JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. Motor Vehicles Law and Rules made thereunder provides stringent and elaborate procedure for granting driving licenses. If one seeks a licence to drive transport or public service vehicle the scrutiny and tests are more rigorous. There are more than enough penal provisions to stem errant and reckless driving cancellation of driving licence, punitive sentences for driving vehicles at excessive speed, dangerously, in alcoholic condition at all causing loss and damage to property and human lives. Despite these precautionary and punitive provisions in the law graph of traffic offence is not showing any sign of improvement. As per the statistics provided in Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India Reports, published by the National Crime Records Bureau, Govt. of India, there were 2,72,100 road accidents in the year 1996 claiming 69,800 precious human lives. Within a decade, i.e. in the year 2006 the number of road accidents shot-up to 3,94,432 and the casualty figure to 1,05,725 and bodily injuries to 4,52,900 persons. In the year 2007, number of road accidents and deaths in such accidents increased to 4,18,657 and 1,14,590 respectively. Despite the fact that deaths in road traffic accidents account for 33.6% of total accidental deaths both the drivers as well as the investigating agencies are totally oblivious to this situation. As far as drivers are concerned the number of accidents prove their defiant attitude to the traffic Rules. At the same time, callous, slipshod and unscientific investigation of traffic offences by Police, leading to high rate of acquittal or awarding inadequate punishment to offending drivers are also contributing factors for the rising rate of vehicular accidents. 2. Amidst this scenario, I am precisely called upon to examine and answer the following questions of law in this revision application. (i) Whether resort to the provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for prosecuting and convicting persons for committing offences of road traffic accidents is legal and justified? (ii) Whether the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are more suitable and appropriate for road traffic offences than the provisions of Indian Penal Code? 3. Heard Sri. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner, who advanced lucid, eloquent and erudite submissions to explain the legal position, more particularly with regard to faulty investigation and unscientific sentencing policy for road traffic offences. The learned Counsel dwelt upon certain unexplored areas in the trial system of traffic offences. 3. Heard Sri. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner, who advanced lucid, eloquent and erudite submissions to explain the legal position, more particularly with regard to faulty investigation and unscientific sentencing policy for road traffic offences. The learned Counsel dwelt upon certain unexplored areas in the trial system of traffic offences. On the other hand, Sri. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State attempted to defend the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (for brevity IPC). 4. This revision petition arises out of the judgment and order dated 10-6-2002 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Jude, West Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Appeal No. 57(4) of 2001 whereby the appellate Court has upheld the judgment of Chief Judicial Magistrate passed in G. R. case No. 913 of 1997 convicting the petitioner Under Section 279/304A/337 of IPC and sentencing him to undergo varied period of prison terms, highest being concurrent sentence for one year rigorous imprisonment. 5. Since the legality of the conviction and also the quantum of sentence have been assailed it is necessary to give resume of the facts, which are as below: 5.1. The petitioner was the owner-cum-driver of a jeep, bearing Regn. No. TR-01-3464. On 3-11-1997 at about 8 O'clock in the morning he was ferrying passengers driving his own jeep. The Jeep met with head on collision with an Army vehicle coming from the opposite direction and the said accident took place on a public road. As a result of the accident as many as 3 passengers succumbed to the injuries and all the remaining passengers of the Jeep, including the driver, also sustained injuries. 5.2. The FIR was lodged by one of the passengers (PW1). The same was registered as Airport PS case No. 62 of 1997 Under Section 279/337/304A IPC. Nearly after one month of the accident, the petitioner surrendered before the Investigating officer and also submitted a written declaration vide Ext.-13 that he was the owner-cum-driver of the vehicle and also disclosed that his vehicle had collided with an Army vehicle. Accordingly, the Investigating officer seized the vehicle, vehicular documents and driving licence of the accused and he also got both the vehicles mechanically examined. As usual, statements of witnesses were also recorded and medicolegal reports were collected. After investigation the petitioner was accordingly challaned and tried. 5.3. Accordingly, the Investigating officer seized the vehicle, vehicular documents and driving licence of the accused and he also got both the vehicles mechanically examined. As usual, statements of witnesses were also recorded and medicolegal reports were collected. After investigation the petitioner was accordingly challaned and tried. 5.3. The prosecution examined altogether 12 witnesses to prove various offences against the petitioner. The defence plea was that neither he was driving the vehicle at the relevant time nor was he responsible for the accident. However, the defence plea did not find favour with the Court. On the other hand, finding overwhelming evidence in support of the prosecution the trial Court convicted the petitioner Under Section 279/337/304A IPC and the appellate Court also upheld the said conviction. Being aggrieved with the concurrent judgments, the convict has preferred this revision petition. 6. At the threshold I would like to repel the confusion of the petitioner that he has been wrongly found guilty of rash and negligent driving resulting into injuries and death of its passengers. I find from the record that except the formal evidence of the Investigating officer all the remaining witnesses are either passengers of the ill-fated Jeep or independent witnesses from the site of the accident. All the witnesses, more particularly, PWs 1, 4, 7, 8, and 10 have deposed that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by the petitioner. The logic for giving such opinion was that the Jeep was not only being driven at a high speed but it also went on the wrong side. As a result it collided with an Army vehicle. Besides these, the witnesses have also given unassailable evidence that the Jeep was being driven by the petitioner and by no other driver at the relevant time. Most of the witnesses are from the same village where-from the accused petitioner hails. Hence, the Courts below have not committed any illegality in rejecting the defence case and holding that the petitioner was driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. 