COMMON JUDGMENT :- These second appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment in view of the fact that the plaintiff is common though the defendants are different and further the substantial questions of law involved being common. 2. These second appeals were admitted by this Court on the strength of the following substantial questions of law. (1) Whether a lease could be validly determined by issuing quit notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, even though demised premises consists of a "Building" within the meaning of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Eviction, Rent) Control Act, 1960, holding that what was leased out was only a vacant site belonging to landlord and the superstructures and building constructed thereon belong to tenant, and holding that civil Court has jurisdiction and that the tenant is not entitled to protection under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Eviction, Rent) Control Act, 1960 ignoring the decision reported in 1964 (1) MLJ page 110 which says that the tenant is entitled to protection under Rent Control Act, and that building becomes integral part of the land, and the lease is no longer regarded as lease of vacant site? (2) Whether the Courts below could refuse to follow the principle of law laid down in 1964 (1) MLJ 110 solely on the ground, that it arose under Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act and not under A.P. Buildings (Lease, Eviction, Rent) Control Act, 1960, forgetting the fact that Andhra Pradesh Act had consolidated and repealed the Madras Buildings and Rent Control Act, 1946 and till such it was the latter Act was in force? (3) Could the civil Court invoke jurisdiction of a matter pertaining exclusively conferred on a Special Tribunal under a statute, solely on the ground, it was not pleaded in the pleadings and could pass a decree of eviction validly without having jurisdiction at all, especially when there is no waiver of estoppel against a statute? 3. Sri Y. Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel representing appellants-defendants in these appeals had taken this Court through the substantial questions of law raised in the grounds of second appeal and would maintain that in the light of the facts and circumstances and the evidence available on record, the findings recorded both by the Court of first instance and also the appellate Court cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel made elaborate submissions on the aspect of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit of this nature, a suit for eviction. 4. On the contrary, Sri P. Vinayaka Swamy, learned Counsel representing respondent-plaintiff in both these second appeals had pointed out to the findings recorded by both the Court of first instance and also the appellate Court and would maintain that in the light of the findings recorded by both the Court of first instance and also the appellate Court being concurrent findings, these second appeals have to be dismissed. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the cross-objections preferred in these matters inasmuch as damages had not been granted by the Courts below and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case it would be just and proper even to award damages. The Counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran and others, 2006 (1) ALD 106 (SC) (2006) 1 SCC 228 . 5. Heard the Counsel on record. 6. The substantial questions of law on the strength of which these second appeals had been admitted already had been referred to supra. 7. SA No.914 of 1999 is filed by the unsuccessful defendant as against the confirming judgment made in AS No.50 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Narsapur, confirming the decree and judgment made by the learned District Munsif, Palakol, in OS No.423 of 1987. The said suit was filed for eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule site and for delivery of possession and also for past and future damages. 8. The averments made in the plaint are as hereunder: The plaintiff was the owner of vacant site described in plaint schedule and the defendant was a lessee on a monthly tenancy on a rent of Rs.1 -25 ps., payable before the end of every following month. The defendant had not been prompt and regular in payment of rent. The plaintiff got issued registered notices demanding arrears of rent and to vacate the plaint schedule site. Since the defendant had not vacated the suit site, the plaintiff got issued a quit notice on 9.4.1987 terminating his tenancy by 30.4.1987 and demanding him to vacate the suit site and handover vacant site. The plaintiff got issued registered notices demanding arrears of rent and to vacate the plaint schedule site. Since the defendant had not vacated the suit site, the plaintiff got issued a quit notice on 9.4.1987 terminating his tenancy by 30.4.1987 and demanding him to vacate the suit site and handover vacant site. Thereupon, the defendant gave a reply dated 27.4.1987 admitting the monthly tenancy and enclosed D.D. for Rs.36-25 ps. towards rent from 1.12.1984 till 30.4.1987 and refused to vacate the suit site. The defendant had raised a shed at his own expense in the suit site and he was bound to remove it. The defendant was liable to pay damages for use and occupation from 1.5.1987 till this day at a minimum of Rs.25/per month at the prevailing rents in the locality. The plaintiff was claiming past damages from 1.5.1987 till the date of the suit at Rs.25/- per month and also future damages at the same rate till delivery of possession. 9. The present appellant as defendant filed written statement with the following averments. The suit is not maintainable under law. Peddi Paidiyya, paternal grandfather of the defendant, had occupied about 250 square yards of vacant site out of the plaint schedule property which was situated in the 3rd lane of Brodipeta more than 60 years ago and constructed a thatched house therein and he lived in the said house till his death. The allegation that the defendant was in occupation of the schedule as a lessee of the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs.1-25 ps. is false. His paternal grandfather spent huge amounts to fill the vacant site, which was a very low lying area, and after levelling the said site he got a house constructed with brick walls and thatched roof and he used to live in the said house till his death. He came to know that his grandfather used to pay property tax to the house situated in the above mentioned 250 square yards of site during his lifetime and after his death, the father of the defendant Reddi Lachanna continued to live in the said thatched house till his death in his own right paying property tax to the Municipality to the house situated in the said site. After the death of the father of the defendant, one Marthi Kameswara Rao, clerk of the plaintiff, informed him that he bad to pay rent for the said site in question at a nominal rate of Rs.1-25 ps. per month, as such the defendant started paying rent at the rate of Rs.1-25 ps. per month under bona fide impression that he was liable to pay the said rent, even though he was not at all liable to pay any rent whatsoever for the site in question, inasmuch as his grandfather had perfected his title by adverse possession and that after his death his father Lachanna was in occupation of the site with the thatched shed therein till his death. After the death of his father, Lachanna, the defendant and his younger brothers, Reddy Sriramulu and Reddy Subbarao, had in fact divided the site in question into 3 equal shares and each of them had been in possession and enjoyment of respective shares. The defendant had been in possession and enjoyment of his 1/3rd share in the above referred site. The remaining 2/3rd share in the vacant site was in the possession and enjoyment of his brothers, Sriramulu and Subbarao. The plaintiff gave a registered notice dated 8.7.1983. A reply notice dated 20.7.1993 was got issued at the instance of Marthi Kameswara Rao, clerk of the plaintiff, and the defendant did not know the contents of the reply notice. As the defendant was advised to send an amount of Rs.8-75 ps. towards the alleged arrears of rent, a bank draft for the said amount was enclosed to the said reply. Again at the instance of Marthi Kameswara Rao the defendant got issued a registered notice dated 30.11.1984 enclosing a Demand Draft for Rs.l5/-. The defendant sent some amounts by means of Money Order to the plaintiff at the instance of Marthi Kameswara Rao, but the plaintiff refused to receive the said amounts. When the plaintiff again got issued another registered notice dated 9.4.1987 to the defendant, he got issued a reply notice. On the advice of Marthi Kameswara Rao, the defendant had deposited Rs.45/- towards the rent for some period. The plaintiff played fraud on the defendant through his clerk Marthi Kameswara Rao by making the defendant sending reply notices suppressing the real facts. On the advice of Marthi Kameswara Rao, the defendant had deposited Rs.45/- towards the rent for some period. The plaintiff played fraud on the defendant through his clerk Marthi Kameswara Rao by making the defendant sending reply notices suppressing the real facts. As the defendant had never taken the schedule premises or 250 square yards of site on lease from the plaintiff at time, the question of payment of any rent for the schedule premises by the defendant to the plaintiff does not arise. The defendant had been in possession of only 1/3rd portion of 250 square yards of site and 1/3rd portion of the house therein. As the brothers of the defendant were not parties to the suit, the suit is bad for mis-joinder of necessary parties. The Court fee paid by the plaintiff was not correct, as the plaintiff had to pay Court fee on the 3/4th market value of the site in question. The plaintiff was not entitled for the arrears of rent or for any amount towards the alleged damages for use and occupation of the site by the defendant. 10. The trial Court, on the strength of the pleadings, settled the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the defendant from the schedule premises and for vacant possession thereof? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any damages for use and occupation and if so, at what rate? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any future damages? (4) Whether the defendant perfected his title by adverse possession to the site of 150 square yards of the plaint schedule premises? (5) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties? (6) To what relief? 11. On behalf of the present respondent plaintiff, P.W.1 was examined, Exs.A1 to A36 were marked. Likewise, D.W.1 was examined, Exs.B.1 to B.32 were marked on behalf of the defendant. 12. The trial Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of vacant possession and further decreed the suit for past damages at Rs.75/- from 1.5.1987 to 31.7.1987 (at the rate of Rs.25/per month) for use and occupation of the vacant site and for future damages from 1.8.1987 till the plaintiff is put in vacant possession of the plaint schedule site at the rate of Rs.25/- per month. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal AS. No.50 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Narsapur, and the appellate, Court formulated the following points for consideration at Para 9, recorded reasons commencing from Paras 10 to 40 and allowed the appeal partly setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court awarding past and future damages, but however, confirmed the decree relating to the relief of eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant preferred the present second appeal and equally aggrieved by negativing of the past and future damages as prayed for by the appellate Court, the plaintiff also preferred cross-objections. 13. Likewise, SA No.915 of 1999 is preferred by the unsuccessful defendant in as No.39 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif, Palakol, and AS No.42 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Narsapur. 14. As already aforesaid, the plaintiff is common in both the matters though the defendants in these matters are different, the pleadings are almost similar and the substantial questions of law raised also are the same in this second appeal as well. 15. The suit was filed for eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule site and for delivery of possession of the plaint schedule site and also for past and future damages. 16. The averments made in the plaint are as hereunder: The defendant was in occupation of the plaint schedule vacant site as plaintiffs lessee from month to month having taken it on lease over 20 years ago and had been paying monthly rent of Rs.1-25ps. The tenancy month commences from 1st of every calendar month and the rent was payable in the 1st week of every following month. The defendant had raised a temporary thatched shed in the suit site and residing therein. Since the defendant had not been regular in payment of rents, the plaintiff got issued a notice demanding arrears of rents and also terminating his tenancy and asking him to vacate the schedule site and delivery of vacant possession. The defendant failed to comply with the said notice and sent Money Order for Rs.1-25 ps. for the month of August, 1983 and on 28.4.1987 sent a Demand Draft drawn on the Indian Bank for Rs.55/- towards rents till the end of April 1987 and thereafter he failed to pay the monthly rents. The defendant failed to comply with the said notice and sent Money Order for Rs.1-25 ps. for the month of August, 1983 and on 28.4.1987 sent a Demand Draft drawn on the Indian Bank for Rs.55/- towards rents till the end of April 1987 and thereafter he failed to pay the monthly rents. The plaintiff got issued a quit notice dated 11.9.1987 to the defendant terminating his tenancy by the end of September, 1987 and demanding him to vacate the plaint schedule site and handover vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff on 1.10.1987 and also pay all the arrears of rent from 1.5.1987 to 30.9.1987. Having received the aforesaid notices, the defendant got a reply telegram issued with false and untenable pleas as well as a registered notice dated 16.9.1987 enclosing a Demand Draft for Rs.5/- stating to be the rents for May, June, July and August, 1987 and refused to vacate the plaint schedule site on untenable grounds. The defendant had no right to continue any longer in occupation of the suit site on and after 1.10.1987. The defendant was liable to pay arrears of rents at Rs.I-25 ps. per month for September, 1987 and also damages at Rs.25/- per month from 1.10.1987 till the date of filing of the suit. 17. The present appellant as defendant filed written statement with the following averments. Bavera Papayya, father of the defendant, had occupied the site about 250 square yards in extent bearing the present Assessment No.3210 situated in 3rd lane of Brodipet more than 60 years ago and constructed a thatched house therein and lived in the said house till his death. As the father of the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the above said site for more than 12 years in his own right, he had perfected his title to the said site by adverse possession. The allegation that the defendant had taken on lease the vacant site shown in the plaint schedule about 20 years ago from the plaintiff is false. After the death of the father of the defendant, one Marthi Kameswara Rao, the clerk of the plaintiff, informed him that he had to pay rent for the site in question at the rate of Rs.1-25 ps. per month and accordingly the defendant started paying rent at the rate of Rs.1-25 ps. After the death of the father of the defendant, one Marthi Kameswara Rao, the clerk of the plaintiff, informed him that he had to pay rent for the site in question at the rate of Rs.1-25 ps. per month and accordingly the defendant started paying rent at the rate of Rs.1-25 ps. per month not knowing that he was not liable to pay any rent, inasmuch as his father had perfected his title by adverse possession. The plaintiff got issued a registered notice dated 8.7.1983 to the defendant and the defendant at the instance of Marthi Kameswara Rao, clerk of the plaintiff, got issued a reply notice through an advocate Sri N Madhava Rao. In fact, the defendant did not know the contents of the said reply notice. Again, the defendant got issued another notice through the said advocate along with a Demand Draft towards the alleged rent for the site in question. At the instance of Marthi Kameswara Rao, the defendant had deposited an amount of Rs.30/- towards the alleged rent for the period from 1.9.1987 to 31.8.1988 and from 1.9.1988 to 31.8.1988 though he was not liable to pay any rent whatsoever. As the defendant had never taken the schedule premises on lease from the plaintiff at any time, the question of payment of any rent for the schedule premises to the plaintiff does not arise. The plaintiff was not entitled to seek a decree for vacant possession of the schedule premises, inasmuch as the father of the defendant had perfected his title for the site in question and that after the death of his father, the defendant became absolute owner of the said site. The plaintiff had to pay Court fee on 3/4th market value of the site in question. The Court fee paid by the plaintiff was not correct. 18. The trial Court, on the strength of the pleadings settled the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule premises and for vacant possession thereof? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any arrears, if so, at what rate? (3) Whether there is any landlord and tenant relationship between the parties? (4) Whether the valuation of the suit and the Court fee paid are not correct? (5) To what relief? 19. (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any arrears, if so, at what rate? (3) Whether there is any landlord and tenant relationship between the parties? (4) Whether the valuation of the suit and the Court fee paid are not correct? (5) To what relief? 19. On behalf of the present respondent-plaintiff P.W.1 was examined, Exs.A1 to A26 were marked. Likewise, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B-1 to B-53 were marked on behalf of the defendant. 20. The trial Court on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of vacant possession and further decreed the suit for past damages at Rs.51-25 ps. from the date of suit till realization and future damages at the rate of Rs.25/- per month till delivery of possession of the plaint schedule site. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal AS. No.42 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Narsapur and the appellate Court formulated the points for consideration at Para 11, recorded reasons commencing from Paras 12 to 42 and allowed the appeal partly setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court awarding past damages and awarding future damages, but however, confirmed the decree relating to the relief of eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant preferred the present second appeal. 21. In both these matters the son of the plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and the respective defendants were examined as DW.1. The under noted documents were marked on behalf of the parties in O.S. No.423 of 1987 and O.S.No.39 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif, Palakol. O.5. No.423 of 1987: Far plaintiff: Ex.A- 1: Property tax receipt Ex.A-2: -do Ex.A-3 : -do Ex.A-4: -do Ex.A-5: -do Ex.A-6: -do Ex.A-7 : -do Ex.A-8: -do- Ex.A-9: -d- Property tax receipt Ex.A-10: -do- Ex.A- 11: -do- Ex.A-12:9.4.87: O/c of legal notice Ex.A-13:14.4.87: Acknowledgement of defendant Ex.A-14:27 .4.87: Reply registered notice got issued by defendant to plaintiff's Counsel. Ex.A-15: Receipt No.436 Ex.A-16: -do Ex.A-17: -do Ex.A-18: -do Ex.A-19: -do Ex.A-20: -do Ex.A-21 : -do Ex.A-22: -do Ex.A-23: -do Ex.A-24: -do Ex.A-25: -do- Ex.A-26: -do- Ex.A-27: -do- Ex.A-28:8.7.83: O/c of legal notice got issued by plaintiff to the defendant. Ex.A-29: 11.7.83: Postal acknowledgment of defendant Ex.A-30:20.7.83: Reply Regd. Notice issued by defendant to the plaintiff's Counsel. Ex.A-15: Receipt No.436 Ex.A-16: -do Ex.A-17: -do Ex.A-18: -do Ex.A-19: -do Ex.A-20: -do Ex.A-21 : -do Ex.A-22: -do Ex.A-23: -do Ex.A-24: -do Ex.A-25: -do- Ex.A-26: -do- Ex.A-27: -do- Ex.A-28:8.7.83: O/c of legal notice got issued by plaintiff to the defendant. Ex.A-29: 11.7.83: Postal acknowledgment of defendant Ex.A-30:20.7.83: Reply Regd. Notice issued by defendant to the plaintiff's Counsel. Ex.A-31: August 83: M.O. Coupon Ex.A-32:23.9.83: M.O. Coupon Ex.A-33:25.11.83: Reply Regd. Notice issued by defendant to the plaintiff's Counsel. Ex.A-34: O/c of legal notice got issued by plaintiff to the defendant's Counsel. Ex.A-35:7.11.84: Acknowledgment Ex.A-36:30.11.84: Reply Regd. Notice issued by the defendant to the plaintiff's Counsel. For defendant: Ex. B-1 :9.2.67: Tax receipt Ex.B-2:7.3.67: -do Ex.B-3: 10.3.67: -do Ex.B-4:10.3.67: -do Ex.B-5:13.3.69: -do Ex.B-6:13.3.69: -do Ex.B-7:11.2.70: -do- Ex.B-8:11.2.70:-do Ex.B-9:21.3.71 : -do Ex.B-10:15.2.72:-do Ex.B-11:31.3.73:-do Ex.B-12:31.3.73: -do Ex.B-13:21.2.74: -do Ex.B-14:21.2.74: -do- Ex.B-15:9.2.75: -do Ex.B-16:9.2.75: -do Ex.B-17:25.11.75: -do Ex.B-18:23.2.76: -do Ex.B-19:26.3. 76: -do Ex.B-20:10.1.76: -do Ex.B-21: September 84: -do Ex.B-22:30.1.86: -do Ex.B-23:30.1.86: -do Ex.B-24:4.3.87: -do Ex.B-25 :4.3 .87: -do Ex.B-26:22.12.87: -do- Ex. B- 27: 21 .3.71 : Vacant property tax receipt 94 Ex.B-28:31.3.71: -do- Ex.B-29:31.3.71: -do- Ex.B-30:12.3.78: -do- Ex.B-31 :15.6.75: Agricultural Land Revenue Tax receipt Ex.B-32:26.2.92: -do O.S. No.39 of 1988. For Plaintiff: Ex.A-1/8.7.83: O.C. of Legal Notice Ex.A-2/13.7.83: Acknowledgment of defendant Ex.A-3/ M.O. Coupon Ex.A-4/26.8.83: M.O. Coupon Ex.A-5/20.7.83: Reply Notice Ex.A-6/19.10.88: Demand Draft. Ex.A-7/20.10.83: Notice given by respondent Ex.A-8/9 .4.87: a/c. of Legal Notice Ex.A-9/15.4.87: Returned Notice Ex.A-10/16.4.87: a/c. of Legal Notice Ex.A-11/20.4.87 : Acknowledgment of defendant Ex.A- 12/28.4.87: Reply registered notice Ex.A-13/6.8.87: a/c. of legal notice Ex.A-14/19.8.87: Returned notice. Ex.A-15/11.9.87: Telegram notice issued by defendant Ex.A-16/11.9.87: O/c. of notice issued by plaintiff Ex.A-17/12.9.87: Acknowledgment of defendant Ex.A-18/12.9.87: Telegram notice issued by the defendant Ex.A-19/16.9.87: Reply notice issued by the defendant Ex.A-20/8.1.81: Receipt issued by plaintiff to the defendant Ex.A-21/19.3.74: -do- Ex.A-22/20.10.64: -do Ex.A-23/9.4.64: -do Ex.A-24/28.8.63: -do- Ex.A-25/27.10.58: -do Ex.A-26/24.10.58: -do- For defendant: Ex.B-1/4.1.57: Property Tax Receipt Ex.B-2/2.1.61: -do Ex.B-3/4.2.62: -do Ex.B-4/4.2.62: -do Ex.B-5/17.3.64: -do Ex.B-6/17.3.64: -do Ex.B-7/24.2.64: -do Ex.B-8/8.3.65: -do Ex.B-9/6.2.66: -do Ex.B-10/21.3.66: -do Ex.B-11/5.3.68: -do Ex.B-12/5.3.68: -do Ex.B-13/30.3.69: -do Ex.B-14/30.3.69: -do Ex.B-15/1.4.69:-do Ex.B-16/29.3.71: -do Ex.B-17/29.3.71: -do Ex.B-18/20.3.72: -do Ex.B-19/20.3.72: -do Ex.B-20/31.3.73: -do Ex.B-21/31.3.73: -do Ex.B-22/6.3.74: -do Ex.B-23/6.3.74: -do Ex.B-24/3.3.75: -do Ex.B-25/3.3.75: -do Ex.B-26/28. 8.75: -do Ex.B-27/17.2.76: -do Ex.B-28/13.5.76: -do- Ex.B-29/4.1.77 : -do Ex.B-30/30.9.77: -do Ex.B-31/17.1.85: -do Ex.B-32/17.1.85: -do Ex.B-33/9.8.85: -do Ex.B-34/10.2.86: -do Ex.B-35/6.2.87 : -do Ex.B-36/6. 2.87: -do Ex.B-37 /16.12.87: -do Ex.B-38/16.12.87: -do Ex.B-39/20.1.89: -do Ex.B-40/20.1.89: -do. 8.75: -do Ex.B-27/17.2.76: -do Ex.B-28/13.5.76: -do- Ex.B-29/4.1.77 : -do Ex.B-30/30.9.77: -do Ex.B-31/17.1.85: -do Ex.B-32/17.1.85: -do Ex.B-33/9.8.85: -do Ex.B-34/10.2.86: -do Ex.B-35/6.2.87 : -do Ex.B-36/6. 2.87: -do Ex.B-37 /16.12.87: -do Ex.B-38/16.12.87: -do Ex.B-39/20.1.89: -do Ex.B-40/20.1.89: -do. Ex.B-41/24.1.90: -do Ex.B-42/24.1.90: -do Ex.B-43/2.1.91 : -do Ex.B-44/2.1.91 : -do Ex.B-45/13.3.92: -do Ex.B-46/13.3.92: -do Ex.B-47/16.10.92: -do Ex.B-48/8.2.93: -do Ex.B-49/30.9.93: -do Ex.B-50/30.6.94: -do Ex.B-51/8.1.81 : Receipt issued by plaintiff's clerk to the defendant Ex.B-52/6.6.83: Receipt issued by clerk of plaintiff to the defendant Ex.B-53/16.3.78: Petition submitted by defendant to the Municipality. ' 22. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, recorded concurrent findings relating to the jural relationship of landlord-landlady and tenant in the light of the voluminous documentary evidence which would establish the said jural relationship, the payment of rents. The plea of adverse possession also had been negatived by both the Courts. Concurrent findings had been recorded relating to the non-applicability of Rent Control Act and how these suits for eviction in the light of the facts and circumstances of these cases are perfectly maintainable. However, the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the admitted rent being Rs.1-25 ps., except evidence ofP.W.1 there is no other acceptable evidence to explain how the past or future damages at a higher rate had been claimed, the same had been negatived. 23. The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties in the respective original suits already had been specified supra. 24. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran and others (supra), wherein the Apex Court at Para 40 observed as hereunder: "We have already referred to the arguments advanced by both the parties in regard to the nature of tenancy and the statutory protection. It is abundantly clear from the recitals in the plaint, the Schedule to the notice and to the plaint and also of the lease deed that what was "leased out" was only a vacant site to put up a petrol bunk with accessory constructions thereon. The mention of a small shed in the current lease undoubtedly belonged to the tenant himself and, therefore, the building put up by the tenant situated in the vacant site belonging to the landlord cannot be said to be the building of the landlord in order to attract the statutory protection of the Rent Control Act. The mention of a small shed in the current lease undoubtedly belonged to the tenant himself and, therefore, the building put up by the tenant situated in the vacant site belonging to the landlord cannot be said to be the building of the landlord in order to attract the statutory protection of the Rent Control Act. This issue is, therefore, answered against the tenant." 25. The following under noted are certain of the essential aspects: (1) Concurrent findings had been recorded in both these second appeals as to the jural relationship of land lord and lady and tenant in the light of the voluminous documentary evidence available on record. (2) Further, concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts that what had been leased out was only vacant site without any superstructures. (3) Further, specifically it was observed that the respective defendants had not chosen to raise specific plea of the applicability of the Rent Control Act either in the written statement or in the grounds of appeal before the appellate Court. The plea of adverse possession had been specifically negatived in the light of the facts and circumstances and also the voluminous documentary evidence available on record relating to payment of rents. (4) The fact that the rent is only Rs.1-25 ps. had been specifically observed by the appellate Court and the appellate Court also observed that there is no other acceptable evidence to substantiate the relief relating to granting of Rs.25/- by way of damages. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had not chosen to enter into the witness box, but however the son of the plaintiff P.W.1 was examined who had deposed relating to all the facts. Inasmuch as these facts are within the knowledge of P.W.1, the son of the plaintiff, the non-examination of the plaintiff as such also cannot be taken advantage of by the respective appellants herein-the defendants in the respective suits. (5) Further in the light of the fact that rents were being paid, the finding relating to the jural relationship of landlord-landlady and tenant also cannot be found fault. It is needless to say that when the said fact had been established the question of applying the doctrine of adverse possession would not arise at all. 26. The appellate Court recorded reasons in detail while partly allowing the appeal relating to the granting of Rs.25/- by way of damages. It is needless to say that when the said fact had been established the question of applying the doctrine of adverse possession would not arise at all. 26. The appellate Court recorded reasons in detail while partly allowing the appeal relating to the granting of Rs.25/- by way of damages. These findings would clearly reflect that the appellate Court came to such a conclusion for want of acceptable evidence in this regard. Hence, the said findings also cannot be found fault. Being aggrieved of that portion of the decree negativing the relief of the claim of Rs.25/by way of damages, the cross-objections had been preferred by respondent-plaintiff. 27. In the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances and on examination of evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the appellate Court, this Court is satisfied that the findings recorded by the appellate Court in this regard also cannot be found fault. Inasmuch as concurrent findings had been recorded relating to the relief of eviction and certain other reliefs, the said concurrent findings having been arrived at by both the Courts on appreciation of the oral and voluminous documentary evidence, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that those findings deserve no disturbance at the hands of this Court, especially in the light of the fact that what had been leased out was only a vacant site without superstructures. In the light of the same, the findings of the appellate Court are hereby confirmed. 28. The second appeals being devoid of merit, inasmuch as the appellants defendants in these second appeals have been fighting these litigations taking unjust defence, these second appeals deserve dismissal with costs and accordingly the second appeals are hereby dismissed with costs. 29. As far as the cross-objections are concerned, the plaintiff being aggrieved of a portion of negativing of the relief of damages had preferred the cross-objections raising certain grounds. In the light of the same, inasmuch as convincing reasons had been recorded by the appellate Court, the cross-objections also are hereby dismissed, but in the facts and circumstances without costs.