JUDGMENT By the Court.—The petitioner No. 1, M/s Kamla Nagar Service Station, in this writ petition, is a registered partnership firm in which petitioners No. 2 and 3 are partners. The firm is a retail dealer of respondent-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (in short BPCL). The petitioners were running retail outlet of the respondent-BPCL under the name and style of petitioner No. 1. The firm was ultimately ordered to be reconstituted and the BPCL has to allow the reconstituted firm to run the outlet. The reconstituted firm is at present form running the retail outlet. The petitioners have entered into dealership agreement dated 4th October, 1993 with the respondents. The petitioners thereafter alleged malafides against the respondent-BPCL and its officers and officials. Ultimately on 24th December, 2005 the petitioners were served with a show cause notice, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, wherein the petitioners have been asked to submit reply to the show cause notice in the following terms : “The past irregularities referred above were sufficient to terminate dealership but we had allowed you to continue with a view that you will not commit any irregularities in future. From the above, it is clear that you have failed in the performance of your obligations under the aforesaid agreement entered between us thereby causing inter-alia, a breach of trust. We take an extreme serious view of the aforesaid breaches committed by you and in the circumstances referred above, you are therefore directed to show cause within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of this letter as to why action should not be taken against you including termination of the dealership, failing which we shall be constrained to assume that you have no explanation/justification to offer and we shall be at liberty to take action as deemed fit. Pending your explanation and to review the matter thereafter, we hereby de-certify your dealership from ‘Pure for sure’.” 2. The petitioners preferred a writ petition against the order-cum-show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005 being Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006 before this Court. This Court was pleased to pass interim order on 29th March, 2006. Thereafter this writ petition was finally disposed off by this Court on 3rd April, 2007. The petitioners preferred a writ petition against the order-cum-show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005 being Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006 before this Court. This Court was pleased to pass interim order on 29th March, 2006. Thereafter this writ petition was finally disposed off by this Court on 3rd April, 2007. The order passed by this Court is quoted below : “...............We, therefore, dispose of the writ petition with a direction to the respondent No. 3 to take a final decision in the matter in accordance with law within a period of one month from the date or certified copy of this order is filed before the said authority. It goes without saying that Clause - 15 of the agreement entered between the parties, even though, it stipulates that upon revocation or termination of licence, the licensee shall cease to have any rights, whatsoever, to enter or remain in the premises or to use the said fixtures etc. etc., but the said clause can be invoked only in accordance with law and the Corporation cannot take law in its own hands as held by the Apex Court in the case of Manager, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and others, in Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 2007 decided on 26th February, 2007 wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the case of a Bank engaging the service of recovery/collection Agents for recovery of the amount of outstanding loan for purchase of a truck. Further the aforesaid clause shall come into play only after revocation or termination of the licence and not at any stage prior to it. The interim order, if any, stands discharged.” 3. The petitioners submitted its reply to the aforesaid show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005 on 29th March, 2006 denying therein all the allegations levelled against the petitioners in the order-cum-show cause notice, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. The petitioners further complained in the writ petition that respondents are bent upon to harm and harass the petitioners and they did not bother about the order passed by this Court in the writ petition referred to above. The petitioners further complained in the writ petition that respondents are bent upon to harm and harass the petitioners and they did not bother about the order passed by this Court in the writ petition referred to above. Petitioners’ further allegation is that when the respondents could not succeed in their device, they got issued a notice to the petitioners from Explosive Safety Organization alleging certain irregularities in the Petrol Pump of the petitioners and the said notice was got issued by the respondents in their own name without any copy of it being furnished on the petitioners. The petitioners further submitted that respondent-BPCL has not given any reply to the notice issued nor they have forwarded it to the petitioners so that the petitioners may file reply. The Explosive Department passed an order dated 31st July, 2007 purporting to suspend retail outlet owned and run by the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the aforesaid order of the Explosive Department dated 17th August, 2007 by means of Writ Petition No. 45380 of 2007 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 21st September, 2007 directing the Explosive Department to take final decision in the matter within two weeks. The order passed by this Court dated 21st September, 2007 is reproduced below : “................Petitioners are aggrieved by an order passed by the Joint Chief Controller of Explosives, Madhyanchal, Agra dated 31st July, 2007, whereby the no objection granted in favour of oil company namely, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which permits the petitioners to carry on the business of retail outlet, has been placed under suspension as also against the consequential order of the District Supply Officer, Agra dated 17th August, 2007. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that till date no charge-sheet, on the basis whereof such order of suspension has been passed, has been served. It is alleged that the order of suspension is based on incorrect facts and the petitioners are being penalized for no fault of their. Sri Prakash Padia, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 3 and Sri R.B. Tewari, Advocate on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submit that against the order of suspension, the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of appeal under Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules. Sri Prakash Padia, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 3 and Sri R.B. Tewari, Advocate on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submit that against the order of suspension, the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of appeal under Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules. However, it is admitted to the parties that till date necessary charge-sheet has not been served upon the petitioner nor the proceedings after suspension of the licence have been brought to their logical end. In the aforesaid factual situation, we are of the opinion that interest of substantial justice would be served if respondent No. 2 is required to serve the charge-sheet upon the petitioners/Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. qua the allegations on which order of suspension has been passed, within two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before him. Petitioner will be at liberty to submit a reply thereto within two weeks from the date of receiving of charge-sheet. The reply so filed shall be considered and final orders passed in accordance with law by respondent No. 2 preferably within two weeks thereafter. With the aforesaid observations/directions the present writ petition is disposed of finally.” 4. In the meantime, due to suspension order of Explosive Department, supply of petroleum products to the petitioners has been stopped by the respondent. The petitioner made several representation to ensure delivery of petroleum products to the petitioners so that it may carry on its business and has deposited necessary money for this purpose. The respondent did not restore supply without there being any order for stopping the same which compelled the petitioner to file Writ Petition No. 53792 of 2007 before this Court. This writ petition is still pending before this Court. The respondents have now passed the impugned order dated 15th December, 2007, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-17 to the writ petition. The aforesaid order has been challenged by the petitioner by means of this writ petition inter alia on the main ground apart from others that the order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 5. Before passing the impugned order petitioner’s firm was not given any show cause notice on the ground mentioned in the impugned order nor it has been given any opportunity to defend the same. Thus the impugned order has been passed without any opportunity to the petitioner. 5. Before passing the impugned order petitioner’s firm was not given any show cause notice on the ground mentioned in the impugned order nor it has been given any opportunity to defend the same. Thus the impugned order has been passed without any opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner has already submitted reply to the order-cum-show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005 by filing its detail reply but the respondent did not pass any order in the matter despite the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006. In these circumstances it will be presumed that respondents have decided not to proceed against the petitioner on the basis of show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005. It is further argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that with regard to all other allegations in the impugned order except which were subject matter of the order-cum-show cause notice dated 24th December, 2005 no explanation has ever been asked from the petitioner and the petitioner has not been given any opportunity, what to say of reasonable opportunity, before passing the order dated 17th December, 2007 and so far as order dated 24th December, 2005 is concerned, as already submitted by the petitioner the charge stood dropped when the respondent have chosen not to pass any order despite the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006. The petitioner has further raised ground of malice and malafides. It is next contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that Para 5.3 to 5.8 of the impugned order are wholly irrelevant and baseless. In subsequent paragraph learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner has specifically denied all the allegations which were not subject matter of the earlier show cause notice issued in the year 2005. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondents have chosen not to proceed with the show cause notice on the basis of complaints. Apparently the complaints were found to be baseless. 6. Sri Prakash Padia, appearing for the contesting respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that since under the dealership agreement there is a clause for arbitration with regard to dispute between the parties, this Court should not entertain and the writ petition should be dismissed on the availability of alternative remedy. Apparently the complaints were found to be baseless. 6. Sri Prakash Padia, appearing for the contesting respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that since under the dealership agreement there is a clause for arbitration with regard to dispute between the parties, this Court should not entertain and the writ petition should be dismissed on the availability of alternative remedy. Sri Prakash Padia relied upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 , wherein the Apex Court held that despite there is no arbitration clause in the agreement by virtue of Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the Court can refer the matter to the arbitration. Sri Padia further relied upon another case of the Apex Court Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, (2003) 6 SCC 503 , to the same effect. Sri Padia has relied upon Para 23 of the aforesaid case in the matter of Hindustan Petroleum (supra) which reads as under : “23. Therefore, in our opinion, the Courts below have erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant did not have the legal authority to investigate and proceed against the respondent for its alleged misconduct under the terms of the Dealership Agreement. We are also of the opinion that if the appellant is satisfied that the respondent is indulging in short supply or tampering with the seals, it will be entitled to initiate such action as is contemplated under the Agreement like suspending and stopping the supply of petroleum products to such erring dealer. In that process any dispute arises between the appellant and such dealer, the same will have to be referred to arbitration as contemplated under clause 40 of the Dealership Agreement.” 7. As against preliminary objection raised by Sri Padia learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Apex Court in the case of Harbans Lal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others, AIR 2003 SC 2120 , wherein the Apex Court has ruled as under : “So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed. Suffice to it observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights :(ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice :(iii) where orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged.” 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case reported in 2007 (3) SCALE 465 in the case of M/s Popcorn Entertainment and another v. City Industrial Development Corporation and another, wherein in the Apex Court ruled in Para 44 as under : “44. We have given our careful consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective Counsel appearing on either side. In our opinion, the High Court has committed a grave mistake by relegating the appellant to the alternative remedy when clearly in terms of the law laid down by this Court, this was a fit case in which the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction in order to consider and grant relief to the respective parties. In our opinion, in the instant case, 3 or 4 grounds on which writ petitions can be entertained in contractual matter were made out and hence it was completely wrong by the High Court to dismiss the writ petition.” 9. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the matters reported in (1998) 8 SCC 11, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks and 2004 (3) SCC 553 , ABL International Ltd. and another v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India. 10. Thus in our opinion the petitioner has made out a case and the objection raised by Sri Prakash Padia deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. 11. It is next argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice : (A) Charges levelled against the petitioner firm in paragraph 8 onwards of the impugned order were not subject matter of the show cause notice dated 24.12.2005 (Annexure-6). 11. It is next argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice : (A) Charges levelled against the petitioner firm in paragraph 8 onwards of the impugned order were not subject matter of the show cause notice dated 24.12.2005 (Annexure-6). Impugned order passed by respondent No. 3 relying on these charges is therefore, in gross violation of principles of natural justice. In this regard specific assertions has been made in paragraph 71, 74, 76 of the writ petition to which there is no specific denial in paragraph 37 of the counter affidavit. Along with the counter affidavit the BPCL could not produce any show cause notice based on these charges. It tried to support its action relying on its letters dated 1.8.2007 and 3.9.2007 (Annexure-29 and RA-2 respectively). These letters though level certain allegations against the petitioner firm are, however, not show cause notice proposing to terminate the dealership nor do they call for any explanation from the petitioner firm. Admittedly, the allegations levelled in these letters were strongly refuted by the petitioner firm vide its letter dated 6.8.2007 (Annexure-30) and 6.9.2007 (Annexure-31). Consequently, the impugned order terminating the dealership on charges contained in paragraph 8, onwards is in breach of principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed. (B) Admittedly, show cause notice is dated 24.12.2005. It was challenged in Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006, in which an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner on 29.3.2006, but it was left open to BPCL to take final decision in the matter. The petitioner firm submitted its reply on 29.3.2006 (Annexure-8). (B) Admittedly, show cause notice is dated 24.12.2005. It was challenged in Writ Petition No. 14512 of 2006, in which an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner on 29.3.2006, but it was left open to BPCL to take final decision in the matter. The petitioner firm submitted its reply on 29.3.2006 (Annexure-8). However, BPCL treated the charges as abandoned as no action was taken on the charges contained in the show cause notice dated 24.12.2005 as is evident from last line of paragraph 7 of the impugned order which is reproduced below : “However, inspite of your failure to give reasonable and/or satisfactory answer for your committing the breaches, stated in BPCL’s letter, BPCL did not take serious action against you and continued its business of selling their product through you and did not terminate the agreement, which BPCL, could have done at that time for repeated breaches committed by you.” After having abandoned the charges contained in the show cause notice dated 24.12.2005 it was not open to BPCL to place reliance on the same charges in passing the impugned order as is evident from paragraph 11(a) to (f) of the impugned order. Thus, once again impugned order is not only in breach of principles of natural justice but suffers from vice of arbitrariness and is a result of “malice in law” and such an action cannot be sustained. (C) The entire family of the petitioner is dependent for its livelihood on the business in question. This has been specifically stated in paragraph 110 of the writ petition to which there is no specific denial in paragraph 46 of the counter affidavit. In such circumstances, on account of totally illegal, arbitrary and malicious action on part of BPCL, the petitioner and his family have been prevented from earning their livelihood by carrying on their business resulting in infringement of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further argued on mala fides and the case that the impugned order is passed on incorrect facts but in view of the fact that we are satisfied that the petitioner has not been afforded opportunity with regard to such charge which according to respondent, as quoted above, after show cause notice of 2005, has been issued to the petitioner but have not relied upon in passing the order against the petitioner as quoted above. This fact that the petitioner has not been issued any show cause notice other than the show cause notice of the year 2005, is admitted by the respondent. It is also not disputed that after show cause notice when the petitioner submitted its reply and at their issuing impugned order, respondents have by their conduct decided to drop the proceedings on the basis of charges levelled in the show cause notice of 2005. 13. In view of the show cause notice of 2005 the proceedings have been dropped and no show cause notice or opportunity has been given to the petitioner in arriving at the conclusion by the respondent. In our opinion the writ petition deserves to succeed and allowed only on the first ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In view of the fact that the petition succeeds on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, we have left all other arguments open to be raised by the petitioner. 14. The impugned order dated 15th December, 2007 is quashed. The respondent-BPCL is directed to pass a fresh order, if they so desire, in accordance with law by affording fresh opportunity to the petitioner in the matter. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed as above. ————