JUDGMENT : B.N. Mahapatra, J. - In the present writ petition, the petitioner challenges the order dt. 31st May, 2008 (Annex. 2) passed u/s 10(23C)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter called as "IT Act") by which the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa, Bhubaneswar (hereinafter called as "Chief CIT) did not entertain the application of the assessee petitioner made u/s 10(23C)(vi) for the financial year 2006-07 for grant of exemption on the ground that the said application was not filed within the time stipulated under the said section. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the fact of the case as stated in the writ petition is as follows: The petitioner, in the present case, is a registered trust which runs an educational institution. The trust is constituted, inter alia, with the object to organize and promote education. It is engaged in imparting technical' education and training. The institution has been approved by All India Council for Technical Education for conducting degree course in engineering and technology. The petitioner-trust has been granted registration u/s 12A of the IT Act on 15th Jan., 2003 bearing registration No. 44/1998-99. It filed an application for exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi) for the financial year 2006-07 in Form 56D along with requisite documents on 31st May, 2007. This application was accompanied by another application for condonation of delay in presenting the application u/s 10(23C)(vi). The Chief CIT-opposite party No. 1 by order dt. 30th May, 2008 refused to entertain and admit the application made u/s 10(23C)(vi) on the ground that it was filed beyond the time prescribed under the statute and the statute does not vest any power with him to condone the delay. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Jagabandhu Sahoo, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the Chief CIT has erroneously held that no power is available to him to condone the delay in filing the application u/s 10(23C)(vi) of the IT Act. The Chief CIT should have admitted the application of the assessee made u/s 10(23C)(vi) for financial year 2006-07. He further submitted that since there is no prohibition under the statute to entertain an application for condonation of delay, the statutory authority can always exercise the power to condone the delay and to consider the application on merit. The Chief CIT should have admitted the application of the assessee made u/s 10(23C)(vi) for financial year 2006-07. He further submitted that since there is no prohibition under the statute to entertain an application for condonation of delay, the statutory authority can always exercise the power to condone the delay and to consider the application on merit. According to him, if an authority conferred with certain power to adjudicate the dispute, such authority cannot prohibit himself to consider the delay, if any, for the purpose of considering the dispute on merit. He further submitted that in absence of any embargo the action of Chief CIT in not condoning the delay is contrary to the principles of natural justice and fair play. In support of his contention learned Counsel relied on the following decisions: (i) ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430 ; (ii) Kailash Vs. Nanhku and Others, ; (iii) R.N. Jadi and Brothers and Others Vs. Subhashchandra, ; (iv) Kandula Prabhakar Rao v. Tumulu Lakshmanamurty and Anr. (1987) 64 CLT 713 ; (v) CST v. Member of Sales-tax Tribunal and Anr. RR 1971 Cutt 1325; (vi) Harendra Prasad Sahu v. Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal and Ors. (1996) 103 STC 333 (Ori); (vii) State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Ors. (2005) 100 CLT 111 (SC); (viii) Padmashree Krutartha Acharua Institute of Engineering and Technology v. Chief CIT, judgment dt. 15th May, 2008 passed in Writ Petn.(C) No. 4514 of 2008. Concluding his argument, he submitted that the petitioner which is a technical educational institution exists solely for the purpose of imparting technical education without motive of profit or gain and therefore the order passed by opposite party No. 1 will cause serious prejudice to the interest of the petitioner. 4. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Mohapatra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties submitted that since the statute provides the period of limitation for making application for grant of exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi) and admittedly the petitioner has not filed the application within the said stipulated time, the Chief CIT is justified in not admitting the petitioner's application for grant of exemption. He further submitted that no power is vested with the Chief CIT to condone the delay in presenting the application u/s 10(23C)(vi) for exemption. He further submitted that no power is vested with the Chief CIT to condone the delay in presenting the application u/s 10(23C)(vi) for exemption. It is the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) which is empowered u/s 119(2)(b) to direct an IT authority to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under the IT Act after expiry of the period specified there in the IT Act. 5. In view of the rival contentions of the respective parties, the question that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the Chief CIT is justified in not entertaining the petitioner's application made u/s 10(23C)(vi) for grant of exemption on the ground that the same was not filed within the period of limitation prescribed under the IT Act and no power is vested with him to condone the delay? 6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of the relevant provisions of Section 10 of the IT Act and Rule 2CA(1) of IT Rules, 1962, which read as follows: 10. 6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of the relevant provisions of Section 10 of the IT Act and Rule 2CA(1) of IT Rules, 1962, which read as follows: 10. Incomes not included in total income-In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included: (23C) any income received by any person on behalf of: (vi) any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit, other than those mentioned in Sub-clause (iiiab) or Sub-clause (iiiad) and which may be approved by the prescribed authority; or Provided that the fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in Sub-clause (iv) or Sub-clause (v) or Sub-clause (vi) or Sub-clause (via) shall make an application in the prescribed form and manner to the prescribed authority for the purpose of grant of the exemption, or continuance thereof, under Sub-clause (iv) or Sub-clause (v) or Sub-clause (vi) or Sub-clause (via): Provided also that in case the fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in the first proviso makes an application on or after the 1st day of June, 2006 for the purposes of grant of exemption or continuance thereof, such application shall be made at any time during the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year from which the exemption is sought:" Rule 2CA.