the impugned notice, does not come within the definition of clause (1) Section 2 (b) of the Act, hence it cannot be said that the petitioner was habitually committing or attempting to commit an offence to level him as Goonda. 4. On the other hand, learned AGA opposed the writ petition and submitted that the order impugned is simply a notice calling upon the petitioner only to show-cause and thus, he instead of approaching this Court ought to have shown cause before the concerned authority and, therefore, this petition is premature and does not lie at this stage. 5. We have considered the rival submissions made before us. 6. 5. We have considered the rival submissions made before us. 6. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines ‘Goonda’ which is as under : “(b)`Goonda’ means a person who— (i) either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 153 or Section 153-B or Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code or Chapter XV, Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the said Code; or (ii) has been convicted for an offence punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956; or (iii) has been convicted not less than thrice for an offence punishable under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 or the Public Gambling Act, 1867 or Section 25, Section 27 or Section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959; or (iv) is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community; or (v) has been habitually passing indecent remarks or teasing women or girls; or (vi) is a tout;” Explanation.—‘Tout’ means a person who— (a) accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever as a motive or reward for inducing, by corrupt or illegal means any public servant or member of Government, Parliament or of State Legislature, to do or forbear to do anything or to show favour or disfavour to any person or to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person, which the Central or State Government, Parliament or State Legislature, any local authority, corporation, Government company or public servant; or (b) procures, in consideration of any remuneration moving from any legal practitioner interested in any legal business, or proposes to any legal practitioner or to any person interested in legal business to procure, in consideration of any remuneration moving from either of them, the employment of legal practitioner in such business; or (c) for the purposes mentioned in Explanation (a) or (b), frequents the precincts of civil, criminal or revenue Courts, revenue or other offices, residential colonies or residences or vicinity of the aforesaid or railway or bus stations, landing stages, lodging places or other places or public resort; or (vii) is a house-grabber. Explanation.—"House-grabber’ means a person who takes or attempts to take or aids or abets in taking unauthorized possession or having lawfully entered unlawfully remains in possession, of a building including land, garden, garages or out-houses appurtenant to a building.” 7. From a perusal of the impugned notice it is evident that Clauses (ii) to (vii) of Section 2 have no application to the present case; as the notice does not contain any allegation mentioned in these clauses. It appears from record that a report was submitted that the petitioner is a land grabber under the last clause of the Section but that proposal was subsequently dropped and the impugned notice was issued to him containing allegations of Clause (i) only. 8. In the impugned notice there is allegation of commission of Crime No. 75 of 2005 of Police Station Civil Lines punishable under Sections 186, 353 and 504, IPC. The offence under Section 186, IPC is not covered in the offences referred to in Clause (i). The offences under Sections 353 and 504, IPC are covered in Chapter XVI & XXII respectively of the IPC and so the present case falls under Clause (i). The basic requirement of applicability of Clause (I) is that the person concerned must be habitually committing the offences referred to in this clause. In the impugned notice there is description of one individual case only which was registered as Case Crime No. 75 of 2005 at Police Station Civil Lines; but one cannot be treated to be habitual unless and until there is recurrence of the offence. Since there is reference at one stray incident only in the notice, the petitioner could not be deemed to be a habitual offender on the basis of that single incident only and so the notice fails to satisfy the legal requirement. 9. The learned Additional Government Advocate submitted before us that one may be a habitual criminal and it is not essential to prove repetition of offence for holding a person to be habitual criminal, so the notice cannot be deemed to be invalid. In reply the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited before us a ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others (supra). In reply the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited before us a ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others (supra). This was a case on the Bihar Control of Crimes Act and definition of the term ‘Anti Social Element’ in Section 2(d) of this Act is similar to that of the term ‘Goonda’ in our Act. Section 2(d) of the above Act runs as under : “2. (d) “Anti-Social Element” means a person who is— (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code; or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups of castes or communities; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to or teasing women or girls; or (v) who has been convicted of an offence under Sections 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959.” 10. Interpreting the word “habitually” in Clause (i) their Lordships observed as under : ‘The word ‘habitually’ used separately in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Section 2(d) means ‘repeatedly’ or ‘persistently’. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. Absence of the word ‘habitually’ in clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) suggests that in order to treat a person as ‘anti-social element’ under clauses (iii) and (v) a single act or omission referred to therein may be enough, whereas in the case of clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) there should be a repetition of acts or omission of the same kind referred to therein. If the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the clauses of Section 2(d) would not be sufficient to treat a person as an ‘anti-social element’. A single act or omission falling under clause (i) and a single act or omission falling under clause (iv) of Section 2 (d) cannot, therefore, be characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them.” 11. The above observations apply with full force to Clause (i) of Section 2 (b) of the U.P. Goonda Act also. Therefore, in order to declare a person Goonda under Clause (i) of Section 2 (b) of the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, it is necessary that he is a habitual or is wanted in more than one case. In the case in hand, admittedly, the only case against the petitioner is pending under Sections 186, 353 and 504, IPC and that too on account of civil litigations pertaining to eviction from a house and for the enhancement of the rent of another house between the parties, which are of civil nature. Therefore, in the facts of the case and looking to the definition of ‘Goonda’ in the Act, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner can be said to be a Goonda as per provisions of Section 2 (b) of the Act. 12. On the other hand, from a perusal of the impugned notice it is apparent that only one incident has been given in the notice of Case Crime No. 75 of 2005, under Sections 186, 353 and 504, IPC, Police Station Civil Lines, District Muzaffarnagar and so it is illegal in view of the above ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 13. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted before us that the petitioner could take all these pleas before the Additional District Magistrate concerned, as he has been given an opportunity to put up his case before that authority and so this writ petition filed before this Court was not maintainable. 13. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted before us that the petitioner could take all these pleas before the Additional District Magistrate concerned, as he has been given an opportunity to put up his case before that authority and so this writ petition filed before this Court was not maintainable. In support of this contention, he cited before us a Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Jainendra @ Chhotu Singh v. State of U.P., 2007(1) ADJ 135 and referred to para 15 of the ruling in which it has been observed : “It is well-settled by now that when there is no material, the Court will interfere but when there is some material the Court will not interfere.” 14. His contention was that the present case is not a case of ‘no material’ because there is reference of one incident in the notice, and so this aspect of the case whether the material is sufficient or not is to be considered by the authority which issued the notice and so this Court has got no jurisdiction as laid down in the above ruling. 15. We do not agree with the above contention. In view of the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others (supra) it is essential to refer to at least two incidents of commission of crime for applicability of Clause (i) of Section 2(b) of the Act. Since there was reference of one incident only in the notice, it fell short of the legal requirement as provided in Clause (i) of Section 2 (b) and in this way the notice being illegal could be challenged before this Court as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U.P. and others, 1999 (39) ACC 321. If there had been reference of two or more incidents in the impugned notice, then the minimum legal requirement of Section 2(b) Clause (i) would have been satisfied, and then in that case sufficiency of the material on merits could not be challenged before this Court, but before the authority concerned as laid down in the Division Bench ruling in the case of Jainendra @ Chhotu Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) but since the impugned notice in the present case is short of the legal requirement, it could be challenged in this Court. The following observations in para 12 of the ruling in the case of Jainendra (supra) which are quoted below, also support this conclusion : “We cannot have any doubt nor we can raise any dispute with regard to aforesaid two Full Bench judgments of this High Court consisting of three Judges in Ramji Pandey (supra), which was also held good by another five Judge Bench in Bhim Sain Tyagi (supra). It is to be remembered that if there is no material, the individual petitioner has every right to challenge the notice in the writ jurisdiction of the Court and there is no bar to that extent. But if there is some material, then the notice cannot be held to be defective but will be tested on the basis of the factual analysis by the appropriate Magistrate.” 16. Hence, in view of the discussions made above, the impugned notice cannot sustain and the same is hereby quashed. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. However, the respondents will be at liberty to issue a fresh notice, if they have got sufficient material against the petitioner and in that case the proceedings may be started again in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment after referring to that material in the fresh notice. ————