ORDER 1. Heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant and Learned Standing Counsel and the judgment is as follows: Appellant challenges his conviction u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life recorded by the Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jeypore in the camp Court at Malkangiri on 13.11.1997 in Sessions Case No. 52 1995 (S.C. No. 281/95 of Sessions Judge, Jeypore). 2. The short fact as projected by the prosecution is that on 16.05.1995 at about 4.00 P.M., Soma Muduli, the deceased accompanied by Sukura Kirsani (P.W.2) and Hadi Muduli (P.W. 3) went to Gunulu Dangar to consume Salap juice. After consuming Sa lap juice, when they were returning to the village on the way, the accused-Appellant coming out from the bushy forest shot an arrow aiming at the deceased. That arrow pierced into his chest. The accused fled away from that spot. The deceased before his death at the spot stated to P. Ws. 2 and 3 that because of the previous dispute in relation to the claim over a Salap tree that accused was bearing grudge against him. P. Ws. 2 and 3 returned to the village and informed the family members of the deceased about the occurrence, whereafter deceased brother Sukura Muduli P.W. 1 and other villagers including P. Ws. 2 and 3 came and removed the dead body from the spot to the village. The arrow was pulled out from the chest so as to cover the dead body by a piece of cloth. On the following day morning, P.W. 1 with other co-villagers carried the dead body to the Mudulipada P.S. where he lodged the F.I.R. and set the law into motion. In course of investigation, the Officer- In-charge, Mudulipada P.S. (P.W. 7) and the A.S.I. of Police (P.W. 8) not only registered the P.S. case, forwarded the dead body for postmortem examination, made inquest and sought for opinion on production of the weapon of offence but also visited the spot and seized the incriminating articles besides arresting the accused. 3. In the Trial Court, accused denied to the charge and took the defence plea that the deceased was also carrying bow and arrow, while returning after consuming Salap juice, he fell down and in that process his own arrow caused the chest injury, for which the deceased suffered the death. 4. Prosecution examined altogether eight charge-sheeted witnesses and relied on documents marked Exts. 4. Prosecution examined altogether eight charge-sheeted witnesses and relied on documents marked Exts. 1 to 11 and the weapons of offence, arrow M.O.I and bow M.O.II. Amongst the documentary evidence, Ext. 1 is the F.I.R., Ext. 5 is the postmortem report, Ext. 6/1 is the opinion report of the doctor, Exts. 3, 4 and 11 are the seizure lists and Ext. 8 is the report from the R.F.S.L., Berhampur. Accused did not adduce any defence evidence. 5. The Trial Court assessed the evidence on record and held that in view of clear and clinching evidence of P.W. 6, the doctor, who conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, prepared the postmortem report, Ext. 5 and the opinion report, Ext. 6/1, it is proved on record that the deceased suffered homicidal death due to ante mortem injury and M.O.I is the weapon of offence. He also held that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is creditworthy and by that evidence, prosecution has proved the accused to be the author of that injury, which resulted in death of the deceased. For the said reasons, the Trial Court found the accused guilty of the offence of murder. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge recorded that the plea of innocence of the accused and the plea that the deceased sustained the injury from his own arrow is not acceptable in absence of any evidence to that effect. Accordingly, Learned Addl. Sessions Judge while convicting the Appellant u/s 302, I.P.C., sentenced him to imprisonment for life. 6. While challenging the aforesaid order of conviction, Learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that when P.W. 6 in his cross-examination has stated that the injury found on the chest of the deceased could also be possible due to piercing of the arrow of the deceased himself on fall that evidence should have been accepted to rule out the possibility of homicidal death. He also argues that in Ext. 5, P.W. 6 did not mention about ante mortem nature of the injury and that the injury was sufficient to cause death and therefore the benefit arising therefrom should have been granted to the accused. Learned Standing Counsel repels that argument and states that in absence of any plea of accidental fall resulting in piercing of the arrow held by the deceased himself, the Trial Court rightly did not take the same into consideration. Learned Standing Counsel repels that argument and states that in absence of any plea of accidental fall resulting in piercing of the arrow held by the deceased himself, the Trial Court rightly did not take the same into consideration. He further argues that P.W. 6, in paragraph 3 of his deposition, has explained that in his report, Ext. 6/1, it has been stated by the doctor that the injury was ante mortem in nature and sufficient to caused death and therefore no benefit accrues in favour of the accused/Appellant. Indeed the position of evidence is as in the manner it is indicated above by the leaned Standing Counsel. When the evidence of P.W. 6 read with Exts. 5 and 6 (or 6/1) proves that the injury found on the dead body of the deceased was ante mortem in nature and is sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Non-mentioning of such fact in Ext. 5 in no way disproves the fact of homicidal death of the deceased. Similarly, the theory propounded by the accused about sustaining of injury by the deceased due to accidental fall is not made out from the evidence available on record and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly disbelieved it. Thus, we do not find any merit on the aforesaid argument of the Appellant. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant then argues that though the occurrence took place on 16.05.1995, the F.I.R. was lodged on 17.05.1995 and the delay has remained unexplained. Learned Standing Counsel argues that the accused did not take the plea of delay of lodging the F.I.R. as a ground of his defence and such a contention is raised for the first time in this Court. Learned Standing Counsel argues that the accused did not take the plea of delay of lodging the F.I.R. as a ground of his defence and such a contention is raised for the first time in this Court. He further argues that Court should bear in mind that the occurrence took place in a bushy forest area in the interior part of Malkangiri district, which was previously a part of Koraput district and that the occurrence took pace at about 6.00 P.M. and soon after the occurrence, there would have been sunset and it could not have been possible for the informant to travel to the police station in the night to lodge the F.I.R. The dead body was brought from the bushy Jungle, most likely with an intention to protect it from the wild animals and therefore, on the following day, P.W. 1 with his companions left the village in the morning and could lodge the F.I.R. only at 8.30 A.M., so also produced the dead body and under such circumstance, there is no delay in lodging the F.I.R. He argues that in the alternative, if it is held that there is delay, then also it is explained in the above indicated manner. 8. Regard being had to the aforesaid facts submitted by Learned Standing Counsel and on perusal of the relevant materials and evidence from the Trial Court records, we find that the circumstance for not lodging the F.I.R. soon after the occurrence, was never challenged in course of the trial. Accused has also not stated anything as to how he was prejudiced for lodging of the F.I.R. on the following day morning i.e. on 17.05.1995. Courts take caution against delayed F.I.R. with a view to curb manipulation on records and fabrication of facts in the intervening period. In this case no such fact situation exists, because death of the deceased due to piercing of arrow on his chest is an admitted fact, though the accused only disputes to the allegation that he shot the arrow and caused the injury. Under such circumstance, the prosecution case is not to suffer on the allegation of delay. That argument of the Appellant is also devoid of merit. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further argues that there is contradictions in the evidence of P.W. 1 vis-a-vis P. Ws. Under such circumstance, the prosecution case is not to suffer on the allegation of delay. That argument of the Appellant is also devoid of merit. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further argues that there is contradictions in the evidence of P.W. 1 vis-a-vis P. Ws. 2 and 3 about the removal of the dead body of the deceased from the place of occurrence to the village. Copy of the F.I.R., which has been prepared and tagged to the paper book, is not correctly reflecting the document on the relevant aspect. Therefore, on reference to the original F.I.R., it is found that P.W. 1 stated in that document that after receipt of the information from P. Ws. 2 and 3, he along with others proceeded to the spot and in the night kept the dead body in the village. Therefore, the contrary statement of P.W. 1 in the evidence may be result of confusion, he being an illiterate and rustic tribal and that contradiction does not affect the material allegations against the accused regarding committing homicide of the deceased. On the aforesaid score, the Appellant is not entitled to any benefit as against the charge or the order of conviction. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant furthermore argues that evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is improbable inasmuch as, they could not have noticed the accused shooting of arrow from behind a bush. In that respect, it appears from the spot map that the area at which the occurrence took place is a part of bushy forest. The accused shot the arrow from a close distance and P. Ws. 2 and 3 were almost behind the deceased. They have stated about the close distance between them and the accused so also the deceased. Each of them have clearly and categorically stated that there was availability of light to provide clear visibility. Thus, such natural and credible evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is above the criticism of contradictions or improbability. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is not only clear and categorical but also corroborative to the evidence of one another in proof of the fact that accused is the author of the crime. Hence, argument of the accused Appellant is rejected. 11. 2 and 3 is above the criticism of contradictions or improbability. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is not only clear and categorical but also corroborative to the evidence of one another in proof of the fact that accused is the author of the crime. Hence, argument of the accused Appellant is rejected. 11. At last, Learned Counsel for the Appellant advances an alternative argument for conviction of the Appellant u/s 304, Part I, I.P.C., in view of the fact that only one injury was caused by the arrow and in that respect he relies on the case of Jasram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006) 34 OCR (SC) 363. Their Lordships taking note of the sudden quarrel between the accused husband and his wife (deceased) and dealing a single blow by the husband under heat of passion held that it would not amount to murder. No such circumstance is available in this case. While making a distinction between culpable homicide amounting to murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, five exceptions have been provided in Section 300, I.P.C. and the case of the Appellant does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions, so as to consider his act as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Therefore, we also do not find any merit in the aforesaid argument of Learned Counsel for the Appellant. 12. No other point is raised and no other argument is advanced. Thus, for the reasons indicated above, we do not find any merit in the appeal. At the same time, we find that the findings and the conviction order recorded by the Trial Court is sustainable. Thus, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed