SANTOSH BORA, J.:- By this application; the applicants viz. Manik, Sanjay and Sharnu, who are real brothers inter-se, pray for: their release on bail pending hearing and final disposal of their Criminal Appeal N 0.566/2006. 2. At the outset, we say that, the present application can be said to be third application for bail and thus, this is subsequent application and commonly known as successive application. We, therefore, raised a preliminary objection for hearing of the application by this bench, when one of the Hon'ble Judges, who decided the previous bail application is available to decide this application. However, learned counsel Shri. V. D. Sapkal insists for hearing of this application by this bench. We, therefore, allowed him to argue this application to the extent to satisfy us that we can hear this application and this is why, we heard learned counsel Shri. V. D. Sapkal for the applicants as well as learned APP Shri. K. B. Chaudhari to the extent of preliminary objection raised by us. 3. Background facts, which are not in dispute, can be stated as under: 4. The applicants were arrested on 30/1112004 in connection with offences punishable under Sections 302, 324 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC vide Crime No.128 of 2004 at Murum Police Station in Osmanabad District. After investigation of the said crime, the applicants and other co-accused were charged and tried in Sessions Case No.8/2005 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Omerga. The applicants were found guilty by the Sessions Court for the offences of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and as such, in view of the provisions of Section 302, Part-II of the IPC, they were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for seven years and required to pay fine of Rs.3,000/- each, with default clause. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court, the applicants preferred appeal under Sub-section 2 of Section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court. 6. The punishment awarded to the applicants was less than 10 years. The appeal was placed for hearing on admission as well as for consideration of their application for bail before the Single Judge [Hon'ble Shri. Justice M. G. Gaikwad]. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment & order passed by the Sessions Court in acquitting the applicants/accused, from the charge of murder, the State Govt. The appeal was placed for hearing on admission as well as for consideration of their application for bail before the Single Judge [Hon'ble Shri. Justice M. G. Gaikwad]. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment & order passed by the Sessions Court in acquitting the applicants/accused, from the charge of murder, the State Govt. also filed an application for seeking Leave to file an appeal as envisaged under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It seems that, when the bail plea and the appeal filed by the applicants came up for hearing before the Single Judge, as per the Rules viz. Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, the objection was raised on behalf of the Public Prosecutor that, the State has also filed an application for seeking leave to file an appeal against the order of acquittal of the applicants from the offence of murder i.e. under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Single Judge was pleased to reject the application for bail filed by the applicants. Said application was rejected as Criminal Application No.2422/2006 in Criminal Appeal No.566/2006. Said application was registered on 5/10/2006. As mentioned above, the application for leave to file an appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court. Again, it must be said that, as per the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, such an application is required to be heard by the Division Bench. The Division Bench was pleased to grant Leave to file an appeal in favour of the State of the Maharashtra. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal filed by the State Govt. was registered as Criminal Appeal No.664/2006. The State's appeal was admitted in view of the fact that State application for leave to file appeal was accepted by this court. The applicants moved another application for bail. This can be termed as second application or successive application. Obviously, said application bearing Criminal Application No.702/2007 was heard by the Division Bench [Po V. Hardas and S. P. Kukday, JJ]. After hearing, the Division Bench was pleased to reject the said application with speaking order on 6/3/2007. The applicants moved another application for bail. This can be termed as second application or successive application. Obviously, said application bearing Criminal Application No.702/2007 was heard by the Division Bench [Po V. Hardas and S. P. Kukday, JJ]. After hearing, the Division Bench was pleased to reject the said application with speaking order on 6/3/2007. It is, thereafter, the present application to which we term as successive or subsequent application came up before us for hearing and as stated above, we raised the preliminary objection for hearing of this application by this Bench and requested the learned counsel Shri. V. D. Sapkal to move the application before the Bench presided over by Hon'ble Shri. Justice P. V. Hardas, who is available to hear the application. 