JUDGMENT (Per A. Gopal Reddy, J.) This appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 24-09-1998 passed in A.S.No.145 of 1998 reversing the decree granted for specific performance of contract agreement by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Saroornagar, R.R. District in O.S.No.139 of 1984 dated 29-04-1988. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as arrayed in the court below. 3. The undisputed facts in nutshell are as under: The respondent/defendant herein purchased plot NO.7 in block-A admeasuring 1730 square yards under a registered sale deed dated 04-06-1967 from the Co-operative Housing Society (Shantinagar) Limited, later the name of the Society was changed as Kakatiyanagar Co-operative Housing Society. Out of the said plot purchased by her, an extent of 723 square yards situated on the western side along with the house marked as plot NO.7-A was sold away to Dr. Indra Mohan. The appellant/plaintiff herein offered to purchase the remaining extent of 1007 square yards for a sum of Rs.45,315/- and paid an amount of Rs.15,000/- towards advance and later entered into an agreement of sale dated 29-07-1978 marked as EX.A-1 agreeing to purchase the same and will obtain sale deed from the respondent/defendant. It is also further agreed that the sale deed shall be executed within one month from the date of receipt of information from the defendant stating that the necessary permission from the concerned authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act is obtained or within such fUl1her period as mutually agreed upon on payment of balance of sale consideration. The defendant shall obtain permission for alimentation under Urban Land Ceiling Act or any other Act as early as but not later 75 days from the date of such agreement and if he fails to get the said permission within the stipulated period, the purchaser shall be entitled to get back the advance paid after 75 days from the date of agreement, but not later than 90 days under any circumstances. The defendant applied for permission under ULC Act and her husband, who is acting on her behalf, wrote a letter dated 13-10-1978-Ex.A-2 to the plaintiff stating that they are ready to execute the sale deed and for the said purpose they are coming to Hyderabad and the plaintiff shall make all arrangements and keep himself ready for taking the sale deed. The plaintiff through reply dated 20-10-1978EX.A-17 expressed his willingness to take the sale deed and reminded the defendant to obtain certificate from the ULC authorities. The plaintiff purchased stamp papers on 23-10-1978 for a value of Rs.4,000/- and got prepared the draft sale deed. Since the permission was not obtained, registration could not take place. The said fact was also intimated by the plaintiff through his letter dated 30-12-1978. Later the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant to send copies of petition filed by her seeking permission from the ULC authorities in triplicate. Meanwhile, the husband of the defendant by a letter dated12-04-1982-Ex.A-3 informed the plaintiff that the agreement stands cancelled and an amount of Rs.15,000/- returned through demand draft. The plaintiff sent a reply dated 02-05-1982Ex. B-1, for which the defendant expressed her anger under EX.A-11 dated 02-06-1982 stating that she is forfeiting the advance amount of Rs.15,000/- on the ground that the contract has become dead, which was replied by the plaintiff. When the matter stood thus, the Government in G.O. Ms. NO.161 dated 07-02-1984 granted exemption from the provisions of ULC Act. On such exemption being granted the plaintiff called upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. When the defendant refused to do so, the plaintiff issued a notice dated 19-02-1984 EX.A-5 for which defendant sent a reply under EX.B-4. Therefore, the above suit was filed on 04-04-1984 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale contending that the defendant by her conduct and specific representations extended the period of time for obtaining permission and for executing the sale deed. 4. In the written statement filed by the defendant she pleaded that as per the agreement if the balance sale consideration is not paid within the stipulated period or agreed period, rendering it difficult for the vendor to execute the sale deed, the agreement of sale shall stand canceled. The parties intended to complete the sale deed within three months from the date of execution of the agreement unless the period is extended or mutually agreed upon on payment of balance of sale consideration. If the balance of sale consideration is not paid within the stipulated period the said agreement stands cancelled. The parties intended to complete the sale deed within three months from the date of execution of the agreement unless the period is extended or mutually agreed upon on payment of balance of sale consideration. If the balance of sale consideration is not paid within the stipulated period the said agreement stands cancelled. When it is specifically agreed that the defendant shall obtain permission for alienation under Urban Land Ceiling Act or any other Act as early as possible but not later than 75 days from the date of the agreement. If she failed to get the permission. the purchaser is entitled to get back the amount paid towards advance within 75 days but not later than 90 days. The plaintiff is only entitled to get back the amount but cannot enforce the agreement. The claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation, as he has not sought for any extension as per the terms of the agreement. Though the defendant is not under obligation to return the amount, she refunded by way of demand draft, but the plaintiff refused to receive the same, which was kept in a separate account in Canara Bank, Vijayawada. The Government in G.O. Ms. NO.161 dated 07-02-1984 granted exemption only for the excess land measuring 137 square meters, which is nothing to do with the permission to alienate the land of the plaintiff. Mere purchase of stamp papers will not entitle the plaintiff to claim specific performance. 5. On the above pleadings the following issues were settled for trial. . 