Order: 1. One Shri Mohd. Amjad Ali Khan, was the owner of agricultural land in an extent of Ac. 481.61 situate in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317, Bachupalli village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District. He died in the year 1950. After his death, his wife, namely Smt. Rabia Begum, his two sons, namely Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, and his two daughters, namely Tahera Yousuf Kadri and Qudsia Sajjad, the petitioners herein succeeded to his property, and since then they were in enjoyment and possession thereof. 2. While so, the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Land Reforms Act') came into force w.e.f. 01.01.1975. The petitioners state that their mother, their two brothers and themselves, filed declarations separately under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, in respect of an extent of Ac. 481.697 cents of land in the above mentioned survey numbers, before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad East Division, on 14.04.1975. The Land Reforms Tribunal, after hearing the petitioners, who were represented by a counsel, passed common order dated 31.08.1976 in C.C. Nos. 1995/M/75, 1972/M/75, 1997/M/75, 1954/M/75 and 2001/M/75, under Section 9 of the Land Reforms Act, determining their standard holding as per muslim law. The Land Reforms Tribunal found that the mother of the petitioners, namely Rabia Begum, was holding surplus land at 0.1619, their brothers, Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan each at 1.7111 and the petitioners each at 0.3555, and further held that they are liable to surrender the said excess land under Section 10(1) of the Land Reforms Act. 3. While the declarations filed by the mother of the petitioners, their brothers and themselves were pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, the Government of India enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ULC Act'), which came into force w.e.f. 17.02.1976. After the Land Reforms Tribunal passed order dated 31.08.1976, the petitioners state that on legal advise, their mother, their brothers and themselves, also filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act on 16.09.1976 before respondent No. 3, namely the Special Officer and Competent Authority, declaring the entire extent of agricultural land owned by them. 4. After the Land Reforms Tribunal passed order dated 31.08.1976, the petitioners state that on legal advise, their mother, their brothers and themselves, also filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act on 16.09.1976 before respondent No. 3, namely the Special Officer and Competent Authority, declaring the entire extent of agricultural land owned by them. 4. While the matters stood thus, the petitioners state that their mother died on 30.10.1990, and as they did not hear anything with regard to the declarations filed by them under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act, they made enquiries with the revenue officials and came to know that respondent No. 3 has suo motu taken up proceedings under the ULC Act, as if the land owners did not file any declarations, and passed orders dated 21.07.2004, which was published in official gazette on 15.11.2005, determining the holding of the mother of the petitioner, namely late Smt. Rabia Begum at Ac.471.14, and further holding that she is entitled to keep an extent of 21,234.30 Sq. mtrs., and surrender the remaining extent of 18,86,253.16 Sq. mtrs., which was found to be in excess of the ceiling limit, to the Government. The petitioners further state that they were informed by the officials of the State Government that the declarations filed by them and their brothers under the ULC Act were not available, and since by virtue of the gazette notification dated 15.11.2005, the land in question, was deemed to have been vested in the Government, they can make applications for regularization of the land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, (Revenue (UC-I) Department, dated 29.07.2002, which provided that the excess land owned by the individuals can be got regularized on payment of compensation to the State. 5. As advised, the petitioners state that they filed separate applications dated 26.11.2005 and paid compensation of Rs. 1,82,00,000/- and Rs.1,98,00,000/- as provided in G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002 and requested respondent No.3 to regularize the excess land, which was deemed to have been surrendered to the Government. However, the petitioners state that on coming to know that the land in question was allotted to some third parties, they made representations to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 requesting them to consider and pass appropriate orders on the applications filed by them for regularization, but no action thereon had been taken. However, the petitioners state that on coming to know that the land in question was allotted to some third parties, they made representations to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 requesting them to consider and pass appropriate orders on the applications filed by them for regularization, but no action thereon had been taken. The petitioners state that on further enquiries, they came to know that respondent No.2, namely the Government through their Revenue Department have vide orders issued in G.O. Ms. No. 1381, Revenue (Asn.V) Department, dated 26.10.2007, alienated the land in question to respondent No.4, namely A.P. Housing Board, which in turn had alienated the same to respondent No.5, namely M/s. Deccan Infrastructure and Land Holdings Limited (joint venture of respondent No.4) and that respondent No.5 had alienated a part of the land in question to respondent No.6, namely M/s. Indu Projects Limited. 6. Hence, they filed the writ petition, seeking the following relief: PRAYER SOUGHT INITIALLY "this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari declaring: (i) that the proceedings No.G1/485/2002 dated 21.07.2004 issued by the 3rd respondent wherein final order under Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was passed against a dead person, petitioners' mother who expired on 30.10.1990, on an erroneous assumption that the entire extent of 457.14 acres of land situate in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317 of Bachupalli village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District was owned by her alone, are null and void and are of no consequence. (ii) that the action of the 3rd respondent in not passing any orders on the declarations dated 16.09.1976 filed by the petitioners in respect of 67.37 acres each from out of the total extent of 457.14 acres of land situated in Sy. Nos.270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317 OF Bachupally village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, as arbitrary, illegal, unjust, violative of the fundamental and constitutional rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India as well as violative of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. (iii) that the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing G.O. Ms. (iii) that the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing G.O. Ms. No. 1381, Revenue (Asn.V) Department dated 26.10.2007 alienating an extent of 119 acres of land situate in Sy. Nos. 285/1, 286/1, 287/1, 289/2, 294, 295, 296 and 297/1, Bachupalli village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District in favour of the 4th respondent, who in turn alienated the same in favour of the 5th respondent and further action of the 5th respondent in alienating a part of the same in favour of the 6th respondent, without awaiting orders that are to be passed by the 1st and 3rd respondents on the applications dated 26.11.2005 bearing Nos. G1/456/28/2005 and G1/456/29/2005 filed by the petitioners before the 3rd respondent seeking regularization under the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 456, Revenue (U.C.I) Department, dated 29.07.2002 is arbitrary, illegal, unjust, discriminatory, without jurisdiction, violative of the fundamental and constitutional rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, violative of the principles of natural justice as well as the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 456, Revenue (U.C.I) Department, dated 29.07.2002 and also destructive of our legitimate expectation, and issue a consequential direction to the 3rd respondent herein to forthwith dispose of the declarations submitted by the petitioners herein on 16.09.1976 in Form-I under the provisions of Section 6(1) of the ULC Act duly taking into consideration the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 733 (U.C.II) Revenue Department, dated 31.10.1988 and Section 4(1)(b) of the ULC Act and further issue a consequential direction to the 1st respondent herein to dispose of the applications dated 26.11.2005 filed by the petitioners under the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 456, Revenue (U.C.I) Department, dated 29.07.2002 and pass such other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 7. On 11.03.2008, this Court while ordering notice before admission, and considering the fact that the applications dated 26.11.2005 of the petitioners for regularization of the land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002 in their favour were pending, passed orders directing status quo obtaining as on the said day to be maintained by the parties with respect to possession of the land in question. On 25.03.2008, as it was reported by the counsel for the petitioners that respondent Nos. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002 in their favour were pending, passed orders directing status quo obtaining as on the said day to be maintained by the parties with respect to possession of the land in question. On 25.03.2008, as it was reported by the counsel for the petitioners that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were going ahead with making construction in the land in question, this Court directed them not to go ahead with any construction in the land in question until further orders. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 filed separate applications seeking to vacate the interim orders passed by this Court supported by counters. 8. Considering the stand taken by respondent Nos. 4 to 6 in their respective counters, the petitioners on 25.04.2008, filed W.P.M.P. No. 12506 of 2008, inter alia stating that since respondent No.3 has not passed any orders on the declarations filed by the petitioners under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act, and having regard to the fact that the ULC Act has since been repealed in the State of Andhra Pradesh w.e.f. 27.03.2008, respondent No.3 is not entitled to pass any orders on the declarations filed by them, and as such, the prayer sought for by them in paragraph 14(ii) of the writ affidavit, has become infructuous. They further stated that since respondent No.1 had rejected their applications dated 26.11.2005 for regularization in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, and ordered refund of the amount of compensation paid by them for the said purpose, they state that they are entitled to claim interest on the amount to be refunded to them. 9. The petitioners state that they have not surrendered any land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and in fact, they have filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act in respect of the entire extent of land held by them. Respondent No.1 is not entitled to alienate the land alleged to have been surrendered in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal by receiving consideration, and as such, the alienation made by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.4, which through respondent No.5 has entered into agreement with respondent No.6 for development into an integrated township, is contrary to the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, and therefore, null and void. 10. 10. So stating, they prayed this Court to permit them to substitute the following as the main prayer in the writ petition: PRAYER SUBSTITUTED SUBSEQUENTLY "It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring: A. (I) that the final order in proceedings No. G1/485/2002 dated 21.07.2004 passed by the 3rd respondent herein, treating the entire extent of Ac. 457.14 of land situate in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317 of Bachupalli village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District was owned by Smt. Rabia Begum alone, who died on 30.10.1990, are null and void and are of no consequence. A. (ii) that the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing G.O. Ms. No. 1381, Revenue (Asn.V) Department dated 26.10.2007 alienating an extent of Ac.119.00 of land situate in Sy. Nos. 285/1, 286/1, 287/1, 289/2, 294, 295, 296 and 297/1, Bachupalli village, Medchal Taluq, Ranga Reddy District, in favour of the 4th respondent who in turn alienated the same in favour of the 5th respondent and further action of the 5th respondent in alienating the same in favour of 6th respondent, are contrary to the provisions of A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and the same are therefore null and void ab initio; and A. (iii) issue consequential direction to the respondents to restore the possession of the aforesaid Ac.457.14 of land to the petitioners and their brothers and a further consequential direction to the 3rd respondent to refund the sum of Rs.1,82,00,000/- and Rs.1,98,00,000/- deposited by the 1st and 2nd petitioners respectively on 26.11.2005 together with interest @ 18% p.a. with quarterly rests forthwith and pass such other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case" and pass such other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 11. Before close of Courts for summer vacation from 02.05.2008, this Court heard the vacate stay petitions and reserved the matter for orders. 11. Before close of Courts for summer vacation from 02.05.2008, this Court heard the vacate stay petitions and reserved the matter for orders. However, during summer vacation, the counsel for respondent No.6 in USR No. 4495 of 2008 on 28.05.2008, filed additional material papers, namely sale deeds, said to have been executed by petitioner No.2, inter alia stating that she had alienated the entire land that fell to her share in the division of properties, and that petitioner No.1 had not alienated any land that fell to her share. In view of this, at his request, the matter was listed "for being mentioned" on re-opening of the Courts after summer recess, and with a view to provide opportunity to all the parties, the matter was heard. And at this stage, all the counsel requested that the writ petition itself be disposed of finally, and accordingly, at their request, the writ petition itself was heard finally and at length on different dates. 12. As the respondents did not oppose the above petition, the petitioners, by order dated 04.07.2008 were permitted to substitute the above prayer as the main prayer in the writ petition. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 also filed detailed counter. To all the counters filed by the respective respondents, the petitioners filed writ petitions. STAND OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 TO 3 IN THEIR COUNTER 13. The Principal Secretary to the Government in their Revenue Department, in the counter filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 and 2 and 3, stated that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, in respect of a total extent of Ac. 481.31 guntas of agricultural land in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317 of Bachupalli village, Qutbullapur Mandal. 481.31 guntas of agricultural land in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317 of Bachupalli village, Qutbullapur Mandal. The Land Reforms Tribunal, by common order dated 31.08.1976 passed under Section 9 of the Land Reforms Act, declared them to be holding surplus land (Rabia Begum - mother of the petitioner 0.1619 standard holding; Ahsan Ali Khan - eldest brother of the petitioners 1.7111 standard holding; Akram Ali Khan - younger brother of the petitioners, 1.7111 standard holding; Qudsia Sajjadd - 2nd petitioner 0.3555 standard holding, and the 1st petitioner - Tahera Yousuf Quadri 0.3555 standard holding), and under Section 10(1) of the Land Reforms Act, they were directed to surrender the said excess land to the government. 14. Pursuant to the said order, notices under Rule 7(1) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act, were issued on calling upon the petitioners to surrender the surplus land on or before 22.09.1976. Accordingly, the petitioners, their mother and brothers, surrender the excess land. Thereafter, objections under Rule 7(4) of the Land Reforms Act, were called. As no objections were received, the Land Reforms Tribunal, vide order dated 03.11.1976 under Section 10(1) requested the Assistant Collector to take possession of the surplus land. In terms thereof, on 23.11.1976, the possession of the surplus land was taken. The land having been vested in the government, was also recorded as government land in the revenue records. Thereafter, the petitioners mother, namely Rabia Begum, was paid an amount of Rs.737/-, the brothers of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, were paid an amount of Rs.5,000/- each and the petitioners namely, Tahera Yousuf Kadri and Qudsia Sajjad, were paid an amount of Rs.1,620/- each vide CDRs dated 18.09.1987. The petitioners having made the joint surrender cannot contend that they have not surrendered the land. The factum of surrender, is evident from the mutation proceedings, effected in terms of the Deed of Settlement, whereunder the left over properties after surrender, were divided. 15. The petitioners having made the joint surrender cannot contend that they have not surrendered the land. The factum of surrender, is evident from the mutation proceedings, effected in terms of the Deed of Settlement, whereunder the left over properties after surrender, were divided. 15. It is contended by respondent No.1 that agricultural land even though in urban agglomeration, is excluded from the purview of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and the land of the petitioners which formed part of subject survey numbers of Bachupalli village, continued to be agricultural land, and as such, the petitioners could not have filed declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, since the provisions thereof, were not applicable to them when they filed the declarations. The land that was surrendered by the petitioners, their mother and brothers, have to be excluded from the purview of the declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. In the declarations filed under Section 6(1) of the Land Reforms Act, the petitioners have claimed that they are entitled to 7/48th share in the property. In fact, notices under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act were issued, but as there was no response, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, did not proceed further in the matter and did not pass any orders on the said declarations. However, on the basis of a report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, who was enquiring into some other matter in relation to other survey numbers, it was found that declarations in respect of the lands in question were not filed. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, was not apprised about the declarations filed by the petitioners and their brothers also. However, as the name of the mother of the petitioners, was found in the revenue records, he issued notice dated 27.06.2003 under Section 6(2) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, calling upon her to file statement in Form-I. In fact, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, was not aware of the death of the said Rabia Begum. As obviously, she was no more, there was no response, and in those circumstances, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, assuming that Rabia Begum is owner of the entire extent of Ac.471.14 guntas of land and unaware of the land surrendered by them in terms of the Land Reforms Act, and the land which she is entitled to retain under G.O. Ms. No. 733, dated 31.10.1988, has passed order dated 21.07.2004. Thereafter, gazette publication was issued, and the land stood absolutely vested in the government w.e.f. 25.11.2005. It, is however, stated that since the order dated 21.07.2004 has been passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, against Rabia Begum, who is a dead person, the same excluding the land in an extent of Ac.214.76 cents, already surrendered in terms of the order dated 31.09.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, are non est in the eye of law. 16. The petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands, they have filed the writ petition suppressing the factum of surrender of surplus land in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal and receipt of compensation, and claimed as if they are entitled to the entire extent of land. In fact, the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal attained finality, since no appeal was filed against the same. Mere repealing of the Urban Land Ceiling Act w.e.f. 26.03.2008, will not have any effect on the proceedings, which concluded under the Land Reforms Act. The lands in question are agricultural land, and they were brought under "urban agglomeration area" only in the year 1980. 17. It is stated that the land that was given to respondent No.4, which through respondent No.5 had given possession some portion thereof to respondent No.6 is the land that was surrendered and taken possession of by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. The land was alienated in terms of a policy decision taken by the government to construct 1,00,000 dwelling houses in and around the twin cities for the poor free of cost. Respondent No.4 has been given the task of developing the Integrated Township either by itself or through its agency, namely respondent No.5. Respondent No.4 had paid an amount of Rs.1,000/- crores for the land in an extent of Ac.178.03 alienated in its favour vide G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 16.10.2007. In fact, land in an extent of Ac.639.03 guntas, including land in an extent of Ac. 119.00 in Bachupalli village, was alienated to respondent No.4 at the rate of Rs.90.00 lakhs per acre. 18. The applications dated 26.11.2005 of the petitioners for regularization of land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 16.10.2007. In fact, land in an extent of Ac.639.03 guntas, including land in an extent of Ac. 119.00 in Bachupalli village, was alienated to respondent No.4 at the rate of Rs.90.00 lakhs per acre. 18. The applications dated 26.11.2005 of the petitioners for regularization of land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, was rejected by the government vide orders passed in Memo dated 26.03.2008 and the amounts paid by the petitioners were directed to be refunded. It is contended that the lands, which the petitioners sought regularization, were not alienated, and in fact, the lands that are alienated in favour of respondent No.4 are the lands that were surrendered and taken possession of by the government under the Land Reforms Act. The petitioners without disclosing the true facts, have filed the writ petition, with a view to take undue advantage, and thus prayed that the writ petition be dismissed with costs. STAND OF RESPONDENT NO.4 IN THEIR COUNTER 19. In the counters filed by respondent No.4, it is stated that the government vide G.O. Ms. No. 42, Housing Department, dated 27.10.2006, permitted them to float respondent No.5 for taking up integrated township either on its own or by joint ventures. Initially, respondent No.4 was having 51% stake while the government was holding 49% stake, but later, the ratio has been fixed at 57: 43. It is stated that respondent No.2, vide G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 26.10.2007, accorded sanction for alienation of land in an extent of Ac.119 in Sy. Nos. 285/1, 286/1, 287/1, 289/2, 294, 295, 296 and 297/1 at Bachupalli village, Qutbullapur, at Rs.90.00 lakhs per acre. Advance possession of the land was given on 12.09.2005 in their favour, and in turn, they have alienated the same in favour of respondent No.5. STAND OF RESPONDENT NO.5 IN THEIR COUNTER 20. Respondent No.5, in its counter, while stating the facts as stated by respondent No.4 and respondent No.1 to 3, in their respective counter, further contended that they invited proposals for handling housing projects at Gajularamaram, Turkayamjal, Kowkur and Bachupalli from reputed developers/firms/consortium on 22.05.2007, and pursuant to the same, they received proposal from various companies, including respondent No.6 through an evaluation process done by CRISIL Infrastructure Advisory. Thereafter, vide letter dated 24.08.2007, it was awarded the work of development of integrated township on certain terms and conditions. Thereafter, vide letter dated 24.08.2007, it was awarded the work of development of integrated township on certain terms and conditions. In fact, respondent No.6, had periodically remitted an amount of Rs.275,19,65,137.00 towards development fee. It is contended that the petitioners were not entitled to regularization of the land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, because they are not in possession of the land. STAND OF RESPONDENT NO. 6 IN THEIR COUNTER 21. Respondent No.6 in their counter stated that under bona fide impression that the government is the absolute owner of the land, participated in the bids, and in fact, submitted its bid for construction of integrated Township. The bids were evaluated by CRISIL on 05.08.2007 and ultimately, the bid of respondent No.6 was accepted by respondent No.5, and vide letter dated 24.08.2007, they were awarded the contract work, enabling them to execute and implement the project through formation of Special Purpose Vehicle. The salient features of the award are - (a) Respondent No.6 shall pay an amount of Rs.4.10 crores per acre as development fee; (b) they shall pay a minimum revenue share of Rs.162.01 crores in quarterly instalments; (c) they shall furnish bank guarantee for an amount equal to the outstanding development fee as security; (d) in case they realize any additional gross revenue over Rs.2,000 crores, the same shall be paid to respondent No.5; (e) the project shall be completed within a period of 30 months from the date of signing of power of attorney; and a 12 month period is granted for marketing the project. Respondent No.6 conveyed its acceptance vide letter dated 27.08.2007, and possession of the land was handed over to them on 28.08.2007. In fact, respondent No.6 have invested an amount of Rs.292.75 crores through its Special Purpose Vehicle M/s. Redfort Akbar Properties Pvt. Ltd. 22, The land which the petitioners are claiming, was already surrendered by their mother, brothers and themselves under the Land Reforms Act, and the land that was permitted to be retained by them was sold by them to private parties either by themselves or through their GPAs, and as of now, they hold nothing. To show that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, have already sold the said lands, he has produced copies of the sale deed, encumbrance certificates, and also statements of the lands held, surrendered and sold. To show that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, have already sold the said lands, he has produced copies of the sale deed, encumbrance certificates, and also statements of the lands held, surrendered and sold. At any rate, he submitted that the lands, which the petitioners are claiming, are not the lands that are given to them for development, and that they are the lands that were surrendered by the declarants in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 23. From the stand taken by the petitioners and the respondents in their affidavits and counter affidavits respectively, and elaborate arguments made on their behalf before the Court, by the learned senior counsel Shri S. Venkat Reddy, for the petitioners, Shri C.V. Mohan Reddy, the learned Advocate General for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, Shri S.R. Ashok, the learned senior counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and Shri C. Kodandaram, the learned counsel for respondent No.6, the submissions can broadly be summarized as follows: I – SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS 1. (a) The land in question falls under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act as well as the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and in case of direct conflict, the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which is a Central Act, has to prevail over the Land Reforms Act, which is a State Act. According to him, though the land in question, in the revenue records, is recorded as "agricultural land", but since it fell in an "urban agglomeration area", the same being a vacant land, and at no point of time, having been put to use for agricultural purposes, it is the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and not the Land Reforms Act, that apply to the land in question. In support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P.1. In support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P.1. (b) Though the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, but having regard to the fact that the Urban Land Ceiling Act, came into force w.e.f. 17.02.1976, the Land Reforms Tribunal, had no jurisdiction to determine the standard holdings of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, and as such, the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, determining the standard holding of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, is one without jurisdiction, and as such, a nullity and void ab initio. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra2 and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh3 and Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal4. He also relied on the judgment of the apex Court in Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai5, to contend that the order dated 31.08.1976, cannot operate either as estoppel or res judicata, as the same is one passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, without jurisdiction, and in support of his argument that no rights would flow from such a void order, he place reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Ramarao Janakiram Kadam v. State of Bombay6. According to him, the respondents cannot plead the question of limitation, for questioning the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal by the petitioners, and in support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the apex Court in M/s. Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana7. According to him, the respondents cannot plead the question of limitation, for questioning the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal by the petitioners, and in support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the apex Court in M/s. Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana7. (c) The alleged common surrender of land by the brothers of the petitioners and taking over possession of land by the Government, in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, according to the senior counsel for the petitioners, suffers from serious procedural illegalities irregularities, in that no notices whatsoever under Rules 7(1), 7(4), 8 and 12 of the Rules, as contemplated under Rule 16(9) thereof, were served on the petitioners properly, and no compensation in respect of the allegedly surrendered surplus land, was paid to the petitioners, and therefore, the alleged joint surrender and taking over possession of the land, having taken place in terms of a void order and in sheer violation of the statutory provisions and the rules made thereunder, the whole of the surrender and taking over proceedings, have to be declared as null and void. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the unreported judgments of this Court in C.R.P. No. 817 of 1976, dated 15.11.1976 and C.R.P. No. 1985 of 1978, dated 22.08.1978. In support of his argument that when a statute says that a particular thing should be done in a certain way, it should be done in that manner only and not otherwise, he placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangal Das8 and Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India9. (d) He submitted that no surrender of land has taken place in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and the Deed of Family Settlement, relied on by the respondents, wherein the factum of surrender of land in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal is mentioned, was fabricated and brought into existence by the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, with a view to cheat the petitioners, and therefore, no credence can be placed on it, to come at the conclusion that there was a joint surrender of surplus land in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal. 2. 2. The order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, determining the extent of land that should be retained by the mother of the petitioners and the extent of land that has to be surrendered by her, is null and void, in that it has been passed against the mother of the petitioners, namely Rabia Begum, who has died on 30.10.1990. According to him, the fact that no surrender of surplus land had taken place in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, is evident from the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, wherein the authority had determined the entire extent of land held by the petitioners mother. Since the order dated 21.07.2004 passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, is a void order, the same has to be set aside. Now that the Urban Land Ceiling Act, has been repealed, he submits that the petitioners should be given an opportunity to file fresh declarations under the Land Reforms Act, in respect of the entire extent of land held by them. 3. According to the learned senior counsel, since the Land Reforms Act, was enacted by the State to give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitution of India, the land alleged to have been jointly surrendered by the petitioners, their mother and brothers and taken over possession by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, cannot be alienated by the government in favour of respondent No. 4, for it violates the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, and as such, the alienation made by the government in favour of respondent No.4 for a consideration, which in turn through respondent No.5 had alienated some portion of the land to respondent No.6 for the purpose of development, is bad. In support of this argument, he relied upon an unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 8657 of 1984, dated 14.07.1988. 4. In support of this argument, he relied upon an unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 8657 of 1984, dated 14.07.1988. 