Judgment Ghanshyam Prasad, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by Plaintiffs against the Judgment and decree dated, 25th April, 1989 passed by Sri P.N. Shukla, Second Additional District Judge, Siwan in Title Appeal No. 141 of 1979/19 of 1987 thereby the learned Court has confirmed the Judgment and decree dated, 6th August, 1978 passed by First Additional Munsif, Siwan in Title Suit No. 379 of 1969. 2. The facts leading to this appeal are that the Appellants who were Plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit filed the case against the Defendant/Respondent first set for redemption of mortgage dated, 4th October, 1917 executed by recorded tenant Karia Dusadh in respect of lands measuring 4 bighas 15 kathas and 4 dhurs, detailed at foot of the plaint, for Rs. 600 in favour of Sk.Wajid Ali, ancestor of Defendant first set. According to their case, Karia Dusadh died issueless leaving behind his nephew Bisheshwar Dusadh, as his only heir. Bisheshwar Dusadh executed a registered sale deed dated, 30th September, 1920 in respect of the aforesaid mortgaged land for Rs. 825 in favour of mother of the Plaintiffs and one Nezamat Ali, father of Defendant second set. In that very sale deed, the amount of aforesaid zarpeshgi was set off and kept as amanat. The Plaintiff-Appellants being co-mortgagor filed the suit for redemption of entire mortgage properties as other mortgagor, Defendant second set, did not agree to join. 3. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 filed written statement and challenged the said sale deed executed by Bisheshwar Dusadh as also right of the Plaintiff-Appellants to redeem the mortgage. The allegation of tender of mortgage amount to them was also denied. According to them, mortgage is not subsisting. The same has already been redeemed by auction purchaser Sk. Wajid Ali. Accordingly, the father of the Defendants handed over possession of the disputed land in favour of him. Now these Defendants have no concerned with the land in question. However, these Defendants did not contest the suit. 4. One Sk. Ishaque and Md. Idris filed intervenor petition in the suit and accordingly vide Order dated, 2nd February, 1978, they were added as intervenor/Defendant Nos. 12 and 13. Respondent Nos. 18 to 30 are heirspf intervenor/Defendant Nos. 12 and 13. They separately filed written statement and contested the suit. Their case, inter alia, was that Sk. 4. One Sk. Ishaque and Md. Idris filed intervenor petition in the suit and accordingly vide Order dated, 2nd February, 1978, they were added as intervenor/Defendant Nos. 12 and 13. Respondent Nos. 18 to 30 are heirspf intervenor/Defendant Nos. 12 and 13. They separately filed written statement and contested the suit. Their case, inter alia, was that Sk. Nezamat Ali, the co-purchaser of the suit land, died leaving behind his widow Most. Bakridan and minor sons. Most. Bakridan as herself and guardian of her minor sons sold their share in the land under redemption through registered sale deed dated, 19th May, 1930 in favour of Defendant No. 12 and grand father of Defendant No. 13 and put them in possession through mortgagee. She also set off the amount of mortgage of ancestor of Defendant first set. Later on they redeemed the entire mortgage as father of the Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 was not ready for piecemeal redemption. The mortgagee on receipt of the entire mortgage amount made endorsement to that effect on back of the mortgage deed and handed over the same to intervenor Defendants and put them in possession over entire land. Now the Defendants first set have no interest in the suit land nor are they necessary party. The mortgage is now not subsisting and hence, the suit for redemption is not maintainable. , 5. The learned Trial Court framed as many as seven issues. He answered all the important issue against the Appellants. The main finding is that the suit is barred by limitation as it is deemed to be instituted against the intervenor/Defendants on the date of adding them as Defendant i.e. 2nd February, 1978 whereas the limitation for suit for redemption expired in the year (1964 + 7) i.e. 1971. The other main finding is that the mortgage deed does not subsist as it has already been redeemed. Accordingly, he dismissed the suit. 6. The Plaintiff-Appellants preferred appeal against the aforesaid Judgment of the learned Additional Munsif. It was decided vide impugned Judgment. The learned Additional Judge confirmed the Judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The learned Appellate Court framed only three points for decision. These are as follows: (1) Whether the zarpeshgi in question is subsisting or it has already been redeemed and if subsisting what is the amount of the zarpeshgi of Rs. 600 or Rs.458? The learned Additional Judge confirmed the Judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The learned Appellate Court framed only three points for decision. These are as follows: (1) Whether the zarpeshgi in question is subsisting or it has already been redeemed and if subsisting what is the amount of the zarpeshgi of Rs. 600 or Rs.458? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (3) Whether the story of tender as set up by the Plaintiff is correct? 7. All the points have been decided against the Appellants. It has been held that the zarpeshgi is not subsisting as it has already been redeemed by the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 in the year 1931. It has further been held that the suit is barred by law of limitation against the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 as the period of limitation according to the new Limitation Act, 1964 expired in the year 1971 whereas the intervenor/Defendants were added as Defendants No. 12 and 13 on 2nd February, 1978. The learned Appellate Court also refused to give benefit of proviso of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act which provides that in case, omission to include a new Defendant was due to mistake or in good faith the Court may direct that the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. 8. At the time of admission, this Court framed following substantial questions of law for decision of this appeal: (1) Whether the co-mortgagor who has paid the entire zarpeshgi money to have been deemed to have redeemed the entire disputed land subrogated in place of the previous mortgagee in so far as other non-paying mortgagors are concerned? (2) Whether in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Plaintiff-Appellants can take benefit of Section 17 (Section 21) of the Limitation Act? 9. This appeal was heard ex-parte as inspite of sufficient opportunity provided to the Respondents, no one appeared on their behalf to contest the appeal. Point No. 2 10. In course of submission, the learned Counsel for Appellants strongly argued that the suit of the Appellant is not barred by limitation against the contesting Defendants i.e. the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 and the Plaintiff/Appellants are entitled to get benefit of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1964. It is submitted that there was honest omission and bona fide mistake to add Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 and the Plaintiff/Appellants are entitled to get benefit of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1964. It is submitted that there was honest omission and bona fide mistake to add Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 earlier at the time of institution of the suit. He had no prior knowledge either about sale or of redemption. The Defendant first set in their written statement also concealed the fact of redemption of zarpeshgi deed by them and set up entirelya different story. Had they disclosed these facts the Appellants would have added Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 earlier, much before expiry of limitation. Since latches on the part of the Plaintiff-Appellants was honest and unintentional they are entitled to get benefit of proviso of Section 21 (1) of the Act. For his submission he relied upon two decisions reported in A.I.R. 1988 Patna 138 (Rabindra Nath Biswas V/s. General Manager, N.F. Rly. andOrs.) and 1983 Supreme Court 271 (MunshiRam V/s. Narsi Ram and Anr.). 11. It appears from the record that the suit was instituted against the Defendanli first and second sets on 19th October, 1969 i.e. well within the grace period of| seven years as allowed under Section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1964 for suit of redemption. However, the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 were made intervene Defendants after expiry of grace period of limitation. They were added as Defendants on 2nd February, 1978. Thus, according to Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, the suit shall as regards them be deemed to have been instituted when they were made party. However, the proviso of Sub-section (1) provides that if omission to include any person as Plaintiff or Defendant was done due to mistake made in good faith the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. 12. In the instant case, the facts would go to show that the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 were not impleaded earlier due to want of knowledge about their having any interest in the suit property or about redemption of zarpeshgi by them. The heirs of mortgagee have been impleaded as Defendant first set and the heirs of vendor of intervenor/Defendants 12 and 13 has been made as Defendant second set. The Defendant second set did not appear in the suit. The heirs of mortgagee have been impleaded as Defendant first set and the heirs of vendor of intervenor/Defendants 12 and 13 has been made as Defendant second set. The Defendant second set did not appear in the suit. However, Defendant first set of the suit appeared and filed written statement but they concealed the fact of redemption of mortgage in question by the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13.0f the other hand, they set up a different story of redemption.Therefore, the Plaint Appellants did not get any opportunity to know about the status of intervene Defendants and hence, they were not earlier added as Defendant. The omission was apparently honest, bona fide and in good faith. Therefore, proviso of Sub section (1) of Section 21 of the Limitation Act comes in aid of the Plaintiff/Appellants. Thus, there is no question of limitation. The suit is deemed to be instituted also against the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 on the original date on institution of the suit. 13. Both the lower Courts have erred in law to hold the suit as barred by limitation against the Defendant Nos. 12 and 13, who have subrogated the rights of the mortgagee in respect of share of the Plaintiff-Appellants in the suit property. The have not properly appreciated the law and facts. The learned first Appellant Court has also not properly considered the ratio decided in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1983 Supreme Court 271. 14. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court as also facts of the case of the aforesaid Munshi Ram is fully applicable in the case. Paragraph-8 of the Judgment runs as follows: 8. We shall now have to consider whether the Appellant is entitled to claim the benefit of the proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act and if he is entitled to it, what is the date on which the suit against the party proposed to be newly added should be deemed to have been instituted. It is not disputed that the Appellant had obtained a certified copy of the sale deed in question from the office of the Sub-Registrar before the suit was filed and in that copy only Respondents 1 and 2 had been shown as the vendees. Munni Devi was not shown in that copy as a vendee. It is not disputed that the Appellant had obtained a certified copy of the sale deed in question from the office of the Sub-Registrar before the suit was filed and in that copy only Respondents 1 and 2 had been shown as the vendees. Munni Devi was not shown in that copy as a vendee. The suit which was filed on 29th January, 1978 was well within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 97 of the Act as against Respondents 1 and 2. There is no evidence to show that on the date of the suit the Appellant knew by any other means that there was any other vendee who had purchased the land along with Respondents 1 and 2. In the written statement which was cleverly drafted, the name of Munni Devi was not mentioned. It merely stated that all the vendees had not been impleaded as Defendants. The original sale deed which was with Respondents 1 and 2 was not produced in Court along with the written statement. The Appellant who had looked into the certified copy of the sale deed asserted that the plea that the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties was untenable as all the persons who were shown as vendees in the certified copy had been impleaded. He had no reasons to suspect that there was an error in the certified copy until the original sale deed was read out in the Trial Court by the Counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 on 14th June, 1978. It cannot be presumed that the Appellant must have known that Munni Devi was also a vendee because the vendor was his father. In fact the Appellant had nothing to gain by not impleading Munni Devi also as a Defendant when he filed the suit and there could be no motive for doing so. It must, therefore, he held that the omission to implead her as a Defendant was due to a mistake. If such mistake is made is good faith, the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act would be attracted. The meaning of the expression good faith is explained in Section 2(h) of the Act thus: 2(h). "good faith"- nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. 15. If such mistake is made is good faith, the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act would be attracted. The meaning of the expression good faith is explained in Section 2(h) of the Act thus: 2(h). "good faith"- nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. 15. Similar view has been expressed in the aforesaid Rabindra Naths case reported in 1988 Patna 138. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussions as well as law, it is quite clear that both the Courts have wrongly held that the suit of the Plaintiff-Appellants against intervenor/ Defendants was barred by limitation. This point is accordingly, answered in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellants. Point No. 1 17. The admitted fact is that the suit land originally belonged to Karia Dusadh. He mortgaged the suit land to Sk. Wajid Mian through registered deed dated, 4th October, 1917 for Rs. 600. Later on Karia Dusadh died leaving behind his nephew Bisheshwar Dusadh as his heir who sold the disputed land in favour of mother of Plaintiff-Appellant and one Nezamat Ali ancestor of Defendant second set through sale deed dated, 30th September, 1920 for Rs. 825. The amount of zarpeshgi was kept as amanat.The Defendant first set are heirs of original morgagee Sk. Wajid Ali. 18. The intervenor/Defendants 12 and 13 have claimed that Sk. Nezamat Ali purchaser of the share in the disputed land, died leaving behind his widow Most. Bakridan and his minor sons as his heirs. Most. Bakridan sold the share of her husband in thedisputed land to Defendant Nos. 12 and grand father of Defendant No. 13 through registered sale deed dated, 19th May, 1930. Later on, they redeemed the entire zarpeshgi by paying entire amount of zarpeshgi deed in the year 1931 to the original mortgagee Sk. Wajid Ali. Exh. A is the note of redemption dated 5th May, 1931 on the back of original mortgage deed dated,, 4th October, 1917. 19. The law of subrogation has been laid down in Section 92 of the T.P. Act. It runs as follows: 92. Wajid Ali. Exh. A is the note of redemption dated 5th May, 1931 on the back of original mortgage deed dated,, 4th October, 1917. 19. The law of subrogation has been laid down in Section 92 of the T.P. Act. It runs as follows: 92. Subrogation.- Any of the persons referred to in Section 91 (other than the mortgagor) and any co-mortgagor shall, on redeeming property subject to the mortgage, have, so far as regards redemption, foreclosure or sale of such property, the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee. The right conferred by this section is called the right of subrogation, and a person acquiring the same is said to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems. A person who has advanced to a mortgagor money with which the mortgage has been redeemed shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage has been redeemed, if the mortgagor has by a registered instrument agreed that such persons shall be so subrogated. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to confer a right of subrogation on any person unless the mortgage in respect of which the right is claimed has been redeemed in full. 20. In view of the above provision, it is quite clear that by paying the entire zarpesh money to Sk. Wajid Ali Defendant Nos. 12 and 13, co-mortgagor by virtue of purchase of share of Sk. Nezamat Ali in suit property, subrogated in place of the origin mortgagee in so far as the share of mother of original Plaintiffs is concerned. Not Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 or their heirs are entitled to receive the excess of the share of mortgage amount in respect of the half share in the disputed land belonging to the Plaintiff-Appellants by way of contribution. Similarly, the Plaintiff-Appellant have corresponding right being a non-redeeming co-mortgagors, to get possession of their share in the property in question from the redeeming co-mortgagor on payment of their share of the liability. The law in this respect has been laid down in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in 1979 Supreme Court page-1937 (Vallima Champaka Pillai V/s. Siwathanu Pillai and Ors.) as well as in 1953 Supreme Co. page-l {Ganeshi Lai V/s. Joti Pershad). 21. Thus, this point is answered accordingly. The law in this respect has been laid down in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in 1979 Supreme Court page-1937 (Vallima Champaka Pillai V/s. Siwathanu Pillai and Ors.) as well as in 1953 Supreme Co. page-l {Ganeshi Lai V/s. Joti Pershad). 21. Thus, this point is answered accordingly. In view of the above discussions and findings, this appeal is allowed with cost.The Judgment and decree passed by both the lower Courts are hereby set aside.the suit is decreed in part against Respondent Nos. 18 to 30 and dismissed against other Defendants/Respondents. 20. Let a preliminary decree be drawn under Order 34 Rule 7 of the C.RC. Plaintiff-Appellants are directed to deposit their share of the zarpeshgi amount within sixty days of the preparation of the preliminary decree. In event of deposit of the amount by the Plaintiff-Appellants, Respondents 18 to 30 are directed to hand over possession to the Plaintiff-Appellants in respect of their share of the land failing which Plaintiff-Appellants shall be entitled to recover possession over their share of the land through process of law.