ORDER Gupta, J. n 1. During course of hearing on l.A. No. 9190/2007, which is an application for condonation of delay, a question crept in about the scope of the explanation appended to sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005. The provisions as contained in section 2 of the Act are reproduced as under: "Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a Judgment or order of one Judge of the High Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction -- (1) An appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court: Provided that no such appeal shall be against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within 45 days from the date of order passed by a Single Judge: Provided that any appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period of 45 days, if the petitioner satisfies the Division Bench that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. Explanation. -- The fact that the petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this sub-section." 2. The explanation appended to the proviso of sub-section (2) as aforesaid is pari materia to the explanation appended to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. On the request of the Bench, learned Senior Counsels Shri R.P. Agrawal with Shri Sanjay Agrawal, Shri Rajendra Tiwari with Shri T.K. Khadka, Shri V.S. Shroti with Shri Ashish Shroti and Shri T.S. Ruprah, Additional Advocate General with Shri Rahul Jain, Deputy Government Advocate addressed this Court on the aforesaid question. 4. The question, which crept in was whether the explanation attached o the proviso of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the aforesaid Act clears he vagueness of the provision attached to section 2 as aforesaid, or the same is in addition to the main provision. 5. 4. The question, which crept in was whether the explanation attached o the proviso of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the aforesaid Act clears he vagueness of the provision attached to section 2 as aforesaid, or the same is in addition to the main provision. 5. Learned Senior Counsels, as aforesaid, submitted that the apex Court in AIR 1985 SC 582 [S. Sundaram Pillai etc. v. V.R. Pattabiraman] has explained the different meanings of the explanation appended to the main provision. The following prepositions have been mentioned to explain the purpose and the role of the Explanation appended to the, section, sub-section or to the proviso. Paragraph 52 from the said judgment s reproduced as under: "52. Thus from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is - (a) To explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself; (b) Where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same to as to make it consistent with the document object which it seems to subserve; (c) To provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful; (d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can held or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment; and (e) It cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in interpretation of the same." 6. The aforesaid judgment has also been referred in Dipak (Candra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar [ (2003) 7 SCC 66 ]. 7. The aforesaid judgment has also been referred in Dipak (Candra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar [ (2003) 7 SCC 66 ]. 7. On basis of the same, learned Senior Counsels submitted that in absence of any vagueness in the main section the ambit of the explanation an not be understood to mean that the same is in the clarificatory nature so as to make it inconsistent with the dominant object which it seems to be and it is submitted that when in the main section the word 'sufficient cause' has been used then the explanation would not control or restrict he meaning of the phrase' sufficient cause' as used in the main provision. All The learned Senior Counsels further submitted that the appended explanation is only to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful. They also contended that an explanation cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under statue has been clothed nor can set at naught working of an Act by causing hindrance by its interpretation. 8. On basis of the aforesaid propositions learned Senior Counsels submitted that the explanation attached to the main section wherein it is stated the fact "that the petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this sub-section, would only mean that it is an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful and the explanation as such cannot, however, take away the statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same. On that basis it is submitted that there is no vagueness in the main part of the section with reference to any matter and in absence of any vagueness in the main part of the section the explanation attached to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve and on basis of the judgment of the apex Court redered in S.Sundaram Pillai etc. (supra) the prepositions 'C' and 'D' which are referred in Paragraph 52 thereof shall have full application in the present case as the word "sufficient cause" has to be provided an additional support to the dominant object of the word sufficient cause in the Act so that a meaningful purpose of the same could be added, therefore in addition to the word "sufficient cause" in the explanation it is stated that the fact the petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of sub-section shall have to be understood as an additional support so that the statutory right of appeal of any person may not be affected because of the explanation attached to the main section. 9. The submissions so made by the learned Senior Counsels who appeared to assist this Court at the request, deserve to be accepted in the light of the judgments rendered by the apex Court in S. Sundaram Pillai etc. (supra) and Dipak Chandra Ruhidas (supra) and we hold that in the case on hands the explanation, which has been attached has to be understood to provide the additional support to the dominant object of the Act for giving a meaningful purpose and also to avoid the creation of any obstacle to the statutory right of an appellant given under the statute. 9A. In view of the aforesaid we find that the explanation attached to proviso of sub-section (2) as aforesaid cannot be understood limit the scope of the words 'sufficient cause' as used in the proviso to sub-section (2). 10. The explanation though states the fact that petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause is not happily worded in the said explanation. The word 'petitioner' though is used in the explanation but it does not mean that petitioner who files a writ petition in fact the word 'petitioner' is to be understood with reference to the context of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 to mean and to be understood as a party who files the Writ Appeal and not the Original Petition. 11. 11. Before we part with the judgment we express our thanks and gratitude to all the learned Senior Counsels who appeared and argued the case to clear the doubts. The matter may now be placed before the Bench to consider the application for condonation of delay.