Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 891 (MP)

Narayan Singh Yadav v. State of M. P.

2008-07-22

DIPAK MISRA, S.K.GANGELE

body2008
ORDER Misra, J. -- 1. In this intra-Court appeal preferred under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the substantiallity and defensibility of the order dated 31.1.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP No.3036/03 is called in question. 2. The appellant, a handicapped person, was appointed as a Teacher on 19th .May, 1992 in Government Girls High School Chanderi, regard being had to his physical incapacity and the post graduate qualification in Political Science. While he was working in the said school he was visited with an order of termination which compelled him to knock at the doors of this Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction for quashment of the same on the base that despite his satisfactory work, the order of termination had been passed; that the doctrine of audi alteram partem had not been followed before passing the order of termination as a consequence of which the said order is vitiated in law; that though the order of appointment was issued after due approval and sanction of the Governor yet the Principal of the Institute had passed the order of termination which nullifies the order; that the order of termination has been passed on the basis of police verification pertaining to criminal cases instituted against him though said cases were instituted out of political vendetta; and that in most of the cases the appellant had been acquitted and, therefore, the foundation on which the order has come into vogue gets foundered. 3. Before the learned Single Judge reliance was placed on the decisions rendered in Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. and others [ AIR 2003 SC 1789 ], Indian Railway Construction Co.Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar [ AIR 2003 SC 1843 ], Ratan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hariram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and others [ AIR 1993 SC 2155 ], Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [ AIR 1958 SC 36 ], Jagdish Ram Sahu v. State of M.P. and others [2000(3) MPLJ SN 21], and Praveen Kumar Karel v. High Court of M.P. and another [ 2004(II) MPWN 37 =2004(2) MPLJ 299], and it was propounded by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the order of termination suffered from incurable fallacy and, therefore, deserved to be quashed. 4. 4. The learned counsel for the State, per contra, proponed before the learned Single Judge that the appointment was cancelled in terms of the order of appointment inasmuch as the appointment was subject to verification of antecedents and when it was found that the incumbent was involved in seven criminal cases commencing 1988•to 1992 and he was impm1ing education in a school, it was thought apposite to cancel the appointment. It was also urged that the State Government had taken the decision to cancel the appointment and such cancellation being within the ambit and purview of law laid down by the apex Court, did not warrant interference in exercise of inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Learned Single Judge, as is unmistakably clear, distinguished the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant-petitioner on the bedrock that it was a case of cancellation of appointment in terms of letter of appointment issued and the facts, as discernible from the record were absolutely clear as crystal that the writ petitioner had criminal antecedents. He placed reliance on the decision rendered in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others v. Ram Ratan Yadav [ 2003(1) JLJ 403 = (2003)3 SCC 437 ], and dismissed the writ petition. 6. We have heard Mr. S.R. Muley, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Vivek Khedkar, learned Government Advocate on behalf of the State. 7. Mr. Muley in his assail of the order passed by the learned Single Judge has submitted that an enquiry was imperative before the order of termination was passed and the competent authority should have passed the order and that having not been done, the learned Single Judge should have quashed the order of termination. The learned counsel further canvassed that the appellant is a handicapped person and when he had been acquitted in number of cases, the criminal antecedents which were an outcome of political malice, should have been allowed to melt into insignificance, thereby permitting the order of appointment to spring into life. Learned counsel also contended that the Principal had no authority to pass the order and, therefore, the order of termination suffers from total incompetence and, hence is liable to be set aside. 8. Mr. Learned counsel also contended that the Principal had no authority to pass the order and, therefore, the order of termination suffers from total incompetence and, hence is liable to be set aside. 8. Mr. Khedkar learned Government Advocate, resisting the aforesaid contentions of the appellant, contended that learned Single Judge is absolutely correct while holding that competent authority had passed the order as there was material on record and the State Government had passed the order and Principal has communicated it. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the State that when the criminal antecedents are patent and manifest, the same cannot be ignored and further the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on Ram Ratan Yadav (supra) cannot be found fault with. 9. First we shall deal with the contention whether the order has been passed by an authority who was not competent to pass an order. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge it is perceptible that he has referred to Annexure A-16 to the writ petition by which the Principal of the Institution had communicated the decision of terminating the services of the appellant whereas on an actual fact the decision had been taken by the State Government and forwarded by the Joint Director, Education to the Principal. In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in repelling the submission of Mr. Muley that incompetent authority had passed the order and accordingly we so do. 10. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is whether despite the criminal antecedents the order of appointment should have been allowed to stand. As is perceivable, the order of appointment was a conditional one. It clearly postulated that his appointment is subject to the condition that he is found fit and produce the fitness certificate from the Civil Surgeon and further his character and antecedents are verified from the Superintendent of Police. We are not concerned with the first limb of the conditions. The second aspect gathers signification since the condition is unequivocally clear that his appointment was subject to police verification. On police verification, it has been found that the appellant was involved in various criminal cases under sections 457,380, 107,393, 352, 294, 506B, 323 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted by Mr. The second aspect gathers signification since the condition is unequivocally clear that his appointment was subject to police verification. On police verification, it has been found that the appellant was involved in various criminal cases under sections 457,380, 107,393, 352, 294, 506B, 323 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted by Mr. Muley that a handicapped person was made a target in the prime of his youth because of political reasons and when he has been acquitted his appointment should be saved. It is worth noting most of the orders of acquittal were brought on record by way of rejoinder affidavit and the same had been passed after submission of the police verification report. In any case, fact remains that the appellant was prosecuted in number of criminal cases. The appellant was appointed in a Girls High School as a teacher. The said order of appointment was subject to condition of verification of antecedents. The apex Court in Ram Ratan Yadav (supra), was dealing with furnishing of information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate. Their Lordships took note of the fact that a criminal case was pending against the incumbent when he filled up the attestation form. True it is, the same was regarded as a material suppression of fact but their Lordships apart from the same proceeded to state the importance of making such information available to the employer. We think it condign to reproduce paragraph 12 of the said decision : "12. The object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service. The employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence of the result of a criminal case ultimately. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence of the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has failed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the offences, in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature. In the present case the respondent was to serve as a Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. The character, conduct and antecedent of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age. The appellants having considered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. The Tribunal after due consideration rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the appellants. The High Court was clearly in error in upsetting the order of the Tribunal. The High Court was again not right in taking note of the withdrawal of the case by the State Government and that the case was not of a serious nature to set aside the order of the Tribunal on that ground as well. The respondent accepted the offer of appointment subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein with his eyes wide open. Para 9 of the said memorandum extracted above in clear terms kept the respondent informed that the suppression of any information may lead to dismissal from service. In the attestation form, the respondent has certified that the information given by him is correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief; if he could not understand the contents of columns No.12 and 13, he could not certify so. Having certified that the information given by him is correct and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of termination of services clearly shows that there has been due consideration of various aspects. Having certified that the information given by him is correct and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of termination of services clearly shows that there has been due consideration of various aspects. In this view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 9 of the memorandum, the termination of service was not automatic, cannot be accepted." From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear to us that character, conduct and antecedents of a teacher are of paramount consideration. That apart, when an order of appointment is accepted with such conditions it has its own significance. Nature of employment cannot also be marginalized. A teacher has an important role and his conduct from all spectrums has a tremendous impact on students who are at an impressionable age. An incumbent might have been acquitted in criminal cases afterwards but the fact remains that he was being prosecuted at the time of appointment. The police verification being against him, the same has to be treated to be in consonance of the conditions of appointment. It is not the case of the appellant that the criminal cases were never instituted against him. It is not a case that wrong cases have been cited in the verification report. In the absence of assertion in that regard, the submission that the principles of natural justice have been violated, if we permit ourselves to say so, is quite specious and not acceptable. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision in Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar [ (1996)11 SCC 605 ], wherein it has been held as under: "3. ....The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under section 304 IPC, under section 324 read with section 34 IPC and under section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the 'tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the 'tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted." 11. Recently in the case of R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police and others [ (2008)1 SCC 660 ], a two Judge Bench of the apex Court had again emphasised on the aspect of antecedents. Their Lordships have opined that the standard expected of a person intended to serve in a uniformed service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. In the instant case the appellant was offered the appointment for a teacher in a Government Girls High School. The nature of job of teacher is of immense significance not only in the context of a school but also in the context of national scenario. A teacher builds the character of students who in turn participate in playing the role of building of the nation. A teacher has the role of in loco parent is and the students and the guardians of students look forward to conceptual ideology and imitable immaculate qualities in the character of a teacher. Tested on these parameters and scrupulously scrutinised on the aforesaid paradigms, we have no hesitation in holding that the order passed by the authority canceling the appointment is absolutely just and proper and affirmation thereof by the learned Single Judge, by no stretch of imagination, can be regarded to be faulty. On the contrary, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is absolutely faultless and impeccable and accordingly we concur with the same. 12. Consequently, the writ appeal, being devoid of substance, stands dismissed with no order as to costs.