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Andhra High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 861 (AP)

G. Krishna v. S. Narender Reddy

2008-09-30

NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO

body2008
ORDER This is an appeal preferred by the clalm8nts not being satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded in OP.No.660 of 1997 by tile Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal cum-District judge, Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar, Hyderabad, 2. The claimants-appellants are the parents of G. Ravi Kiran Gaud @ Ravi Kiran who died in a motor accident on 13-4-1997 at 9 a.m. They laid a claim in a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- whereas the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.81,000/- as compensation. Hence this appeal. 3. On Sunday 13-4-1997 at about 9 a.m. when the deceased G. Ravi Kiran Gaud @ Ravi Kiran was proceeding from Nagaram colony to Kushaiguda on a scooter bearing No. AP 10G 9293. a lorry bearing Registration No. APK 7170 came at a high speed coming in the opposite Direction and drive in a rash and negligent manner dashed against the scooter and due to the multiple injuries sustained by Ravi Kiran Goud in the accident he died immediately. The 1st claimant/appellant, father of the deceased had examined him self as P.W.1 while an eye-witness has been examined as P.W.2. They have also marked Exs.A-1 to A-7. The 1 respondent – owner of the vehicle has remained ex parte and did not choose to contest the case. The 2 respondent insurance company has contested the case and got filed copy of the Insurance policy and marked it as EX.B-1 though no witnesses have been examined on its behalf. On the strength and basis of the d8position of P.W2 and Ex.A-l, copy of the FIR and EX. A-2, the charge-sheet, the Tribunal had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the accident had occasioned wholly due to the rash and negligent manner of driving of tile truck by its driver. Therefore, it held the respondents as liable to pay compensation, inasmuch as EX. A-3, tile Motor Vehicle inspection Report carried out on the offending truck has not disclosed any mechanical failure of the brakes of the said vehicle as a causative factor for the accident. While dealing with the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal has noted that the claimants have asserted that that the deceased was a 17 year old student and was assisting his father in toddy business and was earning Rs.1500/- per month. While dealing with the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal has noted that the claimants have asserted that that the deceased was a 17 year old student and was assisting his father in toddy business and was earning Rs.1500/- per month. The Tribunal had not believed this assertion of the claimants that the deceased was earning Rs,1,500/- per month and that he was partaking in toddy business as well. It is not in dispute that the 1 appellant - claimant, the father of the deceased had not filed any material to show that ho was carrying a licence to do toddy business or to establish the income arrived therefrom. There was no material on record to vouch for the income of the father of the deceased, for one to have an idea of possible contribution therein of the deceased. Therefore, taking into reckoning that the deceased was a young student studying only 9 class, it had evaluated his annual contribution to the family at Rs,6,000/- and applied the multiplier 11' as per the principle laid down by this Court in Bhagwandas v. Mohd. Arif, thus working out the compensation payable as Rs.66,000/-, A sum of Rs.15,000/- has also been awarded towards loss of estate and thus the total quantum of compensation 11as been worked out to Rs,81 ,000/-. 4, Before we proceed further in the matter, it is appropriate to notice the contradictions in the claim relating to the age of the deceased. EX.A-1 is the FIR lodged by the father of the deceased, who is none other than the F appellant herein, In his compli1int to the Inspector of Police, Kushaiguda Police Station, he has described the age of the deceased Ravi Kiran Gaud as 16 years. Ex. A-2 is tile charge sheet which also refers to tile age of the deceased to be 16 years. Ex. A-4 is the inquest report. It was prep8red on the date of the accident itself. There is a correction therein, appearing to a naked eye that the age of the deceased was corrected from 15 to 16 Ex.A-5 is the post-mortem certificate dated 13-4-1997. There also the correction of the age of the deceased from 15 to 16 years is clearly visible both on page 1 as well as at page 2. Thus, the age of the deceased is sought to be inflated. There also the correction of the age of the deceased from 15 to 16 years is clearly visible both on page 1 as well as at page 2. Thus, the age of the deceased is sought to be inflated. In fact, Ex.A-6 and A-7 which are the scholastic record of the