JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. The judgment of August 6, 2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in FAO No.386 of 2007 is assailed in this Letters Patent Appeal. In the FAO an order of September 9, 2005 passed by the Ad hoc Addl. District Judge, FTC-III, Bhubaneswar in Interim Application No.12 of 2005 arising out of C.S. No.498 of 2004 appointing a receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called ‘CPC’) was assailed. 2. The question of maintainability of the LPA against the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court was raised in course of hearing of the LPA. It was pointed out at the Bar that there had been two sets of directly conflicting judgments of Division Benches of this Court, inasmuch as in the case of V.N.N. Panicker v. Narayan Pati & Anr., 2006 (II) OLR 349 , a Division Bench had taken the view that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintain¬able in view of amendment of Section 100-A CPC against the judg¬ment/order of a learned Single Judge. Similar view was also taken by another Division Bench in the case of Ramesh Ch. Das v. Ki¬shore Ch. Das & Ors., 2007 (Suppl-I) OLR 1110. But then in the case of Birat Chandra Dagara v. Taurian Exim Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2006 (II) OLR 344 , a Division Bench had held that such an appeal was maintainable. In order to resolve the aforesaid controversy this Full Bench has been constituted. 3. In course of hearing, submission was made at the Bar to resolve the controversy as to whether Writ Appeals are main¬tainable against orders passed in Writ Petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and also with regard to orders passed under Special Acts. Law being well settled that a Bench dealing with a specific reference can extend the scope of such reference, to avoid inconsistency this Bench felt it just and proper also to deal with such aspect. Consequently the case was adjourned so as to enable the Bar to address with regard to maintainability of Writ Appeals and LPAs against the orders/judg¬ments in matters arising out of Special Acts. 4. Consequently the case was adjourned so as to enable the Bar to address with regard to maintainability of Writ Appeals and LPAs against the orders/judg¬ments in matters arising out of Special Acts. 4. In the case of V.N.N. Panicker (supra) the question of maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC was considered by a Division Bench. The disputes arose out of C.S. No.131 of 2005 which was one for declaration and other ancillary reliefs. Along with the plaint, a petition was filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC praying for interim injunction. The trial Court had re¬strained the defendants by way of an ad interim injunction. Being aggrieved by the said order, defendant No.1 had preferred FAO No.298 of 2005 before this Court. The learned Single Judge dis¬posed of the FAO partly confirming the order of the trial Court and making certain observations. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge a Letters Patent Appeal was filed. 5. It was contended before the Division Bench that not¬withstanding the provisions of Section 100-A CPC, the appeal was maintainable. In support of such submission the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sathappan (dead) by L.Rs v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 5152 as well as the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Birat Chandra Dagara v. M.S. Taurian Exim Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (supra). 6. In P.S. Sathappan case (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows : “In this context, reference may be made to Section 100- A. The present Section 100-A was amended in 2002. It is thus to be seen that when the Legislature wanted to exclude a Letters Patent Appeal, it specifically did so. The words used in Section 100-A are not by way of abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002, a specific exclusion is provided as the Legislature knew that in the absence of such words a Letters Patent Appeal would not be barred. The Legislature was aware that it had incor¬porated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and incorporated in S. 4 in the CPC. Thus, now a specific exclusion was provid¬ed. The Legislature was aware that it had incor¬porated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and incorporated in S. 4 in the CPC. Thus, now a specific exclusion was provid¬ed. To be noted that here again the Legislature has provided for a specific exclusion. it must be stated that now by virtue of Section 100-A no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. However, it is an admitted position that the law which would prevail would be the law at the relevant time. At the relevant time neither Section 100-A nor Section 104(2) barred a Letters Patent Appeal. Applying the above principle to the facts of this case, the appeal under CI.15 of the Letters Patent is an appeal provided by a law for the time being in force. Therefore, the finality contemplated by Sub-section (2) of S. 104 did not attach to an appeal passed under such law.” (Emphasis supplied). 7. The Division Bench of this Court in the V.N.N. Panicker case (supra) in view of the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court in P.S. Sathappan case (supra) held that by virtue of Section 100-A CPC no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable if the order of the trial Court which was appealed against in an appeal filed under Section 104 CPC was passed after insertion of Section 100-A by amendment which came into force with effect from 1st July, 2002. In view of the fact that the order against which the LPA was filed was passed after 1.7.2002, the Letters Patent Appeal was held to be not maintainable. 8. The question of maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of learned Single Judge was raised before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Birat Chan¬dra Dagara (supra). The said Letters Patent Appeal was filed challenging the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in FAO No.270 of 2003 which was one under Order 43, Rule 1(r) CPC assailing an order granting temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The Division Bench referred to para-32 of the decision in Sathappan case (supra) and held that the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents against maintainability of the LPA could not be accepted. The Division Bench referred to para-32 of the decision in Sathappan case (supra) and held that the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents against maintainability of the LPA could not be accepted. But then the Division Bench lost sight of the observation made in para-12 of the said judgment wherein it was held that maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge passed in an appeal under Section 104 CPC depended on the fact as to when the original order appealed against before the learned Single Judge was passed. In other words, if the same was passed before amendment/insertion of Section 100-A CPC, the bar would not stand in the way of main¬tainability. 9. A similar question again came up before another Divi¬sion Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Ch. Das v. Kishore Ch. Das & Ors., 2007 (Suppl-I) OLR 1110. In the said case also an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in two appeals, i.e. FAO No.274 of 2006 and FAO No.286 of 2006 arising out of order dated 3.7.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (SD), Bhubaneswar in T.S. No.223 of 1990 was assailed. The dispute in the said Appeal was with regard to appointment of a receiver. The trial judge had removed appellant Ramesh from receivership and had declined to appoint any of the plaintiffs as receiver. The trial judge had discharged defendant No.1 Kishore Ch. Das from receivership. Thus both Ramesh and Kishore had preferred the aforesaid two FAOs. The learned Single Judge disposed of both the Appeals by a common judgment appointing plaintiff No.2 as receiver in place of defendant No.1 and imposing certain restrictions. The said order was assailed in LPA. 10. Debate arose with regard to maintainability of the LPA in view of Section 100-A CPC. The Division Bench took note of earlier decisions of different Division Benches of this Court such as, Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Talcher & Ors., v. Tan¬kadhar Mana Bhoi & Ors., 2003 (Suppl) OLR 337; Birat Ch. The said order was assailed in LPA. 10. Debate arose with regard to maintainability of the LPA in view of Section 100-A CPC. The Division Bench took note of earlier decisions of different Division Benches of this Court such as, Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Talcher & Ors., v. Tan¬kadhar Mana Bhoi & Ors., 2003 (Suppl) OLR 337; Birat Ch. Dagara (supra) and the case of V.N.N. Panicker (supra), but relying upon the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiash Choudhury & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 540 came to the conclusion that the vested right of appeal can be taken away by subsequent legislative enactment either expressly or even by necessary intendment. This Court further observed that a right of appeal being a creature of stat¬ute, it can be controlled, modified or even taken away by stat¬ute. 11. Mr. Sarangi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Birat Chandra Dagara (supra) forcefully submitted that a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed by the Single Judge in an appeal filed under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC is maintainable. The said proposition is repudiated by Mr. Routray, learned coun¬sel appearing for the respondent, relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of V.N.N. Panicker (supra) as well as Ramesh Ch. Das (supra). 12. No doubt there is conflict between the conclusions arrived at by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Birat Chandra Dagra (supra) in one hand and the conclusions ar¬rived at by two other Division Benches in the case of V.N.N. Panicker and Ramesh Chandra Das (supra). Thus the moot question which needs determination is as to whether in consonance with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent read with the Orissa High Court Order, 1948, this Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained in view of amendment of the CPC by the Amendment Act 22 of 2002 after 1st July, 2002. 13. Before proceeding further, it would be prudent to quote the relevant portion of Section 104 of the Code. “104. 13. Before proceeding further, it would be prudent to quote the relevant portion of Section 104 of the Code. “104. Orders from which appeal lies - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force from no other orders : (Clause (a) to (f) omitted) (ff) an order under Section 35-A; (ff-a) an order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under Section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree. (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules; Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order speci¬fied in Clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.” 14. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinaf¬ter called ‘the Code’ was inserted by Amendment Act 104 of 1976. The said Section read as follows :- “S.100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstand¬ing anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or orders is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.” The said Section was again amended by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 as follows :- “S.100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstand¬ing anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force,- (a) where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided. (b) Where any writ, direction or order is issued or made on an application under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, by a single Judge of High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge. This amendment was however not given effect to. Again Section 100-A of the Code was amended by Act 22 of 2002 and the amended Section reads as follows : “100-A. No further appeal in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original, or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge.” 15. In the case of Garikapti Veeraya (supra), the Supreme Court after considering various decisions has formulated the following propositions : (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all con¬nected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actual¬ly exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the insti¬tution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 16. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Saha Babulal Khimji v. Jayaban D. Kania & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1786 had elaborately dealt with this aspect. In that case an appeal was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court (which is pari materia to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent governing this Court). Against the judgment of a trial Court in a suit tried on original side of the High Court refusing to appoint a receiver and to grant injunction. That appeal was held to be not maintainable on the ground that the order impugned was not a judgment within the meaning of Section 15 of the Letters Patent. An appeal being filed, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the correct¬ness of the said decision. Before the Supreme Court it was con¬tended that the provisions of Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 CPC, 1908 does not impose any bar on the trial held by trial judge. Thus by virtue of these provisions, it was observed that the order impugned falls squarely under Clauses (r) and (s) of Order 43 Rule 1 CPC and was appealable to larger Bench. The ratio of this decision shall however not be applicable in view of subsequent amendment of S. 100-A by the 2002 Amendment Act. 17. In the case of Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, APSRTC & Anr., AIR 2003 AP 458 , a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follows : “We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100-A of the Code in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything con¬tained in the Letters Patent ......”. A Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court while dealing with a similar question in the case of Laxminarayan v. Shivlal Gujar & Ors., AIR 2003 MP 49 , came to the conclusion that LPA against an order passed by a single Judge shall not be main¬tainable. 18. A Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court while dealing with a similar question in the case of Laxminarayan v. Shivlal Gujar & Ors., AIR 2003 MP 49 , came to the conclusion that LPA against an order passed by a single Judge shall not be main¬tainable. 18. In the case of P.S. Sathappan (supra), the Supreme Court held that by Section 100A introduced by 2002 Amendment to the Code a specific exclusion has been contemplated. It was observed that by virtue of Section 100-A no Letters Patent Appeal against original or appellate judgment/decree/order of a learned Single Judge would be maintainable. 19. In the case of Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 2004 Ker 111 , a Full Bench of Kerala High Court also arrived at a conclusion that after the amendment of Section 100-A of the Code no litigant can have a substantive right for a further appeal on the ground that the proceedings from which that appeal arises was initiated prior to 1st July, 2002. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutt v. Rubby General Hospital Ltd., (2006) 7 SCC 61, taking note of the Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi (supra) and Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai (supra) not only approved the ratio of the said two decisions but also observed as follows : “Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by a single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. It is further observed that the amendment has taken away the power of the Letters Patent in the matter where the learned Single Judge hears an appeal from the original order.” 21. In the case of Kamala Devi v. Khushal Kanwar & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 66, the Supreme Court held that only a Letters Patent filed prior to coming into force of the 2002 Amendment Act would be maintainable. 22. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement it is no more res integra that a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. 22. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement it is no more res integra that a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a con¬flict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment (see Union of India v. G.M. Kokil, AIR 1984 SC 1022 ). 23. The Constitutional validity of the above amendment came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Salem Bar Advocate Association, Tamil Nadu, etc. v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 189 , Paragraphs 13 to 15 of that judgment deals with the question of validity of Section 100-A of the Code and its validi¬ty was upheld. 24. The second contention advanced by Mr. Sarangi was that even if it is assumed that Letters Patent was a special law and would override provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the power under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 being no way inconsistent with the provision of Letters Patent the High Court can entertain Letters Patent Appeals. 25. After going through the history of Section 104, the Supreme Court arrived at the following conclusions : (1) That there is no inconsistency between Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 and the appeals under the Letters Patent and there is nothing to show that the Letters Patent in any way excludes or overrides the application of Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 or to show that these provisions would not apply to internal appeals within the High Court; and (2) Even if it be assumed that Order 43, Rule 1 does not apply to Letters Patent Appeal, the principles governing these provisions would apply by process of analogy. In short, what was really held in Babulal case (supra) is that the provisions finding place in the Letters Patent as well as Section 104 of the Code co-exist and one would not override the other. 26. In short, what was really held in Babulal case (supra) is that the provisions finding place in the Letters Patent as well as Section 104 of the Code co-exist and one would not override the other. 26. The same controversy was also resolved by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Barendra alias Barendra Kumar Majhi v. Sitamani Bewa and others, 74 (1992) CLT 389. After discussing the law involved this Court held : “The very fact that the Legislature thought it necessary to bring Section 100A in the statute book shows that but for it Section 104 (2) of the Code would not have saved the purpose sought to be achieved by Section 100A. A perusal of the Section shows that it barred further appeal from any order of a Single Judge passed inter alia in any appeal....” (Emphasis added). 27. It would be worthwhile to mention that the said Full Bench was dealing with provisions of Section 100-A was introduced by 1976 Amendment Act restricting only to an appellate order, whereas by 2002 Amendment the said scope was expanded also to original or appellate judgment, decrees and orders. 28. Mr. Sarangi further submitted that Section 100-A of the Code as amended by the 2002 Amendment Act having stipulated “No further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge” cannot be stretched to orders passed under Section 104 also, and the decision of a Single Judge in such appeal being orders can be assailed in LPA. One of the contention raised by Mr. Sarangi is that the restrictions of Section 100-A CPC relate to only judgments and decrees. He submitted that the orders passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC cannot be construed as judgment or decree and hence the bar imposed shall not be ap¬plicable. In the case of ERMC Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 883 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the expression ‘judgment’ observed that the said expression has not been defined in Letters Patent. It is well settled that the definition of ‘judgment’ in Section 2(9) CPC is “much wider and more liberal”. In the case of ERMC Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 883 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the expression ‘judgment’ observed that the said expression has not been defined in Letters Patent. It is well settled that the definition of ‘judgment’ in Section 2(9) CPC is “much wider and more liberal”. In the said judgment it is pointed out that intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43,Rule 1 and also such other orders which possess the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceed¬ing. The contention of Mr. Sarangi is therefor not tenable. 29. To appreciate the argument it would also be prudent to refer to amended Section 100-A of the Code which clearly stipu¬lates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word “judgment” as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 CPC a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. It is no more res integra that an order under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC is an interlocutory judgment although it does not qualify the term of a judgment in terms of Section 2(9) CPC. (See- ERMC Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 883 ; and Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda and others, AIR 2006 SC 2190 ). 30. Being confronted with the decision in P.S. Sathappan (supra), Mr. Sarangi submitted that Section 100A as amended by 2002 Amendment was not an issue in the said decision. Their Lordships had only referred to Section 100A by way of an example and, as such, the said example cannot be construed to be a prece¬dent. 31. The aforesaid submission of Mr. Being confronted with the decision in P.S. Sathappan (supra), Mr. Sarangi submitted that Section 100A as amended by 2002 Amendment was not an issue in the said decision. Their Lordships had only referred to Section 100A by way of an example and, as such, the said example cannot be construed to be a prece¬dent. 31. The aforesaid submission of Mr. Sarangi also cannot be accepted mainly on the ground that perusal of the case of P.S. Sathappan (supra) clearly reveals that the Supreme Court dealt with the provision of Section 100-A CPC and its nature, charac¬ter, effect, sequence and consequences elaborately. Even other¬wise it is too late in a day to submit that the discussion made by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court even if construed to be an obiter dictum cannot be obeyed or followed. Sometimes well considered obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is taken as prece¬dents and binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. (See Saroon Singh Lamba v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 546 ). In the case of Municipal Committee v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1087 , the Supreme Court observed that obiter dicta of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding. 32. Mr. B.R. Routray, learned counsel for the respondents, relying on P.S. Sathappan case (supra) submitted that the legis¬lature in its wisdom wanted to exclude Letters Patent Appeal to minimize the delay in disposals. Considering the bar provided under Section 104 CPC and also the provisions of Section 100-A CPC prior to 2002 Amendment, the Supreme Court came to the con¬clusion that by express stipulations made in mention in Section 104(2) a Letters Patent Appeal is also prohibited and, as such, it must be held that by virtue of Section 100-A no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. 33. Referring to Mallimath Committee Report, Mr. Routray, submitted that right to appeal should be curtailed and only one appellate forum should be available and, therefore, the learned Single Judge having exercised the original or appellate jurisdic¬tion, an appeal contemplated under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable. In support of such submission Mr. Routray relied upon the decision reported vide Kamal Kr. Dutta and others v. Ruby General Hospital & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 613 . In support of such submission Mr. Routray relied upon the decision reported vide Kamal Kr. Dutta and others v. Ruby General Hospital & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 613 . In para-19 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that Section 100-A CPC starts with a non obstante clause to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in Letters Patent for any High Court, or in any other instrument having the force of law, or in any other law for the time being in force, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decid¬ed by a Single Judge of High Court. Therefore by virtue of the latest amendment of CPC, Letters Patent or intra-Court Appeal will not lie when the learned Single Judge has exercised appel¬late jurisdiction. The same view has also been expressed in the case of Subal Paul v. Malina Paul (2003) 10 SCC 361 , wherein it was observed that “whenever the statute provides such a bar, it is so expressly stated “when appear from Section 100-A CPC”. According to Mr. Routray, Letters Patent Appeal is the charter under which the High Court is established. The power given to High Court in Letters Patent is akin to the Constitu¬tional power of High Court, but then subject to restriction stipulated under Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34. The only other issue that needs consideration is as to whether against an order or judgment passed by a Single Judge in a Writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Con¬stitution a Writ Appeal lies to a Division Bench or not. 35. In the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors. v. Smt. Radhika Bai & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1272 , the Supreme Court being confronted with such a problem held : “Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Bishnu Kamat v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , before this Court of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chap¬ter XVII of the appellate side rules or against decrees or orders of Courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chap¬ter XVII of the appellate side rules or against decrees or orders of Courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter in the final order the Court gives ancil¬lary direction which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive the party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226.” 36. In the case of Kanhaiyalal Agrawal & Ors. v. Factory Manager, Gwallior Sugar & Co., (2001) 9 SCC 609 , the Supreme Court held that if the Single Judge of a High Court in considering the question under Articles 226 and 227 does not state under which provision he has decided the matter and how the facts satisfied filing of petition both under Articles 226 and 227 and the peti¬tion so filed is dismissed on merit, the matter may be considered in proper perspective in appeal. The said controversy was also dealt with by before this Court and the Supreme Court in the cases of - Rashamani Dei v. Naba Kishore Acharya, 2005 (II) OLR 779 ; Chunta v. State, 1992 (I) OLR 139; Birendra v. Sitamani, (34) OJD (Civil) 473, Naresh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 ; Gobinda v. Rama, 85(1998) CLT 61; Mahadeo v. Puna, (1995) 3 SCC 33 ; and Shiv v. M/s. Swaraj, 2003 (I) OLR (SC) 673. 37. 37. Relying on a number of decisions it was held that the legislative intention and the public policy in bringing amendment of CPC are for attaining finality to a lis by cutting short the provisions which would otherwise be misutilised by litigant for prolonging the litigation to the prejudice of the opponent and as such this Court held that no appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge passed on an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable before a Division Bench. A similar view was also expressed by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Manoj Kumar v. Board of Revenue & Ors., AIR 2008 MP 22 . 38. In the case of Susanta Kumar Roy v. Meera Roy, AIR 2007 Orissa 26, a Division Bench of this Court held that just mention¬ing Article 227 of the Constitution in the cause-title does not render the petition as one filed under the said Article. The specific case for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court must be made out to come to a conclusion whether a Writ Appeal is maintainable or not. 39. Mr. S.S. Rao while supporting the arguments advanced by Mr. Routray added that the Legislature intended to exclude Let¬ters Patent Appeal and specifically did so by introduction of Section 100-A to the Code by 2002 Amendment Act. A reading of the provision clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature for specific exclusion of appeal against judgment/decree/order passed by a learned Single Judge. In other words, according to Mr. Rao by virtue of Section 100-A no Letters Patent Appeal is maintain¬able. According to him, a Writ Appeal will also not be maintain¬able against an order/judgment passed by a learned Single Judge in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution; whereas the said bar does not apply to Writ Appeals filed against orders/judgments passed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Consti¬tution. 40. Dr. A.K. Rath relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 , submitted that jurisdiction to issue Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is original and distinct from appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It may be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction. 40. Dr. A.K. Rath relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 , submitted that jurisdiction to issue Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is original and distinct from appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It may be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction. A Writ assailing an order of a learned Single Judge in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 shall very much lie and the said order is thus appealable. Relying upon the decision in the case of Babubhai Mujibhai Patel v. Nandalal Khodidas Barot & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 2105 , Dr. Rath submitted that the words “as far as it can be made applica¬ble” appearing in Section 141 CPC make it clear that in applying various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court must taken into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved party. If the procedure of a suit is also to be adhered to in the case of a Writ Petition the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpen¬sive remedy will be defeated. A Writ Petition under Article 226 is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into a pro¬ceeding arising out of a petition under Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief the question of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues of both facts and law. When a petition raises complex questions of fact which may for determination require oral evidence to be taken and the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a Writ Petition, it may decline to entertain the same. Basing upon such decisions, he argued that the provisions of Section 100-A CPC do not stand as a bar in the aforesaid context. Dr. Rath also forcefully submitted that even an obiter dictum of a Supreme Court judgment will be binding on High Court. Basing upon such decisions, he argued that the provisions of Section 100-A CPC do not stand as a bar in the aforesaid context. Dr. Rath also forcefully submitted that even an obiter dictum of a Supreme Court judgment will be binding on High Court. This aspect having been dealt with earlier, we do not dilate the same. 41. In reply, relying upon the decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Ch. Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 , Mr. Sarangi submitted that the provisions of CPC are not applicable to Writ Petitions and there is no bar for entertaining Writ Appeals against orders/judgments passed by a learned Single Judge. 42. In the case of J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, AIR 1997 SC 113 , it was observed that while exercising jurisdiction to consider a matter on merit, if a learned Single Judge travels beyond the scope and makes observation beyond the scope of the issues raised, then a Division Bench of the same Court would have jurisdiction to correct the mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. The said decision was in a case under Contempt of Courts Act. In consonance with Section 19 of the said Act an appeal lies to the Supreme Court against an order imposing pun¬ishment by High Court. A learned Single Judge however did not pass any order punishing the respondent for violation of any order of the High Court. However, he made certain observations. The Supreme Court held that against the observations made as no appeal lay, a Writ Appeal could be entertained. 43. The only other question that needs consideration is with regard to Letters Patent Appeal against judgment/orders passed by a learned Single Judge so far as Special Acts are concerned. It is no more res integra that a right of appeal is a conferred right and not an inherent right as has been recognised by a catena of decisions, e.g. Garika Pati case (supra) as well as State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films, AIR 1960 SC 890. It has been held that a right of appeal once conferred is a vested right and not merely a procedural right and in view of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it is clear that the said right is preserved until the said right is extinguished by a newly intro¬duced provision. 44. It has been held that a right of appeal once conferred is a vested right and not merely a procedural right and in view of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it is clear that the said right is preserved until the said right is extinguished by a newly intro¬duced provision. 44. In Kamal Kumar Dutta case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed : “So far as the general proposition of law is concerned that the appeal is a vested right, there is no quarrel with the propo¬sition. But it is clarified that such right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intend¬ment. The Parliament while amending Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002 took away the Letters Patent power of the High Court in the matter of appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge to the Division Bench.” (Emphasis supplied). 45. We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100-A CPC in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything con¬tained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instru¬ments having the force of law - be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a learned single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a learned Single Judge. 46. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court we are of the view that after introduction of Section 100-A with effect from 1.7.2002, no Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a learned Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. 47. 46. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court we are of the view that after introduction of Section 100-A with effect from 1.7.2002, no Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a learned Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. 47. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties patiently, noted the citations carefully, perused the materials meticulously and considered the submissions pragmatically and for the discussions made above, we have arrived at the following conclusions : (1) After introduction of Section 100-A in the Code of Civil Procedure by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against a judgment/order/decree passed by a learned Single Judge of a High Court. (2) The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Birat Ch. Dagra case (supra) has not laid down the correct position of law. On the other hand, the conclusions arrived at by Division Benches of this Court in V.N.N. Panicker and Ramesh Ch. Das cases (supra) are held to be good law and are confirmed. (3) A Writ Appeal shall lie against the judgment/orders passed by a learned Single Judge in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a Writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a Writ Appeal will lie, whereas no Writ Appeal will lie against judgment/order/decree passed by a single Judge exer¬cising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Consti¬tution. (4) No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against judgment/order passed by a learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of Special Acts. The reference to the Full Bench is accordingly answered. Dr. B.S.CHAUHAN, CHIEF JUSTICE I agree. L. MOHAPATRA, J. I agree. Reference answered.