7. On the question of legality of the investigation and trial of the petitioner under various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (briefly, Cr. P.C. hereinafter) and IPC, Sri. Hence, the Courts below have not committed any illegality in rejecting the defence case and holding that the petitioner was driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. 7. On the question of legality of the investigation and trial of the petitioner under various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (briefly, Cr. P.C. hereinafter) and IPC, Sri. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, MV Act) is a special legislation and a complete Code to regulate vehicular movements on the road. According to the learned Counsel, the Act not only defines various kinds of offences for driving motor vehicles either in contravention to the Motor Vehicles Rules, traffic rules or in violation of the licence conditions but has also prescribed varied punishments, inter alia, for driving vehicles at excessive speed, dangerously, under the influence of drugs/liquor and in a state of mentally or physically unfit condition of the driver. Sri. Deb, also pointed out that apart from statutory punishments for the aforesaid offences, precisely under Chapter XIII, the legislature has also empowered the Courts and investigating agency to disqualify the guilty drivers or suspend and cancel their driving licence in addition to awarding substantive punishment. Stretching his contention, the learned Counsel submitted that keeping provisions like suspension/cancellation/disqualification etc. for the errant drivers in Chapter II of the MV Act, the Legislatures were very much aware that the dangerous or rash driving might also result into causing loss of property and causing bodily injury or death of persons. To put it differently, it was contended that since the MV Act is a new legislation and later in point of time to IPC, it cannot be said that the legislatures did not visualize these aspects to give a free hand to the investigating agency or Courts to readily invoke the provisions of IPC for road traffic offences. Sri Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner emphatically submitted that Section 5 of the Indian Penal Code statutorily debars trial and conviction of any person under IPC in the event of existence of special or local law on the specific subject, covering similar offences. 8. In the same vein, Sri. Sri Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner emphatically submitted that Section 5 of the Indian Penal Code statutorily debars trial and conviction of any person under IPC in the event of existence of special or local law on the specific subject, covering similar offences. 8. In the same vein, Sri. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that MV Act has also laid down certain special procedure for investigation of road traffic offences and as such investigation of the road traffic offences under the provisions of Cr. P.C. and also submission of final reports Under Section 173 Cr. P.C. is also untenable in law. Referring to Section 208 of the MV Act, which prescribes procedure for summary disposal of road traffic offences, learned Counsel submitted that if the case is investigated within the parameters of Cr. P.C. it offends and violates the statutory right of the accused persons to plead guilty and, more so, since after such composition of the offence Under Section 208(3) of the MV Act further prosecution of the accused is statutorily barred. According to the learned Counsel Section 4(2) of the Cr. P.C. also mandates that all offences under special and local laws should be investigated and tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of special law. To buttress his submission that investigation and trial of the petitioner for committing vehicular offences the provisions of IPC and Cr. P.C. are per se illegal and in total contra-distinction to Section 5 of IPC and Section 4(2) of Cr. P. C; Sri. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of The Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sardar Ali (1983) 3 SCR729; Moti Lal vs. CBI 2002 Cri LJ 2060; State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran, (2003) 12 SCC 578 ; Moly vs. State of Kerala 2004 Cri LJ 1812; Sarabjit Rick Singh vs. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 417 and Suresh Nanda vs. CBI 2008 Cri LJ 1599. 9. Per contra, the submission of learned Public Prosecutor was that punishments in the nature of disqualification, suspension, endorsement and cancellation of driving licence under Chapter II of the MV Act are basically not the punishments for rash, negligent or dangerous driving. 9. Per contra, the submission of learned Public Prosecutor was that punishments in the nature of disqualification, suspension, endorsement and cancellation of driving licence under Chapter II of the MV Act are basically not the punishments for rash, negligent or dangerous driving. According to learned Public Prosecutor, had it been so the legislature would have incorporated the same punishments in Chapter XIII. It was also contended on behalf of the State that since the punishments for rash and dangerous driving provided under Sections 183 and 184 of the MV Act do not comprehend causing of hurt or death of any person there is no illegality or impropriety in punishing the guilty drivers Under Section 337/338/279/ and 304A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Public Prosecutor also took the aid of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, which prescribes prosecution and punishment to the offenders under either any of two or more enactments covering the same field. In support of this submission, the learned Public Prosecutor also cited the authority of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court rendered in the case of Amarnath Roy vs. State AIR 1955 Cal 236 and the judgment rendered by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Re. AIR 1970 AP 47 . 10. Since the controversy relates to the implication of various provisions of IPC, Cr. P.C. and MV Act, the relevant provisions of law are reproduced herein-below for ready reference. INDIAN PENAL CODE 5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act-Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the provisions of any special or local law. 279. Rash driving or riding on a public way - Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 304A. 304A. Causing death by negligence-Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws – (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 20. Power of Court to disqualify: (1) Where a person is convicted of any offence under this Act or of an offence in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used, the Court by which such person is convicted may, subject to the provisions of this Act, in addition to imposing any other punishment authorized by law, declare the person so convicted to be disqualified, for such period as the Court may specify, from holding any driving licence to drive all classes or description of vehicles, or any particular class or description of such vehicles, as are specified in such licence; Provided that in respect of an offence punishable under Section 183 no such order shall be made for the first or second offence. (2) Where a person is convicted for an offence under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section132, Section 134 or Section 185, the Court convicting any person of any such offence shall order the disqualification under Sub-section (1) and if the offence is relatable to Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) or Section 132 or Section 134, such disqualification shall before period of not less than one month, and if the offence is relatable to Section 185, such disqualification shall be for a period of not less than six months. (3) A Court shall, unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it thinks fit to order otherwise, order the disqualification of a person-(a) who having been convicted of an offence punishable under Section 184 is again convicted of an offence punishable under that Section. (b) Who is convicted of an offence punishable under Section 189. (c) Who is convicted of an offence punishable under Section 92. Provided that the period of disqualification shall not exceed, in the case referred to in Clause (a), five years, or in the case referred to in Clause (b), two years or, in the case referred to in Clause (c), one year. 21. Suspension of driving licence in certain cases: (1) Where, in relation to a person who had been previously convicted of an offence punishable under Section 184, a case is registered by a police officer on the allegation that such person has, by such dangerous driving as is referred to in the said Section 184, of any class or description of motor vehicle caused the death of, or grievous hurt to, one or more persons, the driving licence held by such person shall in relation to such class or description of motor vehicle become suspended-(a) for a period of six months from the date on which the case is registered. (b) If such person is discharged or acquitted before the expiry of the period aforesaid, until such discharge or acquittal, as the case may be. (2) Where by virtue of the provisions of Sub-section (1), the driving licence held by a person becomes suspended, the police officer, by whom the case referred to in Sub-section (1) is registered, shall bring such suspension to the notice of the Court competent to take cognizance of such offence, and thereupon, such Court shall take possession of the driving licence, endorse the suspension thereon and intimate the fact of such endorsement to the licensing authority by which the licence was granted or last renewed. 22. 22. Suspension or cancellation of driving licence on conviction: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 where a person, referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 21, is convicted of an offence of causing, by such dangerous driving as is referred to in Section 184of any class or description of motor vehicle the death of, or grievous hurt to, one or more persons, the Court by which such person is convicted may cancel, or suspend for such period as it may think fit, the driving licence held by such person in so far as it relate to that class or description of motor vehicle. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, if a person, having been previously convicted of an offence punishable under Section 185, is again convicted of an offence punishable under that Section, the Court, making such subsequent conviction, shall, by order, cancel the driving licence held by such person. 23. Effect of disqualification order: (1) A person in respect of whom any disqualification order is made under Section 19 or Section 20 shall be debarred to the extent and for the period specified in such order from holding or obtaining a driving licence and the driving licence, if any, held by such person at the date of the order shall cease to be effective to such extent and during such period. (2) The operation of a disqualification order made under Section 20 shall not be suspended or postponed while an appeal is pending against such order or against the conviction as a result of which such order is made, unless the appellate Court so directs. (3) Any person in respect of whom any disqualification order has been made may at any time after the expiry of six months from the date of the order apply to the Court or other authority by which the order was made, to remove the disqualification; and the Court or authority, as the case may be, may, having regard to all the circumstances, either cancel or vary the disqualification order: Provided that where the Court or other authority refuses to cancel or vary any disqualification order under this section, a second application thereunder shall not be entertained before the expiry of a period of three months from the date of such refusal. 183. Driving at excessive speed etc. 183. Driving at excessive speed etc. (1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle in contravention of the speed limits referred to in Section 112 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to four hundred rupees, or, if having been previously convicted of an offence under this sub-section is again convicted of an offence under this sub-section, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. 184. Driving dangerously: Whoever drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time or which might reasonably be expected to be in the place, shall be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and for any second or subsequent offence if committed within three years of the commission of a previous similar offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both. 11. Section 200 of the MV Act relates to composition of certain offences; Section 202 deals with power of the Police Officer to arrest the drivers without warrant for certain offences; Sections 203 and 204 deal with breathing and blood tests of the guilty person. Section 206 authorizes Police Officers to impound/seize vehicular documents and Section 207 relates to seizure and detention of offending vehicles and its documents. Section 208 of the MV Act deals with summary disposal of cases. Since this later provision of law is relevant to examine the contours of rights of the accused persons to be tried under the special law the same is extracted below in extenso. 