JUDGMENT Per Dabholkar, J. : 1. This is an appeal u/s 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by which original accused challenges the judgment rendered by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, in Sessions Case No.18/1997 on 17.2.2001. The appellant / original accused was tried for offence punishable u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for having committed murder of Lalita Vithal Vakhare on 20.9.1996). At the conclusion of the trial, he was found guilty, convicted and is, therefore, sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, fine of Rs.100/-, in default rigorous imprisonment for 7 days. 2. The prosecution story in brief can be narrated as follows: . Accused is resident of Deopimpri Tq.Jamner Dist.Jalgaon. Victim Lalita was daughter of PW 1 Vithal and PW 6 Kalpana Vakhare r/o Jamthi Tq.Bodhwad. Lalita was married with one Nivrutti Suryawanshi, but she obtained divorce from said Nivrutti on the ground that Nivrutti was found to be a patient of tuberculosis. In the year 1994-95, Lalita stayed with her elder sister at Jalgaon i.e. wife of PW 7 Vasant Dande. During her stay at Jalgaon, she was serving as a Nurse in the hospital of Dr.Gajare. On 5.4.1996, Lalita got married with one Raju Kshirsagar at Surat. However, on this occasion, she cohabited with husband only for 10 days. . According to prosecution story, elder brother of accused namely Ravindra Sapakale is President of Hamal Mapadi Union. He was also having his STD booth in the premises of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Jamner. The accused was looking after the booth and the victim was employed to attend the booth at Rs.700/- per month. Lalita used to attend the booth during the day time and accused during the night hours. Thus, the two became thickly acquainted. The brother of the accused terminated the services of Lalita as he suspected Lalita having committed theft in the earnings of STD booth. This was about a year before the alleged incident. Couple of months since termination of the service, Lalita started approaching the accused and extracting some money from him by threatening that otherwise she will disclose relationship between herself and the accused to the elder brother of the accused. . It is the claim of the prosecution that on 22.9.1996 at 23-30 hours, the accused lodged report (Exh.11) with Jamner Police Station. . It is the claim of the prosecution that on 22.9.1996 at 23-30 hours, the accused lodged report (Exh.11) with Jamner Police Station. Apart from factual details narrated hereinabove, the accused informed that on 13.9.1996, Lalita had come in search of the accused, but since she could not trace the accused, she returned. According to the accused, he had committed some embezzlement in the earnings of STD booth in order to satisfy the demands of Lalita and as this was also noticed by his brother, the brother had shifted him for supervision over the construction of farm house. . According to this report, allegedly lodged by the accused, on 20.9.1996 at about 3-30 or 4.00 p.m., the accused was working on the construction of farm house when the victim approached him and she expressed her desire to talk to the accused. The two walked into the Hybrid jowar crop of Ukha Choudhary located in Mal Pimpri Shivar. During the discussion, Lalita informed that she did not approve of second husband and hence she had deserted him. Lalita proposed that the accused should marry her, otherwise pay her Rs.50,000/-. As the accused replied in the negative, Lalita expressed that they should die like Laila Majnu expressing, thus, she took out a knife, tucked near her waist and got herself stabbed in the abdomen. According to the report, the accused snatched away the knife, kept it aside and finding that the victim was about to collapse, the accused got scared and ran away from the spot. The incident is said to have taken place between 5.00 to 5-30 p.m. on 20.9.1996. Admittedly, on that day, the accused did not report the matter to anybody. Upon registration of the case of unnatural and unexpected death as A.D.No.44/1996, Head Constable Bharatsing Patil (PW 13) entrusted the enquiry to PI Patond (PW 12). Shri Patond recorded inquest panchanama and spot panchanama by visiting the location on 23.9.1996. Statements of parents and relatives of the victim were recorded on 24.9.1996. Upon getting report of the post mortem on 26.9.1996, indicating that the injuries were not self inflicted, PI Patond lodged a complaint on behalf of the State and registered an offence. On that day i.e. 26.9.1996, he effected arrest of the accused. According to PI Patond, the weapon (knife), shirt and pant of the accused were discovered at the instance of information given by the accused. On that day i.e. 26.9.1996, he effected arrest of the accused. According to PI Patond, the weapon (knife), shirt and pant of the accused were discovered at the instance of information given by the accused. The accused was also subjected to medical examination. On completion of investigation, the chargesheet was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jamner, and after committal, the trial ended in conviction as described hereinabove. 3. The prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses, but except 5, all have turned hostile. Apart from two Police witnesses, already referred while narrating the prosecution story i.e. Police Head Constable Bharatsing Patil (PW 13), who registered A.D.No.44/1996 on the basis of report by the accused and Investigating Officer Shri Patond (PI), Dr.Yousuf (PW 8) who carried the post mortem, PW 9 Ukha Choudhary (the person in whose field the dead body was found lying) and PW 11 Narendra who had reached the parents of the victim to the Police Station on 22.9.1996, are the only witnesses, who did not turn hostile. . PW 1 Vithal Vakhare (father), PW 6 Kalpana (mother) and PW 7 Vasant (brother in law of the victim) were examined in order to demonstrate that the victim had come in contact with the accused, the nature of relationship that was developed between the two and such other details. Eventually, the parents have turned totally hostile to the prosecution. PW 7 Vasant atleast admitted stay of victim at Jalgaon for some period