JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - The order dated in November, 1992 (Annexure-I) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D.Misc.Case No. 123 of 1986 is assailed in this Writ application by M/S. Jute Marketing Cooperative Society, Danpur. 2. Admittedly present opposite party No. 2, namely, Gananath Swain, was appointed as a Cashier in the Petitioner-society on 17th October, 1963. Certain acts of malfeasance and misfeasance having been alleged against him he was placed under suspension and in a departmental proceeding initiated against him his services were terminated in the year 1973. Being aggrieved by the order of termination of service, opposite party No. 2 raised an industrial dispute. Conciliation having failed the dispute was referred by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar and the same was registered as I.D.Case No. 51 of 1976. The Labour Court by its Award dated 23-2-1977 set aside the order of termination of service of the Petitioner and directed his reinstatement in service will full back wages. According to the Petitioner, in spite of the said Award opposite party No. 2 did not report on duty nor did submit his joining report till 19-6-1989 for a period of more than twelve years and his whereabouts were not known. Consequently the Award of the Labour Court could not comply with. 3. In the year 1986 opposite party No. 2 filed an application u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court alleging that in spite of the Award passed by the said court the Petitioner neither permitted him to join his service nor were his back wages paid. The said application was registered as I.D.Misc.Case No. 123 of 1986. The Petitioner in spite of receiving notice having not appeared before the Labour Court to contest the case it was set ex parte. Before the Labour Court opposite party No. 2 got himself examined as a witness. Considering the evidence of opposite party No. 2, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Award passed in I.D.Case No. 51 of 1976 having not been assailed before the higher forum that had attained finality and consequently it allowed the Misc.Case and directed the Petitioner-management to pay the back wages of opposite party No. 2 for the period from April, 1973 till 31-8-1986 which was computed at Rs. 98,357.70. 4. 98,357.70. 4. The order Annexure-1 is assailed by the Petitioner-management mainly on the ground that it was all along ready to allow opposite party-workman to join his service and discharge his work in consonance with the Award of the Labour Court, but then he never reported on duty and absconded till 1986. Thus No. latches whatsoever could be attributed to the Petitioner. Further the application u/s 33C(2) was filed after lapse of more than twelve years which fact revealed that opposite party No. 2 was not interested to join his duty and he had been engaged in some other avocation, but with an avowed oblique motive of harassing the Petitioner had filed the aforesaid application u/s 33C(2) of the I.D.Act. The Petitioner has disputed with regard to computation of arrear dues of opposite party No. 2 stating that the actual gross pay of opposite party No. 2 was only LRs. 90.00 per month and calculation of arrear dues having been computed on the basis of his gross pay of Rs. 290.00 per month was not justified and was an error apparent on the face of the records. The Petitioner further averred that its non-appearance before the Labour Court had occasioned due to inadvertence and not deliberately. 5. Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 on the other hand submitted that the conduct of the Petitioner itself would reveal that it was negligent from the very beginning. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him on flimsy ground of misappropriation and by a cryptic order his services were terminated. The Labour Court after discussing the evidence came to a clear finding that the order of termination of the service of opposite party No. 2 was not justified and accordingly set aside the same and directed the Petitioner-management to reinstate opposite party No. 2 with all back wages. 6. Thereafter it is stated that opposite party No. 2 had approached the Petitioner on several occasions. At the first instance he was directed to come after a few days on the ground that the order of the Labour Court had not reached the management, but thereafter he was not allowed to meet the concerned authorities and was turned back from the main-gate of the Society itself. Thus he had No. occasion to submit his joining report. He was always ready and willing to join the service but was prevented from doing so. Thus he had No. occasion to submit his joining report. He was always ready and willing to join the service but was prevented from doing so. Consequently he had No. way out but to file a petition u/s 33C(2) of the I.D.Act. Notice of the said petition being service on the management it appeared but then subsequently did not contest the same. Under such circumstances the Labour Court computed the back wages and directed the management to pay the same to opposite party No. 2. 7. this Court heard Learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the A ward and other orders passed by the Labour Court. Under the I.D.Act, an Award becomes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication in consonance with Section 17 of that Act. In other words, on the thirty-first day of publication of the Award the same becomes enforceable and from the said date a duty is cast on the employer to perform and/or satisfy the A ward. 8. The submission that the petition u/s 33C(2) of the I.D. Act was time-barred also needs examination The question is as to whether the time prescribed under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to a petition filed u/s 33C(2) of the Act. The said Schedule deals with the period of limitation for filing an application and states that for filing of a petition for which No. period of limitation is stipulated elsewhere in the Schedule or Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be three years. It further stipulates that the time from which the period would begin to run would be when the right to apply accrues. The scope of this Article was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sha Mulchand and Company Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. AIR 1853 SC 89. Considering the question whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an application filed u/s 33C(2), the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram (Dead) through Gurbax Rai held that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to an application u/s 33C(2). The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of The Management of State Bank of Hyderabad Vs. Vasudev Anant Bhide etc. Ghamandi Ram (Dead) through Gurbax Rai held that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to an application u/s 33C(2). The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of The Management of State Bank of Hyderabad Vs. Vasudev Anant Bhide etc. and concluded that No. limitation is prescribed for filing an application u/s 33C(2). 9. A cumulative reading of the reasoning given in all the cases (supra) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in S.K. Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Council (2004) 10 SCC 679 , is that although bar of limitation would not be taken as a plea, but then delay in approaching the court has to be satisfactorily explained. 10. In the case at hand, as it appears, No. action was /taken by the management to satisfy the A ward. The management has totally failed to establish that any effort was made by it in that regard. Neither any letter was not issued to opposite party No. 2, nor was any action taken. That apart, latches on the part of the management is very much apparent from day one, inasmuch as neither it implemented the Award, nor did it contest the application filed u/s 33C(2) of the I.D. Act in spite of receipt of notice. Considering the matter from all angles, this Court finds that in fact the management did not take any steps to discharge its obligation under the A ward after lapse of thirty days of passing thereof. On the other hand, it appears that opposite party No. 2 waited for more than twelve years before filing the petition u/s 33C(2) of the Act. The reasons assigned are that though initially he was told by the management that as soon as the order would be received from the Labour Court necessary intimation would be sent to him, at later stage he was not permitted to meet the authorities and was turned out at the main gate. According to Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2, the said opposite party was a poor laborer belonging to down-trodden class of the society. He was all along waiting to receive intimation from the management and in fact he had No. means to enter into further litigation. According to Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2, the said opposite party was a poor laborer belonging to down-trodden class of the society. He was all along waiting to receive intimation from the management and in fact he had No. means to enter into further litigation. Though opposite party No. 2 had succeeded in the earlier litigation, not once but twice, he was deprived of the fruits of the orders for years together and was made to run from pillar to post and ultimately approached this Court after arranging funds with great difficulty. The explanation for such delay though probable is not very much acceptable. 11. (SIC) Considering the matter from all angles and applying the principles of 'No work, No. pay', this Court feels that ends of justice and equity will be better served if the management is directed to pay 50% of the amount as awarded by the Labour Court in the Misc.Case. The said amount is paid within two months hence. 12. this Court disposes of the Writ application with the aforesaid observation.