208. Summary disposal of cases: (1) The Court taking cognizance of any offence (other than an offence which the Central Government may by rules specify in this behalf) under this Act. (i) May, if the offence is an offence punishable with imprisonment under this Act. (ii) Shall, in any other case, state upon the summons to be served on the accused person that he. (a) May appear by pleader or in person. (i) May, if the offence is an offence punishable with imprisonment under this Act. (ii) Shall, in any other case, state upon the summons to be served on the accused person that he. (a) May appear by pleader or in person. (b) May, by a specified date prior to the hearing of the charge, plead guilty to the charge and remit to the Court, by money order, such sum (not exceeding the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offence) as the Court may specify and the plea of guilt indicated in the money order coupon itself. Provided that the Court shall, in the case of any of the offences referred to in Sub-section (2), state upon the summons that the accused person, if he pleads guilty, shall so plead in the manner specified in Clause (b) and shall forward his driving licence to the Court with his letter containing such plea. (2) Where the offence dealt with in accordance with Sub-section (1) is an offence specified by the Central Government by rules for the purpose of this sub-section, the Court shall, if the accused person pleads guilty to the charge and forward his driving licence to the Court with the letter containing his plea, make an endorsement of such conviction on his driving licence. (3) Where an accused person pleads guilty and remits the sum specified and has complied with the provisions of Sub-section (1), or as the case may be, Sub-sections (1) and (2), no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall be taken against him nor shall he be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty. 12. I shall first examine the import of Section 4 of the Cr. P.C. Section 4(1) is unambiguous with regard to the procedure to be adopted for investigating offences which clearly fall under the Indian Penal Code. However, Sub-section (2) of Section 4 is in the nature of exception to the general rule of applicability of the Cr. P.C. in respect to investigation, inquiry or trial of special offences. There are umpteen numbers of authorities from the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it has been held that Cr. P.C. must give way to the prescriptions of special and local laws. Sri. P.C. in respect to investigation, inquiry or trial of special offences. There are umpteen numbers of authorities from the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it has been held that Cr. P.C. must give way to the prescriptions of special and local laws. Sri. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited a few of such authorities and the opinion and observations of the Apex Court in this regard are briefly referred to herein-below: 12.1. In the case of the Transport Commissioner vs. S. Sardar Ali, (1983) 3 SCR 729 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the issue of constitutional validity of Section 129-A of the MV Act, 1939. Section 129-A of the old law was part materia to Section 207 of the new MV Act. Under this law, the Police Officers are authorized to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration. Their Lordships have held that if a Police Officer detects the commission of an offence punishable under MV Act the next step for him would be to consider whether the offence should be compounded as provided by Section 127B (now Section 200). Thereafter, the investigating officer should lay a complaint before a competent Court for taking cognizance. In the light of the exclusion clause in the form of Section 4(2) Cr. P.C. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that after the complaint the case has to be tried in accordance with the provisions of Cr. P.C. but subject to special prescription made Under Section 130 of the MV Act (now Section 208). The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below: Thereafter the next logical and appropriate step for the police officer or the authorized person would be to lay a complaint before the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence, subject to the overriding provision of Section132 of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides that no Court inferior to that a of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the second class shall try any offence punishable under the Motor Vehicles Act or any rule made thereunder. Section 4(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that all offences under any law other than the Penal Code shall also be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions that is, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. So, subject to Section 132 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Court before which the complaint may be laid has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the complaint is laid the case has to be tried in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This again is subject to one special provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, namely, Section 130. 13. As noted earlier, Section 130 of the 1939 MV Act was also verbatim of Section 208 of MV Act, 1988. This provision of law deals with cognizance of road traffic offences and summary disposal of the cases by the Courts. Section 208(3) clearly lays down that if the accused pleads guilty and deposits the amount of fine in the Court no further proceeding in respect of offence shall be taken against him nor shall he be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty. 14. Sri. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that if the offences relating to vehicular accidents are investigated and tried within the four corners of Cr. P.C. and IPC, the accused persons will be deprived of the beneficial provisions of composition of the offence either before the Police Officers or in the Court which would be offending to Section 208 of the MV Act. I find sufficient force in the submission of the learned Counsel inasmuch as Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, which is readily invoked for the offences of rash and negligent driving of vehicles, is non compoundable under Cr. I find sufficient force in the submission of the learned Counsel inasmuch as Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, which is readily invoked for the offences of rash and negligent driving of vehicles, is non compoundable under Cr. P.C. on the contrary, Sections 183 and 184 of the MV Act which relate to driving of motor vehicles at excessive speed and dangerously and other offences of identical nature are compoundable before the Police Officers or in the Court with a rider that no further proceeding after pleading of guilty shall be taken against the accused. It is the settled position of law that the executive authorities cannot take away the beneficial provision laid down under any special law on any pretext. On this premise also, it can be held that the provisions of Cr. P.C. must succumb to the statutory provisions of MV Act and any investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to that would be illegal and unsustainable in law. 15. In the case of Moti Lal vs. CBI reported in 2002 Cri LJ 2060, the Apex Court has observed that special procedure of seizure under the Wild Life Act being contrary to the general law would prevail. The observations are thus: The aforesaid section inter alia specifically provided that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Code of Criminal Procedure but it shall be subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. In view of the specific provision under the Wild Life Act, apart from any police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, the Director or any other officer authorized by him in this behalf or the Chief Wild Life Warden or authorized officer or any forest officer can inspect, conduct search or inquire, seize article mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1). To this extent, there is contrary provision under the Wild Life Act and would prevail as provided under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. Similar view has been taken in the case of State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran (2003) 12 SCC 578 . In this case, trial and conviction of a CRPF officer under the provisions of CRPF Act, 1949 was under challenge. 