4. (a) According to him, there are no disputed questions of fact involved in the writ petition, and even if they exist, this Court in appropriate cases can go into such disputed questions of fact and record its findings, and in support of this argument, he relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee10, State of A.P. v. Merit Enterprises11 and A.B.L. International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation12. (b) In support of his argument that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has plenary powers and that it can issue appropriate writs and that its powers are wider than the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 32, and that the apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 can grant relief to parties who are not before it, placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. Chandilal Saha13, B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore14 and M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala15. II - SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 to 3 1. On the date when the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act and the date when the Land Reforms Tribunal Act adjudicated the said declarations and passed order dated 31.08.1976, the land in question was "agricultural land" and it continued to be so, even after the Urban Land Ceiling Act came into force, and this is evident from the admissions made by the petitioners, their mother and brothers in the declarations filed both under the Land Reforms Act and the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the various sale deeds executed by them, apart from the entries made in the revenue records, and therefore, the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, determining the standard holding of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction, warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and more so when the said order having not been appealed in any higher forum, attained finality. In support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P. According to him, the land in question was brought under "urban agglomeration area" in the year 1980 when the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., dated 23.06.1980, and in support of his argument that the petitioners, their mothers and brothers were under an obligation to file declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, only after the said date and not earlier, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in State of A.P. v. N. Audikesava Reddy16. 2. The land in question, was surrendered and taken possession of by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, but not in terms of the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, against the mother of the petitioners, who was no more. The land having stood absolutely vested in the government, as is evident from the surrender proceedings and the Deed of Family Settlement, wherein the petitioners and their brothers have jointly made a mention about the surrender of the land, as also the faisal patti of the year 1978-79, wherein the land in question was recorded as "government land", no exception can be taken to the action of the government in alienating the same in favour of respondent No.4 for a consideration, which in turn through respondent No.5 had alienated some portion thereof to respondent No.6, for common development, and such alienation, cannot be said to be violative of the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act. The petitioners in the guise of questioning the allotment made in favour of third parties contending that the same is violative of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, are seeking to protect the private interest of the persons to whom they sold the land in question. 3. Since the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, is against a dead person, the entire process undertaken by the said authority, are void and non est in the eye of law. However, the land that were surrendered and vested in the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, which were erroneously included in the order dated 21.07.2004, have to be excluded. 4. However, the land that were surrendered and vested in the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, which were erroneously included in the order dated 21.07.2004, have to be excluded. 4. The writ petition raises disputed question of fact, in that they have disputed the entire surrender proceedings on the ground that notices were served on them, that no compensation was paid to the petitioners and that the Deed of Family Settlement, is not genuine and that it was brought into existence by their eldest brother, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, and such disputed question, cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and prayed that the writ petition be dismissed in limine. The petitioners have approached the Court with unclean hands, suppressing the material facts, and as such, they are not entitled to grant of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This apart, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of these arguments, he placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat17, Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab18, Lalit Kumar v. Jaipur Traders Corporation Pvt. Ltd.19, State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi20, Arunima Baruah v. Union of India21 and Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India22. III - SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 4 AND 5 1. The land in question, is an agricultural land, and this is evident from the revenue records, assertions made by the petitioners themselves in the declarations filed by them both under the Land Reforms Act and the Urban Land Ceiling Act, Deed of Family Settlement, and the various sale deeds executed by their mother, 2nd petitioner and brothers of the petitioners. The land in question, is an agricultural land, and this is evident from the revenue records, assertions made by the petitioners themselves in the declarations filed by them both under the Land Reforms Act and the Urban Land Ceiling Act, Deed of Family Settlement, and the various sale deeds executed by their mother, 2nd petitioner and brothers of the petitioners. In support of this argument, that the land is an "agricultural land" and did not fell in an "urban agglomeration area", he relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P. The petitioners, with a view to take advantage of the repealing of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, have filed the present writ petition contending that the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, is null and void ab initio, because the land in question fell in an "urban agglomeration area" and as such, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the declarations and adjudicate and much less pass orders determining the standard holding of the declarants. The order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, attained finality, because no appeal was preferred thereagainst, and after 32 long years the petitioners cannot be allowed to question the same. 2. The petitioners did not file declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, but they got them stealthily inserted in the files. At any rate, even if the petitioners, their mother and brothers had filed declarations, the same are of no consequence because they were filed when the land in question was an "agricultural land" and did not fell in an "urban agglomeration area". In fact, the petitioners, their mother and brothers, were liable to file declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, within 212 days from the date they were brought under the "urban agglomeration area", i.e. they could have filed declarations only after 23.06.1980, when the government issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., bringing the land in question under "urban agglomeration area". 3. The land in question alienated by the government in their favour, is the land that was surrendered and taken possession of by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. No. 391, M.A., bringing the land in question under "urban agglomeration area". 3. The land in question alienated by the government in their favour, is the land that was surrendered and taken possession of by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. The alienation of the land in favour of respondent No.4, which through respondent No. 5, had given possession thereof to respondent No.6, for development, was done following procedure of bidding, in a transparent manner, and as such, the alienation cannot be said to be bad or violated the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act. 4. The petitioners approached the Court with unclean hands, suppressing the material facts and that too with long delay, and they are not entitled to grant of any discretionary relief from this Court. Further the writ petition raises disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and their remedy is elsewhere. IV - SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO. 6 1. The land in question is an agricultural land, and as such, the Land Reforms Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass an order, and therefore, the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by it determining the standard holding of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. He relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P. to contend that the land in question is an "agricultural land" and did not fell in an "urban agglomeration area". The land was brought under an "urban agglomeration area" only on 23.06.1980, when the government issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., dated 23.06.1980, bring the in that regard. . 2. The land in question, was transferred to respondent No.6 for development of a housing colony, by respondent No.4 through respondent No.5, in a transparent manner, following the process of bidding, and respondent No.6 had paid huge sums of money to respondent Nos. 4 and 5 for the said purpose. The temporary transfer of land in their favour, for development of housing colony for providing to weaker sections, does not violate the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act. If, at the instance of the petitioners, the writ petition is entertained and allowed, they will be put to great loss. 3. 4 and 5 for the said purpose. The temporary transfer of land in their favour, for development of housing colony for providing to weaker sections, does not violate the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act. If, at the instance of the petitioners, the writ petition is entertained and allowed, they will be put to great loss. 3. The land that was given possession of to respondent No.6, is not the land that fell to the respective shares of the petitioners in the Deed of Family Settlement. The petitioners and their brothers admitted to the surrender of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal in the Deed of Family Settlement, and therefore, they cannot contend that they did not surrender any land. He submitted that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, after surrender of the surplus land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, have sold the remaining extent of land that was allowed to be retained, under different registered sale deeds, and the extents mentioned therein, tallies with the land that was allowed to be retained. Petitioner No.1 has already sold the entire land and other members of her family have also sold their respective shares, while petitioner No.2 did not sell any land. The petitioners have filed this writ petition to protect the interest of the persons who purchased the land from them. 4. The petitioners have come to the Court with unclean hands. They have suppressed the material facts, and they came out with some correct facts only after they were pointed out in the counter filed by them. The writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The writ petition raises disputed question of fact, which cannot be adjudicated by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. The fact that the petitioners are claiming re-delivery of the land in question shows that they are not in possession of the land in question, and since the petitioners are not in possession of the land, they cannot claim the benefit of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, which provides that regularization can be done only if one is in possession of the land. QUESTIONS THAT ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION 24. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, which provides that regularization can be done only if one is in possession of the land. QUESTIONS THAT ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION 24. On the basis of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners and the respondents, as summarized above, the following principal questions arise for consideration, in this writ petition: 1. Whether the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, is a nullity and void ab initio, because the provisions of the Land Reforms Act were not applicable to the land in question, and therefore, it had no jurisdiction? 2. Whether the land in question, came to fall in an "urban agglomeration area" attracting the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and the obligation of the land owners to file declarations in terms of the provisions thereof? 3. Whether the proceedings initiated for surrender of the land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, have to be declared void because of non-service of notices and non-payment of compensation? 4. Whether the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, is a genuine or a fabricated document? 5. Whether the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, against Rabia Begum, is void? 6. Whether in view of repealing of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the declarants should be given an opportunity to file declarations once again under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act? 7. Whether the writ petition filed by the petitioners suffers from delay and laches, acquiescence/waiver and suppression of facts? 8. Whether allotment of land by the government in favour of respondent No.4,which was taken possession of under the Land Reforms Act, violated the provisions of Section 14 thereto? 9. Whether at the instance of the petitioners, on the ground of non-following of the procedure in the matter of allotment, the allotment made by the government in favour of respondent No. 4, can be set aside. 10. Whether on the ground of non-maintenance of record post-Land Reform Tribunal's order, and surrender proceedings initiated in terms thereof stand vitiated? FACTS THAT LEAD TO PASSING OF ORDER DATED 31.08.1976 BY THE LAND REFORMS TRIBUNAL 25. The A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, came into force w.e.f. 01.01.1975. 10. Whether on the ground of non-maintenance of record post-Land Reform Tribunal's order, and surrender proceedings initiated in terms thereof stand vitiated? FACTS THAT LEAD TO PASSING OF ORDER DATED 31.08.1976 BY THE LAND REFORMS TRIBUNAL 25. The A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, came into force w.e.f. 01.01.1975. The petitioners, namely Tahera Yousuf Kadri and Qudsia Sajjad, their mother, namely Rabia Begum, and their two brothers, namely Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, filed separate declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act on 14.04.1975, in respect of agricultural land in an extent of Ac.481.67 cents, owned by them jointly in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306, 307 and 311 to 317. They Land Reforms Tribunal registered the declarations filed by them as C.C. Nos. 1954/M/75, 1972/M/75, 1995/M/75/1997/M/75 and 2001/M/75. Before the Land Reforms Tribunal, the petitioners were represented by an Advocates Sri. Mohd Abdul Rashid. The record discloses that as the names of the petitioners did not find place in the Succession Certificate, which was issued on the basis of the report submitted by the Patwari, the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed separate affidavits. In the said affidavits, they have stated that the Patwari not knowing about the living daughters who are minors (petitioners) did not mention their names in the enquiry report, and basing on the said report, the Tahsil Office issued the Succession Certificate, and as at the time of death of the Pattedar and the succession proceedings, the daughters (petitioners) were minors, non-inclusion of their names in the Succession Certificate, shall not deprive them of their vested legal rights and hereditary rights, and so stating, they prayed that the ceiling area of all the co-owners be determined as per their respective shares under the muslim law - Rabia Begum 1/8th share; Ahsan Ali Khan 7/24th share; Akram Ali Khan 7/24th share; petitioner No.2, namely Qudsia Sajjad 7/48th share and petitioner No.1, namely Tahera Yousuf Kadri 7/48th share. Thereafter, the Land Reforms Tribunal, after hearing the declarants through their Advocates, adjudicated the declarations, and passed an order under Section 9 of the Land Reforms Act, determined their excess land holdings at - 0.1619 (Rabia Begum - mother of the petitioners); 1.7111 (Ahsan Ali Khan - eldest brother of the petitioners); 1.7111 (Akram Ali Khan - younger brother of the petitioners); 0.3555 (Qudsia Sajjad - petitioner No.2) and; 0.3555 (Tahera Yousuf Kadri -petitioner No.1), which comes to Ac. 214.76 cents, and accordingly passed an order to that effect on 31.08.1976, inter alia, observing that the above declarants are liable to surrender the excess land under Section 10(1) of the Land Reforms Act. In re Question No.1: WHETHER ORDER OF LAND REFORMS TRIBUNAL IS A NULLITY AND VOID AB INITIO 26. The question as to whether the Land Reforms Tribunal, had inherent jurisdiction to entertain the declarations filed by the petitioners, their mother and brothers under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, and pass an order dated 31.08.1976, so as to hold that the same a nullity and void ab initio, has to be considered on the basis of the facts, as are appearing, in the case on hand and the law governing the field. 27. On the date when the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, the land was "agricultural land", and therefore, they had filed their declarations, and the petitioners cannot dispute the same. After filing the declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force w.e.f. 17.02.1976. By the date when the Urban Land Ceiling Act, came into force, the declarations filed by the petitioners, their mother and brothers, under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, were pending adjudication on the file of the Land Reforms Tribunal. The petitioners, their mother and brothers, who were represented by an Advocate, participated in the proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal and claimed that the land in question is an "agricultural land". The petitioners, their mother and brothers, who were represented by an Advocate, participated in the proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal and claimed that the land in question is an "agricultural land". They have not taken the objection, which they have now taken in the present writ petition, stating that the land is not "agricultural land", but "vacant land" falling in an "urban agglomeration area", and therefore, the Land Reforms Tribunal, has no jurisdiction to deal with the declarations, filed by them under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act. 28. If, according to the petitioners, the lands in question were dry and kancha lands, covered by hillock and not fit for cultivation or agricultural operations, and fell within an "urban agglomeration area", and the Land Reforms Tribunal, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the declaration filed by them under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, nothing prevented them from bringing the same to the notice of the Land Reforms Tribunal, which they failed to do. Had the petitioners, their mother and brothers raised such an objection, certainly the Land Reforms Tribunal would have considered the question, whether it had jurisdiction or not to deal with the declarations filed by them. In fact, the petitioners, their mother and brothers, who were represented before the Land Reforms Tribunal by an Advocate, did not take any such objection, and without any demur, participated in the proceedings, and allowed the Land Reforms Tribunal, to adjudicate their declarations filed under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, and pass the order dated 31.08.1976 under Section 9 thereof, inter alia making a direction, to surrender the land under Section 10(1) of the Land Reforms Act. The said order of the Land Reforms Tribunal attained finality, inasmuch as neither the petitioners nor their mother nor their brothers preferred any appeal before the appellate authority or any other higher forum. 29. The said order of the Land Reforms Tribunal attained finality, inasmuch as neither the petitioners nor their mother nor their brothers preferred any appeal before the appellate authority or any other higher forum. 29. The fact that the land in question, when the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act and the date on which the Land Reforms Tribunal passed the order dated 31.08.1976, was "agricultural land" and did not fall in an "urban agglomeration area", becomes crystal clear from the very own admissions and statements made by the declarants, including the petitioners, in the declarations, filed by them under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which they filed on 16.09.1976 i.e. 15 days after the Land Reforms Tribunal passed the order dated 31.08.1976. Petitioner No.1, namely Tahera Kadri, in the statement (declaration), filed by her under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act, in respect of the land in question, situated in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306 and 311 to 317, the in Column No.5, relating to whether the land is a vacant land, stated "vacant land and land with building" and also "agricultural land" admeasuring about 185 hectares (7/48th share); in the Annexure-A appended thereto, in Column Nos. 7 and 10 relating to class of land i.e. vacant land/land with building/agricultural land and approved land use, she stated as "agricultural", and in Column No. 15 relating to remarks, she stated that "the lands are agricultural lands and used for agricultural and horticultural purposes". Stating so, she sought exemption of the land in question from the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Likewise, petitioner No.2, namely Qudsia Sajjad, represented by her GPA holder, Akram Ali Khan, who is her younger brother, also in the statement (declaration) filed under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act, in respect of the land in question, situated in Sy. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306 and 311 to 317, in Column No. 5 relating to whether the land is a vacant land, stated "agricultural land only"; in the Annexure-A appended thereto, in Column Nos. Nos. 270, 284 to 300, 302, 304, 306 and 311 to 317, in Column No. 5 relating to whether the land is a vacant land, stated "agricultural land only"; in the Annexure-A appended thereto, in Column Nos. 7 and 10 relating to class of land i.e. vacant land/land with building/agricultural land and approved land use, he stated as "agricultural", and in Column No.15 relating to remarks, he stated that "the lands are agricultural lands and used for agricultural and horticultural purposes", and so stating, he sought exemption of the land from the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. 30. This apart, the mother, brothers of the petitioners as also petitioner No.2, Qudsia Sajjad, sold some of the lands that were retained by them after surrender. It is appropriate to make a reference to the assertions made by them with respect to the nature of the lands in the sale deeds. In the 23 sale deeds, executed by the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, between 24.04.1978 and 19.05.1980, alienating an extent of Ac. 45.00, it is stated that the lands are "agricultural lands" that "the vendor was issued a certificate vide Lr. No.C4/11883/78, dated 13.03.1978 that the said land was not attracted by the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act". The petitioners mother, namely Rabia Begum, has also alienated an extent of Ac.42.07 cents under 20 registered sale deeds on 24.04.1978, and in all the said sale deeds, she mentioned that the lands are "agricultural lands" and also referred to the certificate dated 13.03.1978. Petitioner No.2, namely Qudsia Sajjad, had also executed eight sale deeds on 27.03.1996, covering an extent of Ac.34.11 cents, describing the lands as "agricultural lands". In the sale deed dated 22.04.1992 executed by Akram Ali Khan, the younger brother of the petitioners, he has mentioned the land in question as "agricultural land". The fact that the lands in question are "agricultural lands", is also evident from the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, executed by and between the petitioners an their brothers, which the senior counsel for the petitioners contends, was brought into existence by the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, and the genuineness or otherwise of which, will be considered, later. The assertions made in the sale deeds and Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, that the land in question is "agricultural land", clearly go to show that the land in question is "agricultural land" and did not fall in "urban agglomeration area", when the same was subjected to the declarations under the Land Reforms Act. 31. The aforementioned, admissions and statements made by the petitioners in the declarations filed by them under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and the various registered sale deeds, executed by the petitioners mother, their brothers and petitioner No.2, and the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, clearly go to show that the petitioners are very much conscious that the land in question is an "agricultural land", and did not fall in an "urban agglomeration area", and in fact, they have made the statement that the land in question is an "agricultural land" in the declarations filed under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, with a view to protect the balance land that was allowed to be retained by the Land Reforms Tribunal. The petitioners having made such assertions in the declarations, and having sought the exemption of the application of the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, to the land in question, now cannot be allowed to contend that since the declarations filed are in the nature of written statements in a suit, they are entitled to take different stands. If indeed, the lands in question fell in an "urban agglomeration area" and were not fit for agricultural or horticultural operations, as contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, there was no reason for the petitioners to seek exemption of the land in question from the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, stating that the land is "agricultural land". The petitioners on the one hand say that the lands in question are agricultural and on the other hand contend that they are not agricultural, but fall in an "urban agglomeration area" 32. The petitioners on the one hand say that the lands in question are agricultural and on the other hand contend that they are not agricultural, but fall in an "urban agglomeration area" 32. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that even though the land in question, in the revenue records, is recorded as "agricultural land", but since the same is a vacant land, not capable of being used for the purposes of agriculture, it will come under the provisions of both the Land Reforms Act and the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and since the Urban Land Ceiling Act had already come into force w.e.f. 17.02.1976, the Land Reforms Tribunal, had no jurisdiction to deal with the declarations filed by the petitioners, their mother and brothers under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, and pass orders dated 31.08.1976. This contention of the petitioners has to be examined in the light of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P., particularly, the observations of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J, on which the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, placed heavy reliance. In Tumati Rangayya v. State of A.P., what the Full Bench of this Court, speaking through O. Chinnappa Reddy, J, held was that the State Act (Land Reforms Act) applies to all the land which is used or is capable of being used for agricultural and allied purposes, while the Central Act (Urban Land Ceiling Ac) applies to all the vacant land in an urban agglomeration, barring land mainly used for purpose of agriculture, shown in the revenue of land records as such, and not specified in the master plan for a purpose of other than agriculture. From these observations of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J, in the Full Bench judgment, would make it clear that agricultural land in an "urban agglomeration area", which is used mainly for the purpose of agriculture and shown in the revenue of land records as such, and not specified in the master plan for a purpose of other than agriculture, is excluded from the definition of "vacant land", as defined in the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The observations, on which the learned senior counsel relied, rather than helping the petitioners, help the respondents, inasmuch as on the date when the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, the land in question was "agricultural land", and in fact, it was recorded as such, in the revenue records, and was not included in the master plan of "urban agglomeration area", and as such, it continued to be "agricultural land", even after the Urban Land Ceiling Act, came into force. Therefore, it has to be held that, when the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act and when the Land Reforms Tribunal passed the order dated 31.08.1976, the lands in question, were "agricultural lands" and did not fall in an "urban agglomeration area", and therefore, the provisions of the Land Reforms Act were applicable, and as such, the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction, and therefore, a nullity and void ab initio. 33. There can be no quarrel on the proposition of law laid down by the apex Court in Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu v. Udavumkarankal23, Hira Lal v. Kalinath24 and State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar25, on which the learned senior counsel for the petitioners placed reliance to contend that a judicial order is void if the jurisdictional infirmity is fundamental and that an order or decree passed by a Tribunal or Court lacking inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity and ab initio void, and equally there can be no dispute that defects of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent or waiver, and the law laid down by the apex Court in that regard in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai, and Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh, but since this Court has found that the Land Reforms Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass the order dated 31.08.1976, the question of considering the effect of the said judgments to the case on hand, had become redundant. In re Question No.2: WHEN THE LAND IN QUESTION CAME TO FALL UNDER AN "URBAN AGGLOMERATION LAND" 34. In re Question No.2: WHEN THE LAND IN QUESTION CAME TO FALL UNDER AN "URBAN AGGLOMERATION LAND" 34. The fact that the land in question, on 14.04.1975 and 16.09.1976, when the petitioners filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act and Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and on 31.08.1976, when the Land Reforms Tribunal, adjudicated the declarations of the declarants, including the petitioners and passed common order, declaring the surplus land, was "agricultural land" and not vacant land, falling in an "urban agglomeration area", has become crystal clear from the findings recorded in the preceding paragraphs. But it may be noticed as to from what date, the land in question became "vacant land", falling in an "urban agglomeration area". Since the land in question, when the Urban Land Ceiling Act, came into force, was "agricultural land", there was no need for the petitioners, their mother and brothers to file declarations under Section 6(1) thereof, however, they filed the declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. However, considering the need to develop the fringes of the twin cities, and to de-populate the crowding cities, the Government have issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, Municipal Administration, dated 23.06.1980, bringing the lands in question, which are situated in Bachupalli village, under the master plan - "urban agglomeration area" i.e. "conservation use zone". Therefore, obviously, prior to the said date, thelands in question, were "agricultural lands". It is only w.e.f. 23.06.1980, the lands in question became "vacant land" falling in an "urban agglomeration area". The provisions of Rule 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976, provide that declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, have to be filed within 212 days. The petitioners, their mother and brothers, therefore, having regard to the provisions of Rule 3 of the said Rules, were under an obligation to file declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, within 212 days from thedate when the land in question became urban land, i.e. only w.e.f. 23.06.1980, when the government issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., to that effect, and as held by the apex Court in State of A.P. v. N. Audikesava Reddy. Further, the government have issued another order in G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., to that effect, and as held by the apex Court in State of A.P. v. N. Audikesava Reddy. Further, the government have issued another order in G.O. Ms. No. 362, M.A., dated 06.07.1994, changing the land use of the land in question from "conservation zone", to public and semi public use/residential use/conservation use/industrial use zones. In view of the above orders issued by the government, it has to be held and is held so that the land in question became "vacant land" falling in an "urban agglomeration area" only w.e.f. 23.06.1980, and prior thereto, it was on "agricultural land", and in view of the said G.Os., the petitioners, their mother and brothers, were under an obligation to file declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, only after 23.06.1980, an not an earlier date, as was done by the declarants, when the Urban Land Ceiling Act, came into force. In re Question No.3: SURRENDER PROCEEDINGS - (A) NON-SERVICE OF NOTICES 35. Though the record produced by the respondent No.1-government does not contain all the notices issued to the declarants post-Land Reforms Tribunal order, for surrender of the excess land, the fact remains, a perusal of the same would disclose that pursuant to the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Act, the authorities issued notice dated 07.09.1976 under Rule 7(1) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act to the declarants, and in fact, it was also issued to petitioner No.2, namely Qudsia Sajjad, and the same was received by her daughter Maleesha Sajjad. By the said notice, the declarants were called upon to surrender the excess land above the ceiling limit on or before 22.09.1976. The notice was also taken out by way of tom tom in the village, and this is evident from the correspondence addressed by the Mandal Revenue Officer to the Revenue Divisional Officer. Probably, having received similar notices, two declarants, namely Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, the brothers of the petitioners, filed a memo, on behalf of themselves as well as their mother and others (petitioners) before the Land Reforms Tribunal for surrender of the excess land on 04.10.1976, which was signed by their Advocate also. In the said memo, they have submitted as follows: 1. In the said memo, they have submitted as follows: 1. The declarants have to surrender lands as per the common orders of this Hon'ble Tribunal passed in the above cases on 31.08.1976. 2. The declarants are surrendering the land particulars of which are given in the annexed proforma. This Hon'ble Tribunal may sub-divide the lands of each declarant to be surrendered out of the said lands. The total area of the lands given in the annexed area is equal to 4.2951 standard holdings which are to be surrendered by all the five declarants. 3. The declarants will divide the remaining lands among themselves according to their permitted standard holdings. It is therefore prayed that the above said lands be accepted as surrendered and compensation of the same may be paid to each declarant according to the area which each declarant has to surrender. 36. To the above said memo, and as stated therein, they have annexed Form-VI, indicating the particulars of lands which they proposed to surrender, and even on the said annexure, the brothers of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, have put their signatures. A reading of the contents of the said memo would disclose that all the five declarants have proposed and agreed to jointly surrender an extent of Ac.214.76 cents in different survey numbers, namely Sy. No.270, 284 to 287 and 289 to 297 in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. Thereafter, public notice dated 15.10.1976 under Rule 7(4) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act, was issued calling upon persons interested to file their objections, if any, for surrender of the excess land determined. The Tahsildar, Medchal Taluq, prepared sketches and maps of the lands that are to be taken possession of, and communicated the same to the Revenue Divisional Officer. As no objections were received from any quarter, the Land Reforms Tribunal, vide order dated 03.11.1976, requested the Assistant Collector, Hyderabad Eastern Division, to take necessary action for taking possession of the surplus land. As no objections were received from any quarter, the Land Reforms Tribunal, vide order dated 03.11.1976, requested the Assistant Collector, Hyderabad Eastern Division, to take necessary action for taking possession of the surplus land. Pursuant to the said order, the record discloses, that the Assistant Collector, issued orders in Form IX, dated 11.11.1976 under Rule 8(1) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act, to take possession of the lands surrendered or deemed to be surrender Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act, and directed the declarants to deliver possession of the same to the officer mentioned therein, namely the Revenue Inspector, Dundigal Circle. This order was served on all the declarants, as is evident from the signatures, affixed by them in acknowledgment thereof, on the backside of the same, on different dates. In terms of the said order of the Assistant Collector, the Revenue Inspector, Dundigal Circle, took possession of the surplus lands under cover of panchanama, signed by three witnesses, which includes the Sarpanch and two other persons of the village. The possession of the lands having been taken by the Revenue Inspector, Dundigal Circle, the Tahsildar, Medchal Taluq, addressed letter in A4/4113/76, dated 25.11.1976, informing him about the taking over of possession of the surplus land from the declarants, including the petitioners, and also enclosing copies of Form IX and X orders and original panchanama. That is how the land in an extent of Ac. 214.76 in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal came to be surrendered by the five declarants, including the petitioners, and stood vested in the government. The factum of surrender of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, is admitted by petitioner No.2 in the sale deeds executed by her in favour of her vendees, and it would be appropriate to refer to one such sale deed dated 27.03.1996, executed by her in favour of one Gottumukkala Jagga Raju, wherein she admitted about the surrender and retainable area in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal, the Deed of Family Settlement and mutation proceedings before the Mandal Revenue Officer. The factum of surrender and vesting of land in the government, is evident from the faisal patti for the year 1978-79, which records the name of the government against the surrendered lands. The factum of surrender and vesting of land in the government, is evident from the faisal patti for the year 1978-79, which records the name of the government against the surrendered lands. In fact, the petitioners have themselves in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, in para 5, while referring to the applications dated 26.11.2005 for regularization of their lands in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, have stated "It is submitted here that we also have other lands apart from the above lands in the village and the same have already been vested in the State Government". However, in the reply affidavits filed to the counters of the respondents, they have surprisingly taken a contradictory stand stating that they have not surrendered any land, and that the respondents, have misread their statement. The vesting of some other lands in the government, referred to by the petitioners in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, obviously refer to those that were surrendered by them in terms of the order dated 31.07.1976, for there was no occasion for the petitioners, to surrender any land in favour of the government, under any other proceedings. 37. The question as to from which date the surplus surrendered land would stand vested in the government was considered by the apex Court in D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officers26. The apex Court, having considered the said question in the light of the provisions of Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act and Rule 8 of the Rules made thereunder, held thus: The surplus land which is surrendered or deemed to have been surrendered shall vest in the State on communication of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over possession of such land to the owner/holder/occupier of the said land. The word 'thereupon' in Section 11 refers to such order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The order in form 'IX' and the manner in which the said order will be served on the owner are prescribed in sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 8. The provisions incorporated in sub-rules (3) to (7) of the said Rule are steps to be taken after the surplus land has vested in the State. The order in form 'IX' and the manner in which the said order will be served on the owner are prescribed in sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 8. The provisions incorporated in sub-rules (3) to (7) of the said Rule are steps to be taken after the surplus land has vested in the State. Vesting of the surplus land in the State is not dependent on taking over physical possession of the land which maybe immediately after vesting or sometimes subsequent thereto. Such a conclusion emanates from a harmonious construction of the provisions in Section 11 and Rule 8 and it is in accord with the object and purpose of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 38. In the instant case, as stated supra, orders in Form IX were served on the petitioners, their mother and brothers, and in fact, the brothers of the petitioners, on their behalf and on behalf of their mother and the petitioners, have after receipt of notice under Rule 7(1) of the Rules made the Land Reforms Act, calling upon them to surrender the surplus land, have filed an affidavit, on 04.10.1976 proposing to and agreeing to jointly surrender the land in terms of the order dated 31/08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, and possession of the land was taken by the Assistant Collector on 23.11.1976 through the Revenue Inspector, Dundigal Circle, under cover of panchanama, and since then the same stood absolutely vested in the government free from all encumbrances, as is evident from the faisal patti of the year 1978-79, which recorded the name of the government against the surrendered lands. 39. The petitioners, neither in the main writ petition nor in the application seeking substitution of prayer, have pleaded about the non-issuance and non- service of notices under the Land Reforms Act. They have only taken an objection in the replies filed by them to the counters of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 stating that as to how the notices could be served on the petitioners, who were residing elsewhere, and that if the notices were not able to be served, they should be served under certificate of posting. In this context, a reference be made to the judgment of the apex Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. V. State of Gujarat, wherein what would be the effect of the allegation of non-compliance of statutory provision and rule by the State, was considered. In this context, a reference be made to the judgment of the apex Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. V. State of Gujarat, wherein what would be the effect of the allegation of non-compliance of statutory provision and rule by the State, was considered. The apex Court having considered the said question, held thus: It is not enough to allege that a particular rule or any provision has not been complied with. It is a requirement of good pleading to give details, i.e. particulars as to why it is alleged that there is non-compliance with a statutory requirement. Ordinarily, no notice can be taken on such an allegation which is devoid of any particulars. No issue can be raised on a plea the foundation of which is lacking. Even where rule nisi is issued, it is not always for the department to justify its action when the court finds that a plea has been advanced without any substance, though ordinarily the department may have to place its full cards before the court. In the present case, in the absence of any allegation that Rule 3 had not been complied and there being no particulars in respect of non-compliance of Rule 4 also, it is difficult to see as to how the High Court could have reached the finding that statutory requirements contained in these Rules were not fulfilled before issuance of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The High Court did not give any reason as to why it reached the conclusion that Rules 3 and 4 had not been complied in the face of the record of the case. Rather, it returned a finding which is unsustainable that it was "not possible on the basis of the material on record to hold that there was compliance with Rules 3 and 4. It is not necessary to set out in any detail as to how requirements of Rule 4 have been complied when in presence of the relevant record it was difficult for the respondent to contend otherwise. It was conceded that there was no specific averment relating to Rule 3. Even otherwise, the stipulations contained in Rule 3 were fully observed. As regards non-compliance of Rule 4 it was submitted that there was no independent report of the Collector. That is also not correct. It was conceded that there was no specific averment relating to Rule 3. Even otherwise, the stipulations contained in Rule 3 were fully observed. As regards non-compliance of Rule 4 it was submitted that there was no independent report of the Collector. That is also not correct. It is not necessary for the Collector personally to examine all the details himself. 40. According to the own admission of the petitioners, they having been married, at the relevant point of time, never lived at Bachupally. That petitioner No.1 was resided at Bombay, while petitioner No. 2 resided at Gauhati, Assam. That both of them are highly educated. That petitioner No.1 is a housewife, while petitioner No.2, who is a Doctor, is presently in London, and that she moved from place to place along with her husband, who was working in the Railways, in a very high position. Admittedly, a perusal of the notices disclose that the respondents have taken out notices to the addresses mentioned by the declarants in the declarations i.e. Bachupally/Ameerpet. It is not their case that they had mentioned the addresses of the places where they were residing, and yet the respondents have not served notices on them at the places where they were residing. In fact, the record shows that the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, is a common order, and notices at every stage, were issued to the individuals, and were sent to the addresses mentioned by them in the declarations, and therefore, the petitioners cannot be allowed to contend that they are not aware of the surrender proceedings or that the surrender proceedings initiated by the authorities, are bad because of non- service of notices on the persons properly, and that if the individuals were not present, the notices were required to be served on them under certificate of posting. (B) - PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION 41. (B) - PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION 41. After taking over of possession of the land in an extent of Ac.214.76 cents by the Government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal from the petitioners, their mother and brothers on 23.11.1976, the record discloses that notice dated 05.01.1978 in Form 12, under Rule 12(1) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act, calling upon the declarants, including the petitioners to appear before the Land Reforms Tribunal on 25.01.1978 at 11.00 A.M. for determination of the compensation payable for the surrendered surplus lands. On the same day, another notice in Form 13, under Rule 12(2) of the Rules made under the Land Reforms Act, was issued to the declarants, calling upon them to submit their claims for compensation for the surrendered surplus lands. An errata was requested to be issued in respect of the declarants by the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer. Thereafter, notices were issued calling upon the declarants to receive the compensation amount. Ultimately, on 18.09.1987, the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Reforms Tribunal, addressed a letter to the Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, authorizing the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, for withdrawing the compensation amount payable to the declarants under Call Deposit Receipts - Rabia Begum an amount of Rs.737/- vide CDR No. C-293639- 30-90, dated 24.10.1980; Ahsan Ali Khan and Akram Ali Khan, an amount of Rs.5,000/- each vide CDR Nos. C-293637-30-88, dated 24.07.1980 and C-293640- 30/91, dated 24.07.1980 respectively; and the petitioners, namely Tahera Yousuf Kadri and Qudsia Sajjad, an amount of Rs.1,620/- each, vide CDR Nos. C-293649- 30/100, dated 24.07.1980 and C/293636-30-87, dated 24.07.1980 respectively. It is the contention of the senior counsel for the petitioners that no material is produced by respondent No.1 to show that the petitioners have authorized their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan to receive compensation on their behalf. No doubt, there is no material produced by respondent No.1 to show that the petitioners had authorized their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan to receive the compensation on their behalf, but the fact remains, the record produced by respondent No.1 shows that the amounts mentioned in the above-mentioned CDRs were paid to the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, under receipts dated 18.09.1987, in the presence of the witnesses, who have put their signatures on the receipts. The factum of payment of compensation by the authorities and the receipt thereof by the declarants, was identified by their Advocate, Sri. N. Durga Reddy, who filed vakalat on their behalf before the Land Reforms Tribunal. The petitioners having surrendered the land surplus land jointly, and having received the compensation, as evidenced above, now cannot be allowed to contend that they have not received any compensation. The petitioners have taken the plea of non-payment of compensation only when respondent No.1 produced the record to show that compensation. In fact, the compensation was paid to and was received by the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, who in fact, being the eldest member of the family, was representing before all the forums, even though on behalf of petitioner No.2, her younger brother Akram Ali Khan, had filed the declaration under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. 42. In the above view of the matter, it is held that the declarants, which include the petitioners also, have surrendered the land jointly in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and the same also stood absolutely vested in the government w.e.f. 23.11.1976, on which date the possession of the land was taken, that notices, in fact, were issued to the declarants prior to the surrender, and that compensation was also paid to all the declarants. In re Question No. 4: DEED OF FAMILY SETTLEMENT - GENUINENESS 44. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners contends that the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992 was brought into existence by their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan and that they signed the same because their elder brother namely Akram Ali Khan signed, and that the same cannot be believed, because the extent of land owned by them, which is mentioned as Ac. 538.00 is more than what they really owned. Admittedly, the petitioners have not disclosed about the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992 in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. However, curiously, they have taken the plea of their brother Ahsan Ali Khan, bringing this into existence, only in reply to the stand taken by the respondents in their counters. Admittedly, the petitioners have not disclosed about the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992 in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. However, curiously, they have taken the plea of their brother Ahsan Ali Khan, bringing this into existence, only in reply to the stand taken by the respondents in their counters. Be that as it may, the genuineness or otherwise of this Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, has to be examined, in the light of the overall facts and circumstances of the case, particularly, the affidavit filed by the petitioners and their brothers before the Mandal Revenue Officer, mutation proceedings, the sale deeds executed by them in favour of third parties. May be the extent of the land owned by them is mentioned as Ac.538.00, which is more than what they really owned and possessed, but that by itself would not make it unbelievable. According to the own admission of the petitioners, they signed the Deed of Family Settlement, but it is their case that they signed it because their elder brother Akram Ali Khan had signed it. Whether they have signed it on their own or because their elder brother Akram Ali Khan had signed it, but the fact remains, the petitioner indeed had signed it. The petitioners claim that they are highly educated people, and in fact, they are so, and they not being illiterate people, it would be difficult for one to believe that they would have signed the Deed of Family Settlement blindly without reading and verifying the contents thereof, and more so when it sought to partition the joint family properties and confer some property thereof in them. The petitioners having signed the Deed of Family Settlement, cannot now resile and contend that their eldest brother had brought the same into existence. 45. The genuineness of the Deed of Family Settlement cannot be doubted because the same was executed by and between the brothers of the petitioners as "First Party" and the petitioners as "Second Party" on 22.04.1992, i.e. nearly two years after the death of their mother, namely Smt. Rabia Begum on 30.10.1990. In the Deed of Family Settlement, the First and Second Parties have stated that her mother, namely Rabia Begum, who was the owner, possessor and pattedar of dry agricultural land in all Ac. 538.00 in Sy. Nos. In the Deed of Family Settlement, the First and Second Parties have stated that her mother, namely Rabia Begum, who was the owner, possessor and pattedar of dry agricultural land in all Ac. 538.00 in Sy. Nos. 270, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 306, 307, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316 and 317 in Bachupally village, was declared surplus holder of land an extent of Ac. 214.76 cents, and the remaining extent of Ac.238.31 cents came to them as standard holding for all of them, that their mother Smt. Rabia Begum, who was assessed surplus in an extent of Ac.214.76 cents by the Land Reforms Tribunal, vide its proceedings dated 31.08.1976, had surrendered the same, and that out of the balance extent of land i.e. Ac.238.31 cents, an extent of Ac.68.34 cents was sold by them on various dates and that still there remains an extent of Ac.169.37 cents, and that after the death of their mother, her share also devolved upon them. That they have mutually settled to the division of the remaining land of Ac.169.37 cents in four shares. 46. As per the division agreed to by the First and Second Parties, the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, was allotted land in an extent of Ac.48.22 cents in the survey numbers as detailed in Schedule "A" annexed thereto, while their elder brother, namely Akram Ali Khan and his children, were allotted land in an extent of Ac. 51.38 cents in the survey numbers, as detailed in Schedule "B" annexed thereto. Qudsia Sajjad, petitioner No.2 herein and her children, were allotted land in an extent of Ac. 34.11 cents, in the survey number as detailed in Schedule "C" annexed thereto, while Smt. Tahera Kadri, petitioner No. 1 herein and her children, were allotted land in an extent of Ac. 35.16 cents in the survey numbers, as detailed in Schedule "D" annexed thereto. The manner in which the joint family properties were divided between the First and Second Parties and their children, clearly shows that the same was divided as per muslim law, and therefore, it cannot be disbelieved. 47. 35.16 cents in the survey numbers, as detailed in Schedule "D" annexed thereto. The manner in which the joint family properties were divided between the First and Second Parties and their children, clearly shows that the same was divided as per muslim law, and therefore, it cannot be disbelieved. 47. Another reason, not to disbelieve the Deed of Family Settlement, is that the brothers of the petitioners and the petitioners, have jointly made a representation dated 06.06.2002 to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Qutbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, enclosing copy of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal, Death Certificate of their Mother and Deed of Family Settlement, stating that their mother Smt. Rabia Begum, who expired on 30.10.1990, was pattadar of the lands in Sy. Nos. 284B, 285A, 288, 289A, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 306, 307, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316 and 317, and that they have partitioned the lands, and requested him to transfer the lands in their respective names as pattadars as per the Partition Deed i.e. Deed of Family Settlement. In fact, Ahsan Ali Khan, the eldest brother of the petitioners also sworn to an affidavit stating that they are in possession of the lands and that they have applied for mutation of their names in the revenue records. Acting on the said representation of the petitioners, the Mandal Revenue Officer, after calling for enquiry report dated 14.09.1992 from the Mandal Revenue Inspector vide proceedings dated 16.09.1992 ordered for mutation of names of the brothers of the petitioners and the petitioners against the lands that fell to their respective shares in the revenue records. It appears that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, altogether were holding an extent of Ac.463.60 cents in various survey numbers i.e., out of which they surrender an extent of Ac.214.76 cents in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and there remained an extent of land in an extent of Ac. 248.50 cents, and some portion thereof having been sold by the mother and brothers of the petitioners, the balance extent of land, was divided by the petitioners and their brothers after the death of their mother, as is evident from the Deed of Settlement dated 22.4.1992. 248.50 cents, and some portion thereof having been sold by the mother and brothers of the petitioners, the balance extent of land, was divided by the petitioners and their brothers after the death of their mother, as is evident from the Deed of Settlement dated 22.4.1992. Therefore, the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, executed by the petitioners and their brothers, cannot be said to be ingenuine, and more so when the petitioners, who claim to be highly educated, have also signed it. In re Question No.5: WHETHER ORDER DATED 21.07.2004 PASSED BY THE SPECIAL OFFICER AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE URBAN LAND CEILING ACT AGAINST RABIA BEGUM - A DEAD PERSON, IS VOID 48. It is the contention of the senior counsel for the petitioners that the order dated 21.07.2004 passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, is a void order, in that it has been passed against a dead person. According to the petitioners, they, their mother and brothers, filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act on 16.09.1976. The record relating to the Urban Land Ceiling proceedings produced before this Court, that after the petitioners, their mother and filed declarations, notices were issued to them calling upon them to appear before the Competent Authority for enquiry. However, it appears that the petitioners, their mother and brothers did not respond, and this is evident from the fact, that notices were issued to them in succession. The notices dated 18.01.1977, 11.08.1980, 19.11.1983 and 09.03.1997, which are found in the record produced by respondent Nos. 1 to 3, negative the stand taken by the counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5 that the petitioners had got the declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act inserted stealthily in the files. Whatever may be the reason, the fact remains, declarations filed by the petitioners, their mother and brothers, remained unattended, and it is the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that since there was no response to the notices, they did not take further action. Rabia Begum, the mother of the petitioners, admittedly, died on 30.10.1990. However, neither the petitioners nor their brothers brought this fact to the notice of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that since there was no response to the notices, they did not take further action. Rabia Begum, the mother of the petitioners, admittedly, died on 30.10.1990. However, neither the petitioners nor their brothers brought this fact to the notice of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, in relation to some other lands, that there were large extents of land in Bachupalli, and that no declarations were filed in relation thereto, including the land in question, that the Special Officer and Competent Authority, had initiated suo motu proceedings, and on the basis of the entries in the revenue records, particularly the chouphasla of the year 1977-78, which reflected the name of Rabia Begum, had issued notice dated 26.07.2003 calling upon Rabia Begum, to file declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is their further case that the factum of the petitioners, their mother and brothers filing declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, was not brought to the notice of the Special Officer and Competent Authority, and in those circumstances, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, had issued such a notice. Obviously, as the mother of the petitioners died, she could not respond to the said notice, and eventually, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, has passed the order dated 21.07.2004, treating the entire land as belonging to Rabia Begum, without knowing that the petitioners, their mother and brothers, had already surrendered an extent of Ac.214.76 of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and in the remaining extent of land, the petitioners, their mother and brothers were also entitled to shares, as is evident from the declarations filed by them under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. 49. The petitioners, their mother and brothers have made a joint surrender of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. Thereafter, after the death of the mother of the petitioners, the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, was entered into by and between the petitioners and their brothers. 49. The petitioners, their mother and brothers have made a joint surrender of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. Thereafter, after the death of the mother of the petitioners, the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, was entered into by and between the petitioners and their brothers. On the strength of the said Deed of Family Settlement, they got their names mutated in the revenue records, in respect of the lands that fell to their share in the family division, as evidenced by the proceedings issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned. In fact, there are also protected tenants in respect of the land in question, who filed an application in W.P.M.P. No. 21709 of 2008, seeking to implead them as party- respondents in the present writ petition, claiming that their father was recognized and recorded as Protected Tenant under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, and therefore, they are proper and necessary parties to the writ petition. However, it is unfortunate to note that the Special Officer and Competent Authority, without looking into the revenue records, and without issuing any notices to the petitioners and their brothers as also the protected tenants, who are persons interested in the land, has issued the order dated 21.07.2004, against Rabia Begum, the mother of the petitioners, who is a dead person, by treating the entire land as belonging to her. As the petitioners, their brothers and protected tenants, were persons interested in the land, it was incumbent upon the Special Officer and Competent Authority to issue notices to them and call for their objections, but he has not issued any such notices calling for the objections of the interested persons. What would be the effect of non-issuance of notices to the persons interested in the land, was considered by a learned Judge of this Court in M/s. L.S. & Co. v. State27. The learned Judge having considered the said question in the light of the scheme of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, held as follows: The scheme of the Act contemplates issuance of notice and hearing of objections of the persons furnishing the statements and all other interested persons. The Act gives such a protection to all the concerned at every stage of the proceedings. The Act gives such a protection to all the concerned at every stage of the proceedings. After all any decision of the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the provisions of the said Act are fraught with serious consequences in respect of the urban property. Rights in immovable properties cannot be allowed to be adjudicated by the quasi-judicial authorities like the Special Officer and Competent Authority in a casual and perfunctory manner. The scheme of the Act and particularly Sections 8 and 9 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder would show that the procedure to be adopted by the Special Officer and Competent Authority is to be reasonable and fair. The scheme of the Act ensures an elaborate hearing by the Special Officer and Competent Authority in adjudication by the statements filed by the persons holding the vacant land. Any deviation in this regard would have to be viewed very seriously. There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the whole decision making process in the instant case is totally vitiated. The 2nd respondent was under the statutory obligation to issue and serve notices upon the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner herein before disposing of the statements filed by the 4th respondent. Non-issuance of notice and its service upon interested persons is fatal. 50. Since the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, is without notice to the petitioners and their brothers and also the Protected Tenants, having regard to the above judgment of this Court, the same is liable to be set aside. In fact, it is brought to the notice of this Court by the Protected Tenants, who sought to implead themselves in the writ petition that assailing the above order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, they filed appeal before the Commissioner of Land Administration, who vide order dated 05.01.2008, set aside the same, and directed the Special Officer and Competent Authority to give reasonable opportunity of being heard the Protected Tenants, and pass appropriate orders on the objections directed to be filed. However, the factum of the said order dated 21.07.2002 having been set aside by the Commissioner of Land Administration, was not brought to the notice by any of the respondents. 51. However, the factum of the said order dated 21.07.2002 having been set aside by the Commissioner of Land Administration, was not brought to the notice by any of the respondents. 51. Be that as it may, since the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, is against a dead person, it is stated by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in their counter that "The entire process undertaken by the 3rd respondent is contrary to the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and thereby the orders passed by the 3rd respondent in proceedings No. G1/485/202, dated 21.07.2004 are non est in the eye of law to the extent of including the lands already surrendered by her under the Land Reforms Act. Apart from the above, suo motu proceedings initiated by the competent authority are also illegal, since Smt. Rabia Begum has died by the time Sec. 6(2) notice dated 26.07.2003 was issued and in ignorance of the declarations filed by the petitioners and others. In fact, a statement is also made by the learned Advocate General representing them at the bar, that the proceedings initiated by the Special Officer and Competent Authority i.e. issuance of notice dated 26.07.2003 and passing of final order by him on 21.07.2004 are non est in the eye of law". In view of this stand taken by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the counter filed by them, the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, treating the entire land in question as belonging to Rabia Begum, and determining her standard holding and surplus land, and having regard to the fact that the same came to be issued without issuing notices to persons in possession and persons interested in the land, and in violation of the procedure contemplated under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which was already set aside by the Commissioner of Land Administration, vide orders dated 05.01.2008 passed by him on the appeal filed by the Protected Tenants against the order of the Special Officer and Competent Authority, the said order as well as the consequential proceedings initiated in that regard, including issuance of gazette notification, are declared as void. In re Question No. 6: WHETHER PETITIONERS SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE FRESH DECLARATIONS UNDER THE LAND REFORMS ACT 52. As stated above, the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, and after adjudication, the Land Reforms Tribunal, has also passed the order dated 31.08.1976, determining the extent of surplus lands held by them, which the declarants having surrendered, stood vested in the government free from all encumbrances w.e.f. 23.11.1976, when the Assistant Collector, in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, had taken possession of the land. Though the petitioners, their mother and brothers were not under an obligation to file declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, yet they filed declarations thereunder. When the petitioners filed declarations under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the land in question was an "agricultural land", and as such, the provisions thereof, were not applicable to them. The obligation of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, to file declarations under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, had arisen only w.e.f. 23.06.1980, when the government have issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., bringing the land in question under an "urban agglomeration area". However, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, without knowing that the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, has suo motu taken up proceedings on the basis of report of the Mandal Revenue Officer, has passed orders dated 21.07.2004 against Rabia Begum, the mother of the petitioners, who died long back. Now that the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, for the reasons recorded on Question No. 5, has declared the same as void, and now that the Urban Land Ceiling Act, has since been repealed, and the lands of the petitioners, their mother and brothers, having already been subjected to ceiling under the Land Reforms Act, in 1976, there is no need for the petitioners to once again file declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act. In re Question No.7: DELAY AND LACHES/ACQUISENCE OR WAIVER /SUPPRESSION OF FACTS 53. In re Question No.7: DELAY AND LACHES/ACQUISENCE OR WAIVER /SUPPRESSION OF FACTS 53. The law is well settled that there is no limitation prescribed for the High Courts to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. However, such a power cannot be exercised in favour of a person who does not approach the Courts with expedition for the relief and allows things to happen and the approaches the Court and put forwards a claim, which by then stands already settled and becomes stale28. The doctrine of laches or delay is not a rigid doctrine, which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights, the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. Therefore, whether or not a party is entitled to grant of relief, despite delay and laches, has to be considered on the basis of the facts and circumstances appearing in each case, the conduct of the parties and the effect that it would have on the already settled issues if the writ petition is entertained and the relief is granted. The statement of law, as summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, on the issue of delay and laches, at Para 911, Page 395, reads as follows: 54. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. 55. Article 14 is one of the fundamental rights of the citizen and basic structure of the Constitution. The apex Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India29, even though found that the State action was unconstitutional as it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, yet refused to grant relief to the petitioner therein on the ground that he filed the writ petition after lapse of more than five months after acceptance of the tender and that by that time, unofficial respondents had already acquired the land and constructed the distillery by spending huge sums of money. The apex Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, considered the question of laches and delay, and held as follows: Now it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The right of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor, which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 56. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor, which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 56. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar30, the apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, which directed the State of Maharashtra to pay compensation to the petitioner, who made a claim after 20 years, holding thus: Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the Government agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it. Thus, when the writ petitioner was guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or undue delay disentitled the writ petitioner for discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtually no attempt had been made by the writ petitioner to explain his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches. 57. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh31, the apex Court, refused to grant relief of the extended age of superannuation from 58 years to 60, as was granted to similarly placed persons, on the ground that the petitioners therein, filed the writ petition two years after their retirement, after receiving the retrial benefits, and after noticing the favourbale judgment granted in favour of similarly placed persons, inter alia holding: The respondents are guilty of delay and laches since they have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussion on the financial management of the Nigam. Why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence. 58. Further, the apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi32, held that even if an order is void, the same need not be set at naught, if the party does not approach the court within a reasonable time. The apex Court held as follows: Under the scheme of the Act, after the possession of the land was taken either under Section 17(2) or Section 16, the land stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, there is no provision under the Act to divest the title which was validly vested in the State. When there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and declarations under Section 6. 59. It is in the light of this settled law, the question as to whether there is delay and laches, acquisence/waiver and suppression of facts, on the part of the petitioners, has to be considered. 60. The Land Reforms Tribunal passed order on the declarations on 31.08.1976. The petitioners, their mother and brothers admittedly, have not preferred any appeal assailing the said order before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal. In pursuance of the said order, they have also jointly surrendered the land. 60. The Land Reforms Tribunal passed order on the declarations on 31.08.1976. The petitioners, their mother and brothers admittedly, have not preferred any appeal assailing the said order before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal. In pursuance of the said order, they have also jointly surrendered the land. There is also mention of the factum of surrender of the land in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal in the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, which was executed by and between the petitioners and their brothers, with regard to division of the remaining land. These facts clearly go to show that the petitioners are very much aware of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. 61. The petitioners, though in the writ petition, initially brought the factum of their filing declarations under the Land Reforms Act and the passing of the order dated 31.08.1976 by the Land Reforms Tribunal on the declarations filed by them and declaring an extent of Ac.214.76 cents, but they did not question the validity of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to pass the same, but they questioned the order dated 26.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, against their mother, as null and void; that the action of the Special Officer and Competent Authority in not passing any orders on the declarations dated 16.09.1976 filed by them in respect of an extent of Ac.67.37 each under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, is arbitrary and illegal, and the action of respondent No.1 in not considering their applications dated 26.11.2005 for regularization of their land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, and on the other hand, their action in issuing G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 26.10.2007, as illegal and arbitrary. 62. As stated above, the petitioners have not prayed the relief of setting aside the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, but they have sought re-delivery of possession of the entire land that was surrendered in terms of the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal, obviously to take advantage of the erroneous inclusion of the entire land in the order dated 21.07.2008, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, as belonging to Rabia Begum, who is a dead person. The petitioners have also not made the Presiding Officer of the Land Reforms Tribunal, who has passed the said order, a party to the writ petition, as is required under the Rules framed under the Land Reforms Act. However, after respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and 6 filing their respective counters bringing the factum of surrender, the petitioners with a view to take advantage of the order dated 26.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which erroneously and unaware of the surrender of the land by the petitioners in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, had included the entire land of the family of the petitioners, as if it belonged to Rabia Begum, had filed an application seeking substitution of the main prayer, so as to question the order dated 26.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, as null and void, the action of respondent No.1 in issuing G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 26.10.207, alienating the land in favour of respondent No.4, which in turn through respondent No.5 had alienated the same in favour of respondent No.,6, as void and consequently to re-deliver the entire extent of land and return the monies paid by the petitioners for regularization with 18% interest per annum, and the same having not been opposed by the respondents, was allowed. 63. In fact, the petitioners neither in the main writ petition nor in the application filed seeking substitution of the prayer, have questioned the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, as being one without jurisdiction. They have introduced the theory of the Land Reforms Tribunal having no jurisdiction to entertain the declarations filed by them under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act because the land fell in an "urban agglomeration area", only after noticing the fact that the order dated 26.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, against a dead person, which is a void order, as admitted to by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 themselves, had included the entire extent of land held by them. This stand taken by the petitioners, clearly shows that the petitioners are not fair in their approach. 64. Admittedly, the petitioners have not disputed about the passing of the order dated 31.08.1976, by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and non-filing of any appeal thereagainst and its attaining finality. This stand taken by the petitioners, clearly shows that the petitioners are not fair in their approach. 64. Admittedly, the petitioners have not disputed about the passing of the order dated 31.08.1976, by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and non-filing of any appeal thereagainst and its attaining finality. In pursuance of the said order, the surrendered land stood absolutely vested in the government w.e.f. 23.11.1976, and the name of the government was also recorded in the revenue records against the surrendered lands, as is evident from the faisal patti of the year 1978-79. 65. The fact that the petitioners remained silent for 32 long years without questioning the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, indicates that they have reconciled with the said order. It is not that the petitioners are illiterate, in fact, they claim to be highly educated people, and they being literate and well-educated, cannot seek any relief. They have not assigned any reason as to why they have not assailed the order dated 31.08.1976 for 32 long years, except stating that they did not surrendered the surplus land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, and this is evident from the fact that the entire extent of land is mentioned in the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, as belonging to Rabia Begum. The said order has been passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority unaware of the surrender made by the declarants under the Land Reforms Act. 66. It appears that the petitioners with a view to take advantage of the erroneous inclusion of the entire land in the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, have disputed the surrender of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, inter alia contending that the said order is without jurisdiction, which plea, this Court negatived. Though the petitioners disputed that they are not aware of the surrender of the land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, the fact remains, the petitioners have knowledge about the surrender, and this is evident from the fact, there is a mention about the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal and the surrender made by them in the Deed of Family Settlement, in pursuance of which, they applied for mutation of their names in the revenue records against their respective shares, and the sale deeds executed by them in favour of third parties, wherein also they have referred to the order passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal and surrender of land made in terms thereof. 67. Further, the petitioners have themselves, in the applications dated 26.11.2005 made by them seeking regularization of their lands in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002, did not claim the entire extent of land, but claimed regularization in respect of the extent of share that fell to them in the Deed of Family Settlement, in the remaining land after surrender. Though the petitioners have knowledge of all these facts, they have not brought them to the notice of the Court when they filed the writ petition, but brought them only when the respondents in the counters pointed out, and that too by way of replies filed thereto. Thus, it is clear that the petitioners despite having knowledge of the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, including the surrender, have not challenged the same, and have filed the present writ petition suppressing the vital material facts. 68. Thus, it is clear that the petitioners despite having knowledge of the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, including the surrender, have not challenged the same, and have filed the present writ petition suppressing the vital material facts. 68. The learned senior counsel tried to justify the delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching the court stating that the petitioners did not surrender the land, that no compensation was paid to them, that the 2nd petitioner has not authorized their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan to receive the compensation, that their eldest brother with a view to defraud and cheat them, had brought the Deed of Family Settlement into existence, and that they would take legal action against him, but the fact remains, the petitioners have not pleaded about the wayward activities and the alleged fraud said to have been played by their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan on the petitioners, either in the main writ petition or the prayer substitution petition or in the reply affidavits filed by them to the counters of the respondents. However, the petitioners admitted the factum of the death of their brother, only when the respondents brought the same to the notice of the Court. The petitioners, knowing that their eldest brother Ahsan Ali Khan had died, yet made such statements. 69. A person invoking equity jurisdiction must come to the court with clean hands. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, the apex Court held that in the grant of equity and discretionary relief, the conduct of the party must be kept in view, and it observed as under: A prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible There is still one more reason why the appellant company should be denied equitable relief under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appellant has not come with clean hands. It has suppressed and concealed material facts from the Court. Though the appellant company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court in exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a court of law is also a court of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into the merits of the matter. 70. To the very same effect is the judgment of the apex Court in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Jaipur Traders Corporation Pvt. Ltd. In the instant case, the petitioners have failed to explain the long delay of 32 years. They having filed an affidavit, surrendering the surplus land jointly in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, as having mentioned of such surrender in the Deed of Family Settlement and various sale deeds, failed to bring the same to the notice of the Court at first instance, and suppressed them, and brought the same only after they were pointed out by the respondents in their counters. The petitioners having failed to explain the long delay, and they have suppressed the vital material facts are not entitled relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In re Question No. 8: ALLOTMENT OF LAND TO RESPONDENT NO. 4-A.P. HOUSING BOARD, TAKEN POSSESSION OF UNDER LAND REFORMS ACT - VIOLATED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 14 OF THEREOF 71. The petitioners having failed to explain the long delay, and they have suppressed the vital material facts are not entitled relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In re Question No. 8: ALLOTMENT OF LAND TO RESPONDENT NO. 4-A.P. HOUSING BOARD, TAKEN POSSESSION OF UNDER LAND REFORMS ACT - VIOLATED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 14 OF THEREOF 71. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the land surrendered and taken possession of under the Land Reforms Act, cannot allotted to respondent No.4 for a consideration, which in turn through respondent No.5 had allotted some portion thereof to respondent No.6 for development, and that such allotment, is violative of the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, which has been enacted to give effect to the provisions of Article 46 of the Directive Provisions of State Policy. It is no doubt true that the Land Reforms Act, has been enacted to give effect to the provisions of the Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy. In the instant case, the joint surrender of land made by the declarants, including the petitioners, and taking over possession of land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, concluded on 23.11.1976, and since then the said land stood absolutely vested in the government free from all encumbrances, and their name was also recorded in the revenue records, as is evident from the faisal patti of the year 1978-79. 72. 72. Though the petitioners contend that the allotment of the said surrender land in favour of respondent No.4 by the government for a consideration, which in turn through respondent No.5 had allotted some portion thereof to respondent No.6, is violative of the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, the fact remains, sub-section (1) thereof provides that the lands so vested shall be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no house sites, or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture for agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, in such manner as may be prescribed, while sub-section (6) which contains a non-obstante clause provides that notwithstanding anything in this Section, the Government may, (i) lease out any land vested in them under the Act for such purposes and on terms and conditions as may be specified by them; or (ii) reserve such land for any common use or benefit of the community. The non- obstante clause contained in sub-section (6) of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act, empowers the Government to make use of the land that is vested in it by leasing out for such purposes on terms and conditions as may be specified or reserve such land for any common use or benefit of the community. 73. Once the land stood vested in the government free from all encumbrances, and the government having become the owner thereof, it is entitled to make use of the same in larger public interest. The land in question, though was taken possession of by the government in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, the fact remains, the same was not made use of by the government immediately. However, considering the fact that the city was growing at a fast past, and there was scarcity of housing, the government have decided to bring the land under "urban agglomeration area" i.e. conservation use zone, and accordingly, they have issued G.O. Ms. No. 391, M.A., bringing the land in question under "urban agglomeration area" w.e.f. 23.06.1980, when the said G.O. was issued. Thereafter, the government has again changed the user of the land by issuing G.O. Ms. No. 362, M.A., dated 06.07.1994, to public and semi public use/residential use/conservation use/industrial use zones, as per Zonal Development Plan of Shambhupur Zone. No. 391, M.A., bringing the land in question under "urban agglomeration area" w.e.f. 23.06.1980, when the said G.O. was issued. Thereafter, the government has again changed the user of the land by issuing G.O. Ms. No. 362, M.A., dated 06.07.1994, to public and semi public use/residential use/conservation use/industrial use zones, as per Zonal Development Plan of Shambhupur Zone. Be that as it may, after reserving the matter for judgment, respondent No.6 filed a memo in USR No. 8017 of 2008, dated 19.09.2008, bringing to the notice of the Court that the Government passed AP Ordinance No.10 of 2008 to amend the Land Reforms Act, which was published in the A.P. Gazette on 16.08.2008, and that by virtue of the said Ordinance, Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act has been amended by introducing new Clause (iii). Thereafter, the State Leghislature passed a Bill, and the same has been published in the A.P. Gazette on 26.08.2008. He has also filed copies of the said Ordinance and amendment. The newly incorporate Clause (iii) empowers the government to utilize/sell such lands in the notified areas of Urban Development Authority/Authorities for infrastructure development or any such public purpose. Therefore, the action of the government in allotting land to respondent No.4- A.P. Housing Board, cannot be faulted, and cannot be said to be violative of the provisions of Section 14 of the Land Reforms Act. In re Question No. 9: WHETHER PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ALLOTMENT OF LAND TO RESPONDENT NO.4 74. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that in the allotment of the surrendered land to respondent No.4, which in turn through respondent No.5 had allotted some portion thereof to respondent No.6, the procedures are not followed, and that the government has given advance possession of the land even before it issued G.O. Ms. No. 1381, dated 26.10.1007 and without following the Rules, obviously with a view to favour respondent No.6. This contention advanced by the petitioners is a larger public interest question, and in fact, is a contention raised in despair. The petitioners have obviously advanced this argument as a last resort knowing fully well about the inherent weaknesses in the case set up by them claiming certain reliefs for themselves. This contention advanced by the petitioners is a larger public interest question, and in fact, is a contention raised in despair. The petitioners have obviously advanced this argument as a last resort knowing fully well about the inherent weaknesses in the case set up by them claiming certain reliefs for themselves. The petitioners, admittedly, in this writ petition, are espousing their personal interest, and they can neither be permitted nor can they suddenly turnaround and adorn the role of a genuine public interest litigant. 75. It is very well settled law and needs no restatement at the hands of this Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Writs, orders, directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto, may be issued for doing substantial justice to the parties. It is, therefore, absolutely essential and necessary that the person approaching the court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing relevant material and seek appropriate relief or reliefs. The Court will be well within its discretion, and in fact, duty bound to dismiss the writ petition, without considering the merits of the claim if there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court. The conduct of the petitioner, who invokes the writ jurisdiction of the Court, has to be taken into consideration, in the matter of granting equitable relief in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the case on hand, as noticed above, in the preceding paragraphs, the petitioners have indulged in suppression of vital material facts, and in fact, made attempts to mislead the Court. The petitioners who have conducted themselves in such a manner, are not entitled to any consideration at the hands of this Court. 76. It is true that even in matters where relief is claimed on the basis of infringement of certain rights, it may partake the nature of a Public Interest Litigation, provided the conduct of the petitioners inspire confidence to examine the issue from the prospective of a Public Interest Litigation. 76. It is true that even in matters where relief is claimed on the basis of infringement of certain rights, it may partake the nature of a Public Interest Litigation, provided the conduct of the petitioners inspire confidence to examine the issue from the prospective of a Public Interest Litigation. It is well settled law that persons approaching the Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation, must come forward with clean hands, clean heart and clean objectives. Persons or groups with a mala fide objective of either for vindication of their personal grievance or by resorting to blackmailing or considerations extraneous to public interest, cannot be permitted to misuse the forum of Public Interest Litigation. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the strategic arm of PIL is never intended to settle personal accounts or resolve private disputes, and it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the Public Interest Litigation process is not abused by unscrupulous litigants. Be that as it may, it is important to notice that respondent No.5 having invited detailed proposals for handling private project from reputing developers/firms/consortiums on 22.5.2007 and having evaluated the proposals selected the respondent No.6 for the development of Integrated Township Project and awarded the contract on 24.8.2007. Therefore, it would be imprudent for this Court to interdict the project at this stage, and that too at the instance of the petitioners, whose conduct is eloquent and speaks for itself. In re Question No. 10: WHETHER NON-MAINTENANCE OF RECORD POST-LAND LAND REFORMS TRIBUNAL ORDER VITIATE SURRENDER PROCEEDINGS 77. The petitioners, have sought to assail the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, after lapse of 32 years. The grievance of the petitioners is not with regard to the steps taken by the Land Reforms Tribunal that preceded its order dated 31.08.1976, but their grievance is with regard to the steps taken by the authorities post-Land Reforms Tribunal's order, i.e. with regard to surrender of land and taking over possession in terms thereof. Respondent No.1, in fact, produced the original record relating to the proceedings that have taken place before the Land Reforms Tribunal. The record produced by the respondents, is completely in a bad shape and in a very precarious condition, and was very difficult to handle. However, they made available a xerox copy of the record, containing the copies/documents, noticed hereinabove, to the Court. The record produced by the respondents, is completely in a bad shape and in a very precarious condition, and was very difficult to handle. However, they made available a xerox copy of the record, containing the copies/documents, noticed hereinabove, to the Court. Even though the record does not contain the entire correspondence that has taken place by and between the petitioners, their mother and brothers on the one hand and the respondents on the other in relation to the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, in particular, the papers relating to each and every individual declarant, but a perusal of the same, the contents of which, were extracted above, in fact, would go to show that post-Land Reform Tribunal's order, the authorities have followed the procedure contemplated under the law, with regard to surrender and taking over possession of the land. 78. The notings recorded by the officers concerned who handled the file, clearly indicate that the officials had dealt with the matter in relation to the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, and performed certain acts. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact, which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Further, a public record, prepared by a Public Officer in discharge of his duties, carries a presumption of correctness. In the case on hand, the undisputed fact remains, the petitioners, their mother and brothers filed declarations under Section 8(1) of the Land Reforms Act, and the Land Reforms Tribunal passed on order dated 31.08.1976, and in terms thereof, surrender proceedings also took place, and stood concluded on 23.11.1976, and the file discloses the faisal patti of the year 1978-79 discloses that the name of the government was also recorded against the surrendered lands, compensation in respect of the surplus surrendered land was also paid to the eldest brother of the petitioners, namely Ahsan Ali Khan, who was identified by an Advocate, under Call Deposit Receipts, and in respect of all these action, the record contains certain documents, throwing a link to the sequence. 79. 79. The further events that took place, namely the execution of the Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992, after the death of Rabia Begum, dividing the properties, which the petitioners signed, though disputed it, and the sale deeds executed by the mother and brothers of the petitioners as also petitioner No.2, in which they made a mention about the surrender of the land in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, clearly go to show that surrender proceedings took place in terms of the said order, and in fact, there was a surrender made by the declarants, as is evident from the affidavit filed before the Land Reforms Tribunal. The admissions made by the petitioners, their mother and brothers, which matches with the record produced before the Court by the respondents, enables one to draw a presumption, as is provided under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that the record produced by them, is a reflection of the official acts performed by them, in taking consequential actions for surrender in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. Therefore, on the ground that the file does not contain all the papers, it cannot be said that the entire consequential surrender proceedings taken in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 of the Land Reforms Tribunal, for surrender of the surplus land, stand vitiated. CONCLUSIONS 80. Taking into consideration, the discussion made above on the basis of the material available on record, this Court arrives at the following irresistible conclusions: 1. The land in question is an "agricultural land", and as such, the Land Reforms Act, alone applies, and therefore, the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, under Section 9 thereof, on the declarations filed by the petitioners, their mother and brothers, is one with jurisdiction. The said order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, attained finality. 2. The land in question, having regard to the judgment of the apex Court in D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officers, stand vested in the State on communication of the order passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal to take over possession of such land to the owner/holder/occupier of the said land. 3. 2. The land in question, having regard to the judgment of the apex Court in D. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officers, stand vested in the State on communication of the order passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal to take over possession of such land to the owner/holder/occupier of the said land. 3. The non-receipt of some notices and payment of compensation, does not vitiate the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Act, and the proceedings initiated thereafter, for surrender of the land, for upon surrender, the land stands absolutely vested in the government. 4. The Deed of Family Settlement dated 22.04.1992 is genuine. 5. The order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority against Rabia Begum, a dead person, is void, not only on that count, but is also liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, in that no notices were issued before passing the same on the persons who are in possession of the land. 6. The correctness or otherwise of allotment of land in favour of respondent No.4, which through respondent No.5 had allotted some portion of the land to respondent No.6, having regard to the judgment of the settled law, cannot be adjudicated at the instance of the petitioners, who have come to the court to espouse their private cause. 7. The petitioners failed to prove that the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, is one without jurisdiction, a nullity and void. They also failed to explain delay and laches, their acquiescence/waiver conduct, and suppressed the material facts. RELIEFS 81. Having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court, the writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: 1. The substituted prayer, prayed for by the petitioners in Clause A(i) - The order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, against Rabia Begum, a dead person, is declared void. The lands to the extent of Ac.214.76 cents, surrendered by the declarants in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, shall stand excluded from the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority. Therefore, they are not entitled to the prayer sought for in Clause A(ii). 2. The lands to the extent of Ac.214.76 cents, surrendered by the declarants in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976, passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, shall stand excluded from the order dated 21.07.2004, passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority. Therefore, they are not entitled to the prayer sought for in Clause A(ii). 2. The prayer sought by the petitioners in Clause A(iii) for restoration of the land, particularly the land already surrendered by them in terms of the order dated 31.08.1976 passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, cannot be granted. However, since the request of the petitioners for regularization of the land under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, has been rejected, respondent No.1-government are directed to return the amount paid by them for regularization of their land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 456, dated 29.07.2002. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.