and has furnished the details of couple of marriages of deceased Lalita. . PW 2 Nana Salunke and PW 3 Pundlik Salunke are the witnesses to inquest and spot panchanama. PW 4 Jagdeo and PW 5 Ashok Choudhary are the witnesses to the panchanama regarding discovery at the instance of the accused as also seizure of the clothes of the deceased. All panchas have turned hostile to the prosecution and the purpose, for which they were examined, was not fulfilled by them. Jagdeo and Ashok have supported the prosecution only regarding panchanama of seizure of the clothes of the deceased. . In response to notice (Exh.8) by the prosecution u/s 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defence did not dispute the genuineness of four documents and hence those were exhibited and admitted in evidence even before commencement of recording of evidence. . In response to notice (Exh.8) by the prosecution u/s 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defence did not dispute the genuineness of four documents and hence those were exhibited and admitted in evidence even before commencement of recording of evidence. These documents are report by the accused dated 22.9.1996 (Exh.11), panchanama regarding arrest of the accused dated 26.9.1996 (Exh.12) and couple of communications addressed by Jamner Police Station to Forensic Laboratory dated 2.10.1996 and 3.10.1996 (Exhs.13 & 14) respectively. . The post mortem notes proved by Dr.Yousuf are at Exhibit 30 and the opinion is at Exhibit 31. Inquest and spot panchanamas are at Exhibits 18 and 19. Panchanama of seizure of the clothes of deceased is at Exhibit 22. Memorandum of the statement by the accused and discovery panchanama are at Exhibits 23 and 24. All these documents, except panchanama regarding seizure of the clothes of the deceased, were not supported by the respective panch witnesses and, therefore, could not have been exhibited and admitted in evidence during the course of depositions of panch witnesses merely because panch witnesses admitted their signatures on these documents. However, PI Patond has duly proved these documents. 4. Heard respective counsel. . The learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the entire evidence and entire judgment under challenge. . Taking into consideration that the case of the prosecution is based upon circumstantial evidence, the learned Sessions Judge reminded himself of the requirements regarding the standard of proof and the nature of evidence for achieving such standard of proof. He has classified the prosecution evidence into three parts in para 19 of the judgment, as under: (1) First information by the accused; (2) Injuries noticed on the ring and little finger of the accused; (3) Discovery of incriminating articles (weapon and clothes of the accused) at the instance of information given by the accused. . It must be said that the learned Judge has placed quite a heavy reliance upon the Exhibit 11, which was always described by the learned Judge as First Information Report given by the accused himself. According to the learned Sessions Judge, Exhibit 11 clearly revealed that the accused and deceased Lalita were in company soon before the death on 20.9.1996. It must be said that the learned Judge has placed quite a heavy reliance upon the Exhibit 11, which was always described by the learned Judge as First Information Report given by the accused himself. According to the learned Sessions Judge, Exhibit 11 clearly revealed that the accused and deceased Lalita were in company soon before the death on 20.9.1996. However, according to learned Judge, that the story made out in Exhibit 11 regarding the cause of death did not appeal to a judicial mind. Even the medical evidence indicated that the injuries sustained by deceased Lalita could not have been self inflicted. Thus, according to learned Judge, possibility of suicidal death of Lalita was completely ruled out. Naturally, the only possible logical conclusion was that the accused must have inflicted those injuries upon Lalita. . Objections to the admissibility of this report of the accused (Exh.11) were repelled by the Judge by observing that the fact of accused himself giving such information is admissible in view of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act as the evidence of subsequent conduct as influenced by the fact in issue. The information being non confessional, it is also admissible u/s 21 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to learned Sessions Judge, the report of the accused, therefore, was not only relevant, but admissible. Since it was not confessional statement, the same was not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. . After holding the report (Exh.11) of the accused to the Police Station as admissible piece of evidence, the learned Judge has held that the report indicates intimacy between Lalita and accused and that the two had maintained physical relations, which were not likely to be accepted by family members as they belonged to different castes and that Lalita died on 22.9.1996 after she had resumed the company of accused by deserting her second husband. According to learned Judge, once the report was admissible and indicated circumstances as above as also the fact that Lalita intermittently extracted some money from the accused, it was necessary for the accused to have offered explanation and in the absence of any explanation from the accused, he was liable to suffer by an adverse inference and in the absence of any explanation from the accused, according to learned Judge, following circumstances were firmly established: (i) close intimacy between victim and accused; (ii) Lalita having extracted money from the accused; (iii) Lalita deserts her husband due to this relationship; (iv) there was physical relationship between the two; (v) Lalita was keen to meet the accused as she was carrying from him; (vi) Lalita insisting accused to marry her; (vii) Lalita and accused being in a lonely place soon before the death; (viii) Lalita was insisting for accused making provision for her future. . On the basis of these circumstances, the Judge has drawn an inference that accused had sufficient cause to get rid of and, therefore, he must have caused the injuries to Lalita. . In this context, it may be stated here itself that during the course of his statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.C., 1973, the accused preferred to deny everything that was put up to him and claimed the prosecution to be a false case, but in reply to question no.28, he has admitted Exhibit 11 to be bearing his signature. Referring to the injuries on the person of accused and that those were suffered about 5 to 7 days before the examination, in the absence of any explanation on the part of the accused, the Judge felt that to be one of the circumstances against the accused. . The discovery evidence is believed by the Judge on the basis of deposition of Investigating Officer Shri Patond. Since the knife as well as shirt and pant discovered at the instance of accused were reported to be stained with human blood, although the group of blood was not determined, the learned Judge has recorded the said to be a circumstance strongly loaded against the accused. . Since the knife as well as shirt and pant discovered at the instance of accused were reported to be stained with human blood, although the group of blood was not determined, the learned Judge has recorded the said to be a circumstance strongly loaded against the accused. . According to the learned Sessions Judge, cumulative effect of these circumstances established on record was unerringly leading to inference that the accused must have inflicted the fatal injuries upon the person of victim Lalita and that is how the learned Judge has recorded a finding of guilty. 5. The report by the accused (Exh.11) was the main pillar of the reasons and findings by the trial Court. Naturally, it was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the same is not admissible in evidence. It was submitted that it is not at all First Information Report as described by the trial Court. On this count, there was no dispute between the two lawyers. Both of them agreed that it can be termed at the most as an intimation or report by the accused regarding death of Lalita, by suicide. What is First Information Report can be seen on reference to Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and the relevant portion reads thus: "Information in cognizable cases : 154 (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a Police Station shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf." . It is evident that for any information to be termed as First Information Report as contemplated by Section 154 of Cr.P.C., 1973, the basic requirement is that the same should be information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. It is not necessary that it must name the person who has committed cognizable offence, it is not necessary that the same should be given in writing. However, even if given orally, the same is required to be reduced into writing. . It is not necessary that it must name the person who has committed cognizable offence, it is not necessary that the same should be given in writing. However, even if given orally, the same is required to be reduced into writing. . The learned trial Judge has reproduced verbatim the text of Exhibit 11 in para 19 of his judgment. We do not intend to reproduce it, but we intend to give sum and substance of it. "Elder brother of accused namely Ravindra runs STD booth at APMC. Victim was employed to attend the same as day duty and accused attended the same as night duty. The victim and accused were, thus, thickly acquainted. Lalita was removed by the brother on the allegations that she had committed theft of the earnings of STD booth. Since dismissal from the service, Lalita approached accused after 2 months and thereafter she intermittently extracted some money from the accused by threatening him of disclosure of illicit relations to his brother. Accused kept on obliging the demands. For the purpose, accused also committed theft from the earnings of STD booth and consequently brother shifted him to supervise the construction of farm house. Victim was divorcee and she had performed second marriage with somebody at Surat. On 13.9.1996, victim had come in search of the accused alongwith couple of boys from Jalgaon by a rickshaw. On 20.9.1996, she alone approached the accused at about 3-30 p.m. while he was at the site of farm house under construction. As desired by her, the two went to a lonely place in the Hybrid jowar crop, field owned by Ukha Choudhary (PW 9). The victim proposed accused that either he should marry her or pay her Rs.50,000/-. Upon denial by the accused, she proposed that the two should die as if Laila Majnu. Saying so, she stabbed herself. Accused snatched the knife, dropped it there and ran away out of fear." . It must be said that the statement of the accused, which is report regarding suicide by Lalita does not contain any part, which can be termed as inculpatory or confession. Consequently, although the same is made to a Policeman, it would not be hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act nor it will be inadmissible on that count. It must be said that the statement of the accused, which is report regarding suicide by Lalita does not contain any part, which can be termed as inculpatory or confession. Consequently, although the same is made to a Policeman, it would not be hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act nor it will be inadmissible on that count. Reference was also made to Section 162 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 145 of Indian Penal Code by the learned counsel for the appellant. Section 162 speaks about the statements to Police not required to be signed by the witnesses and what is the scope of use of those statements. On reference to proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162, it can be seen that the maker of the statement when called as a witness for prosecution during the course of enquiry or trial, the same can be used either by the accused or by the prosecution for the purpose of contradicting the witness. We are unable to appreciate the reliance by the learned counsel for the appellant on Section 162. It is a statement of an individual, who is now an accused before the Court and impleaded as an accused 4 days after he made the statement. Section 162 opens with the words as under: "162 (1) No statement made by any person to a Police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter ............" . For a statement by any person made to the Police being restricted about its use in the criminal trial, the same is required to be a statement during investigation and investigation relates to a crime which subsequently enters the trial. . In the matter at hands, accused submitted this report on 22.9.1996 at 23-30 hours. It was registered as a report of unexpected unnatural death in the record of the Police Station. In fact, the crime is registered on the basis of complaint lodged by PI Patonde on 26.9.1996. On reference to deposition of PI Patonde, it is evident that he registered the offence only after he was armed with the medical opinion that death was not suicidal. This offence was registered on 26.9.1996 at 14-30 hours whereafter accused was arrested on the same day at 16-30 hours (Exh.12). On reference to deposition of PI Patonde, it is evident that he registered the offence only after he was armed with the medical opinion that death was not suicidal. This offence was registered on 26.9.1996 at 14-30 hours whereafter accused was arrested on the same day at 16-30 hours (Exh.12). Thus, it is evident that when the accused lodged report (Exh.11) with the Police Station, neither there was any offence registered, much less against him, and, therefore, Exhibit 11 can not be said to be a statement recorded during the course of "investigation", as contemplated by Section 162. Naturally, the argument that the statement can be used only for restricted purpose as in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162, is not sustainable. . No doubt, the accused has denied the entire statement when that was put to him during the course of his statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. by question nos.11 to 28, but in reply to the last question no.28, he has admitted that the report bears his signature. It was argued by Advocate Shri Kakade for the appellant that the statement was not read over and explained to the accused, because there is no endorsement of the same having been read over to the accused and correctness of the same having been admitted by the accused at the conclusion of recording. We are afraid, such an argument is not available to the appellant. This is because the statement is concluded with following statement: ______________________________________________________ i.e. my report is recorded truly and correctly as per my narration. . The endorsement regarding obtaining approval of the maker of the statement that it is correctly recorded is within the statement and not after conclusion of the statement. . . Learned Advocate Shri Kakade also tried to argue that the statement is not duly proved because of admission by Head Constable Bharatsing that he himself is not scribe of the statement. We may reproduce the part of cross examination of Bharatsing on this aspect: "One Constable reduced into writing the said complaint, but I do not remember his name today. It was reduced in writing in my presence." . Although accused denied to have so reported, as per Exhibit 11, his having admitted his signature, can lead to many adverse inferences against him. It was reduced in writing in my presence." . Although accused denied to have so reported, as per Exhibit 11, his having admitted his signature, can lead to many adverse inferences against him. It is not his contention that he was forced to sign, it is not his contention that the statement is pre-dated and prepared after his arrest on 26.9.1996, it is also not his contention that he was under detention by the Police for all 4 days between 22.9.1996 to 26.9.1996. Absence of any other reaction on the part of the accused to the contents of the statement (once he has admitted his signature thereupon) lends credence to the contention of the prosecution that accused had reported those details and that those were reduced in writing as narrated by the accused. Taking into consideration evidence of PW 13 Bharatsing, prosecution has certainly established a fact that on 22.9.1996 at 23-30 hours, accused orally reported the contents of exhibit 11, which were reduced to writing by the Police and was treated as an intimation of suicidal death. Not only that, Police have acted upon it accordingly. If we refer to the definition of fact said to be "proved" as contained in Section 3 of Evidence Act, a fact is said to be proved when the Court, after considering the matter before it, believes the same to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that it exists. . In the matter at hands, Police have swung into action by registering the death and by entering into enquiry of the causes of death. If at all there is any infirmity, because the scribe is not examined, the same stands cured by reaction of the Police machinery to the report of the accused, which he impliedly admits by admitting his signature. . The learned APP has placed reliance upon couple of judicial pronouncements on this count. . If at all there is any infirmity, because the scribe is not examined, the same stands cured by reaction of the Police machinery to the report of the accused, which he impliedly admits by admitting his signature. . The learned APP has placed reliance upon couple of judicial pronouncements on this count. . In the matter of Prakash Chand V/s State (Delhi Administration) ( AIR 1979 SC 400 ), following observations from para 8 were placed reliance upon by learned APP: "There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation." . If the distinction as laid down in the observations of the Apex Court is taken into consideration, the evidence of PW 3 Bharatsing is sufficient to prove that accused gave a report as per Exhibit 11, which proves two things. Firstly, that accused gave a report and secondly that accused reported Lalita having committed suicide. These details being details regarding conduct of the accused as influenced by the relevant fact (death of Lalita), are admissible in evidence u/s 8 of Indian Evidence Act. . Faddi V/s State of M.P. ( AIR 1964 SC 1850 ) was another case relied upon by learned APP on this point. No doubt, this is a case regarding admissibility into evidence of the First Information Report given by an accused person. In the matter at hands, statement of the accused was at a much premature stage than First Information Report. The observations relied upon by the learned APP read thus: "The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation . Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The observations relied upon by the learned APP read thus: "The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation . Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or whether the appellant’s statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under S.21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who make them. ........... It is, therefore, clear that admissions of an accused can be proved against him." . We must, therefore, record that trial Judge committed no error in relying upon the fact that accused had reported death of Lalita to be suicidal on 22.9.1996 at 23-30 hours and also upon non confessional admissions in that statement. . The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment in the matter of Mandesan V/s State of Kerala (1995 Criminal Law Journal, 61) and more particularly the contents in para 6 to following effect: "Legal position is well settled that the inculpative statement made by an accused even though it forms part of the first information statement in the case is inadmissible in evidence." . We are afraid, although there need be no quarrel over the principle laid down, the reported judgment does not render any assistance to the cause of the appellant. Exhibit 11 in this case is neither FIR nor contains any inculpative statement. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the reported judgments in the matters of Sharad Sarda V/s State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622); Sukhram V/s State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 7 SCC 502 ] and also State of Goa V/s Sanjay Thakaram [ (2007) 3 SCC 755 ]. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the reported judgments in the matters of Sharad Sarda V/s State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622); Sukhram V/s State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 7 SCC 502 ] and also State of Goa V/s Sanjay Thakaram [ (2007) 3 SCC 755 ]. All these cases are relied upon for the purpose of drawing our attention to the principles to be followed while appreciating the evidence in the matters, which are cases based on circumstantial evidence. The principles laid down can be borrowed from para 13 of the last of the three cases referred. Those are: "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." . Keeping in mind these parameters laid down by the Hon’ble the Apex Court, we proceed to consider whether prosecution has brought on record the circumstantial evidence of above standard. We had directed learned APP, during the course of his arguments to enlist the circumstances on which he relies and to demonstrate to us that those are proved firmly by cogent evidence. The learned APP has relied upon following circumstances: (1) Death is homicidal; (2) Report submitted by accused (Exh.11) on 22.9.1996 (FIR was lodged and accused was arrested only on 26.9.1996); (3) Discovery of knife and clothes of the accused at the instance of information given by the accused; (4) Motive (as provided within Exhibit 11); (5) Presence of accused in the company of the deceased at the time / soon before the death (by virtue of admissions in Exh.11); (6) There are minor injuries to the fingers of the accused, which can be inferred to have been suffered almost at the same time when Lalita died. 7. 7. So far as death being homicidal, as rightly discussed by the trial Court, the medical evidence is sufficient. As per deposition of Dr.Yousuf (PW 8), the victim had suffered following injuries: (1) Stab wound on abdomen left side 5" below left breast, waist line transverse in direction 1 1/2" x 1" x 6" deep, haemorrhagic clots present. (2) Stab wound below injury no.1 - 6" measuring 2" x 1" x 7" direction oblique transverse margin clean cut, haemorrhage present, clots present. (3) Stab wound on right side abdomen 6" below right breast 1 1/2" x 1" x 6" transverse in direction, haemorrhagic clots present. (4) Incised wound left side waist 5" x 2" muscle deep, edges, clear cut, haemorrhagic clots present. . The learned counsel for the defence has laid emphasis on certain admissions of the medical officer. Admittedly, the body had started decomposing and maggots were present. The doctor, therefore, admitted that it is difficult to state the size of the injuries in case of decomposed stage of above nature. Relying upon these admissions, the learned counsel for the appellant desired us to believe that the injuries were not as deep as recorded. First three injuries are 6" to 7" deep. Even if admission of the medical officer is taken into consideration, we can not ignore the internal injuries suffered by the victim as recorded in column 21. It is evident that there is a cut in the middle of liver and there is also cutting of spleen. Ordinarily in a decomposed body, it may not be possible for the medical officer to judge and narrate the depth of the injury. But the fact, that inner organs are cut, certainly confirms the entry of the weapon to that extent and, therefore, the observations of the doctor that three injuries were more than 6" deep need not be looked with suspicion. . In our considered opinion, the depth of injuries and number itself rules out any possibility of suicidal tendency. No doubt, fourth injury is only muscle deep, but after infliction of any of the first three injuries, which are more than 6" deep, it is difficult to imagine that a person can draw out the weapon, which had penetrated in the body to a depth of 7" and inflict couple of more injuries of 6" to 7" depth. No doubt, fourth injury is only muscle deep, but after infliction of any of the first three injuries, which are more than 6" deep, it is difficult to imagine that a person can draw out the weapon, which had penetrated in the body to a depth of 7" and inflict couple of more injuries of 6" to 7" depth. After first stroke, the victim may not have strength to push and penetrate the weapon again to such a depth. . The medical officer was specifically asked the age of the injuries and whether those were self inflicted. The doctor has opined the age of the injuries to be 3 to 4 days at the time of post mortem on 23.9.1996 at 5-30 p.m. He has specifically opined that these injuries could not have been self inflicted. . No doubt, the doctor had become somewhat shaky about his observation that the victim was pregnant. This is because no foetus was found in the uterus. We are of a considered view that presence or absence of pregnancy does not make any impact on the nature of the death. That aspect may be material, at the most, while taking into consideration the issue of motive. We feel satisfied that medical evidence coupled with consideration of natural course of human conduct, is sufficient to demonstrate that the death was homicidal and not suicidal. If at all any support is required for such an inference, if it was a suicidal death, the weapon ought to have been found within the body or atleast near the body. On reference to inquest (Exh.18) and panchanama of scene of offence (Exh.19), the weapon is neither within the body of the victim nor it is lying around her. In fact, the weapon is claimed to have been discovered at the instance of information furnished by the accused. The contents in spot panchanama (Exh.19) to the effect that one shoe of the victim is lying at a distance of 40 Ft. from the dead body, also speaks about victim having been subjected to some violence soon prior to death. From the inquest, it is evident that right shoe is worn on the foot and left shoe, as per spot panchanama, is lying at a distant place. . The medical evidence as well as our inference, thus, stand supported by other circumstances available on record. . From the inquest, it is evident that right shoe is worn on the foot and left shoe, as per spot panchanama, is lying at a distant place. . The medical evidence as well as our inference, thus, stand supported by other circumstances available on record. . The learned counsel for the appellant was critical, because panch witnesses have not supported the prosecution and consequently panchanamas are proved by the investigating officer (although the learned Sessions Judge has erroneously exhibited the documents upon hostile panch witnesses admitting their signatures on those). The learned APP on this count has placed reliance upon observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Assam V/s Muhim Barkataki ( AIR 1987 SC 98 ) and submitted that the evidence of investigating officer, merely because he is a Police officer, can not be undermined and in this particular case, the accused has not even suggested any reason as to why the Police should falsely inculpate him. . In view of this, there should be no legal impediment in reading the inquest and spot panchanama, although those are proved only by the investigating officer and not supported by panch witnesses, although they have signed those. And, thus, taking into consideration the medical evidence together with the circumstances at the location where dead body was found, are sufficient to rule out any possibility of death being suicidal. We are, therefore, inclined to confirm the finding of the trial Court that death is firmly proved to be homicidal. 8. As regards report submitted by accused (Exh.11), for the reasons discussed in para 5, we have already recorded that the entire report is admissible in evidence. However, for the sake of hypothesis, if we consider that the facts narrated within the report are not proved, but only fact that accused submitted such a report is proved because of deposition of PW 13 Bharatsing, the same serves considerable purpose of the prosecution. In the report, accused has narrated the death to be suicidal. This is certainly not an inculpatory report and, therefore, even if addressed to the Police, that can be considered in evidence. By the evidence of Head Constable Bharatsing, it stands proved that on 22.9.1996, accused reported to the Police of Lalita having committed suicide in the crop of Hybrid jowar and in the field of Ukha Choudhary. This is certainly not an inculpatory report and, therefore, even if addressed to the Police, that can be considered in evidence. By the evidence of Head Constable Bharatsing, it stands proved that on 22.9.1996, accused reported to the Police of Lalita having committed suicide in the crop of Hybrid jowar and in the field of Ukha Choudhary. In order to prove this much, evidence of Bharatsing is more than sufficient and from this, lot of inferences are required to be drawn. We have consciously used the word "required", because those inferences naturally flow and the inferences are: (1) Accused made a false report regarding the cause of the death (once it is already held that death was homicidal); (2) From the knowledge of accused, it must be inferred that he was present when the cause for the death of Lalita occurred. (Since he knew the location and he knew that Lalita was injured, such an inference is inevitable); (3) Till the time he reported the matter to Police, his reaction to the fact situation was passive. In the sense, he made no attempts to seek medical help to Lalita. In fact, it is not his case in the report that he shouted, secured help of some other people and took Lalita to hospital. On the contrary, it is his admission that he ran away. It is also not his case that he narrated anybody, may be his near and dear, of Lalita having committed suicide. . In our view, if proved homicidal death, is taken into consideration in the light of these inferences possible, based only on the proved fact that accused reported after time gap of two days that Lalita committed suicide at particular location, that obliges the accused, by virtue of Section 106 of Evidence Act to disclose as to who was the assailant. And he has not disclosed anybody else to be the assailant. This should lead us to the only inference that accused himself was the assailant. . At the cost of repetition, we may take support of some other proved facts, which are already referred earlier. There are clear signs of victim being subjected to violence. She is wearing the shoe on her right foot and the shoe on the left foot is lying at a distance of 40 Ft. . At the cost of repetition, we may take support of some other proved facts, which are already referred earlier. There are clear signs of victim being subjected to violence. She is wearing the shoe on her right foot and the shoe on the left foot is lying at a distance of 40 Ft. The weapon, with which she committed suicide as per the report of the accused, is not lying near the victim (Inquest - Exh.18 and spot panchanama - Exh.19). 9. We have already held that entire report is admissible, because that does not contain any inculpatory statements, inviting criminal liability. It could have been argued that maintenance of illicit relations is a statement inviting criminal liability. As per report, the relations, if any, were by mutual consent and, therefore, that part of the report can not be said to be inculpatory and, therefore, must be taken to be admissible. . Accused in saying that he developed relations with the deceased and she had started exploiting him by threatening that she will disclose the relationship to his elder brother, provides the motive. The victim was emboldened because accused paid her some amounts intermittently and ultimately she had come to demand either cash Rs.50,000/- or a proposal that accused should marry her. Accused, according to his own report, had turned down the proposal of marriage and probably amount of Rs.50,000/- was either beyond his reach or was not worth being paid for the relationship. If this situation, which is required to be considered as admission of the accused, is taken into consideration, provides a perfect platform for a desire to eliminate the victim, irrespective of the fact whether the victim was / was not pregnant. Thus, if other part of the report is taken into consideration, the prosecution has been able to bring on record the motive for which accused can be said to have committed the act of killing the victim. 10. The prosecution has also come with the evidence u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is the claim of prosecution that the weapon - knife and his own clothes - a pant and a full shirt of green colour, were discovered on information given by accused on 28.9.1996 (memorandum - Exh.23 and panchanama - Exn.24). 10. The prosecution has also come with the evidence u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is the claim of prosecution that the weapon - knife and his own clothes - a pant and a full shirt of green colour, were discovered on information given by accused on 28.9.1996 (memorandum - Exh.23 and panchanama - Exn.24). This discovery is required to be read articles were sent to Forensic Laboratory and the report shows that these three articles are stained with blood. The blood detected is human. Thereafter, the report does not help the prosecution. It is said that group of the blood detected on these articles could not be determined as the results were inconclusive. In fact, blood group of blood stains found on any of the articles is not determined and blood of accused is said to be of "B" group. . According to learned counsel for the appellant, this evidence is of no help to the prosecution because it does not conclusively prove that the weapon and the clothes were bearing human blood of the victim and excluding the possibility of the same being blood of the accused. . In fact, the learned counsel has also taken an exception to read the discovery panchanama, because panch witnesses have not supported. Although Shri Kakade placed reliance upon the judgment reported at 2004 AIR SCW 743 - Anter Singh V/s State of Rajastan, the case nowhere lays down that memorandum and panchanama regarding discovery at the instance of accused can not be read in evidence merely because panch witnesses do not support. On the contrary, in the matter of Mst.Dalbir Kaur V/s State of Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 472) relied upon by learned APP, recoveries of the weapons at the instance of accused were attested by Police officers as well as independent search witnesses and although independent witnesses were not examined, it was held that, that by itself did not introduce any serious infirmity in the evidence furnished by the recoveries which at best was only a corroborative piece of evidence. . . 2004 AIR SCW 7265 - Anjlus Dungdung V/s State of Jharkhand was another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, which only lays down a general principle that in case of missing link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, suspicion, howsoever strong, can not take place of proof and the benefit of missing link goes to the accused. In this matter, there was no evidence that knife recovered at the instance of accused was stained with blood. It was not a case wherein the article was stained with blood, but only group was not determined. It must be said that the case at hands stands slightly on a different footing than the one relied upon by the counsel of the appellant. Reliance was also placed on State of M.P. V/s Nissar [ (2007) 5 SCC 658 ]. In this case, there was failure of determination of blood group on the axe, although the same was found to be stained with human blood, but this was not the only circumstance causing loss of credibility of the prosecution evidence. Accused Nissar was said to have admitted having killed victim Kandhai because latter had abused him when he was taking away the goat. He had also confessed the murder of Chherkoo, however, first information report was lodged much after said extra judicial confession. Delayed FIR, although based on extra judicial confession, was much stronger circumstance making daint in the credibility of prosecution case. . In the matter at hands, the discovery of weapon and clothes of the accused at his instance is proved by deposition of investigating officer PI Patond (Exh.12). The investigating officer has admitted during the course of his cross examination that hut was not locked. The articles are said to have been recovered from a trunk kept in a hut. Merely because the prosecution has not collected the evidence regarding the ownership of the field in which the hut was located and that the hut was not locked, this does not lose the credibility of "discovery" at the instance of accused. That the articles were in concealed condition and not easily traceable by the investigation is sufficient to term the same as "discovery". . The investigating officer has also admitted that the date on the memorandum and panchanama is corrected from 27th to 28th. That the articles were in concealed condition and not easily traceable by the investigation is sufficient to term the same as "discovery". . The investigating officer has also admitted that the date on the memorandum and panchanama is corrected from 27th to 28th. The record shows that accused was arrested on 26th, produced before the Magistrate on 27th and discovery is claimed to be on 28th September. Soon after admission that date is corrected from 27th to 28th on the memorandum and discovery panchanama, the investigating officer also added that in the case diary, there is an entry that the statement of the accused leading to discovery of articles was recorded on 28.9.1996. The defence had not challenged the prosecution to produce the case diary and, therefore, the doubts, if any, which could be raised because of correction of the date, need not crop up. . Since the blood group of the blood stains discovered on the clothes of the accused and the weapon is not proved, we are not in a position to say that this is the weapon used by the accused for killing Lalita and the discovery has remained a weak piece of evidence. It can at the most be said that the accused was bound to offer some explanation for possessing a weapon having human blood stains. 11. Admission of the accused during statement u/s 313 that Exhibit 11 bears his signature lent substantial credibility to the evidence of PW 13 Bharatsing that accused reported and the report was reduced into writing. The fact that case of unnatural / unexpected death was registered on the basis of report of the accused, gives further strength to the fact that the accused had reported death of Lalita to be suicidal. Reliance was placed upon observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohan Singh V/s Prem Singh ( AIR 2002 SC 3582 ) by the learned counsel for the appellant. The observations relied upon read: "If the prosecution evidence does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. can not be made the sole basis of his conviction." . The observations relied upon read: "If the prosecution evidence does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. can not be made the sole basis of his conviction." . In the same judgment in para 28, observations from earlier judicial pronouncement Nishi Kant Jha V/s State of Bihar ( AIR 1969 SC 422 ) are reproduced, which read thus: "The statement made in defence by accused under Section 313, Cr.P.C. can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the accused can either be relied in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution." . In the matter at hands, we are placing reliance only on one reply of the accused that report (Exh.11) bears his signature. That lends credence to the evidence of PW 13 Bharatsing that accused had approached the Police Station and reported, as recorded in Exhibit 11. We do not find anything in the observations relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant that will compel us not to rely upon the answer of the accused that Exhibit 11 bears his signature. On this point, learned APP has placed reliance upon Division Bench judgment of this High Court in State of Maharashtra V/s Shivaji Chede (2002 (4) Maharashtra Law Journal, 201) wherein it was observed that Court can rely upon the statement of accused recorded in the course of trial and take into consideration admission or confession of accused in the said statement. . In any case, we are not treating the sole admission in the statement u/s 313 as the basis for conviction. We are using it only for lending credence to other prosecution evidence. 12. To sum up, the prosecution has proved the death to be homicidal. . In any case, we are not treating the sole admission in the statement u/s 313 as the basis for conviction. We are using it only for lending credence to other prosecution evidence. 12. To sum up, the prosecution has proved the death to be homicidal. Exhibit 11 is admissible piece of evidence as admission of the accused since the same does not contain any inculpatory material and it was submitted when no offence was registered. IT is neither hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act nor by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. That accused so reported as per Exhibit 11 is a fact firmly proved by evidence of Bharatsing. The said report indicates that the accused made a false report regarding cause of death of Lalita and the false report indicated that the accused had knowledge as to where and when Lalita died. Accused’s passive reaction put the accused in further tight corner. Having reported to Police that he was a witness to the death of Lalita, if he was not the cause of the death, as a natural course of conduct, he ought to have tried to help the victim, which he has not. All these circumstances taken together do not lead to any other inference except that the accused has killed the victim and in order to save his own skin, he has lodged a false report regarding suicide by the victim. As the contents of report are held admissible, those provide sufficient evidence of motive as to why the accused must have been motivated to eliminate the victim Lalita. We feel that the prosecution case, although based on circumstantial evidence, has achieved the expected standards as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Sarda V/s State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622). We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the finding of guilty and the judgment of conviction and sentence. 13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant - accused, who is enlarged on bail, shall forthwith surrender to his bail before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, who shall furnish a certified copy of this judgment to accused free of cost and also issue appropriate conviction warrant indicating period of custodial detention for the purpose of set off u/s 428 of Cr.P.C., 1973.