16. Similar view has been taken in the case of State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran (2003) 12 SCC 578 . In this case, trial and conviction of a CRPF officer under the provisions of CRPF Act, 1949 was under challenge. Both the Sessions Court as well as the High Court held that Assistant Commandant of CRPF had no jurisdiction to convict the delinquent. However, the Apex Court overruled the aforesaid finding with the aid of Section 4(2) Cr. P.C. on the following premises: A special law, as observed in Kaushalya Rani vs. Gopal Singh means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, as distinguished from the general rules of law laid down as being applicable to all cases dealt with by the general law. The Act fits the description. Additionally, Section 16(2) of the Act begins with a non-obstante clause relating to the Code. 17. In the case of Moly vs. State of Kerala, 2004 Cri LJ 1812, the question before the Apex Court was whether the cognizance procedure prescribed under special enactment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 would override Section 193 Cr. P.C. Although the contention of the petitioner did not find favour in absence of any non obstante clause, but at the same time, the supremacy of the provisions of special law was reiterated in this manner. A reading of the provisions concerned makes it clear that subject to the provisions in other enactments all offences under other laws shall also be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with under the provisions of the Code. This means that if another enactment contains any provision which is contrary to the provisions of the Code, such other provision would apply in place of the particular provision of the Code. If there is no such contrary provision in other laws, then provisions of the Code would apply to the matters covered thereby. 18. The question of application of provisions of Cr. P.C. for an offence covered by the provisions of Extradition Act, 1962 also came up before the Supreme Court in the case of Sarabjit Rick Singh vs. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 417 . In this case also, their Lordships have held that the special statute will prevail over the provisions of a general statute like the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. In this case also, their Lordships have held that the special statute will prevail over the provisions of a general statute like the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. Yet again an identical question whether the procedure of seizure of documents provided Under Section 104 Cr. P.C. would be applicable in the case of offences covered under the Passports Act, 1967. In the case of Suresh Nanda vs. CBI 2008 Cri LJ 1599 the Hon'ble Supreme Court echoed the same view in favour of the special law. The relevant observations are quoted below: 9. Impound means to keep in custody of the law. There must be some distinct action which will show that a documents or things have been impounded. According to Oxford Dictionary impound means to take legal or formal possessions. In the present case, the passport of the appellant is in possession of CBI right from the date it has been seized by CBI. When we read Section 104 Cr. P.C. and Section 10 of the Act together, under Cr. P. C, the Court is empowered to impound any document or thing produced before it whereas the Act speaks specifically of impounding of the passport. 10. Thus, the Act is a special Act relating to matter of passport, whereas Section 104 Cr. P.C. authorizes the Court to impound document or thing produced before it. Here there is a special Act dealing with specific subject, resort should be had to that Act instead of general Act providing for the matter connected with the specific Act. As the Passports Act is a special Act, the rule that general provision should yield to the specific provision is to be applied. 20. In the civil side also, the same theory that special laws and procedures laid down therein would override the provisions of general laws, have been re-stated in the case of Ashok Marketing Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 3 SCR 649 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they cover both residential and commercial premises falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Similar view has been taken in the case of Crawford Bayley and Company vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 2544 . 21. The Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure find place in Entry Nos. Similar view has been taken in the case of Crawford Bayley and Company vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 2544 . 21. The Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure find place in Entry Nos. 1 and 2 in the concurrent List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. Similarly, the Motor Vehicles Act has also born through Entry No. 35 in the same List. Hence, apparently and admittedly, the status of MV Act is at par with IPC and Cr. P.C. and as such it cannot for any moment be presumed that the MV Act is either a subordinate legislation or inferior to IPC and Cr. P.C. in the status. 22. Section 5 of the Indian Penal Code removes any kind of ambiguity about the conviction and punishment of offenders under special law, if any exists, covering the field. In the commentary of the Indian Penal Code by Ratan Lal and Dhiraj Lal (29th edition), the author has quoted the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court given in the case of Kaushalya Rani vs. Gopal Singh, (1964) 4 SCR 982 that a special law means a law enacted for special cases in special circumstances, in contra-distinction to the general rules of law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. On the basis of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, the author has opined that general things do not derogate from special and special acts cannot stand repealed by general Acts unless there be some express reference to the previous legislation or a necessary exigency in the two acts standing together. The author is of firm opinion that where there is a conflict between a special provision and the general provision, specific provision prevails over the general provision. I also subscribe to the above view inasmuch as if general law is allowed to prevail over special laws without there being no direct conflict it would practically render special enactment nonexistent. 23. A thorough survey of the provisions of law as well as various authorities from the Hon'ble Supreme Court leave no scope for giving a different interpretation as regards the limited applicability of IPC and Cr. P.C. in the light of exclusion clause Under Sections 5 and 4(2) respectively. 23. A thorough survey of the provisions of law as well as various authorities from the Hon'ble Supreme Court leave no scope for giving a different interpretation as regards the limited applicability of IPC and Cr. P.C. in the light of exclusion clause Under Sections 5 and 4(2) respectively. However, the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that MV Act is a complete Code to investigate and try the road traffic offences cannot be accepted. It is true that the provisions for breathing and blood tests are special in nature in the MV Act. However, this special law does not lay down as to how the offenders can be arrested; within what period the arrestee should be produced before a Magistrate; how the statements of witnesses could be recorded nor is there clear procedure for laying final reports in the court etc. Be that as it may, there is no complete bar to investigate the road traffic offences under the provisions of Cr. P.C. In fact, in the cases of Commissioner Transport vs. S. Sardar Ali and Moti Lal vs. CBI (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that the application of provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be totally excluded. The only limitation is that if the specific provisions of special law are contrary to the Cr. P.C., the former would prevail. This should be the position with regard to the conviction of the accused persons as well in the light of the Section 5 of the IPC. 24. As noted earlier, Section 208 of the MV Act has laid down a special procedure for disposal of road traffic offences and if the road traffic offences are tried dehors to Section 208 it would not only dilute the mandate of special law but it would also offend Section 5 of the IPC which gives way for the conviction of offenders under special enactments. 25. The learned Public Prosecutor basically took shelter under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 for invoking provisions of IPC in preference to penal provisions of M.V. Act. For ready reference Section 26 is also quoted below: 26. 25. The learned Public Prosecutor basically took shelter under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 for invoking provisions of IPC in preference to penal provisions of M.V. Act. For ready reference Section 26 is also quoted below: 26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments-Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. 26. In my considered opinion, the provisions of General Clauses Act can be looked into only when there is necessity to interpret any statute or if the language of the law is vague or if there is any vacuum in the law. In other words, this clarificatory provision of General Clauses Act cannot alter unambiguous provisions of substantive laws. The legal position, more particularly with regard to Section 4(2) of the Cr. P.C., has been laid down in a catena of judicial pronouncements from the Apex Court. Similarly, Section 5 of the IPC, recognizing supremacy of the special laws, also cannot be diluted under the garb of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. I have already noted earlier that both the IPC and M.V. Act are at par since both the statutes have been enacted under List 3 through the Concurrent List. Had there been a conflict about application of statutes enacted under Union List vis-a-vis State List there could have been a possibility of taking aid of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Be that as it may, I am of the considered opinion that if the provisions of punishment laid down under the M.V. Act are altogether glossed-over or ignored it would also offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 20 prohibits imposition of greater penalty than that which might be inflicted under the law in force. It appears to me that the maximum substantive sentence under the M.V. Act is that of six months for the first offence whereas if the investigating agency and courts invoke the penal provisions of IPC it may exceed the aforesaid limit. I make it clear that the question whether the penal provisions of the M.V. Act are pari materia to IPC would be dealt with at a later stage. I make it clear that the question whether the penal provisions of the M.V. Act are pari materia to IPC would be dealt with at a later stage. Hence, I hold that prosecution of road traffic offenders under the provisions of Indian Penal Code is not permitted since it has no sanction of law. The only exception to this rule would be in cases where the offence cannot be adequately punished under the M.V. Act. 27. Sri Ghosh, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the provisions of IPC are invoked since M.V. Act has not taken care of physical injuries and death of persons in road accidents. This submission was made basically referring to Sections 183 and 184, which relates to driving of motor vehicles rashly and dangerously on the public way. If Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code is read harmoniously together with Sections 182 and 184 it would appear that virtually all these penal provisions are synonymous which relates to rash and negligent driving, endangering human lives. The contention of learned Public Prosecutor is that since there is no mention of loss of life or causing physical hurt to the passengers of the vehicle or pedestrians or about loss of property the offenders are normally booked under various provisions of IPC. The submission of learned Public Prosecutor is misconceived and unacceptable on various grounds. Except Section 279, all other penal provisions under IPC, that are commonly invoked, viz. Sections 304A, 337, 338 and 427, do not speak about vehicular related offences. In this factual reality how far is the justification to book the offenders of road traffic offences under IPC provisions overlooking the penal provisions of M.V. Act? 28. As is evident, Motor Vehicles Act is a new legislation and later in point of time in comparison to the Indian Penal Code. Hence, it can be safely inferred that the legislatures were well posted and cognizant about various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and having realized the IPC provisions did not adequately take care of the road traffic offences, the special law was enacted. Hence, it can be safely inferred that the legislatures were well posted and cognizant about various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and having realized the IPC provisions did not adequately take care of the road traffic offences, the special law was enacted. It is true that at the time of enactment of M.V. Act it would have been proper to delete Section 279 in the same manner as Sections 161 to 165A IPC have been deleted after enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, even then, I am of the view that if the road traffic offences, which can be regulated and adequately dealt with under the provisions of M.V. Act, resort to the provisions of the general law i.e. IPC should be avoided. 