JUDGMENT:- (1.) BY a chartered party dated January 29, 1996 Marco Shipping Agency the appellant above named chartered a motor vessel "harvest" to the respondent for carrying rice from India to Bangladesh. The charter party contained an arbitration clause. Under the arbitration clause each party in case of a dispute would nominate their representative as Arbitrator and the Arbitrators would appoint an Umpire whose decision would be final and binding upon the parties. It was agreed that the arbitration would be held at London. Disputes and differences arose by and between the parties. Marco Shipping Agency appointed their nominee, Mr. Patrick Odonovan as Arbitrator and asked the respondent to appoint their nominee. Respondent appointed Mr. Zahid Vohra, as their nominee at a belated stage. By that time arbitration already commenced. The Arbitrator, Mr. Patrick Odonovan so nominated by the appellant entered upon reference as sole Arbitrator as the respondent failed to appoint their nominee in time. Respondents nominee after perusing the arbitration clause and the agreement also observed that since the sole arbitrator started functioning he should continue as sole Arbitrator. The respondent appeared before the sole Arbitrator filed their counter statement. The hearing was concluded on April 20, 1997. Before the Arbitrator published his award the respondent had approached the learned Single Judge by filing a civil suit in this Court as against the appellant and obtained an ex parte order of injunction restraining the appellant from giving any effect to the letter dated August 6, 1996. The contents of the said letter is quoted below: "we are London lawyers who have been instructed by Marco Shipping in respect of their claims against you under the above charterparty. Please take note that we have today appointed Mr. Patrick Odonovan of 611 Floor, wellington House, 125, Strand, London, WC. 2a GAP as Owners Arbitrator in accordance with Clause 41 of the charterparly and Mr. Odonovan has accepted this appointment. We would now be grateful if you would appoint an Arbitrator of your own within 15 days as required by Clause 41. We also attach by way of service the Owners Points of Claim and would be grateful to hear from you as to when you would anticipate being in a position to serve Points of Defence. " (2.) THE order of the learned Single Judge was communicated to the arbitrator vide letter dated May 24, 1997. We also attach by way of service the Owners Points of Claim and would be grateful to hear from you as to when you would anticipate being in a position to serve Points of Defence. " (2.) THE order of the learned Single Judge was communicated to the arbitrator vide letter dated May 24, 1997. The relevant extract of the letter is quoted below: "you are requested to note that by an order passed on May 23, 1997 the said Ms. Marco Shipping Agency has been restrained from taking any step and making any demand pursuant to the notice dated 6th August, 1996. The said notice is the nonce issued by Ms Middleton Potts, the lawyers of the said Marco chipping Agency whereby we were notified inter alia, about your appointment as an arbitrator. " (3.) M/s Middleton Potts, solicitors for the appellant then wrote a letter to the Arbitrator vide fax message dated May 23, 1997 to the following effect: "we thank you for your letter of 23rd May and confirm that our clients do not have a copy of any "final discharge report" for the third voyage apart from that already provided. With reference to the Charterers fax of today, they have once again failed to send us the enclosures. Given that they have taken part in the arbitration to date put indifference submissions and obtained innumerable extension of time. We find their commencement of legal proceedings in india to be cynical in the extreme. We invite you to disregard it, and put, as the Charterers no doubt hope to allow it to form yet another argument for delay in publishing an Award. We would ask you to reserve jurisdiction to yourself to deal with (he question of damages suffered by the Owners as a result of the charterers breach in disregarding the arbitration clause and starting proceedings in India. " (4.) THE injunction petition came up for hearing before the learned Single judge on June 30, 1997 when His Lordship vacated the interim order and directed affidavits to be exchanged. The order of the learned Single Judge is appearing at pages 403-406 of the Paper Book. We are told, the said application was subsequently dismissed for default. (5.) THE Arbitrator published his award on May 27, 1997. The order of the learned Single Judge is appearing at pages 403-406 of the Paper Book. We are told, the said application was subsequently dismissed for default. (5.) THE Arbitrator published his award on May 27, 1997. The Arbitrator in his award, inter alia, observed as follows: "i RESERVE to myself jurisdiction to make a further Award or Awards as may be appropriate in respect of outstanding issues between the parties, in particular the taxation of the Owners costs and the question of any damages suffered by the Owners as a result of what is said to have been the Charterers breach of contract in commencing proceedings in India." (6.) THE appellant filed an application on February 20, 1998 before the learned Single Judge taking arbitration matters, inter alia, praying for enforcement of the foreign award published by the Arbitrator. The respondent contested the said proceeding by filing affidavit-in-opposition. The appellant filed affidavit-in-reply. The learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated May 22, 2002 appearing at pages 456-474 of the Paper Book dismissed the application by holding that the award was contrary to public policy of our country, Hence this appeal by the appellant. Analysis of the judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge, dt. May 25, 2002. (7.) ON a combined reading of the judgment three principal points reveal which are as follows: (i) Once there was an order of injunction the Arbitrator could not have proceeded to publish his award ignoring the order of this Court, such act was contemptuous. (ii) Arbitrator allowed a claim made by the appellant being an incentive given to the agent to clear off the shipping documents by causing incidental expenses to expedite the process in various Government departments of Bangladesh. (iii) The Arbitrator could not have reserved his decision for imposing damage on the respondent for approaching the Indian Court to obtain injunction. (8.) TO elaborate. His Lordship observed that the letter so written by the solicitors on behalf of the appellant was a direct threat against the Indian judiciary. The language used in the said letter was contemptuous. His lordship, however did not feel it inclined to issue any rule of contempt as the period of limitation had expired by that time. His Lordship observed, law of Limitation precluded Court to issue Rule of Contempt. However, the offence committed by the appellant remained. The language used in the said letter was contemptuous. His lordship, however did not feel it inclined to issue any rule of contempt as the period of limitation had expired by that time. His Lordship observed, law of Limitation precluded Court to issue Rule of Contempt. However, the offence committed by the appellant remained. His Lordship considered the incentive claim as a bribe alleged to have been given to the Government officials of Bangladesh which was contrary to the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. His Lordship held that the conduct of the appellant was to disregard this Court and its orders. Hence, this Court must not allow the award obtained by disregarding the order of this Court to be enforced as it would be contrary to public policy of our country. Our Initial Reaction: (9.) WHEN the appellant opened their case before us on perusal of the letter written by the London solicitors to the Arbitrator and particularly examining the contents quoted supra we adjourned the matter to enable the appellant to have written apology from their solicitors. Matter was time to time adjourned and ultimately the appellants filed a letter dated July 3, 2008 addressed by M/ s. Middleton Potts, the contents of which are quoted below: "we unconditionally apologise for this letter and for any affront it may have caused the Honourable Court. It was not our intention to offend the judiciary in India, which we hold in the highest esteem. Please be rest assured the communication of 23th May, 1997 was never intended to he directed against the Honourable Court but rather against the charterers. " (10.) WO also asked Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant to take appropriate instruction on the incentive claim as well as the observation of the Arbitrator quoted (supra) reserving his decision on account of damage. Mr. Ghosh on instruction categorically undertook to us that in case they succeeded in enforcing the award they would not insist upon the incentive claims being US$ 6060. They would also not insist upon and take any further step on the observation of the Arbitrator reserving the claim for damages as against the respondent for approaching Indian Court. (11.) WE directed the said letter dated July 3, 2008 to be kept on record by our order dated July 16, 2008. They would also not insist upon and take any further step on the observation of the Arbitrator reserving the claim for damages as against the respondent for approaching Indian Court. (11.) WE directed the said letter dated July 3, 2008 to be kept on record by our order dated July 16, 2008. We then allowed the appellant to proceed with the appeal on merits. Contention of the appellant: (12.) MR. Dhruba Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended as follows: (i) The parties to the proceeding submitted to the jurisdiction of sole arbitration of Mr. Patrick O Donovan. The parties filed their claims and counter claims. The Arbitrator afforded the parties opportunity of hearing, the hearing was ultimately concluded on April 20, 1997. Hence, there was no occasion for the respondent to approach the Civil Court to obtain an order of injunction. (ii) The order of injunction was nullity in the eye of law in view of the express provisions of Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act of 1996"). (iii) Assuming the order of injunction was valid and binding upon the concerned parties it restrained the appellant from acting upon the letter daied August 6, 1996. By the said letter the appellant informed the respondent about their nomination and invited them to appoint their nominee as Arbitrator. The order was communicated on May 23, 1997. By that time the Arbitrator concluded hearing. There was no further act to be done on behalf of the appellant. Hence, the appellant did not violate the order of the learned Single Judge so passed ex parte. (iv) The learned Single Judge did not pass any order restraint upon the arbitrator. Hence, the Arbitrator was free to publish his award which he did on May 27, 1997. (v) The order of the learned Single Judge was subsequently vacated on june 30, 1997. On February 20,1998 the appellant applied for enforcement of the award so published by the Arbitrator. (vi) The application was maintainable and the learned Single Judge should have gone into the merits of the matter to examine whether the award was enforceable in India in terms of section 48 of the said Act of 1996. (13.) MR. On February 20,1998 the appellant applied for enforcement of the award so published by the Arbitrator. (vi) The application was maintainable and the learned Single Judge should have gone into the merits of the matter to examine whether the award was enforceable in India in terms of section 48 of the said Act of 1996. (13.) MR. Ghosh in support of his contention cited the following decisions: (i) All India Reporter, 1968, Allahabad, Page 139, Shyam Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and Ors. ; (ii) All India Reporter, 1974, Supreme Court, Page 1471, Nawabkhan abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat; (iii) All India Reporter, 1975, Allahabad, Page 280, Sri Ram Charan Das vs. Pyare Lal; (iv) All India Reporter, 1983, Allahabad, Page 180, Sheo Kumar Saxena vs. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh, Gonda and Ors. ; (v) 1990, Volume III, Supreme Court Cases, Page 481, British India steam Navigation Co. Ltd. vs. Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries and Ors. ; (vi) All India Reporter, 1997, Supreme Court, Page 1240, Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. ; (vii)2002, Volume - IV, Supremo Court Cases, Page 105, Bhatia international vs. Bulk Trading S. A. and Anr. ; (viii)2004, Volume -108, Calcutta Weekly Notes, Page 1018, Stephen commerce Pvt. Ltd. vs. Owners and parties interested in the vessel m. V. " Wise King"; (ix) 2004, Volume -108, Calcutta Weekly Notes, Page 995, Vinayak Oil and fats Private Limited vs. Andre (Cayman Islands) Trading Co. Ltd. (x) 2005, Volume - VII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 791, Harshad chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and Anr. ; (xi) 2007, Volume -II, Calcutta High Court Notes, Page 544, Korp. Gems (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Precious Diamond Limited and Ors.; (xii) An unreported decision of the Honble Mr. Justice D. K. Deshmukh of the High Court at Bombay dated 5th June, 2006 in the case of noy vallesina Engineering Spa vs. Jindal Drugs Limited (14.) TO elaborate his contention Mr. Ghosh contended that the learned single Judge relied on Renusagar Electric Supply (supra) and Tayabhai (supra)to hold that the award in violation of the order was not liable to be enforced. The facts involved in Tayabhai as well as Renusagar had no resemblance with the present case. (15.) AS and by way of alternative submission Mr. Ghosh contended that the learned single Judge relied on Renusagar Electric Supply (supra) and Tayabhai (supra)to hold that the award in violation of the order was not liable to be enforced. The facts involved in Tayabhai as well as Renusagar had no resemblance with the present case. (15.) AS and by way of alternative submission Mr. Ghosh contended assuming the ratio decided in Tayabhai (supra) had application in the present case from the nature of injunction it would appear that there was no fetter either on the arbitration proceeding or on the Arbitrator which could preclude the Arbitrator from publishing the award. (16.) MR. Ghosh in his usual fairness lastly contended that the English solicitors should not have used harsh language in such communication appearing at page 401 of the Paper Book. Since they tendered unqualified apology in writing this Court should not penalise the litigant who had no hand in it. (17.) MR. Ghosh prayed for setting aside of the order of the learned Single judge coupled with a direction for enforcement of the award. Contention of the respondent: (18.) MR. Ranjan Bachawat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contended as follows: (i) Once an order was passed by a competent Court of Law the same was valid and binding upon all concerned so long it was not set aside or vacated or recalled by a competent Court. (ii) In a contempt proceeding the Court in its wisdom might condone the wrongful act of the contemnor, might also pardon the contemnor. The Court, however, was not competent to allow the contemptuous act to remain. (iii) Once an order was passed by a competent Court it was the duty of all concerned to obey the same. If any one felt aggrieved he had his remedy in appeal. Any act done in violation of such order was void. (iv) The rule of law was to prevail. The Court to maintain its sanctity and dignity must enforce its orders. Any act in violation of its orders must be undone by the Court as retaining the same would be contrary to the public policy of our country. (v) Mere tendering of apology would not per se permit the contemnor to continue to act contrary to the said order by taking benefit of such violation. (vi) Mere apology was not enough until and unless the contemnor purged the contempt. (v) Mere tendering of apology would not per se permit the contemnor to continue to act contrary to the said order by taking benefit of such violation. (vi) Mere apology was not enough until and unless the contemnor purged the contempt. (19.) TO elaborate his submission Mr. Bachawat contended that rightly or wrongly the Civil Court passed an order of injunction. The respondent had their remedy in appeal. So long the said order subsisted the respondent was not entitled to take benefit of any act done in violation of the said order. The order of injunction was communicated to the respondent and all concerned on May 23, 1997. Hence, the Arbitrator had no business to publish his award on May 27, 1997. The appellant should have requested the arbitrator not to publish the award and wait till the said order was recalled and/or set aside by a competent Court. According to Mr. Bachawat the award published during the period when the order of injunction was subsisting was void in the eye of law and in any event the same could not be enforced being contrary to public policy of our country. The learned Judge rightly held so and no interference was called for on that score. (20.) MR. Bachawat in support of his contention cited the following dccisions:-(i) All India Reporter, 1975, Allahabad, Page 48, Hari Nandan Agrawal and Anr. vs. S. N. Pandita and Ors. ; (ii) 1990, Volume-Ill, Supreme Court Cases, Page 481, British India Steam navigation Co. Ltd. vs. Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries and Ors. ; (iii) All India Reporter, 1994, Supreme Court, Page 860, Renusagar Power co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Co. ; (iv) 1995, Volume-VI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 50, Surjit Singh and ors. vs. Harbans Singh and Ors. ; (v) 1996, Volume-IV, Supreme Court Cases, Page 622, Delhi Development authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. Put. Ltd. and Anr.; (vi) All India Reporter, 1997, Supreme Court, Page 1240, Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. , (vii) 1997, Volume-VI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 241, Vishaka and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. ; (viii)2001, Volume-VIII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 650, Pravin C. Shah vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Anr.; (ix) 2002, Volume-VII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 46, Prakash Narain sharma vs. Burmah Shell Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. , (x) 2003, Volume-V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 531, Sukanya Holdings pvt. vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. ; (viii)2001, Volume-VIII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 650, Pravin C. Shah vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali and Anr.; (ix) 2002, Volume-VII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 46, Prakash Narain sharma vs. Burmah Shell Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. , (x) 2003, Volume-V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 531, Sukanya Holdings pvt. Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and Anr. ,(xi) 2003, Volume-V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 705, Oil and Natural gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Limited; (xii) 2005, Volume -II, Arbitration Law Reporter, Page 324, Kohinoor creations and Ors. vs. Syndicate Bank; (xiii)2005, Volume-VII, Supreme Court Cases, Page 234, Shin-Etsu chemical Co. Ltd. vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and Anr. ; (xiv) 2006, Volume- XI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 245, Centrotrade minerals and Metals INC. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. ; (xv) 2007, Volume-XI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 374, All Bengal Excise licensees association vs. Raghabendra Singh and Ors. ; (xvi) 2007, Volume-V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 510, India Household and Healthcare Limited vs. LG Household and Healthcare Limited; (xvii)108, Calcutta Weekly Notes, Page 573, Praja Enterprises vs. Karnataka Soaps and Detergent Limited: (xviii) Volume-66, Calcutta Weekly Notes, Page 983, Hari Kissen Khettry vs. Farrukh Sayer. Law on the subject: (21.) BEFORE we go into the controversy let us first discuss the law on the subject. Earlier the foreign awards were being dealt with under the Protocol convention Act. In 1996 Law of Arbitration had gone a sea change in our country. A comprehensive law was enacted being Arbitration and Conciliation act, 1996. Part II of the said Act dealt with enforcement of foreign awards. One of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee. J) discussed the law in a Single Bench decision in the case of Korp. Gems India (supra). The relevant extract of the said decision is quoted below: "the law on the subject and the Apex Court decisions on this score.-The Act of 1996 is a comprehensive law enacted by the legislature which includes the entire field of arbitration including the foreign arbitration. Section 5 of the Act debars judicial intervention where the parties agreed to resolve the disputes through arbitration save and except the scope and limitation as provided in the said Act itself. Section 8 has given a mandate to the judicial forum to refer the disputes pending before it to arbitration in case there had been an agreement to the said effect. Section 8 has given a mandate to the judicial forum to refer the disputes pending before it to arbitration in case there had been an agreement to the said effect. Section 16 empowers the arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction if it is questioned by any party. Section 45 deals with the foreign arbitration. It is a similar provision like section 8 giving mandate to the judicial forum to refer the disputes to the tribunal by staying its own proceeding in case there had been a valid agreement to the said effect. These particular provisions by this time have been interpreted by the high Courts as well as the Apex Court and it is now well-settled principles of law that in case there had been a valid arbitration agreement between the parties the judicial forum would have no other alternative but to stay its own hand and refer the disputes pending before it to arbitration as per the agreement. With regard to the admiralty transaction involved through a bill of lading where goods are carried by sea the conditions stipulated in charter party are considered to be applicable and binding upon the parties to a hill of lading in case the hill of lading contains a clause to the said effect. This particular issue was widely discussed in Baltic Confidence (supra) by the apex Court. In the case of Wise King (supra) I held that in case a suit was filed before a Court of Law within the prescribed period of limitation and as long as the defendant did not take any plea of arbitration the suit was to as the be tried by the said Court. Once the defendant approached the court with a valid arbitration agreement, in my view the Court had no other alternative but to refer the disputes to arbitration. Hence, considering the law on the subject I am only to find out whether there had been a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. If the test is positive the suit is liable to stayed, if not the plaintiff would be entitled to proceed with the suit. However, in my view, the law does not permit me as discussed above to stay any foreign arbitration proceeding initialed by one of the parties while suit is pending for adjudication before this Court. If the test is positive the suit is liable to stayed, if not the plaintiff would be entitled to proceed with the suit. However, in my view, the law does not permit me as discussed above to stay any foreign arbitration proceeding initialed by one of the parties while suit is pending for adjudication before this Court. (22.) SIMILAR problem arose in the case of Stiphen Commerce (supra) wherein one of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee. J) referred the disputes between the parties brought before this Court through an Admiralty suit to arbitration invoking the arbitration clause. The relevant extract is quoted below: "if I have to follow Baltic Confidence (supra) which I am bound, I have no other alternative but to refer the disputes for arbitration. Mr. Bose in reply argued that once the plaintiff knowing that there had been an arbitration clause filed a suit the plaintiff could not resist reference to arbitration on the plea of limitation. In my view, if a suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation by the plaintiff so long the defendant does not take the plea of arbitration the suit is competent to be tried by this Court, Here on or about 24th January, 2000 the suit was filed and the order of arrest was passed. The vessel was released by an order dated january 31, 2000 at the instance of applicants where the applicants got the vessel released upon furnishing of security. The instant application was made on 9th May, 2001 after about one year four months from the date of filing of the suit. If I pass an order of reference as of date without any protection to the plaintiff it would be an unjust treatment to the plaintiff. It is true that relying on Batlic Confidence (supra) I have no other alternative but to refer the disputes to arbitration since I am unable to accept the view of Gupta, J. as discussed above. At the