JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The facts, leading to this revision, may, in brief, be set out as follows: (i) The opposite party No. 1 herein instituted, as plaintiff, Title Suit No. 18/2003 (re-numbered as T.S. No. 369/2006), against the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 herein, as principal defendants, and against the petitioner herein and some others, as the proforma defendant, seeking, inter alia, a decree for partition of the suit properties and for delivery of possession to the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 of such share in the said properties, which the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 may be found entitled to. Though the principal defendants, who are opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 herein and who are brothers and mother of the present petitioner and step brothers and step mother of the opposite party No. 1 herein, were served with summons and though they had appeared in the suit, they chose not to contest the suit. The suit proceeded ex parte against the present petitioner too (who was, as already indicated hereinbefore, proforma defendant in the said suit), on the ground that this defendant had not appeared and contested the suit, despite having been served with summon. Eventually, the suit was decreed, on 13.5.2005, by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Divn.), Karimganj. A preliminary decree accordingly followed. (ii) Thereafter, the present petitioner (who was proforma defendant in the said suit) instituted, as plaintiff, Title Suit No. 425/2006, in the same court [i.e., the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Divn. J, Karimganj, with a prayer for, inter alia, setting aside the said preliminary decree, dated 13.5.2005, the case of the proforma defendant-petitioner being that the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 had played fraud on the court inasmuch as the summon was fraudulently shown to have been served on the proforma defendant, though no summon had ever been served on her and that she had come to know about the said ex-parte decree only on 1 12.2006. (iii) When the Title Suit No. 425/2006, so instituted by the present petitioner, was pending, she (i.e., the present petitioner) filed an application, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('the Code'), in the said earlier suit (i.e., Title Suit No. 369/2006), which was pending for drawing a final decree. (iii) When the Title Suit No. 425/2006, so instituted by the present petitioner, was pending, she (i.e., the present petitioner) filed an application, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('the Code'), in the said earlier suit (i.e., Title Suit No. 369/2006), which was pending for drawing a final decree. By her said application made under Section 151, the petitioner herein sought for stay of the further proceedings of Title Suit No. 369/2006 (i.e., the earlier suit) on the ground that she had already instituted a suit, namely. Title Suit No. 425/2006, challenging the preliminary decree, in question, as a decree having been obtained by fraud. The present petitioner, apart from making the application for stay as aforesaid, also made an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, whereby she sought to get set aside the said ex-parte preliminary decree. (iv) Both the above petitions, namely, (a) the petition seeking stay of the further proceedings relating to the granting of final decree and also (b) the application, made under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, seeking to get the said ex-parte preliminary decree set aside, were considered and rejected by order, dated 29.7.2008, and it is this order, dated 29.7.2008, passed by the learned Munsiff No. 2, Karimganj, which, now, stands impugned in this revision. 2. I have heard Mr. B.R. Dey, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. B.K. Goswami Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1. 3. 2. I have heard Mr. B.R. Dey, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. B.K. Goswami Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1. 3. The reason, assigned by the learned court below, for declining to set aside the said ex-parte preliminary decree was that according to the case, which the petitioner had herself set up in her suit, namely, T.S. No. 425/2006, she had come to know about the said ex-parte decree as early as on 1.12.2006, but in the application, which she had filed, under Order IX, Rule 13, she had claimed that she had come to know, only on 23.7.2007, about the pendency of the earlier suit and, thus, when the present petitioner had (according to her own statement, made in her plaint, which has given rise to Title Suit No. 426/2006), the knowledge of the ex-parte decree as early as on 1.12.2006, one could safely hold that her petition, which she had filed under Order IX, Rule 13, on 16.7.2007, was an application made after more than 8 months and, hence, in such circumstances, particularly, when there was no application seeking condonation of delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13, the said ex-parte decree cannot be set aside. I find no flaw in the reasoning, so assigned by the learned court below. 4. As a matter of fact, nothing could be submitted, on behalf of the present petitioner, to show as to how the impugned order (so far as the same relates to the refusal to set aside the said ex-parte decree) can be said to be an order passed refusing to exercise jurisdiction, which the learned court below ought to have exercised. This part of the order could not, therefore, be effectively assailed before this Court. 5. However, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. B.R. Dey, Learned Senior Counsel, seriously challenges the impugned order so far as the same relates to the refusal of the learned court below to stay further proceedings of the former suit, which is pending for drawing of. It is contended by Mr. 5. However, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. B.R. Dey, Learned Senior Counsel, seriously challenges the impugned order so far as the same relates to the refusal of the learned court below to stay further proceedings of the former suit, which is pending for drawing of. It is contended by Mr. Dey that a person, who suffers from an ex-parte decree, which has been fraudulently obtained, can institute a suit seeking declaration that the decree suffers from fraud or he may file an application, under Order IX, Rule 13, seeking to get such a decree set aside: It is further submitted by Mr. Dey that merely because of the fact that such an application under Order IX, Rule 13 has failed, the suit cannot fell and, hence, in the present case, when the suit, seeking declaration that the ex-parte decree, obtained in the former suit, suffered from fraud, was still pending, it was incumbent, on the part of the learned court below not to proceed with the former suit any further and stay further proceedings thereof by taking recourse to its inherent powers as contained in Section 151 of the Code. 6. Appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, Mr. B.K. Goswami, Learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand, seriously disputes the proposition of law so advanced by Mr. Dey. Mr. Goswami contends that under Section 10 of the Code, it is the subsequent suit, which can be stayed and not the former suit, and when there is a specific provision, in this regard, under Section 10, the question of a court taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 151 and staying further proceedings of former suit does not arise at all. It is further contended by Mr. Goswami that the summon was duly served on the petitioner contrary to what she has alleged and, hence, the subsequent suit, which this petitioner has instituted, is aimed at denying to the opposite party No. 1 herein the benefit of the preliminary decree, which he has obtained. 7. It is further contended by Mr. Goswami that the summon was duly served on the petitioner contrary to what she has alleged and, hence, the subsequent suit, which this petitioner has instituted, is aimed at denying to the opposite party No. 1 herein the benefit of the preliminary decree, which he has obtained. 7. Without entering into the correctness of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, as regards the fact as to whether summon had been served on the present petitioner (who was principal defendant in the former suit) or not, what needs to be pointed out is that Section 10 of the Code prohibits a court from proceeding with a suit if the issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title, whether such suit is pending in the same or any other court. Section 10 does not empower a court to slay proceedings or a suit, which has been previously instituted either in the same court or in some other court. It, therefore, logically follows that a civil court, while trying a suit, cannot stay the proceedings of a former suit pending in the same court or in another court. This apart, no civil court, while dealing with a suit pending before it, can stay, in exercise of its original jurisdiction,, the trial of a suit pending in another court even if both the suits are pending within the same territorial jurisdiction. 8. When the specific provisions, made in the Code, do not permit stay of former suit on the ground of pendency of a subsequent suit, which may or may not have been instituted in the same court, it would be very difficult to concede to the submissions of Mr. Dey that in such a situation, a court can take recourse to the provisions of Section 151 of the Code and stay proceedings of a subsequent suit, for, it would amount to the doing of an act, which the court is, otherwise, debarred from doing by specific provisions made, in this regard, in the Code. 9. Dey that in such a situation, a court can take recourse to the provisions of Section 151 of the Code and stay proceedings of a subsequent suit, for, it would amount to the doing of an act, which the court is, otherwise, debarred from doing by specific provisions made, in this regard, in the Code. 9. Coupled with the above, it may be pointed out that defendant, in a suit, has more than one remedy as regards the setting aside of an ex-parte decree; he can file an application, under Order IX, Rule 13, for selling aside such a decree, he may prefer an appeal against such a decree, he may even file an application for review of the decree if the circumstances, so permit, or he may institute a suit that the summon was fraudulently shown to have been served on him [See Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Corporation Punjab and Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 663 ]. I may also hasten to point out that it is also within the ambit of the rights of a judgment-debtor to make an application, under Order IX, Rule 13, seeking to get an ex-parte decree set aside on the ground that no summon had been served, though the summon was fraudulently shown to have been served on the judgment-debtor. It is, therefore, possible for a person, in a case of present nature, to make an application, under Order IX, Rule 13, seeking to get set aside an ex-parte decree or to institute a suit on the ground that service of summon was fraudulently shown to have been completed. However, both the relevant provisions cannot be simultaneously taken recourse to. 10. However, both the relevant provisions cannot be simultaneously taken recourse to. 10. When the present petitioner had already instituted the suit, seeking declaration that the decree, which had been granted in the former suit, was a decree obtained by fraud, her remedy to get the said decree set aside by taking recourse to Order IX, Rule 13 did not arise at all, because two courts may give two different findings, which may come in conflict with each other, inasmuch as it is quite possible that one of the courts may hold the decree as a decree obtained properly after completing service of summons on the defendants, while the other court may come to hold (on the basis of the facts, which may be placed before it) that the summons had not been served upon all or some of the defendants. 11. What also cannot be ignored and must not be ignored is the fact that it is in the subsequent suit (i.e., Title Suit No. 245/2006), wherein the court will decide as to whether the decree, which the opposite party No. 1 herein has obtained, is or is not a decree suffering from fraud. When the present petitioner has already instituted a suit to get the said decree passed in the former suit set aside, she could have filed an application, in her suit (i.e., the subsequent suit), seeking injunction restraining the opposite party No. 1 herein (as the decree-holder in the former suit) from proceeding further with the preliminary decree. Had she made such an application, the learned court, which is in seisin of the subsequent suit, would have been able to decide as to whether in the facts and attending circumstances of the case, such a relief can be granted or not. Instead of taking such a step, what the present petitioner has done is that she has sought for stay of the further proceedings of the preliminary decree by making an application, under Section 151, in the former suit. The court, which has to proceed with the preliminary decree for the purpose of making the same final, will not be in a position to decide, in an application made under Section 151, as to whether the preliminary decree, granted by it, suffered from fraud as contended by the present petitioner or not. The court, which has to proceed with the preliminary decree for the purpose of making the same final, will not be in a position to decide, in an application made under Section 151, as to whether the preliminary decree, granted by it, suffered from fraud as contended by the present petitioner or not. If the court, which is in seisin of the former suit, cannot decide such a question finally, it cannot, by an interim relief, stay further proceedings arising out of the preliminary decree. Viewed from this angle too, the impugned order cannot be said to have been suffering from any infirmity, factual or legal. 12. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find that the petitioner has been able to make out any case warranting interference of this Court either in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code or in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227of the Constitution of India. 13. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this revision is not admitted and shall accordingly stand dismissed. 14. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.