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement of sale? 2. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? 6. To substantiate the respective pleas the plaintiff himself was examined as P.W.1 and adjacent purchaser was examined as P.W.2 and Exs.A-1 to A-18 were got marked. The husband of the defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.B-1 to B-8 were marked. 7. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration and perform his part of contract. On appeal being filed by the defendant the learned single Judge framed three points for consideration and held that obtaining permission from the competent authority is pre-condition for execution of sale deed. Admittedly no such permission was granted within three months or thereafter. On appeal being filed by the defendant the learned single Judge framed three points for consideration and held that obtaining permission from the competent authority is pre-condition for execution of sale deed. Admittedly no such permission was granted within three months or thereafter. Nothing did happen till 12-04-1982 and there is no serious compliant against each other with regard to the readiness of either party for payment of the balance amount or execution of the sale deed. The evidence adduced by the parties reveal that the defendant was ready to execute the sale deed and the plaintiff was ready to obtain the same by paying balance of sale consideration. When the defendant waited for permission till 1982, a good 4 years after the agreement, then he wrote a letter dated 12-04-1982-Ex.A-3 canceling the agreement and refunding the advance amount for which the plaintiff replied under Ex. B-1 dated 02-05-1982 stating that he waited more than three years it was not proper asking him to receive the advance and seeking to cancel the contract. The agreement clause is provided that the purchaser has to pay the money within one month from the date of receipt of information regarding obtaining of the permission and the sale shall be executed within three months from the date of agreement or within one month from the date of receipt of intimation. A combined reading of Clauses 3 and 5 makes it manifest that the parties intended that the permission should be obtained by the vendor within 75 days and they were not prepared to wait for more than 75 days. For return of the amount 90 days was fixed; thereafter the purchaser is not entitled for the advance so paid, which makes it clear that the time is the essence of the contract. Since the trial judge has not considered the conduct of the defendant in waiting upto 1982 and repudiating the contract and that 75 days fixed in the contract was not strictly adhered to. In view of cancellation of agreement under Ex.A-3 the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the contract. Holding so allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 8. Sri B.V. Subbaiah, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in his usual stubborness contended that for purchase of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract. In view of cancellation of agreement under Ex.A-3 the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the contract. Holding so allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 8. Sri B.V. Subbaiah, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in his usual stubborness contended that for purchase of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract. Under Section 55 of the Contract Act even if time is the essence of the contract, if purchaser not violated/breached the terms of contract, vendor who breached cannot prevent the court from granting a decree for specific performance. For the said proposition he relied on the following judgments. 1. Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao1 2. Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswaml Nadar2 3. M/s. Hind Construction Contractors v. State of Maharashtra3 4. Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani" Clauses 2,3,4 and 5 have to be construed together. Clause 5 is only an additional option given to the vendee not for the vendor to repudiate the contract. Right to repudiate comes only when other party commits default but not otherwise. When the finding of the learned single judge is in favour of the plaintiff, when there is no default on the part of the plaintiff at any point of time, the lower court rightly decreed the suit. When the vendor has to obtain permission but he failed to obtain the same, time is not the essence of the contract and the suit of the plaintiff cannot be dismissed on the ground of unreasonable delay. For the said proposition he placed reliance on the following judgments. 1. Moti/91 v. Nanhelaf' 2. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden v. Or. C.L.Katiaf5 3. Nathulal v. Phoolchand 4. Baikunthi Devi v. Mahendra Nattf3 5. Rojasara Ramjibhai oahyabhai v. Jani Narottamdas La!lubhat' 6. R. C. Chandiok V. Chuni Lal Sabharwa10 9. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Advocate General, appearing for the respondents/defendants while sustaining the judgment of the learned single Judge submitted that under EX.A-12 reply to the cancellation of the agreement by the defendant it is only stated by the plaintiff that he never asked for refund of the advance amount; therefore, filing the suit within the time does not arise. The plaintiff never informed his willingness to perform his part of the contract for obtaining sale deed. The plaintiff never informed his willingness to perform his part of the contract for obtaining sale deed. The contract was terminated under EX.A-3 dated 12-04-1982 and returned the advance amount by enclosing demand draft nearly 3 years and 5 months after the agreement and the suit notice as such was issued nearly after 22 months that too only due to hike in prices. The said conduct disentitles the plaintiff to claim specific performance. In the absence of any relief claimed to declare cancellation of agreement as void, unilateral and to declare the same is binding notwithstanding termination, plaintiff is not entitled to relief of specific performance. Permission will be granted only after exemption is granted to return the excess land. In the absence of any application filed after exemption is granted, the contract is frustrated. Cancellation of agreement is long prior to grant of exemption. Frustration did exist on the date of cancellation of agreement. Clauses 2, 3 and 5 have to be read together. In view of steep rise in prices, the plaintiff wanted to keep the contract alive and issued notice nearly after 22 months after cancellation of the contract. For the said proposition he placed reliance on the following judgments. 1. Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (4 supra) 2. K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan' 1 10. In reply to the same, learned counsel for the appellant contended that merely because the Government has not granted permission for 3 years it has not become impossible for the parties to plead frustration. Since exemption granted after 4 years itself demonstrates it is not impossible to perform. Both the courts concurrently held that there is no frustration. Section 26 of the U.L.C. Act does not contemplate permission but only issuance of notice. The stage of issuing such notice will come only after exemption is granted. Intimation under Section 26 has to be made by the vendor. The parties mistakenly stated as 'permission' instead of 'exemption'. Since the parties have made it as condition for performing the contract, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to seek declaration as contended by the learned Advocate General. Repudiation is a right given to the party and in the absence of any such right given to the vendor under the agreement he cannot plead such defence. For the said proposition he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Natural’s case (7 supra). Repudiation is a right given to the party and in the absence of any such right given to the vendor under the agreement he cannot plead such defence. For the said proposition he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Natural’s case (7 supra). He lastly contended that the learned single judge not even thought of ordering refund of the advance amount and damages in lieu of the same. 11. The learned single Judge framed three points for consideration. After considering points 1 and 2 together held that the learned trial judge has not considered the conduct of the vendor In waiting upto 1982 and repudiating the contract and that 75 days fixed in the contract was net strictly adhered to but waited for more than four years from the date of agreement. The learned single Judge also held that EX.A-3 is valid and the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of contract. On point NO.3 the lamed single judge held that the question of frustration does not arise which applies to an agreement to do an impossible act or to do an act, which afterwards becomes impossible or unlawful. In the absence of any such eventuality arises contract has not been frustr3ted and accordingly allowed the appeal. 12. In view of rival submissions, as referred to above, the point that arises for our consideration is: "Whether the repudiation of the contract under EX.A-3 by the vendor is valid and if so, plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of agreement of sale." 13. Before we answering the point framed, it is appropriate to notice the relevant clauses of the agreement under EX.A-1. Clauses 2 to 5 of the agreement read as under: "2. The total consideration for the land sail be Rs.45,315-00 (Rupees forty five thousand three hundred and fifteen only) out of which an amount of Rs.15,OOO/- (rupees fifteen thousand only) is paid on 07-07-1978 by demand draft NO.AK643904/1605 dated 7 -7 -1978 drawn on Canara Bank, Vijayawada, the receipt whereof 'the vendor' hereby acknowledges and the rest within one month from the date of receipt of information stating the vendor has obtained the permission from the concerned authorities at the time of execution of the sale deed. 3. 3. The sale deed shall be executed within three months from the date of this agreement or within one month from the date of receipt of intimation from the 'vendor' stating that the necessary permission from the concerned authority under Urban Land Ceiling fact is obtained or within such further period as mutually agreed 'UDO'1 on payment of the balance of consideration. If the balance of consideration is not paid rendering it difficult for the 'vendor' to execute the sale deed, this agreement of sale Shai1 stand canc8l1ed. 4. That 'the vendor' shah execute f3in deed on payment of the balance in favour of the purchaser or his nominees in two plots or unblock. 5. That 'the vendor' shall obtain permission for alienation under Urban Land Ceiling Act or any other Act as early as possible but not later than 75 days from the date of his agreement and the 'vendor' shall be sale responsible for obtaining the above permission. If 'the vendor' fails to get the said permission 'the purchaser' shall be entitled to get back the advance paid after 75 days from the date of the agreement, but not later than 90 days under any circumstances." 14. Before interpreting the clauses under the agreement it is appropriate for us to advert to the various judgments on which strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. 15. Learned counsel elaborated his submissions on the following three heads: 1. Whether the time is the essence of the contract. 2. Whether the delay in obtaining permission disentitle the plaintiff from seeking specific performance. 3. When the vendor himself defaulted he can repudiate the contract agreement or not? 16. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following judgments to substantiate his plea that when a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that time is not the e$sence of the contract. 17. In Gomathinayagam pjllat's case (2 supra) the Supreme Court after considering the terms and conditions of the agreement and Section 55 of the Contract Act held thus: “It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in language which is unmistakable: it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause-imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. After holding so in para-6 held as under: "6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the' Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 55 and App 360 at p. 372: (AIR 1928 PC 208 at p. 216) "In the suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit." The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit." The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit. On this part of the case the Trial Court recorded a clear finding against the respondent that he was at no time ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court did not consider the effect of this finding upon the claim of the respondent and without expressing dissent with that finding granted a decree for specific performance to the respondent." Justice Bachawat speaking for the majority of the judgment set aside the judgment of the High Court of Madras, grating decree for specific performance, and restored the order passed by the trial court dismissing the suit for specific performance. 18. In Hind Construction's case (3 supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph-S of its judgment while interpreting the agreement of construction contract, which was referred by the learned single judge, held as under: "8. It will be clear from the aforesaid statement of law that even where the parties have expressly provided that time is of the essence of the contract such a stipulation will have to be read along with other provisions of the contract and such other provisions may, on construction of the contract, exclude the inference that the completion of the work by a particular date was intended to be fundamental; for instance, if the contract were to include clauses providing for extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for every day or week the work undertaken remains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the contract such clauses would be construed as rendering ineffective the express provision relating to the time being of the essence of contract." 19. In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Out Shastn12 the Supreme Court after referring its earlier judgment in Gomathinayagam Pillas case (2 supra) held that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of th8 contract. In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Out Shastn12 the Supreme Court after referring its earlier judgment in Gomathinayagam Pillas case (2 supra) held that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of th8 contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by the circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract. Holing so allowed the appeal restoring the judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit for specific performance. 20. In Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor13 after referring its earlier judgment in Govind Prasad Chaturvedls case (11 supra) held whether or not time was of the essence of the contract would have to be judged in the context and circumstances of each case. The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance mainly on the ground that the plaintiff who executed the document pertaining to ostensible transaction and obtained contemporaneous agreement from the defendant agreeing to sell the property in question within 10 years of the date of the execution of the document. The trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not have adequate funds to purchase the property, which was confirmed by the appellate Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court decreed the suit holding that when the defend8.nt was not willing to perform his part of the contract what more the plaintiff could have done. The courts below failed to consider this crucial aspect and having carried away the contention in the context of expenditure and income of the plaintiff. On appreciation of evidence on record no other view is possible. The finding is rendered also in total disregard of the circumstance that the defendant was never willing to perform his part of the contract and had not cared to remain at the sub-registrar's office, notwithstanding the intimation given through the Advocate by Registered Post and by a local telegram. The only conclusion which can be reasonably drawn is that the defendant wanted to defeat the claim of the plaintiff and wanted to wriggle out of the obligation undertaken by him. The only conclusion which can be reasonably drawn is that the defendant wanted to defeat the claim of the plaintiff and wanted to wriggle out of the obligation undertaken by him. Under the circumstances the finding recorded by the courts below must be unhesitatingly set aside and decreed the suit for re-conveyance. 21. In the case of Chand Rani (4 supra) the Supreme Court after referring its earlier judgments in Gomathinayagam Pillai (2 supra); Hind Construction Contractors (3 supra) and Govind Prasad Chatruvedi (11 supra) and after analyzing the ratio laid down therein held that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence af the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the following conditions are fulfilled. 1. from the express terms of the contract 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example; the object of making the contract. After interpreting the terms of the contract which provides for payment of balance sale consideration "within a period of 10 days only' approved the interpretation made by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, reversing the decree for specific performance on the ground that having qualified the amount there was no further need to qualify the same unless it be the intention of the parties to make time as the essence of the contract. Therefore, when the plaintiff was never willing to make payment and not ready to perform his part of the contract confirmed the judgment of the Division Bench reversing the decree of specific performance. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff argued that on obtaining such permission plaintiff issued a notice for execution of the sale deed and even he insisted for obtaining permission from 1979 onwards. 23. In Motilai's case (5 supra) the Supreme Court while upholding the construction of document held that subject matter of the agreement to convey the property which is sought to be enforced is the same as that of the subject matter of sale deed. 23. In Motilai's case (5 supra) the Supreme Court while upholding the construction of document held that subject matter of the agreement to convey the property which is sought to be enforced is the same as that of the subject matter of sale deed. Whether there was implied covenant to apply sir rights it held to have been agreed which are necessary to do all things necessary to effect such transfer which would include an application to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer. 24. In Chandnee Widya Vati Madd,en's case (6 supra) the vendor made an application to the appropriate authority for necessary permission in terms of the agreement of sale but withdrawn the, said application thereupon, the vendee called upon the vendor to fulfill her part of agreement but he failed to do so. Therefore, vendee filed a suit for specific performance of the 8.greement or in the alternative for damages. The trial court dismissed that suit for specific performance of contract and for permanent injunction but decreed the suit for damages. On appeal the High Court of Punjab after relying upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Matilal's case (5 supra) held that the vendor has to make an application for necessary permission; if the Chief Commissioner ultimately refused to grant the sanction to sale, the purchaser/plaintiff may not be able to enforce the decree for specific performance of the contract but there was no bar to the Court passing a decree for that relief; recorded a finding that purchaser is entitled to a sum of Rs.5,775/- would be appropriate amount of damages, as against RS.11 ,550/- awarded by the lower court, in the event of the plaintiff's not succeeding in getting their main relief for specific performance of the contract. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment of the High Court decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. 25. In the above judgment the finding recorded by all the Courts is that the plaintiffs are throughout really and willing to perform their part of the contract and it was the defendant who willfully refused to perform her part of the contract. 26. 25. In the above judgment the finding recorded by all the Courts is that the plaintiffs are throughout really and willing to perform their part of the contract and it was the defendant who willfully refused to perform her part of the contract. 26. In NathuJ9.fs case (7 supra) the vender who rescinded the contract filed a suit for possession of the land and for mesne profits from the date of delivery as per the part performance of the agreement alleging that purchaser was not ready and willing to perform has part of contract which was rescinded. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed the decree declaring that the vendor was entitled to balance of ~ale consideration and also mesne profits; the balance of sale consideration shall be deposited by the purchaser within two months from the date of decree and till that date the purehas9r was allowed to retain possession of the entire property. On further appeal the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any specific clause dealing with the matter, a condition that Nathulal will secure the sanction under Section 70 (4) after paying the appropriate fee must be implied for it is well settled that where by state the property is not transferable without the permission of the authority, an agreement to transfer must be deemed subject to the implied condition that the transferor will obtain the sanction of the authority concerned and accordingly dismissed the appeal filed by the vendor holding that in view of arrangement made by the purchaser it was clear that he had at all relevant times made necessary arrangements for paying the amount due, but so long as vendor did not carry out his part of the contract purchaser could not be called upon to pay the balance of the price. 27. In the case of Baikunthi Devi (8supra) the Supreme Court while considering the bar contained under the Utter Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act held during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings in a district, there should not be transfers, gifts and sales and there is nothing at all in the Act which inhibits contracts for sale being entered into by owners of property. In this case the suit itself was filed after the consolidation proceedings had come to a close, which was decreed by the trial court, reversed in appeal but restored by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal restrong the decree passed by the trial court. 28. In Rojasara Ramjibhai Oahyabhai's case (9 supra) on appeal being preferred by the vendor the Supreme Court held that the permission to convert the disputed land into village site having been obtained on 26/08/1958 insofar as a part of the land admeasuring 1,000 square yards and on 10/09/1959 as regards tit1e remaining portion, it could not be said that the respondents' suit filed on 06/09/1960 was barren by limitation. The Supreme Court also held the decision of the Privy Council in Motilal's raise (5 supra) therefore is an authority for the proposition that if the vendor agrees to sell the property which can be transferred only with the sanction of some Government authority, the Court has jurisdiction to order the vendor to apply to the authority within a specified period, and if the sanction is forthcoming to convey to the purchaser within a certain time. After referring its earlier judgments in Chandee Widya Vati Madden (6 supra) and Ramesh Chandra Chandiok (10 supra) confirmed the decree for specific performance granted by the High Court. 29. In Ramesh Chandra Chandiok’s case (10 supra) the suit for specific performance was dismissed by the trial court holding that the vendor had not been produced the transfer of the lease-hold rights could be affected only with the sanction of the Rehabilitation Ministry; the purchasers did not perform the contract for about1 1/2 years even though the respondents had repudiated it much earlier. Any party to the contract could subsequently make time the essence of the contract by a reasonable notice and this had been done by the vendors and the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by paying balance sale consideration. The trial court dismissed the suit but granted the purchaser to refund part payment of consideration, which was not liable to be forfeited by the vendor. The same was deposited on execution taken out by the purchaser, but the same was lying with the court during the pendency of the appeal. The trial court dismissed the suit but granted the purchaser to refund part payment of consideration, which was not liable to be forfeited by the vendor. The same was deposited on execution taken out by the purchaser, but the same was lying with the court during the pendency of the appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal holding that letter Exhibit P-7 did not contain any such language which would justify the importing of a condition that until the respondents obtained sanction for the transfer of the property the purchasers were not bound t8 get the sale completed and they have not satisbctorily shown that they had sufficient funds to pay the balance amount of Rs.15,000/- from which it could be concluded that they were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and having obtained satisfaction of the decree for RS.7500/- they became disentitled to a decree for specific performance. On further appeal the Supreme Court after considering the statement contained in EX.P7 held that the execution of the sale deed "by us cannot bE1 complete without the said sanction" was unqualified and unequivocal r that the vendor through his letter EX.P-8; 7 that the respondents were having second thoughts and wanted to wriggle out of the agreement because presumably they wanted to transfer it for better consideration to some one else or to transfer it in favour of their own relation as is stated to have been done later. The statement contained in EX.P-10 that the sanction was not forthcoming has not been substantiated by any cogent evidence as no document was placed on the record to show that any attempt was made to obtain sanction prior to November 1956. There was no question of time having ever been made the essence of the contract by the letters sent by the respondents nor could it be said that the appellants had failed to perform their part of the agreement within a reasonable time. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Accordingly set aside the decree of the courts below and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance. 30. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Accordingly set aside the decree of the courts below and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance. 30. From the principles enunciated in the above-referred decisions "whether time is the essence of the contract" depends upon the clauses in the agreement. The readiness and willingness throughout has to be considered in the light of covenants in the contract. 31. A combined reading of clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 of agreement of sale, referred to above, makes it clear that the parties intended to complete the transaction within one month from the date of receipt of information that the vendor obtained permission which shall be obtained as early as possible but not later than 75 days from the date of agreement and if the vendor fails to get such permission, the purchaser shall get back the advance amount after 75 days from such date but not later than 90 days under any circumstances. The parties further intended that the sale deed shall be executed within three months from the date of agreement or within one month from the date of receipt of information about obtaining permission and if tile vendor fails to get permission within such period they can extend the period by mutually agreed upon on payment of balance sale consideration. If the balance sale consideration is not paid within the stipulated period or agreed period, rendering it difficult for the vendor to execute the sale deed, the agreement shall stand cancelled. When parties intended that the contract has to be completed within three months from the date of agreement or within one month from the date of intimation of obtaining permission from the vendor, such obtaining permission should be within 75 days and thereafter sale has to be completed within one month. The parties further agreed if the contract could not complete within three months further period can be extended mutually agreed upon on payment of balance of sale consideration. The parties further agreed if the contract could not complete within three months further period can be extended mutually agreed upon on payment of balance of sale consideration. If the balance sale consideration is not paid within the stipulated period or agreed period i.e. within one month from the date of intimation of obtaining permission or agreed period i.e. within three months and agreed to extend the period for completion of the contract by a separate agreement, the contract shall stand cancelled. What is agreed is only for extension of period for execution of sale deed but not for payment of sale consideration and further if the vendor fails to get such permission, the purchaser shall be entitled get back the advance amount paid after 75 days from the date but not later than 90 days under any circumstances also makes it clear that the purchaser if wants to keep alive the agreement has to pay the balance sale consideration before expiry of three months and get the agreement for extension period for obtaining permission for execution of the sale deed. There is no evidence adduced by the plaintiff that he had made an effort to pay the balance sale consideration as agreed before expiry of three moths and called upon the defendant to agree for extension of period for completion of sale transaction; the purchaser in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale must plead and prove that he was ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract continuously from the date of contract till the date of filing the suit. No doubt the defendants through their letter dated 13-1 0-1978-Ex.A-2 informed the plaintiff that they are ready to execute the registered sale deed on coming to Hyderabad next week and called upon the plaintiff to make himself ready for taking the sale deed for which the plaintiff replied under EX.A-17 dated 20-10-1978 for suggesting a suitable date for registering the sale deed and also reminded to obtain the certificate from ULC to sell the plot. Admittedly by the said date three months period shortly is coming to an end. Admittedly by the said date three months period shortly is coming to an end. As per clause 3 of the agreement, the plaintiff should also express his willingness to pay the balance sale consideration before expiry of 3 months and in the event the permission is not obtained agreeable to have supplemental agreement to the suit agreement extending period for completion of sale deed. 32. The Supreme Court was in full agreement with the observation made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H.Mama v. Flora Sassoon (AIR 1928 PC 208) and in Gomathinayagam Pillai's (2 supra) held that in a suit for specific performance of agreement the purchaser should plead and prove that he was ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit. Following the same the Supreme Court in Govind Prasad Chaturvedls case (12 supra) held that the intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by the circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale land stipulated as to time is not the essence of the contract. 33. The Supreme Court in Chand Ranls case (4 supra) after referring to its earlier judgments upheld the interpretation given by the Division 6ench of the High Court holding that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even tnen the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions set out are fulfilled. Failure to ajay the balance amount within the stipulated period amounts to breach of contract. 34. In the case on hand, plaintiff intentionally failed to pay the balance sale consideration as agreed, but never offered, to pay the said amount even after the contract has been terminated, refunding the advance amount paid by the defendant through his letter EX.A3 dated 12-04-1982. The plaintiff though sent a reply under EX.B1 dated 02-05-1982 filed the suit after 22 months. Except stating that he was ever ready and willing to perform the contract but never offered to pay the balance of sale consideration as agreed. The plaintiff though sent a reply under EX.B1 dated 02-05-1982 filed the suit after 22 months. Except stating that he was ever ready and willing to perform the contract but never offered to pay the balance of sale consideration as agreed. By mere stating that he is ready and willing to perform the contract agre8ment cannot be kept alive unless the balance sale consideration is paid. 35. In view of the same, we hold that the payment of amount within three months and obtaining supplemental agreement is the essence of the contract and failure to do so, it can be said that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 36. it was nextly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that only because of steep rise in prices defendant cannot go back to the agreement and once he committed 3 default he cannot wiggle out from the contract by execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.15,000/with a fond hope to complete the transaction; even if the amount is refunded he cannot even purchase 10 square yards with the said amount and for no fault of him he cannot be suffered. The argument equally applies to the defendant also. Had the plaintiff paid the balance of sale consideration the defendant would have invested the same by purchasing a landed property, since the plaintiff failed to pay the balance of sale consideration the defendant suffered double loss than the plaintiff. 37. The Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanandam's case (11 supra), on which reliance is placed by the learned single Judge, categorically held that the Court, cannot be oblivious to the really and the really is constant and continuous rise in the values of urban property6;:, - fuelled by larger scale migration of people from rural areas to urban centers and by inflation. The representation by the purchaser or the conduct or neglect of him will be an inducing factor for the vendor to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief. It was further held that all stipulations of time provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? It was further held that all stipulations of time provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? All this only means that while exercising its discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time limit. Holding so allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the High Court restoring the decree of the trial court, denying the specific performance. 38. In view of the same, it is inequitable to grant decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff directing the defendants to execute the sale deed. 39. The learned single Judge after considering the said aspect allowed the appellant, which needs no interference. Since the plaintiff paid the amount, which is admittedly refunded by the defendant, he cannot forfeit the amount under the clauses of the contract agreement as the said amount has already been deposited in the bank in a separate account. In view of the same, the plaintiff is entitled to refund of the advance amount of Rs.15,000/- along with accrued interest 0r a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs only) in all. 40. The appeal is party allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs. 17-10-2008: Immediately upon the pronouncement of the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant made an oral application seeking certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. We find no merit in the oral application of the learned counsel for tile appellant since n0 substantial question of law of general importance is involved requiring the same to be decided by the Supreme Court. The application is accordingly dismissed.