Judgment ( 1. ) THE petitioner has filed this petition assailing the validity of the award dated May 15, 2001, of the Industrial Court, Jabalpur, on the grpund that the Industrial Court has committed gross illegality and passed an award in terms of the agreements entered into between the parties without answering or adjudicating upon the disputes that were referred to it by the state Government vide order dated January 4, 1991. ( 2. ) THE case of the petitioner, before this court, is that the petitioner is a representative union duly recognized as such under the provisions of Section 27 of the M. P. Industrial relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is the only Union competent to represent the interest of the employees of the respondent Company. On failure of conciliation proceedings, the petitioner Union moved the state Government for referring the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Court and the state Government vide order dated January 4, 1991 referred the following disputes for adjudication before the Industrial Court, jabalpur: "vernacular matter omitted. " ( 3. ) IT is submitted that during the pendency of the petition, the respondent company filed an application on April 16, 2001 stating that the petitioner Union and the Company had entered into agreements on November 2, 1991, April 17, 1995 and July 21, 1998 and, therefore, the disputes be decided in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties without answering the disputes referred to it. The petitioner Union opposed the said application by filing their reply on April 17, 2001. It was stated by the petitioner Union in its reply that the respondent Company had initially brought on record the alleged agreements/settlement between the parties dated November 2, 1991 and on an objection being raised by the petitioner Union, the following four issues had been framed by the Industrial Court which needed to be answered before any further proceedings could be taken up by the Industrial court: "vernacular matter omitted. " ( 4. ) IT is further submitted that the alleged agreements said to have been entered into between the Union and the Company were not signed by the authorized representatives of the petitioner Union and, therefore, were not binding on the petitioner nor could they be said to be agreements in the eyes of law. " ( 4. ) IT is further submitted that the alleged agreements said to have been entered into between the Union and the Company were not signed by the authorized representatives of the petitioner Union and, therefore, were not binding on the petitioner nor could they be said to be agreements in the eyes of law. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the reply as well as before this Court the main contention raised by them is that the Industrial court could not have decided the case by simply passing an award in terms of the settlement as the Industrial Court, being the creation of a statute and being bound by the limitations prescribed by the statute, is bound to answer the dispute referred to it irrespective of and in spite of a settlement being arrived at between the parties. ( 5. ) IN response, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Company that during the pendency of the dispute before the Industrial Court, the Company entered into agreements with all the Unions notified in their establishment including the petitioner Union and by way of a settlement gave a package deal to all the employees which included pay, bonus, etc. , which was fully accepted by the Unions and was implemented during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court. It is further submitted that on objections being raised by the petitioner Union before the industrial Court, affidavits of each and every employee including the office bearers of the petitioner Union were filed by them before the industrial Court wherein each one of them has accepted and affirmed the agreements, accepted the terms of the agreements, stated that they are willing to abide by the terms of the agreement, stated that the affidavits have been signed on their own free will without any duress and that they are willing for adjudication of the reference in terms of the agreement. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Company that such affidavits have been filed by each and every employee iii respect of all the three agreements i. e. the agreement dated November 2, 1991, April 17, 1995 and July 21, 1998 and in support of the aforesaid contention, the respondents have filed the affidavits sworn by Shri R. L. Nakra who is the General Secretary of the petitioner Union and through whom the petitioner Union has tiled the present petition before this Court. The learned counsel for the respondents have further submitted that the main object and purpose of the Act being a pious one namely to settle all industrial disputes between employer and employee, the Industrial Court, which has passed the award in terms of the settlement and agreement which has been affirmed, accepted and implemented having received the consent of each and every employee, no fault can be found with the impugned award. In the ultimate, it is submitted that the present petition, being one under Article 227 of the Constitution of india, this Court is only required to look into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the industrial Tribunal and no other issues can be gone into in the present petition and as the. impugned award is in accordance with law and does not suffer from any perversity or manifest illegality, the present petition filed by the petitioner Union deserves to be dismissed. ( 6. ) BEFORE I advert to the legal issues involved in the present petition, it would be appropriate to elaborate upon the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, in the award passed by the Industrial Court dated May 15,2001. ( 6. ) BEFORE I advert to the legal issues involved in the present petition, it would be appropriate to elaborate upon the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, in the award passed by the Industrial Court dated May 15,2001. In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and others, AIR 2003 SC 3044 : (2003)6 SCC 675 : (2003) 3 MLJ 60, the Supreme Court while summarizing the law in this regard has held that the power of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari or to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution of India is mainly for the purposes of keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and can be exercised in cases where such a subordinate court has assumed the jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise jurisdiction which has been vested in it or in cases where the jurisdiction so exercised is not in the manner permitted by law resulting in failure of justice or grave injustice. It has been emphasized that this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction cannot exercise its power to correct mere errors of fact or of law Unless the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings like in the cases where it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard to the provisions of law or in cases where gross injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, ft has further been laid down that the supervisory jurisdiction of this court has to be exercised sparingly and cannot be exercised by converting itself into a Court of appeal by indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence. To further elaborate, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant parts of the aforesaid judgment which is in the following terms: "38 (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. To further elaborate, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant parts of the aforesaid judgment which is in the following terms: "38 (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the high Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i)the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i. e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ a certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the high Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. " ( 7. ) IN the instant case, for the purpose of determining the question as to whether there is some manifest error or gross illegality in the impugned award, it is necessary to take into consideration the following admitted facts: (i) The dispute referred to the Industrial court was as to whether the members of the petitioner Union were entitled to wages at par with the persons working in the cement industry and that in view of the fact that the previous agreement between the parties had lapsed on march 31,1987 and the wages of the employees had been increased as an ad hoc measure, whether the second interim relief was required to be given to the employees and if so to what extent. (ii) During the pendency of the reference, 3 agreements were placed before the Industrial court by the respondents i. e. the agreements dated November 2, 1991, April 17, 1995 and july 21, 1998. (iii) These agreements were allegedly signed by Shri R. K. Khare, Treasurer and Shri ramnath Dahiya, Member, Executive committee of the petitioner Union namely; the katni Pottery Karmachari Sangh, Katni, who were at the relevant time neither members of the petitioner Union nor its elected or authorized representatives. (iv) The respondents filed an application for passing an award in terms of the agreements dated November 2, 1991, April 17, 1995 and july 21, 1998 after they were duly registered under Section 33 of the Act, on April 12,2001. (v) These agreements have not been challenged, objected to or referred for adjudication by the petitioner Union before any authority though they were within their knowledge since 1991 itself. (vi) The Union opposed the passing of an award in terms of the agreement dated november 2,1991 and four issues were framed by the Industrial Court on August 4, 1992 including the issue as to the impact of the fact that most of the employees had accepted the agreement. (vii) The respondent Company has filed affidavits of all its employees including all the members of the petitioner Union as well as its office bearers accepting the terms of all the three agreements and agreeing to passing of an award in terms of the said agreements. The fact of signing the affidavits has not been denied by any person. (viii) Shri R. L. Nehra, Geneal Secretary of the petitioner Union, was also examined before the Industrial Court and he has stated in unequivocal terms in his cross-examination that he has signed the agreements and that he was deriving benefits under the agreements and has also stated that the agreements were obtained by the respondents by oblique means. ( 8. (viii) Shri R. L. Nehra, Geneal Secretary of the petitioner Union, was also examined before the Industrial Court and he has stated in unequivocal terms in his cross-examination that he has signed the agreements and that he was deriving benefits under the agreements and has also stated that the agreements were obtained by the respondents by oblique means. ( 8. ) FROM a perusal of the impugned award, it is apparent that the Industrial Court has recorded the submissions of both the parties in detail including the objections of the petitioner union regarding the agreements and has thereafter-taken into consideration the statements made by Shri R. L. Nehra in his cross examination, the fact that all the employees of the respondent-Company have filed affidavits accepting the agreements, the fact that the petitioner Union has not objected to the agreements either before the Registrar nor have they filed any application raising a dispute for referring the agreements before the appropriate government and on that basis has passed the award in terms of the agreements by duly recording a finding that the mere assertion of shri R. L. Nehra, that his affidavit was obtained without disclosing the purpose for which it was being executed, cannot be accepted as the contents of the affidavit were self explanatory and as all the employees have accepted the agreements by filing their affidavits. ( 9. ) THE Industrial Court has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of state of Bihar v. D. N, Ganguly and Others, air 1958 SC 1018 : 1958-II-LLJ-634, Sirsilk ltd. v. Government of A. P. and Another, AIR 1964 SC 160 : 1963-II-LLJ-647, Garment cleaning Works v. DM. Aney and Another, 1970-II-LLJ-195 (Bom), Tata Engineering and locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1981 SC 2163 : (1981) 4 SCC 627 : 1981-II-LLJ-429; bhilai Steel Employees Association, Bhilai and another v. A. W. Kanmadikar, Member Judge, industrial Court, Madhya Pradesh, Indore (Arbitrator) and Another, (1973) MPLJ 1025, new Standard Engineering Co. Aney and Another, 1970-II-LLJ-195 (Bom), Tata Engineering and locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1981 SC 2163 : (1981) 4 SCC 627 : 1981-II-LLJ-429; bhilai Steel Employees Association, Bhilai and another v. A. W. Kanmadikar, Member Judge, industrial Court, Madhya Pradesh, Indore (Arbitrator) and Another, (1973) MPLJ 1025, new Standard Engineering Co. Ltd. v. N. L. Abhyankar and Another, AIR 1978 SC 982 : (1978) 2 SCC 133 : 1978-I-LLJ-487 and national Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of rajasthan and Others, AIR 2000 SC 469 : (2000) 1 SCC 371 : (1999) Supp MLJ 138 : 2000-I-LLJ-247, to come to the conclusion that an award in terms of the settlement and the agreements which has been acceded to by all the employees can be passed by the Industrial court as the very purpose and object of creation of the Industrial Court and the law relating to industrial disputes is to give quietus to industrial disputes and to maintain industrial peace and harmony. The Industrial Court has also recorded a specific finding that the agreements entered into between the parties by way of a package deal encompass all the issues referred for adjudication in the reference pertaining to payment of remuneration to the employees including wages, bonus, etc. etc. and therefore, as the parties to the dispute have arrived at a settlement in respect of the aforesaid issues, there was no need to answer the reference made to it by the State Government as the agreement entered into between the parties would cover the issue raised in the reference also. ( 10. ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the patties have cited several judgments before this court including the ones relied upon by the industrial Court in support of their respective contentions. In addition, the learned counsel for the respondents has also stated, by placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd: v. State of M. P. and Others, AIR 2004 SC 4516 : (2004) 9 SCC 727 in which the respondent-Company was itself a petitioner and wherein the Supreme Court has held that the product manufactured by them is refractory cement which is different from cement, that the petitioner Union is not entitled to claim parity with the employees of the cement industry as the matter stands concluded by the aforesaid judgment. ( 11. ( 11. ) THE Supreme Court in the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties has held that the attempt of the Industrial Court must be to resolve industrial disputes and to bring about settlements so as to ensure industrial peace and harmony. In the case of calcutta Port Shramik Union v. Calcutta River transport Association and Others, AIR 1988 sc 2168 : (1988) Supp SCC 768 : 1989-I-LLJ-223 the Supreme Court in para-10 has observed that at p. 227 of LLJ: "10. . . . . . In all such cases an attempt should be made by Courts exercising powers of judicial review to sustain as far as possible the awards made by Industrial Tribunals instead of picking holes here and there in the awards on trivial points and ultimately frustrating the entire adjudication process before the Tribunals by striking down awards on hyper-technical grounds. Unfortunately the orders of the single Judge and of the Division Bench have resulted in such frustration and have made the award fruitless on an untenable basis. " in the case of Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of a. P. and Another (supra) the Supreme Court has held that in a case where there is a conflict between the award passed by the Tribunal and the settlement arrived at between the parties, the award should not be published and the settlement should prevail in the following terms: "8. It is however urged that the view we have taken may create a difficulty inasmuch as it is possible for one party or the other to represent to the Government that the settlement has been arrived at as a result of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence or that it is not binding as the workmens representative had bartered away their interests for personal considerations. This difficulty, if it is a difficulty, will always be there even in a case where a settlement has been arrived at ordinarily between the parties and is binding under Section 18 (1), even though no dispute has been referred in that connection to a Tribunal. Ordinarily however such difficulty should not arise at all, if we read Sections 2 (p), 18 (1) and 19 (1)of the Act together. Ordinarily however such difficulty should not arise at all, if we read Sections 2 (p), 18 (1) and 19 (1)of the Act together. Section 2 (p) lays down what a settlement is and it includes "a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer. " Therefore, the settlement has to be signed in the manner prescribed by the rules and a copy of it has to be sent to the Government and the conciliation officer. This should ordinarily ensure that the agreement has been arrived at without any of those defects to which we have referred above, if it is in accordance with the rules. Then Section 18 (1) provides that such a settlement would be binding between the parties and Section 19 (1)provides that it shall come into force on the date it was signed or on the date on which it says that it shall come into force. Therefore, as soon as an agreement is signed in the prescribed manner and a copy of it is sent to the Government and the conciliation officer it becomes binding at once on the parties to it and comes into operation on the date it is signed or on the date which might be mentioned in it for its coming into operation. In such a case there is no scope for any inquiry by Government as to the bona flde character of the settlement which becomes binding and comes into operation once it is signed in the manner provided in the rules and a copy is sent to the Government and the conciliation officer. The settlement having thus become binding and in many cases having already come into operation, there is no scope for any inquiry by the Government as to the bona tides of the settlement. In such a case in view of the possibility of conflict between the settlement in view of its binding nature under Section 18 (1) and an award which might become binding on publication under Section 18 (3), the proper course for the Government is to withhold the award from publication to avoid this conflict. In such a case in view of the possibility of conflict between the settlement in view of its binding nature under Section 18 (1) and an award which might become binding on publication under Section 18 (3), the proper course for the Government is to withhold the award from publication to avoid this conflict. If any dispute of the nature referred to above arises as to a settlement, that would be another industrial dispute, which the Government may refer for adjudication and if on such an adjudication the settlement is found not to be binding under Section 18 ( 1) of the Act it will always be open to the Government then to publish the award which it had withheld, though we do not think that such instances are likely to be anything but extremely rare. We are, therefore, of opinion that though section 17 (1) is mandatory and the government is bound to publish the award received by it from an Industrial Tribunal, the situation arising in a case like the present is of an exceptional nature and requires reconciliation between Section 18 (1) and section 18 (3), and in such a situation the only way to reconcile the two provisions is to withhold the publication of the award, as a binding settlement has already come into force in order to avoid possible conflict between a binding settlement under Section 18 (1) and a binding award under Section 18 (3 ). In such a situation we are of opinion that the Government ought not to publish the award under Section 17 (1) and in cases where Government is going to publish it, it can be directed not to publish the award in view of the binding settlement arrived at between the parties under Section 18 ( 1) with respect to the very matters which were the subject-matter of adjudication under the award. We therefore allow the appeals and direct the Government not to publish the awards sent to it by the Industrial Tribunal in these cases in view of the binding nature of the settlements arrived at between the parties under Section 18 ( 1) of the Act. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own costs. We therefore allow the appeals and direct the Government not to publish the awards sent to it by the Industrial Tribunal in these cases in view of the binding nature of the settlements arrived at between the parties under Section 18 ( 1) of the Act. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own costs. " in the case of State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly and Others, (supra) it has again been held that where the parties have arrived at a settlement, the Industrial Tribunal need not insist on passing an award contrary to and in spite of the settlement as under 1958-II-LLJ-634 at p. 640: "it is, however, urged that if a dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 (1) is settled between the parties, the only remedy for giving effect to such a compromise would be to cancel the reference and to take the proceedings out of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. This argument is based on the assumption that the Industrial Tribunal would have to ignore the settlement by the parties of their dispute pending before it and would have to make an award on the merits in spite of the said settlement. We are not satisfied that this argument is well-founded. It is true that the act does not contain any provision specifically authorizing the Industrial tribunal to record a compromise and pass an award in its terms corresponding to the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it would be very unreasonable to assume that the Industrial tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on the merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the parties. We have already indicated that amicable settlements of industrial disputes which generally lead to industrial peace and harmony are the primary objects of this Act. Settlements reached before the conciliation officers or boards are specifically dealt with by sections 12 (2) and 13 (3) and the same are made binding under Section 18. There can; therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before a Tribunal is amicably settled, the Tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties. There can; therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before a Tribunal is amicably settled, the Tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties. It was stated before us at the bar that innumerable awards had been made by Industrial Tribunals in terms of the settlements between the parties. In this connection we may incidentally refer to the provisions of Section 7 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)Act, 1950, (48 of 1950), which expressly refer to an award or decision of an Industrial tribunal made with the consent of the parties. It is true that this Act is no longer in force; but when it was in force, in providing for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal set up under the said Act, the legislature had recognized the making of awards by the industrial Tribunals with the consent of the parties. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument that cancellation of reference would be necessary in order to give effect to the amicable settlement of the dispute reached by the parties pending proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. " in the case of Garment Cleaning Works v. DM. Aney and Another (supra) it has been held that a settlement can be arrived at between the parties to an industrial dispute during the pendency of the dispute and in such a case the dispute should be decided in terms of the settlement and the Tribunal cannot insist that the payment should either be increased or decreased if the workers are satisfied with the settlement, in the following terms 1970-II-LLJ-195 at p. 199: "70. Even on first principle, apart from anything else we do not see why a settlement cannot be arrived at between the employer and the employees in a pending industrial dispute. The Tribunal has to decide the matter on such evidence as is brought before it. If the representatives of the workers come and say that the payments now made are fully justified and they do not want any increase, it is difficult to understand why the tribunal in spite of this must go reducing or increasing the amount. There being nothing in the rules or the statute prescribed by the government to enable the Tribunal to refuse to accept the settlement such a power of refusal cannot be implied. There being nothing in the rules or the statute prescribed