29. Now, I again refer to the question whether loss of life or physical injuries caused to the passengers or pedestrians can be adequately punished under M.V. Act. According to Sri Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner, consequences of an accident are irrelevant to determine the offences. According to the learned counsel be it an accident simpliciter or causing injury to the people or loss of human lives would be the result of either driving a motor vehicle at an excessive speed or due to rash, negligent or dangerous driving or driving under the influence of alcohol etc. can be adequately punished Under Section 183 to 187 of the M.V. Act. In other words, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that litmus test for punishing the errant drivers is the cause of the accident and not the end result. Learned Counsel also contended that apart from imposing fine or substantive sentence under the aforesaid provisions of law, the Act also provides for suspension, cancellation, disqualification and endorsement on the driving licences Under Sections 20, 21, 23 and 24 of the M.V. Act. In the view of the learned Counsel these precautionary punishments are far more effective than prison punishments provided under IPC. Shri Deb further argued that if traffic offences are dealt with under IPC then the special method or check reckless driving, insulated in Chapter II of the M.V. Act, by way of suspending or canceling the D/L etc. would have to be given a total go-bye and that is certainly not the intention of the legislature. 30. Shri Deb further argued that if traffic offences are dealt with under IPC then the special method or check reckless driving, insulated in Chapter II of the M.V. Act, by way of suspending or canceling the D/L etc. would have to be given a total go-bye and that is certainly not the intention of the legislature. 30. Apparently and admittedly, Sections 183 to 188 of the M.V. Act, which relate to punishment for driving at excessive speed or dangerously or in a drunken condition etc. are silent about the outcome of the accidents. In other words, the aforesaid penal provisions do not prescribe any separate punishment for causing hurt to people or for damaging any property. However, in my considered opinion, that does not mean that the legislatures were either not aware or totally oblivious to the consequences of dangerous driving. It is the accepted principle of law that there exists a presumption of legislative awareness and competence. Strangely, Section 304A IPC (quoted supra) also does not speak about causing the death of any person by way of rash, negligent or dangerous driving of a motor vehicle. Similarly, Sections 337, 338/427 that relate to causing hurt and damage to properly also do not refer or speak to any vehicular accident. In this way, if the courts were to take into consideration certain omissions in various penal provisions of M.V. Act and read something more in various provisions of IPC so as to include traffic related offences, which are apparently missing in Sections 304A, 337, 338/427, it would virtually amount to re-writing the statutory provisions. In my considered opinion, if a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any person while driving any motor vehicle in a rash and dangerous manner under various provisions of M.V. Act, the said offender cannot possibly also be convicted under IPC provisions which expressly do not embrace within its fold the road traffic offences. Accordingly, the contention of learned Public Prosecutor is rejected. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has time and again warned against colourable exercise of powers or going against the legislative intent. In the case of Chief Justice of A.P. vs. L.V.A. Dixituly reported in (1979) 1 SCR 26 the Apex Court observed like this. The primary principle of interpretation (of law) is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they made it. In the case of Chief Justice of A.P. vs. L.V.A. Dixituly reported in (1979) 1 SCR 26 the Apex Court observed like this. The primary principle of interpretation (of law) is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they made it. Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. 31.1 Again in the case of Prithi Pal Singh vs. Union of India, 1983 Cri LJ 647 the Hon'ble Supreme Court made these thought provoking observations. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of Parliament. One of the well recognized canons of construction is that the legislature intention speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is ambiguity in the language of the provision the court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to absurdity. 32. Once Lord Denning also, while dealing with a question as to when the judiciary should supplement the law, said that a Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in this texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. 33. The sanctity of the legislations has been recognized globally through a long list of judicial pronouncements, both in its contents and applications. Hence, it can be said that permitting the use of penal provisions of any other law in the matter of motor vehicle accidents by the judiciary not only amounts to overriding the self contained M.V. Act, but it also sounds to indict the legislature for not comprehending all the situations and lacking foresightedness to declare death of persons in normal vehicular accidents as 'culpable homicides or death due to negligent act'. In my opinion, invoking provisions of Indian Penal Code for the offence of vehicular accidents is nothing but distortion of the basic character and structure of the Motor Vehicles Act and by adopting this method we will not be able to curb the rising rate of vehicular accidents. 34. If we look at the M.V. Act from a different angle we find that the law already suggests effective remedial measures to control the menace of vehicular accidents and resultant loss of property and human lives. Sections 20 to 24 prescribes power of disqualification, suspension and cancellation of driving licenses and endorsement of such disqualification in the driving license. Section 20 authorizes the court to disqualify a person from driving motor vehicles for a reasonable period upon his conviction in a traffic offence. If the person is convicted for driving a vehicle in drunken condition (Sec.185) such disqualification should be for a minimum period of six months. Section 21 authorises freezing of the driving license if a person repeats an offence of dangerous driving and this action can be taken immediately on the registration of the second case. Section 22 empowers the court to finally cancel the driving license if a person is convicted for dangerous driving causing death of, or grievous hurt, to one or more persons for that class or description of motor vehicle. The cancellation is mandatory if the license holder is convicted for second offence of driving a motor vehicle in drunken condition. 