deceased for the academic year 1995-96 and 1996-97 respectively clearly discloses that the deceased passed 8'" standard during the academic year 1995-96 and was in fact studying 9" class at the time the accident had occurred. He was about to be promoted to 10 class as Ex.A-7 has disclosed his annual examination marks for 9th standard. The normal average age of bright children would be in the range of 15 or 16 years by the time they complete the 10 class examinations. The deceased appears to be a bright student as disclosed by Exs.A-7 and A-8 - his scholastic record He just completed 9 class examinations. Therefore, he may not have been beyond 15 years of age at the time of tile accident. Conscious effort is therefore, made to slightly inflate the age of the deceased. At the time of the accident, he was found wearing a nicker (i.e., shorts) and obviously he is not beyond the age of 15 years, for him to move out to the stage of putting on trousers, In the claim statement the age of the deceased's mentioned purposefully as 17 years, 5. This apart there is one more serious infirmity In the claim of the appellants. The deceased was found to be riding a "scooter" belonging to and owned by the 1" appellant herein, Going by the definition of the expression "motor vehicle" as is found in Section 2(28), 'any vehicle which is mechanically propelled and adopted for use on roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source,' therefore, a scooter is a motor vehicle. Under Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he 110Ids an effective driving licence issued to him authorizing him to drive the vehicle. Under Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he 110Ids an effective driving licence issued to him authorizing him to drive the vehicle. Under Section 4 of the Act, no person under the age of 18 years, shall drive the motor vehicle in any public place, provided that a motor cycle with engine capacity not exceeding 50 CC may be driven in a public place by a person after attaining the age of 16 years, Obviously keeping this proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 in mind, an attempt has been made to demonstrate that the deceased was 16 year old. But, the claimants have failed to establish that the scooter which the deceased was driving was only of 50 CC engine capacity, Under Section 5, no owner or person incharge of the motor vehicle shall cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 to drive the vehicle, Therefore, the 1" appellant ought not have permitted tile deceased to drive the vehicle at all. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 clearly points out that for granting even a learner's licence to drive a motor cycle without gear one is required to be of 18 years of age and Section 8 positively sets out that only persons who are not disqualified under Section 4 for driving a motor vehicle may apply to the licensing authority for issuing him a learner's licence, 6. The statute has taken note of the fact that driving motor vehicles at public places can be hazardous not only to those who drive, but to those who use the public roads. Therefore, an effort has been made to r8~uiate the exercise of driving motor vehicles. The statute has taken note of the fact that driving motor vehicles at public places can be hazardous not only to those who drive, but to those who use the public roads. Therefore, an effort has been made to r8~uiate the exercise of driving motor vehicles. Young and immaturish minds would hardly be able to stand up to the pressures of adjusting oneself instantaneously or calculate the safe distances vis-a-vis the speed at which the vehicle is moving on public places, Imponderables are the ways in which various challenges for safe negotiation do arise while one is driving a motor vehicle on a public road, Even given a concession that on a Sunday and that too at about 9 a.m., the density of the round traffic in urban areas can be considerably low, but still the elements of risk posed and likely to be faced by the drivers of the motor vehicles may sometimes call for skillful negotiation and dexterous handling of the motor vehicle concerned. It Is all the more so If the motor vehicle is a two wheeler, as It requires a certain degree of skill to keep the balance of the vehicle simultaneously. The appellants therefore have not shown any material much less justification for an inexperienced young person to hit the road on a motor cycle. Therefore, they do not doserve any consideration at the hands of this court for the purpose of enhancing the quantum of compensation as It might result in allowing the 1 appellant – father and owner of the scooter to take advantage of his own wrong. Futher, the unholy attempt made to ensure that the age of the deceased is noted as 16 years was also not to be appreciated at all. For these reasons, l do not see any merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed, but, however, without costs.