(1) The prescribed authority under Sub-clauses (vi) and (via) of Clause (23C) of Section 10 shall be the Chief CIT or Director General, to whom the application shall be made as provided in Sub-rule (2). The above provisions make it amply clear that in order to avail exemption or continuance thereof, if any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit other than those mentioned in Sub-clause (iiiab) or Sub-clause (iiiad), which may be approved by the prescribed authority, makes an application on or after 1st June, 2006 to the Chief CIT such application shall be made at any time during the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year from which the exemption is sought for. Thus, as required by the statute, application for grant of exemption for financial year 2006-07 should be made to the Chief CIT before the end of the said financial year, i.e., by 31st March, 2007. In the present case, the application was made on 31st May, 2007 which is beyond the time provided in the statute. The IT Act nowhere provides any provisions for condonation of delay in presenting application u/s 10(23C)(vi) for grant of exemption. Thus, it is to be examined whether in absence of such a provision any application made u/s 10(23C)(vi) beyond the statutory period of limitation can be entertained by the appropriate authority by condoning the delay in presenting such application. 7. IT Act is a self-contained Act. It contains provisions for filing of first appeal u/s 246A(23C)(vi) and second appeal u/s 253 and appeal to High Court u/s 260A against the order of assessment and first appeal order and second appeal order respectively. There is also provision for filing revision by an assessee before the CIT u/s 264 against any order passed by an IT authority subordinate to the CIT. Period of limitation has been prescribed under the IT Act for filing of first and second appeal, appeal to High Court and revision. In the IT Act, specific provisions have also been made to entertain first appeal, second appeal and revision if the same is not presented within the statutory period provided under the statute. Sections 249(3), 253(5) and 264(3) provide that the first appellate authority, second appellate authority as well as the revisional authority may admit appeal or revision, as the case may be, after the expiration of the period of limitation provided under the statute if the authorities are satisfied that appellant/petitioner has sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal/revision within the period of limitation. With regard to appeal to High Court, Section 260A(7) provides that save as otherwise provided in the IT Act the provisions of CPC, 1908, relating to the appeal to the High Court shall as far as may be, apply in case of appeals under that section. No such power has been vested with the Chief CIT to admit application filed u/s beyond the statutory period by condoning the delay in presenting the application. No such power has been vested with the Chief CIT to admit application filed u/s beyond the statutory period by condoning the delay in presenting the application. In this context, it is relevant to reproduce the Notes on Clauses to the Finance Bill, 2006 as quoted in para 5 of the impugned order: Providing a time-limit for application for grant of exemption or continuance of exemption for certain charitable and religions trusts and institutions and certain educational and medical institutions. Under the existing provisions contained in Sub-clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of Clause (23C) of Section 10, there is No. time-limit for any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other institutions, or any fund or trust or institution specified therein to make an application for issue or notification/grant of approval or continuance thereof. It is proposed to insert a new proviso in Clause (23C), so as to provide a time-limit for the purposes of making an application under the said sub-clause. Such application for grant of exemption or continuance thereof under any of these sub-clauses shall have to be filed at any time during the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year from which such exemption is sought. Such application cannot be made for any earlier period. The proposed amendment shall apply only in respect of applications which are made on or after 1st June, 2006. This amendment will take effect from 1st June, 2006. Thus, Finance Bill, 2006 has been brought, inter alia, to provide period of limitation for entertaining application u/s 10(23C)(vi) for exemption made on or after 1st June, 2006 and accordingly the new proviso 14 was inserted to Section 10(23C)(vi). While providing period of limitation for presenting application for grant of exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi) before the Chief CIT, the legislature has not made any provision for condonation of delay in presentation of such application as has been provided for filing of first appeal, second appeal, appeal to High Court and revision. The language used in proviso 14 to Section 10(23C)(vi), the Notes on Clauses to Finance Bill, 2006 and that the IT Act contain provisions for condonation of delay in presenting first appeal, second appeal, appeal to High Court and revision make it ample clear that the legislature never intended to condone delay in presenting application for grant of exemption u/s 10(23C) (vi) of the IT Act. Legislative intents assume importance which require that application u/s 10(23C)(vi) for exemption shall be made before the end of the financial year from which the exemption is sought. In such a situation, the Chief CIT cannot condone the delay in presenting the application made before him u/s 10(23C)(vi) for grant of exemption beyond the period of limitation. 8. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others. While considering the provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944 the Hon'ble apex Court held: The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commr. and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period. A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble apex Court in Commnr. of Customs, Central Excise, Noida Vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd., Noida Goodearth Steels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commnr. of Central Excise, Kanpur Gopal Sardar Vs. Karuna Sardar, . Hence, provisions of Section 10(23C)(vi) override the provisions of Limitation Act. Therefore, it will not be appropriate/permissible to rely on the provisions of any other statute including the Limitation Act for the purpose of considering the matter relating to condonation of delay. 