Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 2.7.2007 in A.S. No.23 of 2007 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram, confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.12.2006 in O.S. No.10 of 2004 on the file of Additional District Munsif Court, Padmanabhapuram. 2. The appellant in the present Appeal preferred a Suit in O.S. No.10 of 2004 before the Trial Court praying for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents herein, their men and employees and all those who claim right under them in any form or kind, whatsoever, from doing anything calculated to interfere or disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the appellant. 3. In the Plaint in O.S. No.10 of 2004, it is the case of the appellant as plaintiff that the suit property comprising old S. Nos.2948, 2950 and 2954 corresponding to Resurvey No.479 of Surulode Village having an extent of 100 acres belongs to the first respondent Thiruvaduthurai Adhinam. The first respondent owned several acres of land and the father of the appellant Michael Nadar took an extent of 265 acres of land on lease from the first respondent in 1950 and the suit property is a part of the said property. After taking the property on lease, Michael Nadar planted coconut trees and other fruit bearing trees in the property and he had also constructed rention walls for an approximate length of 2,000 feet over a period of 15 years since the commencement of lease. It is the further case of the appellant that the lease was renewed periodically by enhancing the rent and Michael Nadar also cultivated inter crops and tapioca being the main crop. Subsequently, Michael Nadar died on 06.12.2002 at the age of 102 and till the age of 95 years, Michael Nadar has been attending the property assisted by the appellant and in the year 2001 Michael Nadar made a request to the respondents, more particularly the third respondent to continue the lease in favour of the appellant and accordingly, from the year 2001 onwards, the appellant was recognized as the lessee of the suit property. The appellants father as well as the appellant paid the rent very regularly and that was also a reason for continuing the lease in favour of the appellant and his father for the last 40 years. The appellants father as well as the appellant paid the rent very regularly and that was also a reason for continuing the lease in favour of the appellant and his father for the last 40 years. However, the third respondent, who is authorised to receive the rent on behalf of the first respondent, never issued receipts in time and the appellant suspected the bona fides of the third respondent in delaying the issue of receipts and finally, the appellant was convinced that the respondents are attempting to dispossess him from the property, which resulted in filing the Suit for permanent prohibitory injunction. 4. The first respondent filed written statement and contested the claim of the appellant, wherein it is stated that the property was never let out to the plaintiff or his father and the respondents had only auctioned the right to take the improvements from the trees in the property like coconut trees, mango trees and other valuable trees and the respondents admitted the license granted in favour of the appellant to take the income for the Fasli years 1410, 1411 and 1412 on the basis of confirmation of auction in favour of the appellant on 16.03.2001. However, the first respondent emphatically denied the claim of lease made by the appellant, as according to the first defendant, the property was never subjected to lease either in favour of the appellant or his father and as such, the claim of lease is only a figment of imagination and is made for the sole purpose to continue in possession of the property. 5. The first respondent further contended in the written statement that the appellant along with others participated in the auction on 27.12.2003 and when he found that he could not match the amount of bid offered by the other bidders, he dropped out of the auction without completing the auction formalities and immediately, filed the Suit with untenable claims. The first respondent further averred in the written statement that in the auction held on 27.12.2003, one Mr. D.W. Sathish took the license for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- per year and in view of the litigation, the first respondent could not receive the auction amount from the new licensee. Accordingly, the first respondent prayed for dismissal of the Suit. 6. The first respondent further averred in the written statement that in the auction held on 27.12.2003, one Mr. D.W. Sathish took the license for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- per year and in view of the litigation, the first respondent could not receive the auction amount from the new licensee. Accordingly, the first respondent prayed for dismissal of the Suit. 6. The appellant filed a replication/additional pleadings, whereby he had denied the entire averments as contained in the written statement filed by the first respondent. The appellant reiterated his case that the subject matter of the transaction is only a lease and not a license as contended by the first respondent and for more than half a century, the schedule property has been continuously in the possession and enjoyment of Michael Nadar and after his demise, with the appellant and it was the further contention of the appellant that in case it is found that the appellant is only a licensee, then there may be a finding that the license is irrevocable on account of the substantial amount spent by the father of the appellant for construction of rention wall and for improving the property. 7. The Trial Court, on the basis of the respective pleadings, framed issues and taking into consideration the evidence adduced on the side of both parties, found that the transaction is only a license and after the expiry of the license period, the appellant has no right in respect of the suit property and as such, the appellant is not entitled for any relief and accordingly, dismissed the Suit as per judgment and decree dated 29.12.2006. 8. The judgment in O.S. No.10 of 2004 has been challenged by the appellant before the Subordinate Court, Padmanabhapuram in A.S. No.23 of 2007. The First Appellate Court framed point for determination and independently considered the pleadings and evidence and found that the appellant is only a licensee and his right is only to take the yielding from the trees and as the licence term expired long back, the appellant is not entitled for any relief much less the relief of injunction and dismissed the Appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 9. The judgment and decree dated 2.7.2007 in A.S. No.23 of 2007 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram is the subject matter of the present Second Appeal. 10. 9. The judgment and decree dated 2.7.2007 in A.S. No.23 of 2007 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram is the subject matter of the present Second Appeal. 10. This Court, while admitting the Second Appeal, framed the following substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether the Courts below erred in framing the issue as to the test of the documents whether the same is a lease or license ? (ii) Whether the Courts erred in dismissing the Suit for injunction wherein the possession of the appellant were proved and admitted ? and (iii) Whether the Courts below erred in applying the principles of prima-facie possession balance of convenience and comparative hardship while disposing of the case ?" 11. In the factual back ground of the case as narrated above, I have heard Mr. K. Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. V.K. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the father of the appellant and subsequently the appellant himself has been in possession and enjoyment of the property which is evident by Ex.A.1 series marked on the side of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, Michael Nadar as well as the appellant possessed the property by way of lease and they were permitted to make improvements in the property and in fact, they have also planted coconut trees and other valuable trees and as such, it cannot be said that the transaction is only license. The learned counsel further contended that while construing the document, the Court has to see the intention of the parties and taking into account the factum of continuous possession of the property by Michael Nadar and subsequently by the appellant, it cannot be said that they were in possession of the property only as a licensee and they have no interest in respect of the suit property, other than by way of taking improvements. 13. 13. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the first defendant is a public trust which is also a religious institution and there is nothing to show that the property was let out at any point of time to Michael Nadar or to the appellant by the first respondent and as such, it cannot be said that the appellant is entitled to be in possession of the property treating him as a lessee. The learned counsel further contended that the provisions of the Cultivating Tenants Act is not applicable to a public trust coming under the purview of Public Trust Act which is evident from the provisions of the Cultivating Tenants Act itself and as such, the appellant is not entitled to contend that he is a cultivating tenant under the first respondent. The learned counsel also contended that a perusal of the documents exhibited on either side shows that the transaction is only a license and the appellant and his father were permitted only to take the improvements and no right in respect of the land is given to them. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant is not entitled for an order of injunction, and on expiry of the period of license, he has absolutely no right to enter the property or to possess the same. 14. The only point in issue in the present Appeal pertains to the plea of lease as advanced by the appellant and the contrary plea that it was only a licence as urged on the side of the respondents. 15. The appellant mainly relies on Ex.A.1 series to show that Michael Nadar and subsequently, the appellant paid rent in respect of the suit property and as such, it is his contention that on the face of Ex.A.1, it cannot be said that the transaction is only license. On a perusal of Ex.A.1 shows that the payment made by Michael Nadar as well as the appellant was only towards the bid amount which is stated to be the license fee for the particular Fasli year. By no stretch of imagination, Ex.A.1 could be construed to be a document evidencing lease. All the receipts as found in Ex.A.1 shows that the appellant as well as his father made payments for the privilege taken by them, to take the improvements from the property. By no stretch of imagination, Ex.A.1 could be construed to be a document evidencing lease. All the receipts as found in Ex.A.1 shows that the appellant as well as his father made payments for the privilege taken by them, to take the improvements from the property. On the other hand, the voluminous document produced on the side of the respondents clearly shows that what was given to Michael Nadar as well as to the appellant was only the right to take improvements from the valuable trees situated in the suit property. Ex.B.4-auction notice dated 24.7.1984 shows that the first respondent had scheduled to conduct the auction for granting the privilege to take the improvements from the suit property and Exs.B.2 and B.3 shows that the appellant himself took the privilege for the period 1.7.1984 to 30.6.1985 on a consideration of Rs.40,000/- per year by participating in the auction conducted on 7.8.1984. However, the appellant disputed the said document and as such, his signature alone was marked in Exs.B.2 and B.3. 16. Similarly, Ex.B.7 is a document, whereby the license to take the improvements from the property was taken by Michael Nadar for the period 1.7.1985 to 30.06.1988 on payment of a sum of Rs.45,300/- per year. Ex.B.8 is another document, whereby Michael Nadar took the right to take the improvements for the period 1.7.1988 to 30.6.1991 at the rate of Rs.46,500/-per year. In fact, in Ex.B.8 Michael Nadar himself admitted that the property is in the possession and enjoyment of the first respondent. Ex.B.9 is another document whereby Michael Nadar got the right to take the improvements for the period 1.7.1991 to 30.6.1994 at the rate of Rs.47,500/- per year. Ex.B.10 is another document executed by Michael Nadar, whereby the right to take the yield from the property was given to him at the rate of Rs.50,000/-per year for the period 1.7.1994 to 30.6.1997. Ex.B.11 is the auction notice for grant of license for the period 1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000 issued by the first respondent. Ex.B.12 is the licence deed, whereby Michael Nadar took the license for the period 01.07.1997 to 30.6.2000 which was auctioned as per Ex.B.11 notice. 17. Ex.B.11 is the auction notice for grant of license for the period 1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000 issued by the first respondent. Ex.B.12 is the licence deed, whereby Michael Nadar took the license for the period 01.07.1997 to 30.6.2000 which was auctioned as per Ex.B.11 notice. 17. In the same way, Ex.B.18 was executed by the appellant himself on 2.7.2001, whereby he has taken the privilege to take the yield from the trees in the suit property for the period 1.7.2000 to 30.6.2003 on a consideration of Rs.70,000/- for the Fasli year 1410, Rs.80,500/- for the Fasli year 1411 and Rs.92,575/- for the Fasli year 1412. Ex.B.22 is a letter written by the appellant to the first respondent, wherein he has clearly stated that he was granted the license for the period 1410 to 1412 and there is an arrears of Rs.58,000/-and the appellant agreed to clear the dues on or before 30.10.2001. Ex.B.28 is the licence granted to one Sathish on 24.1.2004 for taking the yield from the trees in the suit property for the period 1.7.2003 to 30.6.2006 for the Fasli years 1413 to 1415 on consideration of payment of a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-per year for the Fasli year 1413, Rs.2,00,000/-per year for the Fasli year 1414 and Rs.2,00,000/- per year for the Fasli year 1415. 18. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent in M.P. No.1 of 2007 in S.A. No.819 of 2007, it is also stated that subsequent to Ex.B.28, there was another auction on 28.6.2007 for the Fasli years 1417, 1418 and 1419 and 24 participants took part and in the said auction, one S. Rajan was declared as the highest bidder, for a sum of Rs.9,20,000/-for each Fasli and he had also paid the amount on 5.7.2007 and took possession on 6.7.2007 and he is taking the yielding from the trees as a license holder. 19. The documents exhibited on the side of the respondents clearly shows that what was given to Michael Nadar and subsequently to the appellant was only a license to take usufructs from the trees in the suit property and the same cannot be treated to be a lease conferring right on the appellant in respect of the immovable property. 20. 19. The documents exhibited on the side of the respondents clearly shows that what was given to Michael Nadar and subsequently to the appellant was only a license to take usufructs from the trees in the suit property and the same cannot be treated to be a lease conferring right on the appellant in respect of the immovable property. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents also argued for the position that the first respondent being a public trust, the appellant cannot be heard to say that he is a cultivating tenant, as the said Act has no Application to the property of a public trust. On a perusal of the Plaint filed by the appellant, I am of the view that there is no need to consider the said issue, inasmuch as even the appellant has no such case before the lower Court that he is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the said Act. 21. The documents exhibited on the side of the appellant as well as the respondents have to be considered keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case. It is only when the exclusive possession is granted with certain interest in the property that the agreement could be construed to be as a lease so as to take away the document from the purview of a license. When the document exhibited on the side of the appellant as well as the respondents shows that the right is given only to use the land for the limited purpose of taking the improvements from the property, the same cannot be construed to be a lease entitling the holder to claim interest in the very land itself. When the right given to the appellant is only to collect the usufructs from the Thoppu, it can only be construed to be a license, as no interest is created in the land in favour of the appellant. 22. The fact that the appellant himself took part in the auction and was granted the privilege to take the improvements from the property for the period 1.7.2000 to 30.6.2003 as per Ex.B.18 dated 2.7.2001 clearly shows that the transaction is only a license and what ever right the appellant was having prior to 1.7.2000 has expired and he became the licensee from 1.7.2000 for the Fasli years 1410, 1411 and 1412. In fact, immediately prior to 1.7.1997 the licensee was Michael Nadar for the period from 1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000 as per Ex.B.11 auction notice and if all the circumstances are taken together, it would be clear that the appellant was licensed only to take the improvements from the property and by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that what was given to the appellant was only a lease. 23. The term ‘lease and license’ is often used to describe a particular transaction. While interpreting the term ‘lease or license’, with reference to a particular document, it is not the form, but the real substance which has to be taken into account. At times, a document may be described to be one of license, but in a sense, it may be added of lease and the intention of the parties also may have to create the relationship of landlord and tenant. While considering a document, it is always necessary to look into the intention of the parties and for the said purpose, the document as a whole has to be considered. It is not sufficient to look into the term used to describe the document. All the surroundings circumstances have to be looked into and an interpretation in accordance with the wishes of the parties to the agreement has to be given. By way of particular document, if an interest is created in favour of the other party, which is often called the lease hold interest, the transaction is only a lease. When there is a transfer of interest in land by way of a document and the intention of the parties are clear from the recitals in the document, the document is only a lease even if the transaction is described to be a license. On the other hand, if only, the right to use the property in a particular manner is given retaining the actual possession of the property with the owner, the transaction is only a license and the description of the transaction as a lease does not matter much. In the case of a license, legal possession is always with the owner. The licensee is conferred with the privilege to use the property in the manner indicated in the document. In the case of a license, legal possession is always with the owner. The licensee is conferred with the privilege to use the property in the manner indicated in the document. Therefore, the intention of the parties assumes significance, and instead of the form, the sum and substance of the agreement as a whole has to be given paramount consideration. 24. The appellant himself admitted in his letter in Ex.B.22 about his limited right in the suit property and it was his clear case in the said document that he was permitted to take the improvements for the Fasli years 1410 to 1412 and in case the balance is not paid on or before 30.10.2001, the first respondent would be at liberty to cancel the right granted to him. The subsequent document in Ex.B.28 shows that the license was granted to one Sathish which was followed by a fresh auction concluded in favour of another bidder, by name S. Rajan sand on payment of the bid amount of Rs.9,20,000/-, the successful bidder took possession of property on 06.07.2007. In the face of all these documents, which clearly shows that the transaction is only a license, it cannot be said that the appellant is a lessee and he is entitled to protect his possession by way of prohibitory injunction. I do not find any merit in the contention of the appellant and the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. 25. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed.