Judgment A.M.Sapre, J. ( 1. ) This is an appeal filed by insurance company under section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act against an award dated 15.3.2004 passed by Seventeenth Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Indore (MP), in Claim Case No. 440 of 2002. ( 2. ) By impugned award, Claims Tribunal partly allowed the claim petition of claimants (respondent Nos. 1 to 4) filed under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation for the death of one Nalin Kumar Negi and accordingly, awarded to claimants a total compensation of Rs. 8,38,244. It is against this award, the claimants, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed one appeal being M.A. No. 2165 of 2004 asking for enhancement in the compensation determined by the Tribunal whereas the insurance company Filed present appeal (M.A. No. 1914 of 2004) against the same award contending that it is on higher side and hence, it be reduced. ( 3. ) It may here be mentioned that so far as appeal filed by claimants, i.e., M.A. No. 2165 of 2004 is concerned, the same was dismissed by this court by order dated 21.2.2005, wherein this court held that the Tribunal has awarded just and proper compensation to the claimants, requiring no further enhancement in the same. ( 4. ) So far as appeal filed by insurance company, i.e., present appeal is concerned, the only grievance of insurance company while assailing the legality of impugned award is that since the claimants had filed the claim petition under section 163-A of the Act hence, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award compensation contrary to the provisions of section 163-A read with Schedule applicable for deciding the claim petition filed under section 163-A. In other words, the contention of insurance company in this appeal is that when Schedule applicable to cases filed under section 163-A prescribe a ceiling of Rs. 40,000 by way of yearly income for determination of compensation then Tribunal cannot award compensation more than what is payable on the basis of Rs. 40,000. It is contended that since in this case the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is quantified more than what should be calculated on the basis of Rs. 40,000 hence, it is bad in law. ( 5. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has thus urged only the aforesaid submission in support of this appeal. 40,000. It is contended that since in this case the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is quantified more than what should be calculated on the basis of Rs. 40,000 hence, it is bad in law. ( 5. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has thus urged only the aforesaid submission in support of this appeal. In reply learned counsel for the respondents (claimants) supported the impugned award. ( 6. ) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the entire record of the case, we find no merit in this appeal. ( 7. ) In our opinion the very fact that the claim petition was decided on merits by the Tribunal like a claim petition filed under section 166 of the Act is enough to reject the submission of learned counsel for the appellant. In other words, the Tri bunal allowed the parties to prosecute the claim petition as if filed under section 166 of the Act. Not only that even the Tribunal framed issues on all material pleadings applicable for deciding claim petitions under section 166 such as issues relating to negligence and income of deceased, etc. The Tribunal then allowed the parties to adduce the evidence on these issues and then answered them on merits in favour of claimants. It was held that deceased died due to negligence of driver of offending vehicle. The Tribunal then examined the issue relating to income of deceased on the basis of evidence and held that deceaseds gross income was Rs. 9,850 per month whereas net was Rs. 6,200. Applying the multiplier of 16, the Tribunal determined the compensation of Rs. 8,38,244, which also included conventional compensation payable under the Act. As mentioned supra, it was upheld by this court as being reasonable in M.A. No. 2165 of 2004; decided on 21.2.2005. ( 8. ) In our opinion, therefore, mere mention of section 163-A ibid in claim petition by itself would not be a ground to set aside the award as being without jurisdiction. When the entire trial of claim petition was held treating the same to have been filed under section 166 of the Act without there being any objection then in that event, we cannot allow the insurance company to raise such technical plea at the appellate stage. When the entire trial of claim petition was held treating the same to have been filed under section 166 of the Act without there being any objection then in that event, we cannot allow the insurance company to raise such technical plea at the appellate stage. It is not disputed by insurance company that but for this technical infirmity, the award is otherwise legally and factually sustainable under section 166 of the Act. In other words, the award is otherwise validly passed under section 166 of the Act because it satisfied all the ingredients of section 166 ibid and further, Tribunal has properly appreciated the evidence adduced by the claimants on the point of negligence as also on point of income. Indeed no attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to assail the award on facts. ( 9. ) We are, therefore, of the opinion that substantial justice demand to uphold the award on merits as if passed under section 166 ibid. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal, which fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.