9. The Chief CIT being a creature of the statute cannot travel beyond the statutory provisions. Law is well settled that Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute [Vide The United Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lala Ramnarayan and Others Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Naurang Studio and Anr. AIR 1981 SC 537 , Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1992 SC 96 , Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal Vs. Parkash Wanti (Smt) (Dead) and Another, and Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur Vs. Flock (India) Pvt. Ltd. C-7, Panki Industrial Area, Kanpur, ]. 10. Mr. AIR 1981 SC 537 , Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1992 SC 96 , Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal Vs. Parkash Wanti (Smt) (Dead) and Another, and Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur Vs. Flock (India) Pvt. Ltd. C-7, Panki Industrial Area, Kanpur, ]. 10. Mr. Sahoo, learned Counsel submitted that a direction may be given to the Chief CIT to consider the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay. In support of such submission he relied on the order dt. 15th May, 2008, passed by this Court in Writ Petn.(C) No. 4514 of 2008, M/s Padmashree Krutartha Acharya Institute of Engineering and Technology v. Chief CIT and Ors. (supra) wherein this Court held that though the application for grant of approval for exemption had been filed by an educational institution belatedly, it should have been considered on merit. This Court further held that in deciding such questions CIT decides the rights of the parties and, therefore, has to act in a quasi judicial capacity. He has to decide rights of the parties after a hearing. Any authority exercising such quasi judicial function should also have the incidental power of condoning delay if there is justifiable ground for such condonation. There is no clear statutory bar preventing such condonation. However, law as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Court has no competence to issue a direction contrary to law. Nor the Court can direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions [Vide State of U. P. and others Vs. Harish Chandra and others Union of India and Another Vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Limited, and Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Others Vs. Dr Anand Prakash Mishra and Others, ]. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Renuka Singla and others dealing with a similar situation, the Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: We fail to appreciate as to how the High Court or this Court can be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in substance amount to directing the authorities concerned to violate their own statutory rules and regulations.... Similarly, in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Similarly, in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ashrafulla Khan and Others the Hon'ble apex Court has held as under The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to enforce rule of law and not pass order or direction which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law. While passing the order dt. 15th May, 2008 in Writ Petn.(C) No. 4514 of 2008, the ratio of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court which are applied in this judgment were not brought to the notice of this Court. Hence, the order of this Court dt. 15th May, 2008 in Writ Petn.(C) No. 4514 of 2008 has no application to the present case. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel to issue direction to Chief CIT to consider his application for condonation of delay does not merit any consideration. 11. It is settled legal proposition that function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate [See District Mining Officer and Others Vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and Another, ]. 12. In Mohammed Kunhi's case (supra) relied on by Mr. Sahoo, learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Court held that in absence of any specific power of the authority to grant stay there is implied power of doing all such acts or employing any such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. According to the said decision, while exercising any jurisdiction by any quasi judicial authority, the question of ancillary and incidental power arises. Condonation of delay may itself be a question of jurisdiction depending upon the statute applicable. Once limitation expires, the Court/authority may lose the jurisdiction to adjudicate any issue. In that event, exercise of any ancillary and incidental power does not arise. Thus, Mohammad Kunhi's case (supra) is of no help to the assessee. In the present case. Chief CIT does not acquire any jurisdiction in respect of the application filed u/s 10(23C)(vi) beyond statutory period of limitation. In that situation, the decisions, as reported in (1987) 64 CLT 713 (supra) ILR 1971 Cutt 1325 (supra) (1996) 103 STC 333 (Ori) (supra) and Lipok AO and Ors. case (supra) are of no help to the petitioner. Chief CIT does not acquire any jurisdiction in respect of the application filed u/s 10(23C)(vi) beyond statutory period of limitation. In that situation, the decisions, as reported in (1987) 64 CLT 713 (supra) ILR 1971 Cutt 1325 (supra) (1996) 103 STC 333 (Ori) (supra) and Lipok AO and Ors. case (supra) are of no help to the petitioner. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash's case (supra) and R.N. Jadi & Brothers (supra) rendered with reference to Order 8, Rule 1 of the CPC, hence have no application to the fact of this case. 13. Mr. Sahoo, learned Counsel vehemently opposed the plea of the Department that power of condonation is available with CBDT u/s 119(2) of the IT Act. According to Mr. Sahoo, the contention is out and out untenable for the simple reason that provisions u/s 119(2) of. the IT Act authorizes CBDT to issue instruction to subordinate authorities by general or special orders, if it considers necessary or expedient to do so, but not at the instance of the individual/person or assessee. Be that as it may, we are here concerned whether in absence of any statutory provision to condone the delay in presenting the application u/s 10(23C)(vi), the Chief CIT can exercise any such power. For the reasons stated above, the answer is certainly in negative. 14. In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the Chief CIT passed under Annex. 2 of the IT Act. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. B.S. Chauhan, C.J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed