ORAL JUDGEMENT:- Rule. Mr.Nagle waives service for respondents. By consent, rule is made returnable forthwith. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, through its General Manager, Bombay Electric and Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST), challenges the order dated 30th December 2002 delivered by the Dy.Commissioner of Labour and Settlement Officer, which has been confirmed by the President Industrial Court on 16th August 2007. 3. The petitioner is engaged in the supply of electricity so also conduct and maintenance of Public Transport Service in Greater Mumbai. The undertaking of the petitioner is registered as such under section 11 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. (B.I.R.Act for short). The respondent is Trade Union registered under the Trade Union’s Act. It is represented and approved Union for the Transport Industry of the petitioner. 4. The petitioner states that Standing Orders (Transport section) of the petitioner undertaking are settled by the Commissioner of Labour under section 35(2) of the B.I.R. Act, 1946. They are also settled by the Industrial Court under section 36(3) of the said Act. The alterations therein made by the Commissioner of Labour under section 39(1) of the Act have also come into effect and the standing orders as altered came into operation on and from 1st September 1955. 5. The petitioners point out that the respondent by letter dated 5th March 2002 moved the Commissioner of Labour for alterations in the Standing Orders settled for the employees of the Undertaking. It was their case that standing order No.23(b) provides that the delinquent employee be given an opportunity to show cause as to why proposed punishment should not be imposed upon him. However, this standing orders deals with the procedure in respect of summary enquiry. The contention of the Union is that the Standing Order No.23(a) does not have a similar provision which gives an opportunity to the delinquent employee to show cause as to why proposed punishment should not be imposed against him, in an enquiry conducted under the standing orders. Therefore, it was their case that the protection similar to that of Standing Order No.23(b) must also be provided in Standing Order No.23(a). According to respondent, the General Manager delegates the powers to designated officers to issue charge sheets in departmental enquiry and impose punishment provided for in the Standing Order. Therefore, it was their case that the protection similar to that of Standing Order No.23(b) must also be provided in Standing Order No.23(a). According to respondent, the General Manager delegates the powers to designated officers to issue charge sheets in departmental enquiry and impose punishment provided for in the Standing Order. The officer to whom powers are delegated conducts the enquiry and records findings and also imposes necessary punishment. 6. It is their case that the officer conducting the enquiry does not have sufficient independence as they are officers subordinate to the General Manager. Therefore, the standing order No.23(a) should also provide for an opportnity to show cause against proposed punishment. This would be in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The respondents, therefore, requested the Commissioner of Labour to alter the standing orders as per the Annexures submitted along with the letter. 7. The petitioner submitted its reply/response to the Union’s letter. It is contended that standing order No.23 provides for two types of enquiries. There is a regular enquiry for grave offence and that is covered by Standing Officer No.23(a). Standing Order No.23(b) is summary trial for minor penalties/punishment. It was contended by the petitioner that both standing orders provided for adherence to principles of natural justice in the conduct of disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent employee. A careful perusal of Standing Order No.23(a) would indicate that at the regular enquiry for imposing major penalty/punishment, the enquiry officer is also the disciplinary authority. He is required to give full opportunity to the delinquent employee and his representative to answer the charge and to be defended before trying officer. Evidence is led, cross examination of the witness takes place and in the final submissions, which are made before the enquiry officer/trying officer, the employee concerned is given an opportunity to urge that he may be exonerated of the charges and no punishment be imposed against him. Thus, the opportunity of showing cause against any punishment is inbuilt in the procedure prescribed by standing order No.23(a). The Standing Order No.23(b) is speaking of minor punishments. These are penalties which are to be imposed in summary trials/enquiry. The procedure of summary enquiry does not contemplate defence by the delinquent employee through the defence representative. Nor does it contemplate leading of evidence or cross examination of witness. The Standing Order No.23(b) is speaking of minor punishments. These are penalties which are to be imposed in summary trials/enquiry. The procedure of summary enquiry does not contemplate defence by the delinquent employee through the defence representative. Nor does it contemplate leading of evidence or cross examination of witness. In a summary enquiry the employee, on being orally informed about the misconduct, is given an opportunity to submit his defence either in writing or orally to the enquiry officer, who is also empowered to pass appropriate punishment against him. After considering the statements made in writing or orally the officer proceeds to pass such an order as he deems fit. The element to show cause introduced in standing order No.23(b)(i) is by way of an exception. That is not contemplated in Standing Order No.23(a). However, now the delinquent employees in case of summary trials are allowed to be represented as per the provisions of M.R.T.U. and PULP Act, 1971. Since, a comprehensive procedure is set out and a delinquent employee has adequate opportunity to show cause against the charges, so also the proposed punishment, therefore, there is no question of permitting any amendment in Section 23(a) which has been sought in the light of standing order 23(b). Once, the permission is given to the delinquent employee in case of summary trial to be represented in the manner laid down in the M.R.T.U. and PULP Act, that standing order itself is redundant. The petitioner pointed out that the reliance on the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Mohammed Ramzan Khan reported in 1991 (I) CLR 61 is misplaced. In terms thereof, a copy of the enquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment should be given to the employee. However, the Supreme Court judgement must be seen in the context of the fact that the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority may be distinct. If they are different, then, the requirement laid down in the Supreme Court decision would apply. As far as petitioner is concerned, the enquiry officer is also disciplinary authority and, therefore, Mohd.Khan’s case will have no application. Reliance was also placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (Electronic Corporation of India Ltd.) Hyderabad Vs. B.Karunakar, reported in A.I.R. 1994 SC 1074. As far as petitioner is concerned, the enquiry officer is also disciplinary authority and, therefore, Mohd.Khan’s case will have no application. Reliance was also placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (Electronic Corporation of India Ltd.) Hyderabad Vs. B.Karunakar, reported in A.I.R. 1994 SC 1074. For all these reasons the petitioner submitted before the authority that no change or alteration is necessary or should be made in the standing order No.23(a). 8. It is clarified by both sides before me that the petition concerns only this amendment and, therefore, other aspects or other alterations sought need not be considered or gone into. 9. The Dy.Commissioner of Labour before whom the matter was placed referred to both standing orders and the rival contentions as noted above. In para 3 of the decision of the Dy.Commissioner of Labour, this is what is observed:- "3. In Standing Order No.23(a) at the end of the first paragraph following should be added – "an employee who as a result of such trial is ordered to suffer any punishment shall be served a show cause notice providing him an opportunity to file his say in respect of the proposed punishment being imposed upon him". After receiving the explanation from the delinquent employee in this respect within the reasonable time only and after duly considering the submissions made in this respect by the delinquent employee the final order should be passed." 10. In such circumstances, the Dy.Commissioner of Labour passed the following order. "1. The existing Standing Order No.22 in the settled standing order is deleted. "2. The proposal seeking deletion of Appendix XV attached to the Leave Rules is rejected; "3. In Standing Order No.23(a) at the end of the first paragraph following should be added – "an employee who as a result of such trial is ordered to suffer any punishment shall be served a show cause notice providing him an opportunity to file his say in respect of the proposed punishment being imposed upon him". After receiving the explanation from the delinquent employee in this respect within the reasonable time only and after duly considering the submissions made in this respect by the delinquent employee the final order should be passed." "4. After receiving the explanation from the delinquent employee in this respect within the reasonable time only and after duly considering the submissions made in this respect by the delinquent employee the final order should be passed." "4. Since in view of statutory amendment in the Schedule I of the B.I.R. Act the existing settled Standing Order should be altered after the Applicant Union and the Management undertaking finalise the draft for inclusion at the appropriate place in the existing settled Standing Orders and submit the same for settlement under section 39(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946." 11. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Dy.Commissioner of Labour/Settlement Officer, the petitioner preferred an Appeal under section 36 of the B.I.R. Act being Appeal (IC) No.96 of 2003 before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra State. After referring to the factual position, the petitioner appellant contended that the order of the Dy.Commissioner is uncalled for since the standing order 23(a) provides sufficient safeguards to the employee to defend himself before the enquiry officer. The delinquent employee has opportunity to engage his representative before the enquiry officer and to make submissions based on the evidence so also regarding the charges levelled against him. The delinquent employee is given opportunity to submit before the Disciplinary authority that he may be exonerated of the charges and no punishment be imposed on him. Thus, the element of showing cause against the punishment is in built in the standing order 23(a). The petitioners distinguished the law laid down in Supreme Court’s decision relied upon by the Union. Petitioner’s appeal dated 3rd June 2003 was time barred, according to petitioner and, therefore, the application for condonation of delay was preferred. The same was accompanied by an affidavit of Mr.Ashok Walawalkar, Personnel Officer, BEST and he pointed out that Undertaking decided to file an Appeal against the order dated 30th December 2002 passed by the Dy.Commissioner, Labour. The petitioner Appellant received the certified copy of the order on 5th February 2003 and, therefore, there is delay in filing of the appeal. 12. Petitioner’s appeal was placed before the President Industrial Tribunal and, after hearing both sides, the Industrial Tribunal observed that it is imperative that the petitioner completes domestic enquiry within six months. The petitioner Appellant received the certified copy of the order on 5th February 2003 and, therefore, there is delay in filing of the appeal. 12. Petitioner’s appeal was placed before the President Industrial Tribunal and, after hearing both sides, the Industrial Tribunal observed that it is imperative that the petitioner completes domestic enquiry within six months. However, the petitioner has not pointed out as to how any prejudice or inconvenience will be caused to them if the delinquent employee is given opportunity to say something about the proposed punishment. The argument is, therefore, not acceptable. The learned President then referred to case law i.e. a decision of the Madras High Court, decision of this Court and ultimately held that a delinquent employee must be given opportunity to say something about punishment. Considering the existing standing order, there is no such opportunity. He has no right to submit anything about his past record which is taken into consideration by the enquiry officer for imposing punishment. The enquiry officer invariably considers past service record of the delinquent employee and imposes punishment in the absence of any version of the employee. In the opinion of the Industrial Court, it is obvious that under the existing provisions, the principles of natural justice have not been followed and by amendment this aspect can be taken care of. For this reason and finding that the Dy.Commissioner’s order is just and proper, the learned President refused to interfere with it. Thus, he dismissed petitioner’s appeal by the impugned order. 13. These orders are under challenge in the present petition. 14. Mr.Talsania, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner has taken me through the standing orders which are certified under the B.I.R. Act and particularly standing order No.23. He submits that the only reason assigned by the Dy.Commissioner is to be found in para 3 of his order reproduced above. There is nothing which would indicate any unfairness or unreasonableness in the existing provisions warranting any amendment or alterations thereto. He submits that the lower appellate court also committed the same error inasmuch as it failed to assign any reasons for the proposed changes or alterations. Mr.Talsania submits that merely because in the opinion of the authorities, it would be better that a provision for showing cause against the proposed penalty is incorporated does not mean that the standing orders shall be changed or altered. Mr.Talsania submits that merely because in the opinion of the authorities, it would be better that a provision for showing cause against the proposed penalty is incorporated does not mean that the standing orders shall be changed or altered. He submits that in the BEST, ordinarily the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority are one and the same. The Enquiry Officer himself takes into account the past record of delinquent employee and mitigating circumstances. There is no outsider involved in the conduct of enquiry. In such circumstances, there was no warrant for interfering with the standing orders and directing any changes or alterations thereto. Mr.Talsania was at pains to point out that such provisions for second show cause notice was existing in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India before its amendment. However, after amendment of the said Article/Constitutional provision, the provision of second opportunity is deleted and challenge thereto has also failed. In that light he invited my attention to the decision in Tulsiram Patel’s case reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416. He submits that the decision in Mohd.Khan’s case and D.Karunakar’s rendered by the Supreme Court are not relevant on the issue of punishment. They considered the aspect of supply of enquiry officer’s report. In such circumstances, the petition be allowed as the impugned orders, in his submission, suffer from total non application of mind and are otherwise vitiated by serious errors apparent on the face of record. He submits that the authorities failed to read the standing orders in their proper perspective. If they are considered in the context of the trials and enquiries which are proposed for imposing minor penalties and major punishments, then, there cannot be any confusion and no second opportunity is contemplated. There are inbuilt safeguards and checks and, therefore, there is no question of any amendment or alterations. More so, when the standing order provides for two appeals against the final decision. 15. Mr.Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Union supported the impugned order. He submits that there is no question of any practice or usage in the petitioner governing the issue of amendment to standing orders. He has invited my attention to standing orders 20, 21(2) and (3) and 23. He submits that there is absolutely no prejudice if the amendment or alteration is made. There is distinction between "an officer holding enquiry" and the "officer awarding punishment". He has invited my attention to standing orders 20, 21(2) and (3) and 23. He submits that there is absolutely no prejudice if the amendment or alteration is made. There is distinction between "an officer holding enquiry" and the "officer awarding punishment". He also emphasised the words "answering the charge" appearing in clause 23(a). He submits that the exercise contemplated is only answering the charges in the charge sheet. There is no question of any cause being shown against the punishment. Mr.Singh urges that an enquiry commences with the issuance of charge sheet and concludes by either the order of exoneration or dismissal. At all stages, the employee has a right to be heard and principles of natural justice have to be adhered to. He submits that opportunity which is provided for in the existing standing order is restricted. As far as punishment is concerned, all factors such as gravity of the charges, past service, extenuating or aggravating circumstances would go into consideration and that can be only at the stage, the punishment is imposed. Prior thereto, if an opportunity to show cause is provided for, then, a public body like petitioner should have no objection in granting the same at the stage of imposition of punishment. The amendments proposed are consistent with the principles of fairness, reasonableness and justice and, therefore, there is no warrant for interfering with the impugned orders. Consequently, the petition be dismissed. 16. Mr.Talsania in support of his submissions has relied upon following decisions:- (i) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 513 (Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd., Vs.S.S.Railway Workers Union. (ii) A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1227 (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs.T.C.Shrivastava and Ors.( (iii) A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 (Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Ors.) (iv) 1991 (1) CLR 61 (Union of India and Ors. Vs. Mohd.Ramzan Khan) 17. Mr.Singh on the other hand has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohd.Ramzan Khan. He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K.Ratna and Ors. Mr.Singh has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath Bagde Vs.State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3734. Mohd.Ramzan Khan. He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K.Ratna and Ors. Mr.Singh has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath Bagde Vs.State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3734. He submits that principles of natural justice would encompass 22 such a second opportunity and that is how this Court should uphold the amendment to the standing order in question. 18. With the assistance of learned Senior Counsel appearing for both sides, I have perused the petition and annexures thereto. The only question that falls for my consideration is whether the existing standing order of the petitioner undertaking requires any amendment much less amendment proposed by the Union so also certified by the Authority? In other words, whether the second show cause notice i.e. an opportunity against the proposed punishment is necessary and absence thereof would mean that the opportunity to delinquent employee to defend himself is not complete. 19. The enquiry as far as the standing orders are concerned is limited. It is well settled that the authorities who are in charge of certifying so also considering alterations and amendments to the standing orders must satisfy themselves as to whether the existing provisions are unfair or unreasonable soas to warrant any alteration or change therein. I will have to apply these principles to the present case. 20. Standing orders which are applicable in the BEST cover several aspects. As far as misconduct is concerned, standing order 19 provides that any employee found guilty of misconduct shall be liable to be dismissed by the competent authority. The word "Competent Authority" is defined to mean the General Manager, the Dy.Gen.Manager or any officer duly authorised by the Gen.Manager and notified in that behalf. The term "Gen.Manager" is defined in standing order 3(c) to mean the officer appointed by Municipal Corporation as Gen.Manager or the officer acting for him for the time being. 19. The acts or omissions on the part of an employee set out in standing order 20 have been termed as amounting to misconduct. It is not necessary to enumerate these acts for the purpose of present controversy. 21. 19. The acts or omissions on the part of an employee set out in standing order 20 have been termed as amounting to misconduct. It is not necessary to enumerate these acts for the purpose of present controversy. 21. Standing order 21 provides that subject to provisions of standing order 23 an employee found guilty of misconduct may be punished in one or more of the following ways. It would be desirable to reproduce this standing order. "21. (1) Subject to the provisions of Standing Order 23, an employee found guilty of misconduct may be punished in one or more of the following ways by:- (a) being warned or censured; or (b) being fined, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and/or the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Rules thereunder, where applicable; or (c) in the case of the outdoor staff of the Traffic Department being sent to school for a period not exceeding one day at a time for each separate act of misconduct; or (d) being suspended for a reasonable period not exceeding three months depending upon the gravity of the offence, by an order in writing signed by the Competent Authority; or (e) being demoted and/or reduced in grade; provided that in cases where the punishment of reduction in grade is in excess of two years, the General Manager or any officer duly authorised and notified by him may review, in consultation with the Representative and Approved Union, the punishment of reduction in grade at the end of two years and every two years thereafter, if necessary, in the light of the record during the respective two years, if the employee or his representative under Section 30 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 makes a request to that effect, on the expiry of a period of not less than two years from the date the punishment was given effect to. Such a review will be made within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the representation. If on such review the record of the employee during the period of two years under reference, is found to be satisfactory, the salary of the employee will be restored with effect from the first day of the month following the month in which the representation is received. If on such review the record of the employee during the period of two years under reference, is found to be satisfactory, the salary of the employee will be restored with effect from the first day of the month following the month in which the representation is received. (Provided further that where the punishment of reduction in grade in excess of two years is imposed on the employee in lieu of dismissal or discharge, on humanitarian grounds, the case may be reviewed at the end of four years and every two years thereafter, if necessary, in the light of the record during the respective four years or two years, as the case may be, subject to the other procedure mentioned earlier in this behalf remaining the same). (This Standing order will be deemed to have come into force with effect from 27.3.1985 i.e. he date on which the settled standing order is entered into the register by the Assistant Registrar under the B.I.R. Act). (f) being discharged from service; or (g) being dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice; or (h) The stoppage or postponement of an annual increment in the incremental grade: provided that in cases where the punishment of the stoppage or postponement of an annual increment in the incremental grade is in excess of two years, the General Manager or any officer duly authorised and notified by him may review, in consultation with the Representative and Approved Union, the punishment of stoppage or postponement of an annual increment at the end of two years and every two years thereafter, if necessary, in the light of the record during the respective two years, if the employee or his representative under Section 30 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 makes a request to that effect, on the expiry of a period of not less than two years from the date the punishment was given effect to, such a review will be made within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the representation. If on such review the record of the employee during the period of two years under reference, is found to be satisfactory the salary of the employee will be restored with effect from the first day of the month following the month which the representation is received." Provided further that where the punishment of "stoppage or postponement of annual increment in the incremental grade" in excess of two years is imposed on an employee in lieu of "dismissal" or "discharge" on humanitarian grounds, the case may be reviewed at the end of four years and every two years thereafter, if necessary, in the light of the record during the respective four years or two years, as the case may be, subject to the other procedure mentioned earlier in this behalf remaining the same. (@) This Standing Order will be deemed to have come into force with effect from 27.3.1985 i.e. the date on which the settled standing order is entered into the register by the Assistant Registrar under the B.I.R. Act). (2) In the case of misconduct likely to result in discharge or dismissal, the enquiry shall be conducted by an officer authorised in this behalf by the General Manager. (3) An officer awarding punishment for any misconduct shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. A copy of the order passed by the Departmental Head or the Officer conducting the enquiry shall on request be supplied to the employee concerned. In the case of offences for which the Undertaking intends to punish the employee concerned with the punishments referred to in sub-clause (a) to (c) of Standing Orders 21 (1) the Undertaking shall allow the employee or his representative to look into the record and proceedings of the enquiry held against him." Thus, the standing order 21 provides for punishment which includes punishment of fine, warning or censure, suspension, demotion and/or reduction in grade, discharge from service or Dismissal without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice , stoppage or postponement of annual increment. 22. 22. Proviso appearing at the end of the Standing Order regarding penalty of stoppage or postponement of an annual increment is a safeguard wherein the penalty may be reviewed at the end of four years and every two years thereafter, if necessary, in the light of the record. Standing order 21(2) states that in the case of misconduct likely to result in discharge or dismissal, the enquiry shall be conducted by an officer authorised by the Gen.Manager. The officer awarding punishment for any misconduct shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any of the employee and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. A copy of the order passed by the departmental head or officer conducting enquiry shall on request be supplied to the employee concerned. This would not be necessary in case punishment proposed is under Clause 1(a)to (c). Standing order 22 provides for warning or censuring an employee subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Payment of Wages Act, and/or Minimum Wage Act and Rules thereunder where applicable, fined for any of the acts and omissions mentioned therein. 23. Then comes Standing Order 23 and it reads thus:- "23(a) An employee charged with misconduct of a nature which (if established) is likely to lead to the imposition of any of the penalties (e) to (h) or suspension for a period exceeding seven days under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Standing Order 21, shall be given a charge sheet in writing clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and requiring explanation and the date and time at which the case will be heard, which date shall not be less than two days after the service of the notice. At the hearing of the case, he shall be given an opportunity to answer the charge and permitted to be defended by representative under Section 30 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, or by an employee of his choice. Except for reasons to be recorded in writing by the officer holding the enquiry, the employee shall be permitted to produce witnesses in his defence and cross examine any witnesses on whose evidence the charge rests. A concise summary of the evidence led on either side and the employee’s plea shall be recorded" "@. Except for reasons to be recorded in writing by the officer holding the enquiry, the employee shall be permitted to produce witnesses in his defence and cross examine any witnesses on whose evidence the charge rests. A concise summary of the evidence led on either side and the employee’s plea shall be recorded" "@. An employee, who as a result of such trials is ordered to suffer any punishment, shall have a right of appeal to the officer immediately superior to the one who has imposed the punishment; provided that such appeal is lodged within 14 days of the receipt in writing of the order appealed against. Provided further that where the punishment imposed in one of discharge or dismissal, the employee shall have a right of second appeal to the General Manager or any other officer duly authorised by him and notified, provided that such appeal is lodged within 14 days of the receipt in writing of the order in the first appeal as aforesaid. . At the hearing of any appeal provided for under this Standing Order, the employee concerned may be represented by his representative under Section 30 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, or any person of his choice. . (This Standing Order will be deemed to have come into force with effect from 3.3.1989 in terms of section 35(4) of BIR Act, 1946.) (b) An employee charged with misconduct of a nature which (if established) is likely to lead to the imposition of any of the penalties (a) to (c) or suspension for a period not exceeding seven days under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Standing Order 21, may be tried summarily provided that: (i) the employee concerned is given an opportunity to show cause as to why the proposed penalty should not be imposed; (ii) brief notes on the charge and the plea put in by the employee is maintained by the management for their own record, and (iii) the employee may appeal against any punishment inflicted as a result of such trail to the Officer immediately superior to the one who has imposed the punishment, provided such appeal is lodged within 14 days of the receipt in writing of the order appealed against; he may be represented at the hearing of such appeal by any other employee of the Undertaking." 24. A bare perusal of the same would indicate that an employee charged with misconduct of a nature (if established) likely to lead to imposition of any of the penalties specified in sub-clause (e) to (h) of clause 1 of Standing Order 21 or suspension for a period exceeding seven days under standing order 21(i)(d), then, he shall be given charge sheet in writing clearly setting forthwith the circumstances appearing against him and requiring explanation by the date and time at which the case will be heard which date shall not be less than two days, after the service of notice. At the hearing of the case, he shall be given an opportunity to answer the charge and he may be permitted to defend also in the manner set out in the standing order. Barring exceptions for which reasons have to recorded in writing by the enquiry officer, the employee is permitted to produce witness in his defence and cross examine any witnesses on whose evidence, the charge rests. The concise summary of evidence led on either side and employee’s plea is recorded. Even after the amendment provisions with regard to Appeals to superior officer and second appeal to Gen.Manager is retained and there is no question of any alterations thereto. 25. Standing order 23(b) provides for a summary enquiry/trial where minor penalty is sought to be imposed. There the employee concerned is given an opportunity to show cause as to why the proposed penalty should not be imposed. Brief notes on the charge and the plea put in by the employee is maintained by the management for their own record and the employee is provided with an opportunity of appeal against any punishment inflicted as a result of the summary trial. 26. Mr.Talsania is right in his submission that Standing Order No.23(b) provides for an opportunity to show cause against the proposed penalty because the trial is summary and is only with regard to penalties, which are minor. In such cases, the summary trial may not as comprehensive as in the case of a misconduct which leads to imposition of penalties specified in sub-clause (e) to (h) of Standing Order No.21 or suspension for a period exceeding seven days which are major punishments. The entire procedure as stipulated in sub-clause (a), therefore, may not be necessarily have to followed in summary trials. The entire procedure as stipulated in sub-clause (a), therefore, may not be necessarily have to followed in summary trials. It is, therefore, when minor penalty is sought to be imposed that an opportunity to show cause against the penalty is provided for and an Appeal in case the concerned employee is not satisfied with the outcome, is provided. The Dy.Commissioner was of the opinion that the standing order No.23(a) at the end of first para should have the addition which is set out by him in the order. That addition is that if as a result of trial, the employee is ordered to suffer any punishment, then, he shall be served with a show cause notice providing him an opportunity to file his say in respect of proposed punishment being imposed upon him. The amendment is not be happily worded by the Dy.Commissioner of labour but in his opinion, if any punishment is proposed against the employee, then he shall be served with a show cause notice so that he gets an opportunity to file his say in respect of proposed punishment being imposed upon him. Mr.Singh’s contention is that such an amendment or alteration causes no prejudice inasmuch as all that is provided for is an opportunity to file say against the proposed punishment. Merely because, the amendment proposes issuance of a show cause notice does not mean that any prejudice is caused straight away, is his submission. An additional safeguard when a person/employee who is working in a public body should only be construed as fair and reasonable, according to Mr.Singh. 27. It is not possible to accept this contention of Mr.Singh for more than one reason. In the case of S.S.Railway Company Vs. Workers’ Union, reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 513 an identical controversy fell for determination of the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court an appeal was preferred by special leave by the employer. It raised the question as to the scope of section 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act 1946, as amended. 28. Standing orders of the appellant before the Supreme Court were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner and both the company and workmen filed appeals against the order certifying them. The appeals were also disposed off. Thereafter, the respondent Union applied for certain modifications some of which were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner. 28. Standing orders of the appellant before the Supreme Court were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner and both the company and workmen filed appeals against the order certifying them. The appeals were also disposed off. Thereafter, the respondent Union applied for certain modifications some of which were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner. The appellant company filed an appeal against the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner. Once again further application for modification was made by the Union which was allowed by Regional Labour Commissioner on 2nd September 1965. The Union filed an appeal against this order. The Chief Labour Commissioner by the impugned order directed certain modification. Though the company objected to all the modifications before the Supreme Court, only four modifications were in issue. 29. I am not concerned with other modifications, save and except the fourth modification to standing order No.11(VII) (c), before the Supreme Court. 30. For the purpose of clarification and to avoid any confusion it would be desirable to reproduce that standing order:- The modification allowed was as follows: "In case the management propose to remove the workman from service they shall serve on the workman separate show cause notice to that effect." 31. Thus, the amendment/modification was identical to the one before me. 32. Dealing with rival contentions in that regard, the Supreme Court observed thus:- "18. As regards the modification requiring a second show cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the tribunals such a second show cause notice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article. To import such a requirement from Article 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would necessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would necessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view, it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside." 33. The judgement was by a three judge bench. The Hon’ble Justice Bhargava (as His Lordship then was) delivered a separate opinion/judgement but as far as the subject standing order is concerned, the learned Judge concurred with the majority and that is how para 30 of the Supreme Court decision reads:- "30. As a result, I would partly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), permitting modifications mentioned by him in his Order at items Nos.1,3,5 and 6 relating to Standing Orders 9(a), 12(A) and 11 (vii). In the circumstances of this case, I would direct parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal partly allowed." 34. Both learned Counsel invited my attention to a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ACC Vs. T.C.Shrivastav, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1227. The principal question raised before the Supreme Court was whether the certified standing order 17 contemplates second opportunity being given to a workman after conclusion of enquiry into his misconduct and before inflicting on him punishment of dismissal and if it so contemplates, then, whether the enquiry gets vitiated by not affording him such an opportunity. It is not necessary to go into detailed facts except that a retired Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was appointed an Arbitrator. He gave his award and held that enquiry which was otherwise fair and valid was vitiated because no opportunity was given to show cause against the proposed punishment. The appellant company before the Supreme Court filed writ petition before the High Court and writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court. That is how, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. Para 7 reproduces the rival contentions and in para 8, the Supreme Court follows the earlier three Judge Bench decision (supra) and observed thus:- "8. The appellant company before the Supreme Court filed writ petition before the High Court and writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court. That is how, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. Para 7 reproduces the rival contentions and in para 8, the Supreme Court follows the earlier three Judge Bench decision (supra) and observed thus:- "8. At the outset the legal position as has been clarified by this Court in the Saharanpur Light Railway Co’s case ( AIR 1969 SC 513 ) (supra) may be sated. In the context of certain modification sought to be introduced in a Standing Order requiring a second show cause notice this Court has observed thus (para 18): ...... "It is thus clear that neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. This, of course, does not mean that a Standing Order may not provide for it but unless the Standing Order provides for it either expressly or by necessary implication no inquiry which is otherwise fair and valid will be vitiated by non-affording of such second opportunity. The question is whether para 3 of the Standing Order No.17 provides for such second opportunity being given to the delinquent? The relevant words are "all dismissal orders shall be passed by the Manager after giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation". The underlined words are wholly inappropriate to convey the idea of a second hearing or opportunity on the question of punishment but appropriate in the context of seeking an explanation in regard to the alleged misconduct charged against him. An ‘explanation’ is to be called from the "accused" which suggests that the same is to be called for prior to the recording of a finding that the delinquent is guilty of misconduct; it is the alleged misconduct that is to be explained by him and not the proposed punishment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment is contemplated either expressly or by necessary implication. In other words, it is clear to us that the opportunity spoken of by para 3 of S.O.17 is the opportunity to be given to the delinquent to meet the charges framed against him. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment is contemplated either expressly or by necessary implication. In other words, it is clear to us that the opportunity spoken of by para 3 of S.O.17 is the opportunity to be given to the delinquent to meet the charges framed against him. In this connection, it will be pertinent to mention that the concerned S.O. was framed and came into force on March 1, 1946 and was duly certified on October 16, 1952 under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 i.e. prior to the enunciation of the Law by Courts regarding the observance of the principles of natural justice such as issuance of a charge sheet, holding of an inquiry, opportunity to lead evidence, etc. and it is well-known that after the enunciation of these principles model standing orders have been framed to provide for the detailed steps required to be undertaken during a domestic inquiry. Since the instant standing order was certified prior to the formulation of the above principles it merely contains a bald provision for giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation. In other words, different stages in domestic inquiry were never in the contemplation of the framers of the S.O. That being the position, it would be difficult to attribute any intention to the framers thereof to provide for a second opportunity being given to the delinquent of showing cause against the proposed punishment. The latter part of para 3 merely casts a unilateral obligation on the concerned authority or the officer to give due consideration to the gravity of the misconduct and the previous record of the delinquent in awarding the maximum punishment." 35. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under the Industrial law the second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. However, this does not mean that the standing order cannot be made providing for second opportunity. However, unless the standing order provides for the second opportunity expressly or by necessary implication no enquiry which is otherwise fair and valid will be vitiated by non affording of such second opportunity. 36. In the submission of Mr.Singh appearing for Union, these observations of the Supreme Court leave a door open for the Union to apply for modification/alterations. However, unless the standing order provides for the second opportunity expressly or by necessary implication no enquiry which is otherwise fair and valid will be vitiated by non affording of such second opportunity. 36. In the submission of Mr.Singh appearing for Union, these observations of the Supreme Court leave a door open for the Union to apply for modification/alterations. Thus, a standing order could have been made providing for second opportunity. The Supreme Court decision goes ahead and holds that such an opportunity can be read even by necessary implications. However, the standing order 17 of the subject establishment which was reproduced by the Supreme Court in para 7 of this decision did not provide for second opportunity nor was it read into it. Mr.Singh would urge that the same was not done because the standing order itself contemplates due consideration to the gravity of misconduct and previous record of the workman. In the present case that is not so provided. If at all it is contemplated that is only when the case falls under standing order 21(3). 37. In my view, both Supreme Court decisions clearly lay down one principle viz., the standing orders do not get vitiated nor do they become unreasonable or unfair because second opportunity is not to be found therein. In fact, in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, a contention was raised before it that a notice contemplated by the then Article 311 must be imported in to industrial matters. That contention was specifically turned down. The Supreme Court held that to equate enquiries and employment so also matters falling under Article 311 with Industrial matters, would be equating industrial employees with civil services for which there is no justification on any principle. The Supreme Court sounded a note of caution that importing such concept would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which is not in the interest of Industrial Peace. Interest of industrial peace demands early and expeditious disposal of disciplinary enquiries. Therefore, the modification was not held to be justifiable on the ground of reasonableness or fairness. To my mind, this binding decision cannot be ignored by me. Mr.Singh does not dispute that the decision deals with industrial matters and standing orders applicable to industrial establishment. He does not dispute that the petitioner is an industrial establishment. Therefore, the modification was not held to be justifiable on the ground of reasonableness or fairness. To my mind, this binding decision cannot be ignored by me. Mr.Singh does not dispute that the decision deals with industrial matters and standing orders applicable to industrial establishment. He does not dispute that the petitioner is an industrial establishment. He does not dispute that it is covered by B.I.R. Act and has been given a status of "Industry". In such circumstances and on this undisputed position, it will not be possible to hold that the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by Mr.Talsania would not be applicable. They are squarely applicable. Further there is no conflict nor is, there any thing in the later decision which dilutes the principle laid down in para 18 of Saharanpur Railway’s case. 38. Further, it would not be possible to agree with Mr.Singh that the enquiry officer who may be the disciplinary authority or may not be the disciplinary authority is completely prohibited from taking any explanation on record about the proposed punishment. In case, the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are the same, then, standing order No.21 (3) which lays down that an officer awarding punishment for any misconduct shall taken into account the gravity of misconduct and other aspects would certainly come into play. Further, the requirement of supplying the copy of the order passed by the departmental head or the officer conducting the enquiry is also specified under standing order 21(3). Thus, merely because in Standing Order No.23(a), there is no second opportunity and, therefore, there will be complete non consideration of the above principles, is not a correct reading of the standing order. The punishment has to be awarded taking into account the above aspects. If the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are one and the same, then, he is bound to go into these aspects before awarding punishment. Further, during the course of an enquiry, the employee or his representative is not prohibited from furnishing an explanation with regard to the charges but also about the punishment. In other words, the opportunity to answer the charge contemplated under Standing Order No.23(a) is always there. Further, during the course of an enquiry, the employee or his representative is not prohibited from furnishing an explanation with regard to the charges but also about the punishment. In other words, the opportunity to answer the charge contemplated under Standing Order No.23(a) is always there. While answering charge, the employee alternatively and without prejudice to his pleas on merits can always contend that even if the charges are held to be proved the acts of misconduct are not such as would warrant extreme punishment. He can highlight his past record so also place on record the mitigating circumstances, if any. Thus, on the enquiry officer’s record both versions would be there. 39. In any event, once there is a right of Appeal to the superior authority and the authority would be superior to the one who has imposed punishment, then, the appeal cannot be held to be a restricted challenge. The appeal would be with regard to the conclusion on merits of the charges and also on the punishment. That is not the only appeal contemplated. There is a further appeal when the punishment is of discharge or dismissal and that lies to the General Manager as is clear from the standing orders. At the hearing of both appeals, the employee concerned may be represented by a representative under section 30 of the B.I.R. Act or any person of his choice. In such circumstances, there is no question of altering or amending standing order 23(a) so as to make it complete, fair and reasonable. There is nothing unfair or unreasonable in this standing order merely because second opportunity as demanded by the Union is not provided therein. 40. In the view I have taken, it would not be necessary to now make a detailed reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd.Khan or Karunakar. Further, it is not necessary to enter into any larger controversy. Suffice it to state that Mr.Talsania brought to my notice these decisions and further, the decision in Tulsiram Patel (supra). He has relied upon para 68 of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel. The said para reads thus:- 68. Further, it is not necessary to enter into any larger controversy. Suffice it to state that Mr.Talsania brought to my notice these decisions and further, the decision in Tulsiram Patel (supra). He has relied upon para 68 of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel. The said para reads thus:- 68. The question which then arises is, "Whether the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, which further amended substituted clause (2) of Article 311 with effect from 1st January 1977, has made any change in the law?" The amendments made by this Act are that in clause (2) that portion which required a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty to be given to a Government servant was deleted and in its place the first proviso was inserted, which expressly provides that it is not necessary to give to a delinquent government servant any opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty. Does this affect the operation of the original proviso which, by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, became the second proviso? Such obviously was not and could not have been the intention of Parliament. The opening words of the second proviso remain the same except that the word "further" was inserted after the word "Provided, because the original proviso by reason of the insertion of another proviso before it became the second proviso. It should be borne in mind that the show cause notice at the punishment stage was originally there as a result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee in Lall’s case (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121) and by this Court in Khem Chand’s case (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300) upon the phrase "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him". Clause (2) as substituted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act merely reproduced the substance of what was held in Khem Chand’s case. The words which originally found a place in clause (2), "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him", do not any more feature in clause (2). All that clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the government servant is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. All that clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the government servant is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Clause (2) taken by itself even without the first 62 proviso does not provide, expressly or impliedly, for any opportunity to make a representation against the proposed penalty. After the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act this second opportunity formed a separate part of clause (2), which part was deleted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. Thus, when the second proviso states in its opening words that "Provided further that this clause shall not apply", it means that whatever safeguards are to be found in clause (2) are wholly taken away in a case where any of the three clauses of the second proviso is attracted. In this connection, the following observations of this Court in the case of Suresh Koshy George Vs. University of Kerala (1969) 1 SCR 317 at pages 326-327) are pertinent." ". There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuance of show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law makers may not prescribe such a course." ". In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. T.Shrivastava (1984) 3 SCR 361 , this Court held that "neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment necessary." Since a right to such opportunity does not exist in law, it follows that the only right which the government servant had was to make a representation on the proposed penalty was to be found in clause (2) of Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. This right having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which a Government servant can claim this right." 41. The Supreme Court goes further and holds that the right of second representation/second show cause notice, therefore, does not exist in law. This right having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which a Government servant can claim this right." 41. The Supreme Court goes further and holds that the right of second representation/second show cause notice, therefore, does not exist in law. Therefore, it follows that the only right which the Government servant has is to make representation on the proposed penalty was to be found in clause (2) of Article 311, prior to this amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act. This right has been taken away by the 42nd Amendment Act and there is no provision of law under which Government servant can claim this right. Far from supporting Union’s cause of equating the rights and claiming equality on the basis of parity with Government servant, these observations would seem to go contrary to it. Thereafter, my attention was invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath Bagde (Supra). 41A. Once again the decision deals with a case of judicial officer who was proceeded under the service rules. Further, the controversy before the Supreme Court was whether a second opportunity is necessary when the disciplinary authority differs with the findings of enquiry officer and proposes penalty against the delinquent judicial officer. While that exercise was undertaken, the principles of natural justice were not adhered to and that is how the matter went to the Supreme Court. The Judicial Officer succeeded in his challenge because the Supreme Court was of the view that these principles have not been followed. It is apparent from the observations of the Supreme Court that they were made in the context of the peculiar controversy of a disciplinary authority differing with the findings and conclusions of the enquiry officer. When the enquiry officer fully exonerates but the disciplinary authority feels that, that conclusion needs to be revised or changed or altered completely or qua some charges, then, the Supreme Court holds that mere show cause notice would not be enough but a copy of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer as also the reasons recorded by the disciplinary committee while disagreeing with the findings, though communicated but that was not sufficient. The delinquent was required to show cause only against punishment proposed by the disciplinary authority. The delinquent was required to show cause only against punishment proposed by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has taken final decision that the charges against the appellants were proved. It was not communicated to the delinquent judicial officer that the disciplinary committee had only come to a tentative decision and he could, therefore, show cause. Apart from the fact that the Disciplinary authority was in error while recording disagreement with the Enquiry officer. The observations in para 33 must be read in the backdrop of this peculiar fact situation. They cannot be read torn out of context soas to confer a right on an industrial employee as demanded by the Union in the present case. 42. The last decision which needs to be noted is that of Institute of Chartered Accountants Vs. L.K.Ratna (supra). First of all it must be noted that this decision deals with Chartered Accountants and their Professional Regulations. Secondly, the facts before the Supreme Court were that the respondent submitted written statement to the Institute denying that he was guilty of professional misconduct and he set out detailed statement reasons in support of his stand. The Institute came to a prima facie opinion that the respondent was guilty of professional misconduct. It referred the case to disciplinary committee which consisted of the President of Council and other members so also Government nominee. The disciplinary Committee gave personal hearing to respondent and his Advocate. The Disciplinary Committee submitted its Report to the Council opining that respondent was guilty of professional misconduct, more particularly set out in para 8 of the decision of Supreme Court. The Council considered the report of disciplinary committee and found that respondent was guilty of misconduct. The Institute wrote to respondent that it found him guilty of professional misconduct and his name was proposed to be removed from the list of members for a period not exceeding five years. He was also informed that he would be called upon to appear before the Council at its next meeting but in case he did not wish to be heard in person he could send his written representation. The scope of oral hearing was also indicated. 43. He was also informed that he would be called upon to appear before the Council at its next meeting but in case he did not wish to be heard in person he could send his written representation. The scope of oral hearing was also indicated. 43. Respondent filed a petition in Bombay High Court which was allowed and it was held that the Council should have given an opportunity to the Member to represent before it against the report of disciplinary committee and that the President and Vice President and the two members of the Institute who were members of the disciplinary committee were disqualified from participating in the proceedings of the Council. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration. The appeal from Single Judge’s decision to the Division Bench was also rejected that is how the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. In that context the observations relied upon by Mr.Singh in para 12 have been made. Thus, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Council has before it the report of the disciplinary committee. The Council will take into regard the allegations, his defence, evidence and conclusion of the disciplinary committee. Therefore, when the member who has participated in the enquiry has no opportunity to demonstrate the error in the findings, before the Council, then, the entire exercise would get vitiated. Therefore, even though the member has participated in the enquiry he would be entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the Council finds him guilty on this point. 44. It is not possible to accept the contention of Mr.Singh that this decision lays down an absolute principle. He further relies upon para 17 of the decision. It is not necessary to enter into any larger controversy. From earlier decisions to Tulsiram Patel and till the latest decision, we have traveled a lot. Now mere infraction or breach of principles of natural justice may not alone result in the cause of employee being accepted. The Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, has read into all this element of prejudice being established, if there is a breach or infraction. Therefore, it is not as if there is an absolute principle which Mr.Singh would like me to read in these decisions. That apart, the decision has been rendered in the context of the facts before the Supreme Court and the Regulations before it. Therefore, it is not as if there is an absolute principle which Mr.Singh would like me to read in these decisions. That apart, the decision has been rendered in the context of the facts before the Supreme Court and the Regulations before it. In the light of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court to the contrary in the industrial matters, it would not be possible to read into the present standing order, the requirement of second show cause notice straight away. The absence of the same does not mean that the standing order as existing is unreasonable or unfair. 45. As a result of the above discussion, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. The authorities below have clearly erred in directing addition to standing order 23(a). They have misdirected themselves in law and have ignored the binding principles which have to be applied while considering such issues in industrial matters. Once their orders are vitiated on account of misdirection in law and failure to apply their mind to settled principles, then, they cannot be upheld. This Court would be failing in its constitutional duty if it upholds the orders which are patently unsustainable. 46. In such circumstances, there is enough substance in the contentions of Mr.Talsania that the orders would cause serious prejudice as well. Merely because another view is possible according to authorities below, it was not necessary to issue the directions as prayed for by the Union. For these reasons also the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 47. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no costs. 48. At this stage Mr.Nagle appearing for respondents pray for stay of this order. Upon a query to him as to whether amendment to standing order has come into effect, it is fairly stated that the same has not been given effect to. In such circumstances, no question of granting stay of this judgement and order arises, more so, when it interprets the existing standing order and decides the issue of them requiring any alterations or amendment. If union succeeds in its challenge to this judgement, then, needless to state that the earlier position would be restored. In other words, the orders of authorities would be restored. Therefore, stay cannot be granted and the request in that behalf is refused.