JUDGMENT DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, C.J. — This Writ Appeal was filed in 2002 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There is a delay of 346 days in filing the appeal. The explana¬tion for the delay has been furnished in paragraph 3 of the application which reads as follows : “That the appellants/petitioners received the aforesaid order of this Hon’ble Court on 3.9.2001 as communicated by this Hon’ble Court in letter dated 20.8.2001. On receipt of the order of this Hon’ble Court, the appellant No.2 instructed the appel¬lant No.4, the District Inspector of Schools, Salepur under whose jurisdiction, the respondent was working for examination of the claim. The District Inspector of Schools, Salepur, vide his letter dated 19.1.2002 submitted a report to the appellant No.2 which was so received by the appellant No.2 on 18.2.2002. On examination of the report submitted by the appellant No.4, since certain relevant informations were lacking, the District Inspector of Schools, Salepur was asked to furnish those documents. On 5.4.2002 appellant No.2 received the required documents from the District Inspector of Schools, Salepur. After examining the entire records, detail report for implementation of this Hon’ble Court’s order was submitted to the Government (appellant No.1) by appellant No.2 on 12.4.02. The Government in School and Mass Education Department by examining the entire records thought it appropriate to move this Hon’ble Court by filing an appeal on the grounds stated in the appeal memorandum. This decision was taken on 24.5.02 and thereafter by collecting necessary documents and in consultation with the Government counsel this appeal has been filed on 20.8.02. In this process some delay has been caused in preferring the appeal.” 2. This Court vide order dated 14.12.2002 issued notice on the said application. The sole respondent entered appearance and filed an objection to the said application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 23.4.2006. The matter came up for hearing on 6.8.2008, 27.8.2008 and 5.9.2008. On 5.9.2008 Mr. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the application for condonation of delay has to be decided after hearing the full arguments and he sought time for it. The matter came up for hearing on 12.9.2008. On that date, adjournment was sought by the learned counsel for respondent asking the Court for listing the matter on 17.9.2008. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the application for condonation of delay has to be decided after hearing the full arguments and he sought time for it. The matter came up for hearing on 12.9.2008. On that date, adjournment was sought by the learned counsel for respondent asking the Court for listing the matter on 17.9.2008. When the matter was listed on 17.9.2008, again adjournment was sought by the respondent for preparing arguments to oppose the application for condonation of delay. On 17.9.2008 the Court passed the following order : “List this matter on Monday (22.9.2008) for further hearing peremptorily as requested by the learned counsel for the respond¬ent. No further adjournment shall be sought for on that day.” 3. Today, when the matter came up for hearing learned counsel for the respondent sought adjournment of the case. It becomes evident that the learned counsel for the respondent is avoiding hearing of the said application. 4. The Court considered the averments made in paragraph 3 of the application and the objection taken by the respondent. 5. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every¬day by the Courts. 6. The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim inter¬est reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general wel¬fare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 7. In Apangshu Mohan Lodh & Ors. v. State of Tripura & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 267 , the Apex Court held that the power of condonation of delay is discretionary and is to be liberally construed. 8. The Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 , observed that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the reason that other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. v. Mst. Katiji & ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 , observed that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the reason that other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. The Court observed as under : “In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inher¬ited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philoso¬phy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.” 9. Time-barred cases should not be entertained by Courts as the rights which have accrued to others by reason of delay in approaching the Court, cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The vested rights of the parties should not be disrupted at the instance of a person who is guilty of culpable negligence. (Vide R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 ; and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh, AIR 1986 SC 2086 ). 10. The Privy Council in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that “a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge can¬not, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.” 11. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222 , the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condo¬nation of delay, observing as under : “The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dis¬pute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situa¬tions is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.” 12. In (Smt.) Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, 1987 (Supp) SCC 339, the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 13. In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shan¬taram Baburao Patil & ors., AIR 2001 SC 2582 , the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under : “In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other wise will be a rele¬vant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach.....” 14. In P.K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under :- “Law of limitation harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so pre¬scribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 15. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Supreme Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Supreme Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156, it was observed that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , the Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such in action or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 16. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe, (1981) Supp SCC 72, it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 17. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. 18. In G. Ramegowda Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 the Supreme Court held as under : “If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individual. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its offi¬cers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assession what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristics of the func¬tioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow enumbered, as they are by a considerable degree of procedur¬al red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have ‘a little play at the joints’. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all re¬spects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmen¬tal functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process.” (Emphasis added). 19. In State of Haryana v. Chandramani, AIR 1996 SC 1623 , Supreme Court considered large number of its earlier judgments including Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1245 ; M/s. Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 2090 ; Warlu v. Gangotribai, AIR 1994 SC 466 ; Ramlal Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 , Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi, AIR 1979 SC 1666 , Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 , and held that expression “each day’s delay must be explained”, does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made and it must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi, AIR 1979 SC 1666 , Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 , and held that expression “each day’s delay must be explained”, does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made and it must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. Considering the fact that State represents the larger public interest, the Supreme Court held that some latitude must be given to the State when it files an application for condonation of delay, observing as under : “It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State- are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. When the State is an applicant praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State repre¬sents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise- is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragma¬tism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days’ delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.” (Emphasis added). 20. A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma, AIR 1996 SC 2750 . 21. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.” (Emphasis added). 20. A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma, AIR 1996 SC 2750 . 21. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2191 , considering a similar issue the Apex Court examined large number of its earlier judgment and held as under : “It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agen¬cies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of push¬ing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise- is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and charac¬teristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause.” 22. In view of the above, the Court is required to take a realistic view in the case as the appeal has been filed by the State where there is delay because of red-tappism in the Depart¬ment and ultimately public interest is going to suffer. Prima facie we are of the view that the appeal has some merit. It is evident from the letter of the District Inspector of Schools, Salepur dated 28.4.1998 that the respondent had never been ap¬pointed as an Assistant Teacher in Chitrotpala High School with effect from 17.5.1990. The documents annexed to the letter of recommendation were not genuine documents and this finding has not been touched by the learned Single Judge. 23. It is evident from the letter of the District Inspector of Schools, Salepur dated 28.4.1998 that the respondent had never been ap¬pointed as an Assistant Teacher in Chitrotpala High School with effect from 17.5.1990. The documents annexed to the letter of recommendation were not genuine documents and this finding has not been touched by the learned Single Judge. 23. In view of the above, the application of condonation of delay is allowed. Misc. Case No.22 of 2002 is disposed of. B.N. MAHAPATRA, J. I agree. Misc. Case disposed of.