35. From a conjoint reading of Sections 20 to 24 of M.V. Act, which supplement other penal provisions in the same law, it is crystal clear that the legislatures were well aware that there may be loss of human lives in vehicular accidents and despite that the offence was not treated as culpable homicide. I am also of the opinion that if the supporting penal provisions enumerated under Sections20 to 24, i.e. powers of suspending and canceling the licenses and making the endorsements of such disqualifications in the licenses are effectively and comprehensively used it will certainly bring down the rate of vehicular accidents. On the contrary, penal provisions of M.V. Act and equivalent provisions of Indian Penal Code confer discretionary power upon the courts to let-off the offenders by handing down maximum prison sentence of six months or after imposing fine only. On the contrary, penal provisions of M.V. Act and equivalent provisions of Indian Penal Code confer discretionary power upon the courts to let-off the offenders by handing down maximum prison sentence of six months or after imposing fine only. This mode of punishment has little impact to discipline the errant drivers. Hence, effective and extensive use of Sections 20 to 24 of the Act will change the entire scenario with regard to vehicular accidents. 36. On the contrary, the penal provisions of the Indian Penal Code do not have subsidiary line of punishments by way of suspension or cancellation of driving licences or disqualifying a traffic offender. Besides this, unlike penal provisions in M.V. Act there is no provision for inflicting higher sentence for subsequent and repeated traffic offences under IPC. From this angle also, it can be said that the penal provisions of IPC are inadequate to encounter the menace of road traffic accidents. 37. In the light of foregoing discussions made herein above, I am of the view that the prosecution of road traffic offenders under various penal provisions of Motor Vehicles Act is the Rule and the prosecution of such guilty persons under various provisions of Indian Penal Code is violative of the settled principles of law as well as contrary to the legislative intent. The only exception to this rule to book traffic offenders Under Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) can be made when the offending vehicles are practically driven violating all legal and established norms and the accidents are diabolic in nature, killing large number of innocent people and if some amount of culpable intention is attributable to the offender. This exception can be culled-out from the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in the case of Kuldeep Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2008 Cri LJ 3932. Section 304A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 or murder under Section 300. If a person willfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crow and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. If a person willfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crow and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When the intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act. Section 304A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. 37.1 I make it clear that the just exception to invoke Section 304 IPC for unusual and exceptional road accidents, to the general rule that road traffic offences shall ordinarily be investigated and tried under the provisions of M.V. Act, has been carved-out because prison sentence of six months provided under M.V. Act appears inadequate, going by the rising rate of violent road accidents. Hence, it is high time for the legislatures to give a fresh look to the M.V. Act and suitable amendments may be carried out urgently so that there may not be any occasion for conflict between M.V. Act and IPC. 38. Coming to the case at hand I find that the petitioner herein has been convicted under various provisions of IPC and the cumulative and concurrent sentence of one year has been handed out. Since the petitioner/accused was challaned under IPC provisions the Judicial Magistrate did not consider to invoke enabling provisions made in Chapter II of the M.V. Act to disqualify or suspend of cancel or to pass an order of the endorsement of the driving licence of the accused. I have already held in this judgment that inflicting of any one of the aforesaid subsidiary sentences would put the reckless drivers on tenterhook, as his licence would be liable to be cancelled for all the time. On this analogy I hold that although the conviction of the petitioner Under Sections 279, 304A and 337 of IPC are unsustainable in law, the same is not disturbed by me since the legality of the trial was not assailed by the petitioner at the early stage of the trial. However, since the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act prescribe the maximum prison sentence of six months I am persuaded to interfere with the sentence. However, since the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act prescribe the maximum prison sentence of six months I am persuaded to interfere with the sentence. In my considered opinion RI for six months coupled with disqualification/cancellation of driving licence for a period of one year as provided Under Sections 20 and 22 of the M.V. Act, 1988 would meet the ends of justice. 39. In the result, the revision petition stands dismissed. However, the sentence is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall undergo RI for six months and his driving licence shall stand cancelled and he shall also stand disqualified to drive any kind of motor vehicle for a period of one year. 40. The petitioner is directed to surrender in the Court of CJM, West Tripura, Agartala to serve out the sentence within a period of one month from today. The petitioner shall also surrender his driving licence to the CJM who shall forward the same to concerned DTO for making necessary endorsement in the driving licence. At the end of the one-year the driving licence shall be returned to the petitioner. 41. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Director General of Police, Tripura and of all other States under Gauhati High Court for information and issuing appropriate instructions to their subordinate officers that road traffic offences shall ordinarily and invariably be registered under various provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, subject to the just exception formulated in paragraph 37 in this judgment.