JUDGMENT :- Common Order: C.R.P.(NPD) No.3598 of 2007 arises out a Judgment in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai, which had been preferred against the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.352 of 2002 on the file of XV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. C.R.P(NPD) No.3599 of 2007 has been directed against the Judgment in R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai which had arisen out of an order passed in R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 on the file of XV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. . The revision petitioner in both the revisions is a tenant in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 and R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002. The landlady had filed R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 against the tenant under Section 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960(hereinafter referred to "the Act") on the ground that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rent from September 2001 to January 2002 amounting to a sum of Rs.72,500/- rent at the rate of Rs.14500/-per mensum(5 months x Rs.14500 = Rs.72,500). The said petition was resisted by the tenant by filing a counter contending that he had filed a petition for fixation of fair rent which is pending before XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 and that in the said R.C.O.P., the fair rent was fixed as Rs.8,612/-per mensum. That is the reason why the respondent has not paid the rent from August 2001 and that he has not committed wilful default in payment of rent. But the fact remains that in R.C.O.P.No. 1901 of 1999, the present landlord/respondent herein viz., A.C.Sivakumar is not a party. The learned Rent Controller only on the said ground had rejected the contentions raised by the respondent in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 and allowed the petition filed under Section 10 (2)(i) for eviction on the ground of wilful default. The said order was challenged before the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 but the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has also dismissed the said R.C.A. on the ground that the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is not a party in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 filed under Section 4 of the Act by the tenant/revision petitioner herein. The said order was challenged before the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 but the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has also dismissed the said R.C.A. on the ground that the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is not a party in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 filed under Section 4 of the Act by the tenant/revision petitioner herein. R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 was filed by the tenant under Section 8(5) of the Act seeking the indulgence of the Court to deposit the rent for the month of September 2001 on wards. The said petition was also dismissed by the learned Rent Controller. Against the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002, R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 was also dismissed which necessitated the tenant to prefer C.R.P.NPD No.3598 of 2007. Against the Judgment passed in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2007, C.R.P.NPD No.3599 of 2007 has been preferred. 3. Heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and considered their respective submissions. 4. R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 was filed only under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent for the month of September 2001 to January 2002 at the rate of Rs.14,500/-p.m., for five months. It is the case of the revision petitioner that he had filed R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 before the learned XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes , Chennai under Section 4 of the Act for fixation of fair rent for the petition schedule building and that in the said petition, the vendors of the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 viz., Rangawala Estate represented by its owners No.133, Thambuchetty Street, Chennai-1 were made parties and R2 and R3 are the owners of the said Rangawala Estate/R1 in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 who are the owners/landlords of the building in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. The learned Rent Controller who had jointly tried both R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 and R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 had allowed R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 but dismissed R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 . In the said joint trial, the order passed in R.C.O.P.No. 1901 of 1999 was filed as Ex P2. The petitioner/landlord in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is very well aware of the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 (Ex P2) proceedings. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the landlord/petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 had no knowledge about ExP2 proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999. The petitioner/landlord in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is very well aware of the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 (Ex P2) proceedings. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the landlord/petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 had no knowledge about ExP2 proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999. But the fact remains that the vendors under whom the petitioner/landlord in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 had purchased the petition schedule property are the parties to R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999, they are the respondents in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999. 5. According to the landlord/petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002, the tenant was paying the rent at the rate of Rs.14,500/-till August 2001 and the rent for September 2001, to be payable in October 2001 was sent by the tenant at the rate of Rs.8,612/-was refused by the landlord. So from September 2001, the rent was refused by the landlord on the ground that the rent for the building was Rs.14,500/- and not Rs.8,612/-per mensum. But as per the order in Ex P2 passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 filed by the tenant under Section 4 of the Act, the rent was reduced and fixed as Rs.8601.04ps rounded to Rs.8612/- per mensum. The order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 will bind the erstwhile owner of the petition schedule building in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002, the vendor of the respondent herein/the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999/the revision petitioner herein ought to have impleaded the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002/the present landlord. The learned counsel for the respondent further state that after the purchase by the respondent of the petition schedule building, he had informed the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 about his purchase of the petition schedule building in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 through Ex P6(a) letter. But from the learned Rent Control Appellate Authoritys Judgment in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 and R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 dated 10. 2007, at paragraph 10, it is seen that the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 has been informed about the purchase of the petition schedule building in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 by the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. The tenant/revision petitioner herein has paid the subsequent rents till August 2001 rent at the rate of Rs.14,500/-per mensum to the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. The tenant/revision petitioner herein has paid the subsequent rents till August 2001 rent at the rate of Rs.14,500/-per mensum to the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. Eventhough, the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 has not impleaded the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 after his purchase of the petition schedule building during the pendency of R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 nothing prevented the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 to file an appropriate application to get himself impleaded in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999. The order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 as to the effect of fixation of fair rent for the petition schedule building as Rs.8612/- per mensum will bind the respondents therein/vendors of the petition schedule building in favour of the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002/present landlord. 7. The only point to be decided in these revision petitions is whether the default in payment of arrears of rent from September 2001 to January 2002 to the petition schedule building by the tenant will amount to wilful default. Admittedly, after the filing of R.C.O.P the tenant has paid the rent to the petition schedule building at the rate of Rs.14,500/- per mensum. Even as per the pleading in the petition in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002, the present landlord would admit that the respondent/tenant was paying the rent till August 2001 at the rate of Rs.14,500/-per mensum. But only subsequently, the rent for the month of September 2001 was sent to him at the rate of Rs.8612/- per mensum which he refused to receive. Only after the disposal of R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999, on 16. 2001, the tenant had sent a sum of Rs.8612/-per mensum towards the rent for the month of September 2001 to the present landlord. Since the landlord had refused to receive the said rent, he had filed R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 under Section 8(5) of the Act seeking permission of the Court to deposit the rent into the Court on the ground that the provisions contemplated under Section 8(5) was not followed by the tenant, the learned Rent Controller has dismissed R.C.O.P.No.931of 2002 filed by the tenant under Section 8(5) of the Act. Section 8(5) of the Act runs as follows: 1) Every landlord who receives any payment towards rent or advance shall issue a receipt duly signed by him for the actual amount of rent or advance received by him. Section 8(5) of the Act runs as follows: 1) Every landlord who receives any payment towards rent or advance shall issue a receipt duly signed by him for the actual amount of rent or advance received by him. 2) Where a landlord refuses to accept, or evades the receipt of, any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may, by notice in writing, require the landlord to specify within ten days from the date of receipt of the notice by him, a bank into which the rent may be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. Provided that such bank shall be one situated in the city, town or village in which the building is situated or if there is no such bank in such city, town or village, within five kilometres of the limits thereof. Explanation: It shall be open to the landlord to specify from time to time by a written notice to the tenant and subject to the proviso aforesaid, a bank different from the one already specified by him under this sub section. 3) If the landlord specifies a bank as aforesaid, the tenant shall deposit the rent in the bank and shall continue to deposit in it any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building 4) If the landlord does not specify a bank as aforesaid, the tenant shall remit the rent to the landlord by Money order, after deducting the money order commission. 5) If the landlord refuses to receive the rent remitted by Money Order under sub-section (4), the tenant may deposit the rent before the Controller and continue to deposit with him any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building." It is seen from the order of the learned Rent Controller in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 and R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 at paragraph 8(page 37 of the type set of paper inner page 13) that the rent due for September 2001 was sent by the tenant to the landlord/the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 through cheque enclosed with Ex P3 letter. But the same was returned by the landlord on 4. But the same was returned by the landlord on 4. 2002 but the tenant had written a letter to the counsel for the landlord requesting him to furnish the bank account to enable him to deposit the future rent in the account of the landlord. Since there was no reply from the counsel of the landlord, the tenant had sent the future rents upto 30.4.2002 to the landlord by money order. But the same was also refused by the landlord/petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002. Only under such circumstances, the learned rent controller has held that since the landlord has failed to furnish the bank account, the future rent was sent by the tenant by money order. Even though the tenant has not sent any letter to the landlord asking him to furnish the bank account number, it is seen from the Judgment of the learned Rent Controller that the tenant had sent a notice to the landlords counsel requesting him to furnish the bank account number of the landlord to enable him to deposit the future rents. Under such circumstances, the findings of the learned Rent Controller which has been confirmed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority,as the effect that the provision under Section 8(5) of the Act has not been followed requires interference. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying on a decision reported in Syed Shafee and another-v- A. Asmath Basha and another (1989 (1) M.L.J.193) would contend that the Court has to take note of the subsequent events which had taken place after the filing of R.C.O.P. The short facts of the above said dictum is that unsuccessful tenants in R.C.O.P.No.32 of 1983 on the file of learned Rent Controller(XI Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras and also in the appeals in R.C.A.Nos.141 and 172 of 1985 on the file of the Appellate Authority are the revision petitioners therein. R.C.O.P. was filed for eviction of the tenants on the ground of sub letting and for owners occupation. According to the respondents, they have purchased the petition schedule building on 24. 1981 under two separate sale deeds and that the first petitioner was a tenant at that time and that he had attorned the tenancy in favour of the respondents and subsequently, the first petitioner had sub let the premises to one Tmt. According to the respondents, they have purchased the petition schedule building on 24. 1981 under two separate sale deeds and that the first petitioner was a tenant at that time and that he had attorned the tenancy in favour of the respondents and subsequently, the first petitioner had sub let the premises to one Tmt. Khursheed Begum who was added as the third respondent in the eviction petition. The respondents do not own any house in the City of Madras that both of them require the petition premises for their own use and occupation. The said petition was resisted by the tenant on the ground that a single petition filed by the respondents is not maintainable. According to them, the first petitioner is not parted his possession in favour of the second petitioner who is his sister. On the other hand,the newly added party Mrs. Khursheed Begum in her counter contended that she is a direct tenant under the respondents . The learned Rent Controller has held that the eviction petition is maintainable and the requirement of the landlord is bonafide and the petition was dismissed as infructuous as against Khursheed Begum since she had already vacated the premises and therefore, the learned Rent Controller had negatived the case of sub let. The learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has also confirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller. Hence the revision. According to the revision petitioners in view of the sale deed dated 30.11.1985, the landlords ceased to have any right , title, or interest in the petition mentioned property and that they are no longer entitled to receive the rents from them or demand eviction from the petition mentioned property. But they would concede that as far as the ground of requirement for own use and occupation, the revision petitioners may not survive. Only under such circumstances, it has been held by this Court as follows: "I am surprised to note that such a stand has been taken by the respondents. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the purchasers are aware of these proceedings and that they will seek appropriate relief by themselves. While so, it is not known how the present respondents are competent to plead on behalf of the purchasers in whose favour the transfer of title has been effected. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the purchasers are aware of these proceedings and that they will seek appropriate relief by themselves. While so, it is not known how the present respondents are competent to plead on behalf of the purchasers in whose favour the transfer of title has been effected. It is not the case of the respondents that title has not passed to the purchasers or that they have got any right or interest over the petition property so as to enable them either to receive rent from the tenants or to evict them in these proceedings. While so, as on date , the respondents have lost their title to the property and as such the substratum of the eviction petition has gone. It is no longer open to them to continue these proceedings in the absence of the real owners who are alone entitled to prosecute these proceedings and evict the tenants. It is well settled principle of law that the Court has to take into consideration of the subsequent events and the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time of hearing and mould the relief accordingly, as held by the Supreme Court inM/s Variety Emporium-v- V.R.M.Mohamed Ibrahim,98 L.W.26 (1985)1 M.L.J.(S.C.) I A.I.R. 1985 S.C.207. Again the Supreme Court has held in P.Venkateswarlu.v. Motor & General Traders, (1975) 4 S.C.C 111 : A.I.R.1975 S.C.1409 that the subsequent event disabling the landlords from seeking eviction has to be taken note of by the Court in moulding the ultimate relief." But in the case on hand, even though the present landlord/petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is not a party in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999, the vendors are the parties and that the fixation of fair rent for the petition schedule building as Rs.8612/-per mensum, fixed in R.C.O.P.1901 of 1999 will not only bind the respondents in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 but also the present landlord/the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 because he had purchased the petition schedule building only from the respondents in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 . The learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in its Judgment has also dismissed R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 as well as R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 on the ground that the present landlord/the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is not a party in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 it will not bind on him forgetting for a moment, the vendors of the petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002/the landlords are the parties in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying on a decision reported in Padmavathi Ammal-v- Gopal (1994(2) MLJ,622) would contend that the petition filed by the tenant under Section 8(5) under R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 is not maintainable on the ground that the tenant had not taken any steps under Section 8(4) of the Act. But in the said dictum, the point that arose for consideration was whether the tenant seeking permission to deposit the rent into Court by resorting Section 8(5) can skip any one of the steps laid down under Section 8(5) of the Act. In the said case, the tenant without taking any steps as enumerated under Section 8 to 8(5) of the Act had filed a petition under Section 8(5) of the Act which was held to be not maintainable. But that is not the case on hand, the tenant herein in his notice to the advocate for the landlord under Ex P3, had asked the counsel of the landlord to furnish the name of the bank and since he has not received any reply, he had sent the arrears of rent by money order and after the refusal of the money order has filed a petition under Section 8(5) of the fact. So the facts in Padmavathi Ammal-v- Gopal (1994(2)MLJ 622) will not applicable to the present facts of the case. Only for the same proposition of law, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would rely on a decision reported in Majestice Leatherware rep. By its Proprietor S.M. Mahboob Basha-v-Govinda Chetty( 1999 (III) CTC 199 ) wherein the relevant observation in the said Judgment relevant for the purpose of this case runs as follows: "If the petitioner had refused to receive the rent, there are remedies provided under the Rent Control enabling the tenant to send a registered notice and thereafter initiate proceedings under Section 8(5) of the Act. Notice sent to the advocate of the landlord is not an embargo for the tenant to avail the provisions contemplated under Section 8(5) of the Act. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner relying on a decision reported in Chordia Automobiles-v-S. Moosa and others (2000)3 Supreme Court Cases 282) would contend that a petition filed under Section 10(2)(i) by the present landlord under R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 itself is not maintainable because there was no wilful default as contemplated under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, since there was no mandatory notice under Section 10(2)(I) of the Act was issued in this case and there was no default for two months thereafter from the said notice. The relevant observation in the said ratio decidenti runs as follows: "Explanation 1 to Section 10(2)(i) of the T.N. Buildings(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has given a benefit to a tenant viz., if there is default in payment of rent and a notice is sent by the landlord of such default, then the default would mature into a wilful default only if the default continues; in other words, the defaulted amount is not paid within a period of two months from the date of notice. In the present case, notice was sent on 9.8,.1989, thus the said two months would have expired only on 10. 1989. In other words, in case the tenant could have paid the said amount within this period, it would not be a case of wilful default. In the present case after sending the said notice, the landlord did not wait for the expiry of the said period and before that filed the eviction petition alleging the wilful default. If the suit itself was filed before the said period there could no question of sending any reply to the said notice. It is further to be noticed that the amount for the period 4. 1989 to 37. 1989 was admittedly in dispute. In fact for this reason during pendency, a proceeding to fix interim rent under Section 11 was initiated. The tenant reasonably thought to pay the same after its adjudication and in fact deposited the same the moment was adjudicated. So far as the earlier period ie., 1. 1989 to 33. 1989 to 37. 1989 was admittedly in dispute. In fact for this reason during pendency, a proceeding to fix interim rent under Section 11 was initiated. The tenant reasonably thought to pay the same after its adjudication and in fact deposited the same the moment was adjudicated. So far as the earlier period ie., 1. 1989 to 33. 1989, of three months is concerned, the case of the appellant is that the tenants long dependency in the past, on the agent of the landlord to collect the rent and as he did not come, thus rent could not be tendered, thus this could not be a case of wilfully not paying the rent. It may be, as enhancement of rent came in dispute, the agent did not come to collect the rent. The submission for the appellant has force, which has not been adverted to by any of the three Courts below. This coupled with the Explanation to the provisio of Section 10(2)(i) as two months did not expire from the date of notice when the suit was filed it could not be said to be a case of wilful default." In the case on hand, even after the demand for the rent, the tenant was paying the rent to the present landlord. Since the tenant had sent rent for the month of September 2001 as Rs.8612/- instead of Rs.14,500/-the landlord had refused to receive the same. But the tenant only after the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1901 of 1999 filed by him under Section 4 of the Act had sent the rent for September 2001 at Rs.8612/-. So viewed from any angle, the findings of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 as well as R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 cannot be sustainable because even though both the Judgments In R.C.A.No.172 of 2004 and R.C.A.No.171 of 2004 are concurrent in nature , they suffer from perverseness to warrant interference from this Court while exercising the power of revision. 11. In fine, C.R.P.(NPD) Nos.3598 and 3599 of 2007 are allowed and the Judgment in R.C.A.Nos.172 of 2004 and 171 of 2004 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai is set aside. The order passed in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is consequently dismissed. 11. In fine, C.R.P.(NPD) Nos.3598 and 3599 of 2007 are allowed and the Judgment in R.C.A.Nos.172 of 2004 and 171 of 2004 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai is set aside. The order passed in R.C.O.P.No.356 of 2002 is consequently dismissed. At this juncture, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would fairly state that the tenant is paying the subsequent rent to the landlord himself without any default and that the landlord is receiving the same and as such there is no need to pass any order in R.C.O.P.No.931 of 2002 directing the tenant to deposit the rent into the Court under Section 8(5) of the Act. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner in C.R.P(NPD) .No.3599 of 2007 has no grievance for the same. Hence, C.R.P(NPD) No.3599 of 2007 is closed as no order is necessary. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P.No.1 of 2007 is closed.