JUDGMENT By the Court.—Petitioners have challenged the order dated 23.10.2007 passed by the Secretary, Industrial Development, U.P., Lucknow rejecting their representation requesting for release of land in question under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The State Government has rejected request of the petitioners on the ground that since the possession of the land in question was already taken by the State, therefore, land in question cannot be released from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. 2. Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vishnu Gupta, vehemently contended that finding of the respondent No. 1 that the possession of land in question was taken by the respondents is perverse and contrary to material on record and, therefore, the impugned order, having been passed on non-est facts, is liable to be set aside and the respondent No. 1 be required to pass a fresh order on the petitioners’ representation in accordance with law. 3. On the contrary Sri Zafar Naiyer, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 3 and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 submitted that since the possession of the land in question was taken long back, the application under Section 48 of the Act was not entertainable and, therefore, has rightly been rejected by the respondent No. 1. 4. Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate while assailing the impugned order contended that it is true that under Section 48 of the Act it is State Government’s privilege to de-notify the acquired land or not but once it is found that the order has been passed on incorrect facts or there is error apparent on the face of record with respect to facts and law, as the case may be, or there is a basic fallacy of assumption on which such order has been passed, in such a case an order under Section 48 passed by the State Government is liable to be set aside and the respondent No. 1 would be required to pass a fresh order. He also contended that even otherwise the State Government cannot refuse to de-notify acquired land arbitrarily and if it deny to de-notify acquired land it is under obligation to give reasons thereof which are open for judicial review. He also contended that even otherwise the State Government cannot refuse to de-notify acquired land arbitrarily and if it deny to de-notify acquired land it is under obligation to give reasons thereof which are open for judicial review. Relying on the Apex Court decision in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. and another, AIR 1974 SC 555 , Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; and Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851 he contended that arbitrariness is antitheses of the doctrine of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, any executive act of the State, if arbitrary, is liable to be set aside. He further contended that in order to show that Section 48 is not attracted in the case in hand, it was incumbent upon the respondents to show that the possession of land in question was actually taken and there is no question of any symbolic possession. In support of the aforesaid submission he placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat and others, 1976 (1) SCC 700 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Uma Shankar Dixit v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1978 All. 194 . 5. The respondents, however, disputed the aforesaid submission and said that memorandum or Panchnama prepared by SLAO is sufficient to show that the possession of the land in question was taken and in support thereof reliance is placed on the Apex Court decision in State of T.N. and another v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and others, 1996 (7) SCC 269 and General Manager, Telecommunication and another v. Dr. Madan Mohan Pradhan and others, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 268. 6. Before considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties it would be appropriate to have a bird eye view of the facts and provisions of Section 48 of the Act, to understand the dispute between the parties. 7. Section 48 of the Act reads as under : “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.—(1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. 7. Section 48 of the Act reads as under : “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.—(1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.” (emphasis added) 8. Now coming to the facts of this case as is evident from the pleadings of the parties it appears that one Sri Kali Charan son of Sri Risal owned about 6-3-0 bigha land at Plot No. 391, Village Chalera Bangar, Tahsil Dadri, District Bulandshahr. In the year, 1976, vide notification dated 8.11.1976 published under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act, the State Government notified that the said land is required for public purpose namely, Planned Industrial Development in District Bulandshahr through New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Bulandshahr (in short “NOIDA”) and, therefore, under the provisions of the Act directed the Collector of Bulandshahr to take order for acquisition of the said land. A notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 9.11.1976, a copy whereof has been placed on record as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4. Since in the meantime the area in question became part of District Ghaziabad, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad (in short “SLAO”) took possession of the said land on 28.3.1977 on the entire area of 6-3-0 bigha, plot No. 391, and handed over the same to the Executive Engineer of the project concerned on the same date. The award was given by SLAO on 23.3.1978, a copy whereof has been produced before this Court during the course of arguments and the same has also been placed on record subsequently by means of a supplementary counter affidavit. The award was given by SLAO on 23.3.1978, a copy whereof has been produced before this Court during the course of arguments and the same has also been placed on record subsequently by means of a supplementary counter affidavit. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has not disputed this fact that the award was made by SLAO with respect to the land in question. 9. However, the case of the petitioners is that they are the legal heirs of late Kali Charan son of Sri Risal. The respondents took possession of the area of plot No. 391 as notified under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act except of an area of 1-0-0 bigha over which there was construction of late Kali Charan to which the petitioners have succeeded after his death; late Kali Charan was given compensation only for the area of which possession was taken i.e. 5-3-0 bigha and no compensation was paid for the remaining area i.e. 1-0-0 bigha over which the residential house situated. In order to show that a residential house existed and possession was not taken over by the respondents, the petitioners have pointed out that in the year 1978-79 the NOIDA authorities initiated eviction proceedings under U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (in short “1972 Act") against the petitioners’ father namely late Kali Charan but the said proceedings were decided by the prescribed authorities against NOIDA authorities vide order dated 11.12.1979 holding that construction made on the premises in question was old and of the period prior to the date of acquisition. However, we find from record that NOIDA authorities filed an Appeal No. 2 of 1980 before the District Judge, Ghaziabad which was allowed and the matter was remanded to the prescribed authority whereagainst late Kali Charan filed Writ Petition No. 13321 of 1983 which was dismissed in limine by this Court. While the aforesaid proceedings were pending, Sri Kali Charan died and thereafter the NOIDA authorities tried to demolish the construction and sought to evict the petitioners, whereagainst the petitioners approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 9787 of 1987. However, a Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment observed that the eviction proceedings initiated by the NOIDA authorities against Sri Kali Charan have abated after his death and, therefore, if the petitioners have to be evicted, they have to be issued fresh notice under 1972 Act. However, a Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment observed that the eviction proceedings initiated by the NOIDA authorities against Sri Kali Charan have abated after his death and, therefore, if the petitioners have to be evicted, they have to be issued fresh notice under 1972 Act. Thereafter, the petitioners filed Original Suit No. 1101 of 1989 and 185 of 1992 wherein the NOIDA authorities were impleaded as respondents and an injunction was sought against the NOIDA for not interfering in the possession of petitioners on the land in question and also not to demolish the construction existing thereon. Both the suits were decreed vide judgment dated 31.5.1995 passed by the First Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghaziabad. Appeals No. 122 of 1995 and 123 of 1995 against the said judgment were dismissed by IVth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad vide judgment dated 5.3.1999. The NOIDA authorities have filed second appeal against the aforesaid judgment being Second Appeals No. 746 of 1999 and 747 of 1999 which were admitted on 26.5.1999 on the substantial question of law as to whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the title and possession over plot in question which was acquired under the Act and the judgment of the Courts below were stayed vide order dated 26.5.1999. 10. The learned Counsel for petitioners, however, pointed out that the Commissioner and Director, Land Acquisition on the petitioners’ representation, vide letter dated 10.12.1993, sought a report from District Magistrate, Ghaziabad after making spot inspection. Pursuance thereto the Additional District Magistrate, NOIDA/Ghaziabad submitted his report dated 18.1.1994 which shows that one bigha of the land at plot No. 391 is not in the possession of NOIDA authorities and is being used by the petitioners for residential purposes having constructed their house thereon and, therefore, it recommended that the said land may be de-notified under Section 48 of the Act. Since no action was taken, and the petitioners’ application under Section 48 was pending, they approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 2831 of 1995 which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment dated 2.2.1995 directing the State Government to consider and dispose of petitioners’ representation expeditiously. Since no action was taken, and the petitioners’ application under Section 48 was pending, they approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 2831 of 1995 which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment dated 2.2.1995 directing the State Government to consider and dispose of petitioners’ representation expeditiously. It is said that thereafter again the State Government vide letter dated 1.5.1995 sought the report from Directorate, Land Acquisition, U.P., Lucknow, whereupon, the NOIDA authorities vide letter dated 18.9.1996 informed the State Government that the land in question is being used by the petitioners for residential purposes and actual possession of the said land was never obtained by the NOIDA. In the meantime it appears that the authorities again sought to take possession of the land in question whereupon the petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 35140 of 2000 which was disposed of vide judgment dated 21.08.2000 on the statement made by learned Counsel for the NOIDA that NOIDA authorities not taking steps for dispossession of the petitioners or to demolish their house. The petitioners claim to have made a representation again on 27.1.2006 under Section 48 of the Act and despite of the fact that all the authorities, from time to time, informed the Government that the land in question, as a matter of fact, is being used by the petitioners for their residence, yet the respondents by means of the impugned order dated 23.10.2007 have rejected the petitioners’ application under Section 48 declining to release the land in question from acquisition. However, we find that all these correspondence etc. is of 1992-93 and thereafter and cannot throw any light as to whether possession was taken in 1977 or not. 11. On behalf of State Government no separate counter affidavit has been filed but they have adopted the counter affidavit filed on behalf of NOIDA i.e. respondent No. 4. The learned Additional Advocate General has also produced the original record and possession memo showing that the possession of the land in question was taken by the State Government on 28.3.1977 and this fact was admitted to late Kali Charan as is evident from the award of SLAO which shows that the only objection he raised before SLAO is for providing alternative land instead of giving compensation of the land in question. He thus contended that in none of the proceedings either before the civil Court or before the prescribed authority the State Government was ever made a party and, therefore, it was not in a position to disclose as to how and what manner the possession of the acquired land was taken by the State Government. He contended that in accordance with the well known practice and procedure under the Revenue Manual the possession was taken by SLAO on 28.3.1977 and was handed over to the then Executive Engineer of the project and, therefore, under Section 6 of the Act, land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrance and the actual possession, if any, of the petitioners predecessors or the petitioners thereafter is wholly illegal, unauthorised and would not divest the land which is already vested in the State Government. He also pointed out that the petitioners have also concealed the fact that they also filed Writ Petition No. 25390 of 2004 before this Court seeking a mandamus commanding the respondents to pass orders for de-notification of one bigha land of plot No. 391 but the said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 12.7.2004 with the following order : “Sri A. Khanna has appeared for the respondents. Petitioners have prayed for mandamus directing the respondents to pass order for de-notification of the petitioners’ land measuring 1 bigha of plot No. 391 situated in village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana Dadri, Tahsil Sikandarabad, District Ghaziabad. It is not open for this Court to issue any such mandamus. It is the discretion of the Government whether to issue de-notification under Section 48 or not? It is not in the domain of the Court and the Court should exercise judicial restraint in such matters. The petition is dismissed.” 12. It is submitted that the said order in writ petition was never disclosed by petitioners and, therefore, the petitioners are also guilty of concealment of material fact hence it is liable to be dismissed. We find substance in the above submission. 13. The only question now remains to be seen in this case is whether Section 48 of the Act has rightly been held to be inapplicable by the respondent No. 1 in the impugned order or not. We find substance in the above submission. 13. The only question now remains to be seen in this case is whether Section 48 of the Act has rightly been held to be inapplicable by the respondent No. 1 in the impugned order or not. The ancillary issue would be whether the possession should be actual or symbolic and when it can be said that Government has taken possession. 14. If the possession of the property was already taken by the State, as is evident from the statute, Section 48 would be inapplicable and if the answer is otherwise thereafter probably it may be necessary to consider the other issues raised by the petitioners. 15. A bare perusal of Section 48 makes it clear that it gives liberty to the State Government to withdraw from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken except in the case provided for in Section 36. It is not disputed before us that the case in hand is not covered by Section 36 and, therefore, Section 48 would be attracted only if the possession of acquired land has not been taken by the State Government. 16. The original memorandum produced for perusal of this Court by SLAO while getting possession of the land acquired by the notification dated 9.11.1976 reads as under : Þla[;k& foks"k Hkwfe v/;kfIr vf/kdkjh cq0kgj fnukad vf/kdkj i= ifj;kstuk dk uke xzke Nysjk ckaxj ijxuk nknjh rglhy xkft;kckn ftyk xkft;kcknA Hkwfe ftldk C;kSjk uhps fn;k gS dk dCtk ysdj vf/kkk"kh vfHk;Urk dks fnukad 28-3-1977 dks kkldh; foKfIr /kkjk 6 Hkwfe v/;kfIr vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr la[;k 12275 ¼2½ Hkk-m-@18&11&55 Hkk-m- fnukad 9&11&76 ds vuqlkj vehu }kjk fn;k tkosA foks"k Hkwfe v/;kfIr vf/kdkjh xkft;kckn g0@v0 mijksDr ds vuqlkj vf/kdkj ÁkIr fd;kA vf/kkk"kh vfHk;Urk ua0 jdck 391 6@3 Jheku~ th] ekSdk ij dCtk ÁkIr fd;kA g0@v0Þ (English Version) “No. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bulandshahar, Dated Authority letter Name of the Project Village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana Dadri, Tahsil Ghaziabad, District Ghaziabad. After acquiring possession of the land described below, possession thereof is handed over by Amin to the Executive Engineer on 28.3.77 in accordance with Government Order No. 12275(2)Bha.U./18-11-55 Bha.U. Dated 9-11-76 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad Sd/ Acquired possession as mentioned above. Executive Engineer No. area 391 6/3 Sir, Took the possession on spot. Sd/" (translation by the Court) 17. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad Sd/ Acquired possession as mentioned above. Executive Engineer No. area 391 6/3 Sir, Took the possession on spot. Sd/" (translation by the Court) 17. The aforesaid document clearly shows that the entire area 6-3-0 bigha of plot No. 391 was taken possession by SLAO on 28.3.1977 and was handed over to the Executive Engineer who endorsed that he has got possession on the spot. There is no mention of any part possession or that some part of land was left. It is not disputed that in 1977 Sri Kali Charan was alive. He filed his objection before SLAO on notice under Section 9 having been issued and the only objection filed by him, as mentioned in the award of SLAO, was that since he has made construction on one bigha of the land, therefore, he may be allotted an alternative land instead of paying compensation so that there may not be any obstruction in the scheme. The award was given on 23.3.1978 and it mentions that SLAO himself made spot inspection of the land and found that there was no building, tube-well or tree and only one broken old wall existed for which he directed land owners to remove bricks of that wall vide notice dated 9.6.1977. He did not found the said wall of any worth for compensation. Further vide award dated 23.3.1978 he determined compensation for the entire land which was acquired vide notification dated 9.11.1976 i.e. 6-3-0 of plot No. 391. The said award was well within the knowledge of Sri Kali Charan and also the petitioners. It is not disputed by the petitioners that the said award has not been challenged and the findings recorded therein have attained finality. On the contrary from the pleadings of petitioners in the writ petition it is admitted that they have withdrawn the entire compensation though have treated the said compensation only with respect to 5-3-0 bigha and not with respect to 1-0-0 bigha. For such assumption on the part of petitioners we do not find any basis inasmuch as, when the award was made for the entire land which was acquired by notification dated 9.11.1976 and the amount of compensation was received by petitioners’ predecessor, whatever may be the assumption or presumptions on their part, that would not change the facts as they actually existed at the relevant time. 18. 18. Moreover, we find that almost a similar situation and similar facts were available before the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, 1996 (8) SCC 259 wherein also a dispute of actual possession was raised. The Court relying on the memorandum and Panchnama prepared by the LAO for taking possession of the acquired land and also the letter written by respondent wherein he admitted the title of the respondent but sought for allotment of an alternative site, held that there was no question of requesting for alternative site if according to the respondents the title still vested in him and has not been vested in the State by taking possession. It would be appropriate to refer the following observations : “9. It is settled law by series of judgment of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land. 10. It is seen that in a letter written by the respondent himself, admitting the title of the Board to the land in the said survey number, he sought for allotment of alternative site. In other words, unless possession is taken and he is divested of the title and the same is vested in the appellant, he cannot make request to the appellant for providing him alternative site. It is not his case that at that stage he was still continuing to have title to the land in dispute. The admission is inconsistent with and incongruous to his interest. He was also aware that award was made and the possession obviously should have been taken thereunder.......” 19. It is true that the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) in majority decision, with respect to the question of possession observed as under : “There can be no question of taking ‘symbolical possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. It is true that the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) in majority decision, with respect to the question of possession observed as under : “There can be no question of taking ‘symbolical possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.” 20. The said judgment however thereafter came to be considered subsequently in A. Viswam (supra) and after referring to the above passage the Apex Court in para 9 of the judgment said that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by LAO in the presence of witnesses which would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. 21. Again both the aforesaid judgments i.e. Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) and A. Viswam (supra) came to be considered by Apex Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujrat and others, 1998 (4) SCC 387 and there also the Court referring to Panchnama of the Deputy Collector having been prepared showing that the possession was taken, found it sufficient to hold that the possession of the land in question in that case under the Act is taken. For the purpose of mode of possession the Apex Court in Mahalakshmi Ammal (supra) also held as under: “Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would no be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant......” 22. Similarly in General Manager, Telecommunication (supra) also the Apex Court in para 3 of the judgment said : “...It is common knowledge that possession would always be taken under a memo and handling over also would be under a memo. It is a recognised usual practice in all the acquisition proceedings. By operation of Section 17(1) even before award could be made, the Land Acquisition Officer is entitled to take possession of the land. He did so.....” 23. Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) judgment has also been considered recently in P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and others, 2005 (12) SCC 489 . There it appears that Minister passed an order of de-notification observing that a symbolic possession did not amount to actual possession and so long as actual possession is not taken, the power to withdraw from acquisition could be exercised under Section 48 of the Act. There it appears that Minister passed an order of de-notification observing that a symbolic possession did not amount to actual possession and so long as actual possession is not taken, the power to withdraw from acquisition could be exercised under Section 48 of the Act. The Apex Court held that the aforesaid understanding of the Hon’ble Minister was contrary to the majority decision of the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) and said that how such possession would be taken would depend on the nature of the land. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. In the said case the land which was taken possession was unoccupied, there was no proper structure standing thereon. The Court held that symbolic possession could be taken and that was sufficient and would amount to vesting the land in the Government. 24. In the case in hand also from the award of the SLAO it is evident that there was no building existed on the land in question and only a broken wall was existing on some part and, therefore, he did not found that any such construction was existing which warrant award of compensation for such constructed area. The said finding in the award has attained finality and in the light thereof it cannot be said today that the symbolic possession of the land in question could not have been taken by the respondents. 25. So far as the decree in Suit No. 1101 of 1989 and 185 of 1992 is concerned, it is evident that in the aforesaid suit the State Government and SLAO were not party. The possession was taken by SLAO and it is only he who could have shown the Court the manner in which possession was taken. In his absence, if any finding is recorded by the trial Court, that would not prevent the State from showing this Court that the possession was taken on 28.3.1977 by SLAO by executing a memorandum on the spot. We find that even this aspect is covered by the decision of the Apex Court in A. Viswam (supra) where also the land owner who had filed the suit did not implead Land Acquisition Officer and only Housing Board which was the beneficiary was impleaded though the factum of possession was disputed. We find that even this aspect is covered by the decision of the Apex Court in A. Viswam (supra) where also the land owner who had filed the suit did not implead Land Acquisition Officer and only Housing Board which was the beneficiary was impleaded though the factum of possession was disputed. The Court in para 10 of the judgement said that the LAO being the best person to speak to the factum of taking and giving delivery but he was not impleaded as party defending in the suit though he was a necessary party. The beneficiary who has taken possession from LAO could not be expected to prove as to how LAO had taken possession of the land. Same is the position in the case in hand and, therefore, in the absence of State or SLAO being party in the aforesaid suits, the finding therein, if any, would neither be binding on the State Government nor would deprive it from pleading and placing before this Court material to prove that possession was already taken by the Government by execution of memorandum and, therefore, the land has vested in the Government on the date of possession i.e. 28.3.1977 without any encumbrance. 26. Thus we are of the view that the respondents have been able to show that the possession of the land in question was taken by the Government on 28.3.1977 and the acquisition proceedings having not been challenged by the petitioners or their predecessors before any appropriate forum, and having attained finality, the request of petitioners for de-notifying the land in question under Section 48 of the Act cannot be accepted for the reason that Section 48 in the aforesaid facts would not be attracted at all. Therefore, we do not find any error apparent on the face of record committed by respondent No. 1 in rejecting representation of the petitioners under Section 48 of the Act on the ground that the possession was already taken by the Government on 28.3.1977 and, therefore, Section 48 is inapplicable. Hence, there is no reason warranting any interference with the aforesaid order. 27. Since we have held that Section 48 was rightly not applied by respondent No. 1 in the present case, we do not find any occasion to consider the other issues raised by the petitioners. 28. In the result, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. 27. Since we have held that Section 48 was rightly not applied by respondent No. 1 in the present case, we do not find any occasion to consider the other issues raised by the petitioners. 28. In the result, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The interim order is vacated. No costs. ————