Judgment :- Heard the arguments of Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and M. Vaidhyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and have perused the records. 2. The petitioner challenges the order dated 30.6.2003 wherein and by which she was informed that the scheme for providing employment assistance on account of any death of the Board employee has certain pre-conditions. With reference to the petitioners case, her husband, who was working as a Wireman, passed away on 12.10.1999. Her application was dated 05.5.2003 and she was eligible to apply for employment assistance provided she should have had the educational qualification of a pass in VIIIth Standard. If that was taken into account, she should have made an application before 11.10.2002 and even if she had applied during that period, as she had not passed VIIIth Standard, no action could be taken in respect of her request. 3. It is an admitted case that the petitioner had studied in a private aided school upto VIIth Standard during the year 1981-83 and had not passed 8th Standard as required under the scheme provided by the Board. But, subsequently, she appeared as a private candidate in the VIIIth Standard public examination during November 2000 and she had failed in the Mathematics paper. Subsequently, it transpires that she made an attempt to pass Mathematics examination in December 2002 and had passed in the Mathematics paper. It is under the strength of this December 2002 result, the petitioner made an application for compassionate appointment and also wrote a letter dated 07.7.2003 stating that since she was now in possession of the minimum educational qualification required for a Group D post in the respondent Board. It is to this request, the respondents passed the order impugned in the writ petition. 4. Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that it is a case of a person coming from a lower rung of the society making an honest attempt to qualify herself and, therefore, her case should not be considered on technical ground and that her effort should be appreciated and rewarded with an employment. 5. 4. Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that it is a case of a person coming from a lower rung of the society making an honest attempt to qualify herself and, therefore, her case should not be considered on technical ground and that her effort should be appreciated and rewarded with an employment. 5. He also relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 2005 W.L.R. 256 [Chief Engineer (Personnel) and another vs. K. Lakshmi] wherein the Division Bench, without reference to any binding precedent, granted relief as can be seen from the following passage found in paragraph 4: Para 4: "We fully agree with the learned single Judge that the Electricity Board should consider the application of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds on merits and in accordance with law and without reference to the educational qualification as she is a widow with five children. In fact we feel that the Electricity Board should have itself taken a humanitarian and sympathetic approach towards the writ petitioner since her husband was their employee, and should not have compelled her to come to Court. The Electricity Board should behave like an ideal employer who looks after its employees and takes care of the widows and children of its employees who die in harness. In that way it will get respect and regard of its employees as well as the public." 6. On the contrary, a subsequent Division Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 2006 (4) M.L.J. 1080 [E.Ramasamy Vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board] observed as follows: “In Sanjay Kumar vs. State of Bihar and others [ (2000) 7 SCC 192 ], the Supreme Court has expressly held that there cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief. An application made after the period stipulated under the scheme is not maintainable, and it is not permissible to hold that such application could be made after attaining majority. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief. An application made after the period stipulated under the scheme is not maintainable, and it is not permissible to hold that such application could be made after attaining majority. We are afraid, the Division Bench which rendered the judgment in Indiraniammal vs. Chief Engineer (Personnel), the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, No. 800, Anna Salai,Chennai–2 and another (supra) has not followed the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and does not lay down correct law. The order of the learned single Judge in Meer Ismail Ali.T vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (supra) is rather cryptic where the learned single Judge has observed that without going into the merits of the controversy the petitioner be given employment on humanitarian consideration. None of the judgments of the Supreme Court cited above are considered.” While doing so, the Division Bench had an occasion to review all the decisions of the Supreme Court relevant on the subject and hence, those decisions may be looked into once again. 7. In State of Haryana and others vs. Rani Devi and another [ 1996 (5) SCC 308 ], the Supreme Court while examining the object of compassionate appointment pointed out that the claim of the person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premise that he was a dependant of the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 8. In the decision reported in 1994 (2) SCC 718 [Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Asha Ramachandra Ambedkar (Mrs.) and another], it was pointed out that the High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointment on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplates such appointment. 9. 9. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana and others [ 1994 (4) SCC 138 ], it was noted that as a rule in public service, appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of application and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of the employee while in service leaving his family without any means livelihood. In such cases, the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. 10. In State of U.P. and others vs. Paras Nath [ 1998 (2) SCC 412 ], it was held that the purpose of providing employment to the dependant of a Government servant dying in harness in preference to anybody else, is to mitigate the hardship caused to the family of the employee on account of his unexpected death while in service. To alleviate the distress of the family, such appointments are permissible on compassionate grounds provided there are Rules providing for such appointments. 11. In Punjab National Bank vs. Ashwini Kumar Taneja, [ (2004) 7 SCC 265 ], the Supreme Court observed that appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely an exception to the requirement of making appointments on open invitation of application on merits. The basic intention is that on the death of the employee concerned his family is not deprived of the means of livelihood. The object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. 12. In State of Haryana and others vs. Rani Devi and another (cited supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows: “It was also impressed that appointments on compassionate ground cannot be made after lapse of reasonable period which must be specified in the rules because the right to such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future.” 13. It is, thus, clear that the Courts cannot direct appointments on compassionate grounds de hors the provisions of the Scheme in force governed by rules / regulations / instructions. It is, thus, clear that the Courts cannot direct appointments on compassionate grounds de hors the provisions of the Scheme in force governed by rules / regulations / instructions. If in a given case, the department of the Government concerned declines, as a matter of policy, not to deviate from the mandate of the provisions underlying the Scheme and refuses to relax the stipulation in respect of ceiling fixed therein, the Courts cannot compel the authorities to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular way and that too, by relaxing the essential conditions, when no grievance of violation of substantial rights of parties could be held to have been provided otherwise. 14. Though the learned counsel is completely aware of these decisions, brought to the notice of this Court the subsequent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case relating to The Superintending Engineer, Madurai vs. V. Jaya [ 2007 (6) M.L.J. 1011 ] and contended that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the order and, therefore, the petitioner should be granted relief. 15. In order to appreciate the said contention, it is relevant to see whether the subsequent Division Bench considered all the binding precedents of the Supreme Court and also the Division Bench judgment in E. Ramasamys case (cited supra). In fact, in a paragraph 9, a reference is made to the decision in Ramasamys case and the same is extracted below: Para 9: “Of course, reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in K. Ramasamy VS. T.N.E.B. - (2006) 4 MLJ 1080 , where a writ of mandamus was sought for to keep on post vacant for appointment to the son of the deceased employee who is aged 11 years. In our considered opinion, the ratio laid down in the said case is not applicable to the facts of the present case set out supra." 16. Therefore, the Division Bench tried to distinguish the earlier Division Bench judgment only on the facts of the case and not in terms of law. In our considered opinion, the ratio laid down in the said case is not applicable to the facts of the present case set out supra." 16. Therefore, the Division Bench tried to distinguish the earlier Division Bench judgment only on the facts of the case and not in terms of law. Even otherwise, the approach of the subsequent Division Bench relied on by the petitioner can be noted as found in paragraphs 7 and 8, which reads as follows: Para 7: “However, in a case of request for appointment on compassionate ground, however, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot ignore the very purpose of providing employment on compassionate ground to the dependant of an employee/government servant dying in harness in preference to anybody else as it is done so in order to mitigate the hardship to the family of the employee on account of his unexpected death while still in service. The concept of compassionate employment is intended to alleviate the distress of the family and it is for such purpose appointments are permissible and provided even in the rules and regulations and any rigid approach or too technical objections may defeat the very object of the scheme. It is for that purpose while considering the request for compassionate appointment, the authorities are expected to act as a Good Samaritan overlooking the cobwebs of technicalities. Para 8: What all the Court has to look into is whether the case of the writ petitioner comes under the exception for providing appointment on compassionate ground to mitigate the hardships due to the death of the bread-winner of the family would be smashed." 17. As was the earlier Division Bench in 2005 W.L.R. 256, the present Division Bench in Jayas case also largely proceeded to decide the issue disregarding the binding precedents of the Supreme Court. In fact, subsequent to the Division Bench in Ramasamys case, there are several judgments of the Supreme Court on the very same issue which were apparently not brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Jayas case. 18. The Supreme Court in State Bank of India and another vs. Somvir Singh [ 2007 (4) SCC 778 ] held that the dependants of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public service other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer. 18. The Supreme Court in State Bank of India and another vs. Somvir Singh [ 2007 (4) SCC 778 ] held that the dependants of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public service other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer. In this context, it is relevant to extract paragraph 7 of the said judgment: Para 7: "Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Article 16(2) protects citizens against discrimination in respect of any employment or office under the State on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex and descent. It is so well settled and needs no restatement at our end that appointment on compassionate grounds is an exception carved out to the general rule that recruitment to public services is to be made in a transparent and accountable manner providing opportunity to all eligible persons to compete and participate in the selection process. Such appointments are required to be made on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. Dependants of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public services other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer." 19. The Supreme Court in the very same decision, after referring to Union Bank of India vs. M.T. Latheesh [ 2006 (7) SCC 350 ], in paragraphs 9 and 10 held as follows: Para 9: "In Union Bank of India v. M.T. Latheesh this Court while dealing with the similar question observed that indiscriminate grant of employment on compassionate grounds would shut the door for employment to the ever-growing population of unemployed youth. Para 10: There is no dispute whatsoever that the appellant Bank is required to consider the request for compassionate appointment only in accordance with the scheme framed by it and no discretion as such is left with any of the authorities to make compassionate appointment dehors the scheme. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules, etc. framed by the employer in the matter of providing employment on compassionate grounds. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules, etc. framed by the employer in the matter of providing employment on compassionate grounds. There is no right of whatsoever nature to claim compassionate appointment on any ground other than the one, if any, conferred by the employer by way of scheme or instructions as the case may be." 20. Further, the Supreme Court also took exception to the High Court to undertake any exercise to decide as to what should be the reasonable approach and the following passage found in paragraph 13 may also be usefully quoted below: Para 13: "In our considered opinion, the High Court itself could not have undertaken any exercise to decide as to what would be the reasonable income which would be sufficient for the family for its survival and whether it had been left in penury or without any means of livelihood. The only question the High Court could have adverted itself to is whether the decision-making process rejecting the claim of the respondent for compassionate appointment is vitiated? Whether the order is not in conformity with the scheme framed by the appellant Bank? It is not even urged that the order passed by the competent authority is not in accordance with the scheme. It is well settled that the hardship of the dependant does not entitle one to compassionate appointment dehors the scheme or the statutory provisions as the case may be. The income of the family from all sources is required to be taken into consideration according to the scheme which the High Court altogether ignored while remitting the matter for fresh consideration by the appellant Bank." 21. The Supreme Court also in I.G. (Karmik) and others vs. Prahalad Mani Tripathi [ 2007 (6) SCC 162 ], held that there cannot be endless compassion in the matter of employment assistance. The following passages found in paragraphs 7 and 12 may be usefully reproduced: Para 7: "Public employment is considered to be a wealth. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. The following passages found in paragraphs 7 and 12 may be usefully reproduced: Para 7: "Public employment is considered to be a wealth. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. When an appointment is made on compassionate ground, it should be kept confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless compassion." Para 12:".... A person cannot be appointed unless he fulfils the eligibility criteria. Physical fitness being an essential eligibility criteria, the Superintendent of Police could not have made any recommendation in violation of the rules. Nothing has been shown before us that even the petitioner came within the purview of any provisions containing grant of relaxation of such qualification. Whenever, a person invokes such a provision, it would be for him to show that the authority is vested with such a power." 22. Therefore, consistently, the Supreme Court had held that the scheme of compassionate appointment can only be in terms of the scheme provided by the employer and the Court cannot give any direction contrary to the Scheme in vogue. 23. When an employer rejects the application strictly within the terms of the scheme provided by them, the said rejection cannot be merely be brushed aside by labeling it as a technical ground. In fact, the Division Bench in Jayas case in paragraph 5 correctly summarised the legal position, which reads as follows: Para 5: "There cannot be any dispute as to the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant / respondent that neither the respondent Board nor any authority, much less the State, can be compelled to fill-up any appointment on compassionate ground de hors the provisions of the scheme in force governed by Rules and Guidelines." 24. But, the Division Bench tried to confine the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramasamys case, which was rendered in respect of the very Electricity Board itself, to the facts of that case and finally, tried to confer the benefit only on the grounds of legitimate expectation. But, the Division Bench tried to confine the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramasamys case, which was rendered in respect of the very Electricity Board itself, to the facts of that case and finally, tried to confer the benefit only on the grounds of legitimate expectation. What weighed with the Bench was that the particular candidate had subsequently passed in the examination as can be seen from the following passage extracted from paragraph 10 from that order: Para 10 : "But, here is the case where a widow of an employee of the respondent Board has approached the Board as early as on 15.11.2000, i.e., within 13 months from the date of death of her husband; but her request was turned down on the ground that she lacks the minimum educational qualification, namely a pass in 8th standard. Hence, she also completed her 8th standard and again renewed her request. But, this time the request was rejected on the ground that she did not apply within three years from the date of death of her husband, which necessitates this Court to interfere in the matter as the authorities obviously overlooked the very intention behind the provisions made for appointment on compassionate ground on the death of the employee concerned i.e. to enable the family to get over the sudden financial crisis." By stating so, the Court also found fault with the Electricity Board for not adopting a Good Samaritan approach. 25. Inthis context, it is relevant to understand the scope for legitimate expectation in the matter of service law and fortunately, the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in 2006 (8) SCC 381 [Ram Pravesh Singh vs. State of Bihar] dealt with such a concept. It is necessary to quote paragraph 15, which is as follows: Para 15: "What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term “established practice” refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a “legitimate expectation” of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above “fairness in action” but far below “promissory estoppel”. It may only entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bona fide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the “legitimate expectation”. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognised legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly." 26. Therefore, this Court is unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of Division Bench in Jayas case had laid down a binding precedent to be followed. Therefore, this Court is unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of Division Bench in Jayas case had laid down a binding precedent to be followed. On the contrary, Ramasamys case (to which myself is a party) alone is to be followed in the matter of compassionate appointment in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. 27. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that during the limitation period of three years, the petitioner was not qualified and the fact that subsequently she got qualified cannot be a relevant criteria to get over the scheme framed by the Board for the grant of compassionate appointment. In fact, passing of the VIIIth Standard examination as a private candidate on compartmental basis cannot be the basis to tilting the balance in her favour. It must be remembered that there are thousands of candidates with more qualifications, who are waiting in the employment market, to get into any public employment. It is rightly observed by the Supreme Court that in the matter of employment assistance, there cannot be any endless compassion. I do not think that this case falls neither under the concept of legitimate expectation as it was being pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner nor any fault can be found on the part of the Board in denying the request of the petitioner. 28. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and the same will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost.