ORDER 1. The petitioner before this Court is aggrieved by an award passed by the Labour Court dated 16.1.2004 by which his termination has not been interfered with. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed as Ward Boy with effect from 4.10.1979 at Cancer Hospital and Research Institute, Gwalior, which is a trust registered under the Provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Trust Act. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Ward Boy with effect from 4.10.1979 and served the respondent No.1 Institute upto 31.8.1997 i.e. almost for a period of 18 years. As per the averments made in the writ petition which are also not denied by the respondents, the appointment order was for a fixed period and after completion of one year's service fresh appointment was issued from time to time. Annexure P-12 is one such agreement executed between the petitioner and respondent No.1 appointing him on a fixed salary for a period of one year. As the petitioner was discontinued by the respondent No.1 and provisions of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (Standing Orders) Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the 'J.D. Act') as well as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not complied with, the petitioner submitted an application under section 2-A of the I.D. Act before Conciliation Officer, Gwalior, raising an industrial dispute for conciliation. As the conciliation resulted in failure, a reference was raised before the Labour Court on 3.4.1999 and the workman submitted the statement of claim before the Labour Court and a reply was also filed on behalf on the management. The respondent No. 1 did not examine any witness. However, submitted the contract agreement in evidence. The Labour Court after examining the matter came to the conclusion that the appointment was issued with effect from 1.4.1977 as the period has come to an end, it is not a case of illegal retrenchment and therefore, the question of compliance of section 25-F of the J.D. Act does not arise. 2. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents which are produced before the Labour Court was having certain interpolation as the date i.e. 1.3.1997 and the period of six months was inserted later on. In fact, when the contract was signed, there was no such condition that he is being continued for a period of six months. 3. In fact, when the contract was signed, there was no such condition that he is being continued for a period of six months. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently argued that the matter does not fall within the meaning of illegal retrenchment, as the petitioner was appointed on a fixed tenure basis and from time to time his appointment was renewed on fixed term basis and his services have not been continued after expiry of the period as per the agreement. The counsel for the respondents has further stated that the award delivered by the Labour Court does not warrant any interference in facts and circumstances of the case. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is evident that the petitioner was appointed with effect from 4.10.1979 and has continuously served respondent No.2 institution upto 31.8.1997. It is true that the respondents have issued fresh appointment orders every year and some of the appointment orders were issued after an expiry of six months' period but the fact remains that the petitioner has continued in service from the year 1979 to 1997. The documents on record revealed that the petitioner workman was repeatedly engaged by the respondents for a fixed period without any break and has worked for almost 18 years and, therefore, it can be safely gathered .that the intention of the management was not to engage the workman for a specified period as alleged but was to defeat the rights available to him under section 25-F of the Act. The aforesaid contracts at the hands of the management respondent No.1 to employ the petitioner repeatedly after a notional break clearly falls within the ambit and scope of unfair labour breaks. It is not the case of the respondent No.1 that the petitioner was involved in some misconduct nor it has been stated that the petitioner was not holding the qualification of the post. He was appointed as Ward Boy and while passing an award, the Labour Court has not at all considered this vital aspect of the case, the Labour Court merely because the last agreement provided for continuance in service only for a limited period of six months, has held that the petitioner's discontinuance cannot be termed as illegal retrenchment. He was appointed as Ward Boy and while passing an award, the Labour Court has not at all considered this vital aspect of the case, the Labour Court merely because the last agreement provided for continuance in service only for a limited period of six months, has held that the petitioner's discontinuance cannot be termed as illegal retrenchment. The analogy arrived at by the Labour Court is contrary to the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni [ (2006) 9 SCC 434 ]. 5. The apex Court in Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. (supra) held that in such cases where the workman was employed repeatedly after a notional break, the intention of the employer was to defeat the rights available to him under section 25-F of the I.D. Act. The apex Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar and others v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, reported in 2003 (1) BLJ 165 = AIR 2003 SC 3553 has held that the discharge of surplus labour or staff by an employer for any reason otherwise than way of punishment would amount to eeternchment and the apex Court has directed therein to accommodate workers in some other project of Government of India. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Council, Shahpura, Mandla v. State Labour Court, Jabalpur and others [ 2003 (II) MPWN 138 = 2003 MPLSR Vol. 15 page 150], it has been held that as per the provisions of section 2 (00) (bb) if a workman has completed 240 days in one calender year, even when he was employed on daily wages, he is entitled for protection as per the statutory provision under I.D. Act and his services cannot be dispensed with without compliance of section 25-F of the Act. This Court has again in the case of M.P. Text Book Corporation v. Krishna Kant Pancholi and another [ 1999 (I) MPWN 4 = 1998 MPLSR 369], has taken a similar view in the matter. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon an order in the case of Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar [(20.06) 3 SCC 81], in which the apex Court has held that as appointment was for a fixed period, the provisions of section 25 of the I.D. Act are not applicable. 7. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon an order in the case of Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar [(20.06) 3 SCC 81], in which the apex Court has held that as appointment was for a fixed period, the provisions of section 25 of the I.D. Act are not applicable. 7. The facts of the case cited by the learned counsel for the respondents are distinguishable to the extent that the petitioner therein was appointed on 12.7.1994 on a contract basis and his services were put to an end on 22.5.1997 after the contract was over whereas in the present case the employees has put in about 18 years of service. The petitioner was not employed in the project of harvest scheme for temporary duration and his employment has not come to an end with the termination of scheme or project and therefore, the judgment referred by the learned counsel is distinguishable. Similarly, the learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon a judgment delivered in the case of Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Subhash Chand and another reported in (2006) 2 SCC 794 . In the aforesaid case decided by the Hon 'ble Supreme Court, the workman therein was appointed on contractual basis as an Arrival Record Clerk. Such appointments were made during paddy seasons. The case of the petitioner cannot be compared with the case of a Arrival Record Clerk who was appointed during paddy seasons. In the present case, the petitioner has served the respondent No.1 for a period of 18 years and, therefore, the judgment is again distinguishable on facts. This is not a case where the workman was appointed for a fixed term and after the project is over or the job is over, his services have been put to an end and the respondent No.1 is still running a Research Institute and the same has not been closed down. It is nobody's case that on account of closure of the institute or on account of some project being over, the workman who was appointed on contract basis is not being continued in service. In this case, the workman was appointed for a fixed tenure after the notional break only with a view to defeat the rights available to the petitioner under section 25-F of the I D Act. In this case, the workman was appointed for a fixed tenure after the notional break only with a view to defeat the rights available to the petitioner under section 25-F of the I D Act. However, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner has continued from 4.10.1979 to 31.8.1997 with notional break, his service could not have been dispensed with without following the procedure prescribed under the provisions of I D Act. This Court is of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the. case, respondents were duty bound to follow the provisions of the I D Act, while putting an end to the petitioner's services, as the same has not been done, the discontinuance of the petitioner certainly falls within the meaning of illegal retrenchment. 8. Resultantly, as the respondents have not complied with the provisions of section 25-F of the I D Act and as it has been held by this Court that it is a case of illegal retrenchment, the respondents are directed to reinstate the workman forthwith. This Court is, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, interest of justice would be sub-served if the workman is reinstated with 25% back wages. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. No order as to costs.