by the government to enable the Tribunal to refuse to accept the settlement such a power of refusal cannot be implied. In our view, therefore, the settlement is operative and must have its full effect as required by section 19 (2) of the Act. " the Supreme Court, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, in the case of Tata Engineering and locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (supra) has held that an award can be passed in terms of a settlement arrived at by a vast majority of the workmen who have accepted it in totality as it is presumed to be just and fair even if it is objected to by a small number of workmen and even if the Tribunal feels that they are entitled to higher emoluments, in the following words 1981-II-LLJ-429 at p. 431: "10. The conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the settlement was not just and fair is again unsustainable. As earlier pointed out, the Tribunal itself found that there was nothing wrong with the settlement in most of its aspects and all that was necessary was to marginally increase the additional daily wage. We are clearly of the opinion that the approach adopted by the Tribunal in dealing with the matter was erroneous. If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored while deciding the reference merely because a small number of workers (in this case 71, i. e. 11. 18 per cent) were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or because the Tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emoluments than they themselves thought they did. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. " in the case of National Engineering industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others (supra) the Supreme Court has again reiterated the aforesaid law by stating that a settlement is binding on all concerned and in case the bona fide of the settlement is disputed or it is alleged that it has been arrived at by practicing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment of facts or other inducements, such a dispute could be the subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which may be referred by the appropriate government for adjudication in accordance with law. Additionally, the Court has also stated that settlements arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings are binding on the parties to the agreement and has laid down the law in the following terms 2000-I-LLJ-247 at p. 264: "26. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the industrial Tribunal which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial tribunal to adjudicate it, If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended appropriate government lacks power to make any reference. A settlement of dispute between the parties themselves is to be preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award. Settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. A settlement of dispute between the parties themselves is to be preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award. Settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable. A settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinized. . . . " ( 12. ) THE law that emerges from a perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court is that the aim and object of the law relating to industrial disputes is to settle all disputes, to bring about industrial peace and harmony and that the attempt of the Labour Tribunal must also be towards resolving all industrial disputes to bring about industrial peace and harmony and, therefore, if a settlement is arrived at between the disputing parties even during the pendency of a reference before the Industrial tribunal, the Tribunal has the power to pass an award in terms of the settlement. It has also been held that once the parties to the dispute arrive at a settlement, then the Tribunal cannot insist on passing an award contrary to the settlement specifically when the workmen states that they are satisfied with the settlement and they do not want any increase in the wage or emoluments. The Supreme Court has also held that once a settlement is arrived at between the parties during the pendency of the dispute and is registered in accordance with law, it is binding on all concerned and in case any person raises any dispute against the settlement by alleging fraud, misrepresentation, etc. , that would be the subject-matter of a separate dispute which has to be separately and specifically raised by that person and referred to adjudication by the appropriate Government to the Industrial tribunal. , that would be the subject-matter of a separate dispute which has to be separately and specifically raised by that person and referred to adjudication by the appropriate Government to the Industrial tribunal. The Supreme Court has also held that where a settlement is arrived at and an agreement has been entered into between the employer and employee, they are bound by the same and such settlement should not be unsettled on hypertechnical grounds. ( 13. ) IN the instant case all the employees including the office bearers of the petitioner union have filed affidavits and accepted the agreements and stated that the award in terms of the agreement be passed. Though the petitioner union has seriously contended that the agreements are no agreements in the eyes of law and that the agreements could not have been accepted as they were neither signed by their office bearers nor were they legally tenable in view of the provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the Act, surprisingly, it has neither opposed these agreements before the Registrar at the time they were registered in the year 2001 under section 33 of the Act, nor did it raise any dispute in respect of these agreements under the various provisions of the Act under Chapter XVI before any of the authorities under the Act and, therefore, the issues as to whether the agreements were valid or not or as to whether they were obtained by fraud, etc. or were a nullity were neither subject-matter of dispute before the Industrial Court nor can they be gone into by this Court in the present petition. On the contrary, once the agreements are registered under Section 33 of the Act, they are binding on all concerned in view of the provisions of section 97 of the Act and, therefore, in my considered opinion there is no legal infirmity or illegality in the award of the Industrial Court passed in terms of the agreements which have been accepted by each and every member of the petitioner Union as well as the employees of the respondent Company by filing affidavits and have not been assailed, challenged or objected to by any person before any competent authority nor has any dispute raised in that respect before the appropriate authority or tribunal. ( 14. ) ONE of the most glaring aspect of the case is the conduct of the petitioner herein. ( 14. ) ONE of the most glaring aspect of the case is the conduct of the petitioner herein. Admittedly, the wages and other benefits of the workmen in the respondent company was being paid as per agreement entered into between the parties even prior to the agreement of 1991. In the year 1990 while the petitioner Union raised a dispute and got it referred to the Industrial court, agreements continued to be entered into between the parties and the wages and other benefits were revised and paid to the workmen in accordance with the agreements. It was informed during the course of arguments by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties that even subsequent to 1998, three further agreements have been entered into between the petitioner Union an4 the respondent company which have been implemented without any protest. Surprisingly, while the petitioner union professes to represent the employees of the respondent company and has allegedly taken up the issues with the management in the interest of its members. All the employees including each and every member of the petitioner Union and its governing body have admittedly signed and submitted affidavits accepting the agreements and agreeing for passing an award in terms of the agreements and, therefore, the stand of the petitioner Union professing to oppose the agreements is apparently contrary to the wishes of all the employees of the respondent company. On the one hand the employees of the respondent company including the office bearers of the petitioner Union have accepted the agreements and agreed to the passing of an award in terms of the agreement by filing affidavits, the petitioner Union persists in pursuing the dispute which in the facts and circumstances of the case does not exist and, therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner Union has filed this petition only for the sake of justifying its existence. If all the workmen including the office bearers of the petitioner Union have accepted the agreements, the reason or justification for opposing the same in the same breath defies logic. ( 15. ) QUITE apart, from the above, though the petitioner-Union was well aware of the fact that the agreements were entered into in the year 1991,1995 and 1998, they did not oppose the same at any point of time even when the agreements were registered in accordance with law on April 12, 2001 by the Registrar. ( 15. ) QUITE apart, from the above, though the petitioner-Union was well aware of the fact that the agreements were entered into in the year 1991,1995 and 1998, they did not oppose the same at any point of time even when the agreements were registered in accordance with law on April 12, 2001 by the Registrar. The petitioner Union did not raise any objection against the registration nor have they raised any dispute in respect of the aforesaid agreements before the appropriate Government requesting it to refer them for adjudication before the industrial Court. On the contrary, by executing separate individual affidavits, they have agreed to all the terms of the agreements, derived benefits thereunder and have also agreed to passing of an award in terms of the agreements. ( 16. ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the Industrial Court was fully justified in passing an award in terms of the agreements arrived at between the parties in order to bring about industrial peace and harmony. I am also of the considered opinion that the award in terms of the agreements, arrived at between the parties, would fully cover the terms of reference made by the State Government vide order dated january 4,1991 and, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court quoted above, no illegality can be found with the impugned award which has been passed in terms of the agreements/settlements arrived at between the parties and, therefore, the main issue raised by the petitioner before this Court that the industrial Court was bound to answer the reference and could not have passed an award in terms of the agreements even in case where all the workmen have accepted the agreements by filing affidavits deserves to be and is hereby rejected. ( 17. ) I am also of the considered opinion that this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction can only look into the dispute that was raised before the Industrial Court and examine as to whether the Industrial Court has committed any patent error which is manifest and apparent from the face on record which has resulted in gross injustice or failure of justice. In the present case, as the validity or otherwise of the agreements or the dispute as to whether they were entered into by fraud was neither referred to by the State Government nor was the subject-matter of the dispute before the industrial Court, the said issues cannot be gone into in the present proceedings more so as the agreements have been duly registered by the registrar in accordance with law without any objections from the petitioner in view of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of A. P. and another (supra) and National Engineering industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others (supra), more so as there is an underlying presumption that the settlement arrived at between the parties is fair, reasonable and binding on all concerned in view of the provisions of Sections 33 and 97 of the Act, specially in view of the fact that in the present case each and every employee including all the office bearers of the petitioner Union have filed affidavits to accept and affirm the same. ( 18. ) IN the circumstances, I do not find any illegality, manifest error or perversity in the impugned award passed by the Tribunal which has been passed with a view to settle all disputes between the parties and ensure industrial peace and harmony. ( 19. ) THE petition, filed by the petitioner, being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to the costs.