8. At this stage, we must mention that, on 29/2/2008, Standing Order is passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court, which is as under STANDING ORDER The Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to direct as under: "The second and successive bail application by a particular accused/applicant be placed before the same Judge, who had entertained! rejected the first/earlier bail application filed by the same accused, where the Honble Judge holding the regular assignment directs the matter to be so placed before the Judge, who had entertained/rejected the earlier bail application." High Court By Order Appellate Side 29th Feb., 2008 Sd/- [CO V. Bhadang] Registrar-Judl-I 9. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS The learned counsel Shri. V.D. Sapkal for the applicants vehemently submits that, the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the applicants is of limited term/duration of seven years and as applicants have already undergone substantive period of sentence [42 months], it would be just and proper to release them on bail as their substantive criminal appeal may not be heard by this court for considerable period of time, by which, the applicants may complete even the sentence awarded to them and in that event, hearing of an appeal would be a mere formality. He contends that, it may cause grievous prejudice and miscarriage of justice to the applicant. He rightly placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in case of Bhagwan Ram Shinde Gosai & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat [ AIR 1999 SC 1859 ]; Prem Sahwney Vs. Custodian and anr. [2001 AIR SCW 5130] and Sompal Singh Vs. Sunil Rathi & anr. He rightly placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in case of Bhagwan Ram Shinde Gosai & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat [ AIR 1999 SC 1859 ]; Prem Sahwney Vs. Custodian and anr. [2001 AIR SCW 5130] and Sompal Singh Vs. Sunil Rathi & anr. [ AIR 2005 SC 1483 : (2005 ALL MR (Cri) 792 (S.C.»]. He is at pains to point out recent amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of provisions of Section 436-A of the Code and contends that, spirit behind the said provision must be considered and the applicants may be released on bail. Lastly, Shri. V. D. Sapkal, learned counsel, with his usual fairness, did not fail to state that, he has no objection for hearing of this bail plea by the Bench presided over by the Hon'ble Single Judge or Judges, as the case may be, who decided and rejected previous bail application. He contends that, in his view, there is fresh cause of action or new ground for seeking the bail and as such, this bench can very well hear this application. He says that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this application cannot be termed to be successive or subsequent application. 10. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION Learned APP Shri. K. B. Chaudhari submits that at least propriety requires that this application is heard by the Honble Judge or Judges, as the case may be, who is available to hear this application and this would be in keeping with the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Harjeet Singh @ Seeta, appellant Vs. State of Punjab & another, respondents [ AIR 2002 SC 281 ]: (2002)1 SCC 649 : (2002 ALL MR (Cri) 725 (S.C.» as well as in view of the latest Standing Order dt.2912/2008 issued by the Hon 'ble Chief Justice of this court. He further submits that, as the appeal filed by the State Govt. State of Punjab & another, respondents [ AIR 2002 SC 281 ]: (2002)1 SCC 649 : (2002 ALL MR (Cri) 725 (S.C.» as well as in view of the latest Standing Order dt.2912/2008 issued by the Hon 'ble Chief Justice of this court. He further submits that, as the appeal filed by the State Govt. for seeking conviction of the applicants for culpable homicide amounting to murder is admitted by the Division Bench and the bail plea of the applicants/accused was rejected not only by the learned Single Bench but also by the Division Bench presided over by Justice P. V. Hardas, who is available for hearing of this application on its merit or for considering whether the grounds raised can be treated to be a fresh cause of action. The State has objection of hearing of this application by this bench. 11. POINTS DETERMINATION Whether this 3rd application for bail, which can be termed as successive or subsequent application, can be heard by this bench, when the Hon'ble Judge [Hon'ble Shri. Justice P. V. Hardas] who decided and rejected the previous bail application is available for hearing the present application? Answer - Negative. We, therefore, simply say that please move the Registry for placing the application before the Hon'ble Judge [Hon'ble Shri. Justice P. V. HardasJ who decided the previous application. 12. REASONS It would be useful to note the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para nos.8, 9 and 10 in case of Harjeet Singh's case (2002 ALL MR (Cri) 725 (S.C.)) cited supra as under: "8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is justified one. It was not open to the other Judge of the High Court to sit in appeal against the order passed by co-ordinate bench of the same Court. If the accused had obtained bail order by misrepresentation or by suppression of facts, it was for the State Government or the aggrieved party to approach the appropriate higher forum. In any case, for cancellation of the bail on the ground of misrepresentation or misstatement, the matter ought to have been placed before the same Judge. 9. The law on this aspect is well settled. In any case, for cancellation of the bail on the ground of misrepresentation or misstatement, the matter ought to have been placed before the same Judge. 9. The law on this aspect is well settled. In Shahzad Hasan Khan V s. Ishitaq Hasan Khan [ (1987)2 SCC 684 J, while dealing with the subsequent bail application, this Court observed, "Normally, this Court does not interfere with bail matters and the orders of the High court are generally accepted to be final relating to grant or rejection of bai1". Thereafter, the Court stated that longstanding convention and judicial discipline require that subsequent bail application ought to have been placed before the same Judge who had passed earlier orders. Placing of such matters before the same Judge has its roots in principle as it prevents abuse of process of Court in as much as an impression is not created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a Court depending on whether the Court is to his liking or not, and is encouraged to file successive applications without any new factor having cropped up; if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders. The Court finally observed that judicial discipline requires that such matters should be placed before the same Judge, if he is available for orders. Same principle is required to be followed even for setting aside the order passed by the Court granting bail on the ground of misrepresentation or misstatement or suppression of some facts. 10. Further, in Vikramjit Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [1992 Supply (3) SCC 62J, dealing with similar situation, this Court observed as under: “..... No Bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate bench of the same Court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate Court over its decision. That which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. Otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before another bench and there would not be any end to such attempts. That which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. Otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before another bench and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by Courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary ..." 13. Learned Counsel Shri. V.D. Sapkal heavily placed reliance on the decision of the Apex court in case of Mehboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra [2004 Cri.LJ.1359J. We have gone through the factual situation in the said matter before adverting to the observations of the Apex court. In the said case, the accused who were charged and were tried before the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307,147, 148, 149, 295-A, 427, 435 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 25(4) of the Arms Act, 1959. There initial bail application was rejected by the Sessions Court. The accused then approached to the Bombay High Court and the High Court [So S. Parkar, J.] released the accused on bail on certain conditions. Thus, there was conditional bail order. As there was breach of the conditions by the accused as was as misrepresentation or suppression of the facts, the prosecution moved for cancellation of the bail application before the Bombay High Court. Application of the prosecution seeking cancellation of the bail was heard by another Single Bench [Hon'ble Smt. Justice V.K. TahilramaniJ. The High Court was pleased to allow the application of the prosecution and cancelled the bail. It is, that, accused preferred Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The leave was granted and appeal was heard. When the appeal was being heard, a contention was raised that the application for seeking cancellation of bail ought to have been referred or heard by the same Judge who previously granted bail [Hon'ble Shri. Justice S.S. Parkar, JJ. 14. The leave was granted and appeal was heard. When the appeal was being heard, a contention was raised that the application for seeking cancellation of bail ought to have been referred or heard by the same Judge who previously granted bail [Hon'ble Shri. Justice S.S. Parkar, JJ. 14. In the factual situation "1ferred to above, if we read the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para no.13, reproduced here in below, it would be clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to reject the contention of the accused in the said case and thus, reliance on the decision of the Apex Court is wholly misplaced. "13. The other aspect which was emphasized with some amount of vehemence was that the learned Judge who I had granted bail should have heard the t application for cancellation of bail. 2 Observations made in Harjeet Singh V s. State of Punjab and another, ( 2002(1) SCC 649 ) was relied upon for that purpose. As noted above, in the said judgment there is a long standing convention and requirement of judicial discipline which has held the field for a long period that subsequent application for grant or cancellation of bail application should be placed before the same learned Judge who had passed the earlier order. This certainly is a desirable course. But at the same time the party who makes a grievance that the course has not been followed has to indicate as to in what manner he was in prejudice by the deviation. The question of prejudice arises only when on the same set of facts, a different order is passed by another learned Judge cancelling the bailor granting the bail as the case may be. But, where the cancellation is sought for on grounds different from those which existed at the time of granting bail, the conventional practice of placing the matter before the same learned Judge need not be followed as it is a statutory requirement. It does not appear from the order of the High court that any submission was made before the learned single Judge who passed the impugned order to place the matter before the same learned Judge who had passed the earlier order." 15. Shri. V. D. Sapkal, Adv. has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Sompal Singh V s. Sunil Rathi & Anr. Shri. V. D. Sapkal, Adv. has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Sompal Singh V s. Sunil Rathi & Anr. [ AIR 2005 SC 1483 : (2005 ALL MR (Cri) 792 (S.C.))] and more particularly, observations in para no.6. This was a case wherein earlier bail application of Sunil was granted by Allahabad High Court. That order was set aside by the Apex Court observing that, disposal of the bail prayer could not be termed satisfactory. Three flaws in the disposal of the application were recorded by the Hon 'ble Apex Court viz. [i] that applicant was named in the FIR, [ii] that there were severe accusations to the credit of the applicant and [iii] that co-accused was denied bail, were the aspects which, according to the Hon 'ble Apex Court; were not given consideration at all by the High Court and hence, the bail order was cancelled and bail application was again required to be heard by the High Court. When the bail application came up before different Judge of the Allahabad High Court, he ordered placement of the same before the learned Judge who had earlier granted bail. In case of Sompal Singh (2005 ALL MR (Cri) 792 (S.C.)) [Supra], para no.6, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: "6. After the earlier order granting bail had been set aside by this court, a fresh bail application was filed in the High Court on 27.2.2004, which came up for hearing on 1.3.2004 before another learned Judge who had been assigned the jurisdiction. For reasons which are not clear from record, an order was passed by him to list the bail application before the same learned Judge who had granted bail on the earlier occasion. This order may have been proper had it been a second bail application, in view of Chapter V, Rule 13 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. But this being not a second bail application, the jurisdiction to hear the bail application lay with the learned Judge assigned with the jurisdiction by the Chief Justice and he could not have passed an order directing the matter to be listed before a particular Judge." The Hon 'ble Apex Court clearly observed that, re-hearing of the bail application was hearing of the very first bail application and it was not a second bail application. In fact, by the opening sentence of the observation quoted hereinabove, the Hon'ble Apex Court appears to have reaffirmed the view taken by it in earlier judicial pronouncement in Harjeet Singh's case (2002 ALL MR (Cri) 725 (S.C.)) [Supra]. Although not as a statutory, but as a convention, second application for bail, once plea was rejected, is desirable to be heard by the same bench which rejected the earlier application. 16. Last but not the least, it is the prerogative of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the concerned High Court to assign matter for hearing to Hon'ble Judges of the High Court. Thus, having regard to the standing Order dt.29/ 2/2008 of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, referred to above, which we firmly believe is based on the principles enunciated in case of Vikramjit Singh [Supra], Shahzad Hasan Khan [Supra] and Harjeet Singh (2002 ALL MR (Cri) 725 (S.C.» [Supra]; it deserves to be given effect and as such, we are unable to hear the instant application for bail and therefore, pass the following operative order: 17. OPERATIVE ORDER The Registry to place the instant Criminal Application No. 1888/2008 in Criminal Appeal No.566/2006 before the appropriate Bench [Hon'ble Shri. Justice P. V. Hardas, J.] for appropriate orders, in case the applicants and/or learned counsel for the applicants moves for the same. We reiterate that, we have not observed on merits of the application. Ordered accordingly.