same time I should see that such arbitration is not rendered fruitless and or infructuous because of the plea of limitation. " (23.) IN this back dropour understanding of the law is, the scope of Indian court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award is limited. At the same time I should see that such arbitration is not rendered fruitless and or infructuous because of the plea of limitation. " (23.) IN this back dropour understanding of the law is, the scope of Indian court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award is limited. Section 48 (2) of the said Act of 1996, inter alia, provides that enforcement of the foreign award could be refused if it is contrary to public policy of our country. The learned Judge refused enforcement on that ground. Relevant precedent: (24.) ALTOGETHER twenty-nine precedents were referred to and relied on by the parties. We, however, feel that the decision in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. (supra) would be relevant more so because of the reason the learned Judge based His Lordships judgment on the ratio of the Apex court as decided in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. (supra). The Apex Court observed that once there was disobedience of a Court order the contemnor must be punished irrespective of the fact that such interim order was subsequently found to have been passed by the Court without having jurisdiction. (25.) LEARNED Single Judge held that since the learned Single Judge taking up the interim application in Civil Suit passed an order of injunction during subsistence of the said order of injunction the award could not have been published and the same was thus void and not enforceable as it would amount to contrary to public policy of our country applying the ratio of Tayabbhai m. Bagasarwalla and Anr. (supra). (26.) EMPHASIS was put to India Household (supra). There, application under section 11 was dismissed. The Apex Court while considering the issue observed, fraud, as is well-known, vitiates all solemn acts. The Apex Court also made a compcrative study of section 45 with section 8. Emphasis was also put to Centrotrade (supra). Here by a majority decision Apex Court upheld the High Court judgment refusing enforcement of award. While doing so, the Apex Court interpreted "public Policy" within the meaning of the said Act of 1996. Renu Sagar (supra) was also considered. Paragraph 80 being relevant herein is quoted below: the expression "public policy" will have the same connotation in respect of an arbitration agreement or an award. The judicial intervention in such matters has never been free from difficulty. Renu Sagar (supra) was also considered. Paragraph 80 being relevant herein is quoted below: the expression "public policy" will have the same connotation in respect of an arbitration agreement or an award. The judicial intervention in such matters has never been free from difficulty. Whereas refusing enforcement of an arbitral award has been viewed with much scepticism, the English courts have more often than not refused, to enforce a foreign award on public policy ground holding that common law recognises that english public policy is paramount. In some jurisdictions even serious procedural defects in the arbitral proceedings had been held to provide for enough justification for refusal to afford foreign award. [russel on arbitration 22nd Edition, 2003, p. 389, paras 8-046 and Chitty on Contract, 29th Edition, 2004, p. 961, paras 16-45. ] We do not sec any reason as to why the Indian Law should be held to be different. our view: (27.) TO appreciate the controversy before us we divide the same in three compartments, i. e. (i) Violation of the Court order (ii) Reservation of damage claim caused due to approaching the Indian Court by filing Civil Suit; (iii) Claim on account of bribery: (i) Violation of the Court order.-Admittedly the award was published on a day when the order of injunction was subsisting which was later on vacated. If we apply Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. (supra) we have to agree with the ultimate finding of His Lordship. We, however, wish to look at the problem from a different angle. To appreciate the problem let us first examine the order of injunction. No copy of the order of injunction was produced before us. We perused the communication made by the respondent appearing at page 401 of the paper Book. On perusal we find that the learned Judge restrained the appellant from taking any step or making any demand pursuant to the notice dated August 6, 1996. Notice dated August 6, 1996 is appearing at page 21 of the said letter. By the said letter the appellant informed the respondent that they had already nominated Mr. Patrick Odonovan as their Arbitrator and invited the respondent to appoint their nominee. The said letter spent its force once Mr. Patrick started acting as sole arbitrator, Pertinent to mention, the respondent did appoint their nominee, Mr. By the said letter the appellant informed the respondent that they had already nominated Mr. Patrick Odonovan as their Arbitrator and invited the respondent to appoint their nominee. The said letter spent its force once Mr. Patrick started acting as sole arbitrator, Pertinent to mention, the respondent did appoint their nominee, Mr. Vohra who declined to act as an Arbitrator on the ground that his appointment was contrary to the provisions of the agreement because of delay. He also pointed out that Mr. Patrick was properly appointed and he was fit to continue as Sole Arbitrator as contended by mr. Ghosh in course of his argument. Be that as it may, once Mr. Patrick started acting as sole Arbitrator and the respondent submitted to his jurisdiction by appearing at the arbitration by filing their pleadings there was no further act to be done by the appellant or steps to be taken in terms of the said letter dated August 6, 1996. Hence, the order of injunction so passed by the learned Single Judge was super flauous on the day when it was passed or communicated. Even if we accept Mr. Bachawats contention that once such order of injunction was passed the arbitrator could not have published his award and the same was void in the eye of law we would find that there was no fetter upon the Arbitrator to publish his award. So far as the appellant is concerned, the appellant came to enforce the award after it had been vacated by the learned Single judge. Hence, during the period when the order was subsisting we do not find any act done by the appellant themselves which could be termed as a violation or disobedience of the order of the Court. Hence, the ratio decided in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. (supra) could not have any application in the instant case. (ii) Reservation of damage claim caused due to approaching the indian Court by filing civil suit.-The solicitors of the appellant arbitrator inviting him to disregard the order of this Court. We fully agree with Mr. Bachawat when he contended that the language used by the solicitors was harsh and contemptuous. A litigant might do something out of ignorance in law which may amount to Contempt of Court. However, when an Advocate writes and invites someone to disregard Court order the same would definitely amount to contempt. We fully agree with Mr. Bachawat when he contended that the language used by the solicitors was harsh and contemptuous. A litigant might do something out of ignorance in law which may amount to Contempt of Court. However, when an Advocate writes and invites someone to disregard Court order the same would definitely amount to contempt. The concerned Solicitor firm tendered unqualified apology before us. Following ourlong standing tradition and heritage we accept such apology and pardon them. We, however, hope and trust that the said solicitor firm or its partners or associates would think twice in future to make such irresponsible comments touching the sanctity of the Court of Law. The Arbitrator by the paragraph quoted supra reserved to himself jurisdiction to make further award in respect of outstanding issues including the question of damage suffered by the owners in view of commencing proceeding in India. Such issue was raised by the appellant. The Arbitrator did not decide such issue and reserved the same along with other outstanding issues. In deference to the desire of this court Mr. Ghosh on instruction categorically undertook that they would not go back to the arbitrator for resolving any other issue pertaining to damage alleged to have been suffered by the appellant in view of the Civil Court Proceeding. This reservation was made by the Arbitrator himself, may be at the instance of the appellant. For that we should not refuse enforcement by treating the same as contrary to public policy per se. (iii) Claim on account of bribery.-We fully agree with the learned judge that this claim was contrary to the provisions of section 23 of the indian Contract Act, 1872. Hence, that part of the award could not be enforced in our country being contrary to the laws of the land. Mr. Ghosh on instruction conceded on that score. Hence, we do not find any scope to deliberate further on this issue. Conclusion: (28.) WE, thus, feel that interest of justice would subserve. If we remand the matter back to the learned Judge for being heard afresh on merits. We feel so to honour the mandate of the said Act of 1996. We feel so to honour the UNCITRAL Resolution in which India was a party. Order: (29.) THE appeal succeeds in part. If we remand the matter back to the learned Judge for being heard afresh on merits. We feel so to honour the mandate of the said Act of 1996. We feel so to honour the UNCITRAL Resolution in which India was a party. Order: (29.) THE appeal succeeds in part. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside save and except the claim for US$ 6060 on account of incentive. (30.) A. P. No. Ill of 1998 is remanded back to the learned Judge for being heard afresh on merits. It is further made clear that the last paragraph of the award quoted supra would stand deleted for the purpose of implementation of the same or otherwise. (31.) APPEAL is disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. Appeal allowed in part.