ORDER Misra, J. -- 1. In this appeal preferred under section 2 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the correctness and soundness of the order dated 21.1.2008 passed by learned Single Judge in WP No. 5173/2007 (S) is called in question by the M.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). 2. The facts which are requisite to be exposited for appreciating the stands put forth in appeal are that the respondent who was an employee of the appellant Corporation, was put under suspension as per order dated 16.1.1996, Anl1exure P-I, on the base that a charge-sheet was filed against him in Crime No. 2411 989 for the offences punishable under sections 408,409, 161, 477-k and 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with section. 5 (1) (d)/13 (2) and section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. The respondent faced trial and eventually, by judgment dated 7.3.2007.He was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the competent criminal Court. After being acquitted, the respondent preferred WP No. 4220/2007 (S) on 8.8.2007 for revocation of the order of suspension and this Court had directed to consider the representation preferred for revocation of the said order After the order was passed in the writ petition, the employer by order dated 1.9.2007 rejected the representation on the ground that against the order of acquittal, an appeal has been preferred before the competent Court and till the decision is taken in criminal appeal, the order of suspension was to remain in vogue. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition was filed for quashment of the same appropriate direction. 3. Before the learned Single Judge was contended that the order of suspension could not be allowed to stand as the respondent has been acquitted in the criminal case and there is no other proceeding pending against him. To buttress the said stand, reliance was placed on the decision in Ram Ratan Tiwari v. State M.P.and others [ 2002 (4) MPLJ 401 ]. The said submission was critised on the foundation that clue to the conduct of the respondent, the appellant Corporation had been put to loss and once an appeal has been filed, there was no warrant for revocation of the order of suspension. 4. The said submission was critised on the foundation that clue to the conduct of the respondent, the appellant Corporation had been put to loss and once an appeal has been filed, there was no warrant for revocation of the order of suspension. 4. Learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the respondent had been acquitted; that the employee was put under suspension as per Rule 9 (1) (b) of M.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 which entitles the employer to put an employee under suspension where a criminal case has been instituted against him or any criminal offence which is under investigation or trial: that there is no provision enabling the employer to put the employee unclear suspension under these circumstances; and that the order of suspension during the pendency of appeal against the judgment of acquittal is impermissible. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge quashed the order of suspension and directed appellant employer to reinstate the respondent and settle all the consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order. 5. We have heard Mr. Vinay Zelawat learned counsel for appellant -Corporation on the question of admission. It is submitted by Mr. Zelawat that the appellant has inherent jurisdiction to put an employee under suspension by not taking work from him and therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge is erroneous and deserves to be interfered with in this intra-Court appeal. It is also his submission that the respondent would not be entitled to all consequential benefits as the Fundamental Rules would come into play. 6. It is not in dispute that the respondent was put under suspension because of the initiation of the criminal case against him. It is not controverted that he has been acquitted on 7.3.2007. There is no cavil over the fact that the respondent was suspended taking recourse to the provisions contained in 1966 Rules. Under these circumstances the pivotal question that emerged for consideration is whether after acquittal, the employer can be permitted to contend that as an appeal has been preferred in a higher forum, the order of suspension shall be allowed to continue. 7. In this context, we think it apt to refer to Rule 9 (1) of 1966 Rules. The said Rule is reproduced below: "9. 7. In this context, we think it apt to refer to Rule 9 (1) of 1966 Rules. The said Rule is reproduced below: "9. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor, by general are special order, may place a Government servant under suspension: (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation inquiry trial: Provided that a Government servant shall invariably be placed under suspension when a challan for a criminal offence involving corruption or other moral turpitude is filed against him: Provided further that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made." We have reproduced the said Rule to understand the basic tenor of it. In this context it is essential to scan the other rules so that a complete picture is projected. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 deals with the concept of deemed suspension and other aspects relating to the same. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 0 provides the consequences when the punishment imposed against a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or in review. Sub-rule (4) deals with the situation where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of Court of law. Sub-rule (5) of Rule l) stipulates that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9 to continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. The aforesaid are the basic features of Rule 9. The Rule is absolutely silent as regards the situation when a judgment of acquittal is recorded against the accused employee. 8. The Division Bench of this Court in a case of ROlli Ralall Tiwari after referring to the Rule expressed the opinion as follows: "One of the circumstances for placing the Government servant under suspension is when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 8. The Division Bench of this Court in a case of ROlli Ralall Tiwari after referring to the Rule expressed the opinion as follows: "One of the circumstances for placing the Government servant under suspension is when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. Part IV of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. 1996 deals with suspension. Rule 9 (J) provides for circumstances when a person can be placed under suspension by the Government. Petitioner was placed under suspension under the above quoted Rules which means he remains under suspension when criminal offence against him is under investigation, enquiry or trial Investigation enquiry or trial is over after announcement of judgment dated 30-4-2001. Therefore, this provision stands exhausted and petitioner can revert back to service. To hold otherwise would mean reading something in the provision which it docs not provide. Further it may cause immense hardship to person to wait for the final adjudication of the matter by the final Court. Therefore, submission of Shri P.O. Gupta, learned Dy. A.G. cannot be appreciated to the extent that once a person is placed under suspension, he continues under suspension during the appeal as well." 9. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to certain observations made in L.K. Verma v. HAfT Ltd. and another [ (2006) 2 SCC 269 ]. where in their Lordships have held thus: "17. Suspension is of three kinds. An order of suspension may be passed by way or punishment in terms of the conduct rules. An order of suspension can also be passed by the employer in exercise of its inherent power in the sense that it may not take any work from the delinquent officer but in that event, the entire salary is required to be paid. An order of suspension can also be passed, if such a provision exists in the rule laying down that in place of the full salary, the delinquent officer shall be paid only the subsistence allowance specified there in." 10. We have reproduced the above solely to understand the various facets of an order of suspension. As has been stated earlier, there has been a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent. It is submitted by Mr. Zclawat that the concept of deemed suspension is attracted. We have reproduced the above solely to understand the various facets of an order of suspension. As has been stated earlier, there has been a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent. It is submitted by Mr. Zclawat that the concept of deemed suspension is attracted. In a case when an order of dismissal is set-aside and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority fur fresh consideration, the delinquent may be deemed to be under suspension depending upon the language in which the rule is couched or the action taken by the employer. But, when there is an order of acquittal in a criminal case and there is nothing in the rule relating to the spectrum of deemed suspension and nothing has been brought before us that any action has been taken, we are of the considered opinion that there cannot be deemed suspension. 11. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the other submission canvassed by Mr. Zelawat, learned counsel for the appellant. He has invited our attention to the last paragraph of the order, whereby the learned Single Judge has directed the appellant to reinstate the petitioner by revoking the suspension and to settle all consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has granted all financial benefits to the respondent by which the power/authority of the employer under the law has been totally curtailed. A close and studied scrutiny of the order would clearly reveal that there is a direction for reinstatement. The same is beyond assail. 12. As far as second plank of submission of Mr. Zelawat is concerned, as is perceived, learned Single Judge has directed the employer to settle all consequential benefits by passing a reasoned and speaking order. The terms used in this direction arc quite different than issuing a mandamus or a command to pay the arrears. Hence, the submission put forth by learned counsel for the appellant is sans substance. We hasten to clarify that discretion as per law still rests with the employer. 13. Consequently, we find no merit in this intra-Court appeal and accordingly the same stands dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed.