ORDER Both these revision petitions are preferred against the order dated 16.12.2004 passed by the Appellate Authority (Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court), Hyderabad in R.A.No. 87 of 2002. The tenant, aggrieved by the order of learned Rent Controller directing eviction on the ground of wilful default, and confirmed by the lower appellate authority, is in revision before this Court being CRP No. 1131 of 2005. The landladies filed CRP No. 5759 of 2005 against the order of the lower appellate authority in so far as it held the ground of tenant securing alternative accommodation, against them. Both these revision petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. The parties are being referred to as "the tenant" and "the landladies" for the sake of convenience. 2. The brief facts of the case which are necessary for deciding these revisions are as follows: The landladies, who are the owners of the schedule premises bearing No. 4-1-464, Troop Bazar, Hyderabad and which is under tenancy of the tenant from 1 .2.1985, alleged that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of monthly rents (Rs.900/- per month) for the period from January, 1997 to December, 1997, totalling to Rs.10,800/-. The landladies also raised a ground of the tenant securing an alternative accommodation in the same lane and is carrying on business in the said premises and as such he is liable to be evicted. The tenant filed a counter and contested the eviction petition. The learned Rent Controller upheld both the grounds of wilful default and the tenant securing an alternative accommodation and ordered eviction of the tenant by his order dated 28.12.2001 in RC No. 804 of 1997. On appeal, the tenant succeeded on the ground of alternative accommodation, but the ground of wilful default was again held against him by the lower appellate authority as well. 3. I have heard Sri Damodar Mundra, learned counsel for the tenant and Sri Osman Shahid and Sri Basith Ali Yavar, learned counsel for the landladies respectively in both the revisions. 4. 3. I have heard Sri Damodar Mundra, learned counsel for the tenant and Sri Osman Shahid and Sri Basith Ali Yavar, learned counsel for the landladies respectively in both the revisions. 4. The learned counsel for the tenant contends that the finding of wilful default reached against the tenant is ex-facie erroneous in view of the fact that the tenant had deposited a sum of Rs.19,000/- under EX.R.10-carbon copy of rental agreement and Ex.R6-original receipt and the tenant had also paid an amount of RS.1050/- towards advance of rent at the time taking the premises on lease and the tenant had further paid an amount of Rs.10,000/- to the father of the landladies which was evidenced by EX.R7. The learned counsel says that at least Rs.30,050/- is lying in deposit with the landladies and as such even assuming that the rent for the default period is not paid, which put together works out only Rs.10,800/-, still sufficient deposit being available with the landladies, the tenant cannot be evicted on the ground of wilful default. He also contends that the landladies have held back the rental agreement with a view to suppress the recitals of the deposits as mentioned above and contends that neither of the landladies nor their brother, who is an attestor of Exs.R10 and R6 were examined and as such in the absence of any contra and rebuttal evidence on the part of the landladies disproving Exs.R10 and R6 or R7, the findings of wilful default is wholly unsustainable. He further contends that the rejection of these crucial documents by the learned Rent Controller as well as by the lower appellate authority is totally erroneous and in effect, just because the rental deed-Ex.R10 is disbelieved, both the courts below have rejected Exs.R6 and R7 also as if they are consequential documents to EX.R1 O. He, therefore, contends that there is no consideration to these documents by the courts below. He further contends that on behalf of landladies their General Power of Attorney holder was examined as P.W.1 and his evidence can only be with respect to acts or events subsequent to execution of the General Power of Attorney and he is incompetent to speak of events which transpired prior to his examination. He further contends that on behalf of landladies their General Power of Attorney holder was examined as P.W.1 and his evidence can only be with respect to acts or events subsequent to execution of the General Power of Attorney and he is incompetent to speak of events which transpired prior to his examination. The learned counsel relies on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another v. Indusind Bank Limited and others1 in support of the said submission. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the landladies submits that the tenant is bound by his pleadings and he is estopped from contending with respect to existence of the rental deed and in fact, the landladies have denied the execution of such rental deed in their pleadings. He further contends that there is no whisper about Exs. R10, R6 and R7 in the legal notice-Ex. R4 dated 20.9.1999 and in the counter filed by the tenant. He has drawn my attention to the statutory forms filed by the landladies and the tenant in their respective petitions and particularly clauses 13 and 14 thereof wherein the existence of rental deed as well as recitals regarding deposits was not made. He further contends that EX.R10 is a carbon copy of rental deed and not original and the said document was refused to be received as additional evidence by the learned Rent Controller and the said order was confirmed in revision by this Court in CRP No. 4046 of 2000, dated 1.10.2001 and as such, he contends that EX.R10 ought not have been received in evidence. He further contends that the burden is on the tenant to prove those documents and with respect to the signatures of the landladies and attesters found in those documents could as well be compared by the court under Section 73 of the Evidence Act with the admitted signatures available on record. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that the tenant cannot take advantage of these documents when nothing was pleaded about those documents and the said documents are contrary to the tenant's pleadings and have not been proved in accordance with law. So far as Ex.R7 is concerned, the learned counsel contends that it is merely a cheque book counter foil of the tenant which has no probative value to come to any conclusion. 6. So far as Ex.R7 is concerned, the learned counsel contends that it is merely a cheque book counter foil of the tenant which has no probative value to come to any conclusion. 6. The point for consideration is, therefore, whether the wilful default claimed by the landladies is justified and whether the orders of eviction passed by the courts below suffer from any infirmity? 7. I have been taken through the entire material record of the case in detail. It is no doubt true that the defence of the tenant against the claim of wilful default is two fold. The tenant firstly contends that he had deposited the rents under Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short "the Act") by filing RC No. 105 of 1994 before the learned Principal Rent Controller, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the certified copy of the order in the said case was marked as Ex.P1. The tenant, therefore, contends that he has been depositing the rents regularly from January, 1995 onwards in compliance with the orders of the learned Principal Rent Controller and the said order-Ex.P1 having become final and since it covers the default period which is in question in the present proceedings, ex facie it cannot be said that the tenant has committed any default. It is, however, admitted that the challans have not been deposited in the court by the tenant nor any notice has been given to the landladies on each such deposit as required under Rule 5 (4) of the Rules framed under the Act. The learned counsel for the tenant contends that not giving intimation to the landladies and non-deposit of challans into the court was on account of circumstance beyond the control of the tenant, inasmuch as his earlier counsel was suffering from brain cancer and he was unwell for a long time and ultimately he died. He, therefore, submits that there is a valid explanation offered by the tenant for his failure to deposit the challans and for not giving intimation to the landladies. He, however, maintains that in spite of the fact that the deposits undisputedly having been made by the tenant in compliance with the order EX.P1 upto date, he cannot be called a wilful defaulter merely because he could not give intimation to the landladies or deposit the challans into the court. 8. He, however, maintains that in spite of the fact that the deposits undisputedly having been made by the tenant in compliance with the order EX.P1 upto date, he cannot be called a wilful defaulter merely because he could not give intimation to the landladies or deposit the challans into the court. 8. The above issue is covered against the contention of the tenant by decisions of this Court reported in Hari Prasad Badurka v. Tellakunta Lakshmi and others 2 as well as Arnavaz Rustom Printer Mumbai and another v. V.N.D. Thandani and another 3. Further the latter decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a decision reported in N.D. Thandani (dead) by LRs. v. Amavaz Rustom Printer and another4 wherein a similar contention was raised on Rule 5 of the Rules framed under the Act and it was rejected. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment which is extracted hereunder would completely answer the contention of the learned counsel for the tenant, "..... ...The tenant did not even thereafter comply with the provisions of R. 5. Huge amount of arrears accumulated, which were cleared in one go. Even other deposits were not regularly made. The tenant did not keep the landlords informed of the deposits either directly or by complying with the provision of the Rule. The obligation of the tenant to payor tender the rent cannot be said to have been discharged unless and until the landlord were posted with the information along with particulars enabling them to withdraw the amount. The legal notices served by the landlords were not responded to in the desired manner so as to put an end to their grievance. A claim for eviction founded on the simple ground of default in payment remained pending for years, obviously because of the reluctance and the procrastinating tactics of the tenant. If this is not 'wilful default' then what else can it be? We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has rightly held the tenant to be a chronic wilful defaulter. The decree for eviction is fully justified." (emphasis supplied) 9. If this is not 'wilful default' then what else can it be? We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has rightly held the tenant to be a chronic wilful defaulter. The decree for eviction is fully justified." (emphasis supplied) 9. The second line of defence by the tenant against the said claim of wilful default is that the tenant deposited Rs.30,050/- with the landladies and as such they were holding much more amount than the alleged arrears of rent on account of default and as such in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kamati Swaroop Machine Tools Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Smt. Kanta Bai Asawa and others 5, which was followed by this Court in Kanuboina Venkata Ramanaiah v. Palukuru Rukminamma and in CRP No. 4447 of 2005, dated 29.10.2008, it cannot be said that there was any wilful default. The landladies are holding suffic:8nt deposits than the alleged arrears of rent. As mentioned above, both the Courts below upheld the said claim of wilful default by rejecting Exs.R10, R6 and R7. The learned counsel for the tenant has made several comments and criticism on the reasoning adopted by the courts below in rejecting the said documents which, according to him, completely substantiates the case of the tenant. It has to be remembered that Ex. R 10 was sought to be introduced by the tenant in evidence and for that purpose he had filed an application being IA No. 117 of 2001 in RC No. 804 of 1997. The said application was necessitated as Ex. R 10 was not an original rental deed, but it is a carbon copy and without permission under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to lead secondary evidence, the said document could not have been received in evidence. The tenant, therefore, made the application for receiving of the said document which was, however, rejected by the learned Rent Controller by his order dated 19.7.2001. The said order was questioned in appeal by the tenant in R.A.S.R. No. 11662 of 2001 which was dismissed on 24.8.2001. The tenant had carried the matter in revision to this Court in CRP No. 4046 of 2000 which was also dismissed by order dated 1.10.2001. The said document, therefore, could not have been received in evidence. The said order was questioned in appeal by the tenant in R.A.S.R. No. 11662 of 2001 which was dismissed on 24.8.2001. The tenant had carried the matter in revision to this Court in CRP No. 4046 of 2000 which was also dismissed by order dated 1.10.2001. The said document, therefore, could not have been received in evidence. But surprisingly I find that EX.R10 was marked in evidence during the chief-examination of R.W.1 on 13.11.2001. The lower appellate authority has noticed the above and rightly held that the said document ought not to have been received and marked as EX.R10. There is, therefore, no infirmity to the extent of rejecting EX.R10. So far as EX.R6 is concerned, it is an original receipt evidencing deposit of Rs.19,000/- and the said document was signed on revenue stamps by the landladies and also attested by witnesses which include the counsel for the landladies as one of the attestors (who incidentally is the brother of the landladies). This receipt does not contain any date and it reads as follows. "Received a sum of Rs.19,000/-(Rupees Nineteen Thousand only) from Sri Shyamlal Tiwari s/o Sri Paras Ram Tiwari, towards deposit of Mulgi No. 4-1-464, Troop Bazar, Hyderabad. The same shall be refunded at the time of vacation of the premises." 10. Obviously the said receipt refers to the initial lease when the mulgi taken by the tenant. The learned counsel for the tenant is right in making submission that none of the landladies have entered into the witness box to speak against the said document. Further the attestor who is the counsel and brother of the landladies has also not entered into the witness box to speak about the said document. The only witness examined by the landladies is P.W.1 who is their General Power Attorney holder and the said GPA was marked as EX.P5 and is dated 23.8.1999. The learned counsel for the tenant relies on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another v. Indusind Bank Limited and others (15t supra) to contend that the power of attorney holder can depose for the principal in respect of matters subsequent to the GPA and which are within his knowledge and cannot depose with respect to the acts or matters which are within the personal knowledge of the principal. In the present case, the said GPA holder during evidence has denied execution of EX.R10 as well as EX.R6. The said denial by the GPA holder is hardly of any relevance, inasmuch as the said GPA holder was not in the picture at all other than the landladies and attestors. He could not have denied the truth or genuineness of the said document EX.R6. The learned Rent Controller as well as lower appellate authority has rejected the EX.R6 document without properly appreciating these aspects. While the learned Rent Controller feels that the signatures are not found on all the revenue stamps which gives a doubt about its genuineness, the lower appellate authority feels that when EX.R1 O-rental deed is disbelieved, EX.R6 cannot be true and as such it disbelieved EX.R6 also. The manner in which EX.R6 was rejected by the courts below is, therefore, clearly opposed to law and in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the landladies with respect to the said documents, EX.R6 could not have been eschewed from consideration by both the courts below. In fact, a party to a proceeding ought to have been examined, otherwise it gives rise to an adverse inference as has been held by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and another and in paragraph-16 it held as follows, "16. Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbaksha Singh v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1927 PC 230. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh, AIR 1930 Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Oeshmukh, AIR 1931 Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 225, also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (AIR 1927 PC 230) (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath, AI R 1971. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 225, also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (AIR 1927 PC 230) (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath, AI R 1971. Allahabad 29 held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Oass v. Bhishan Chand, AIR 1974 Punj and Har 7, drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box." 11. If we consider Ex.R6 as evidencing the deposit of Rs.19,000/- with the landladies, obviously they are holding sufficient deposits and the tenant cannot be declared a wilful defaulter, even assuming that there was any default. This circumstance has to be clubbed with the admitted fact that the rents from January, 1995 onwards are lying credit to RC No.1 05 of 1994 vide Ex.P1-order of the learned Principal Rent Controller. Thus, in effect, the entire amount covering the default period is already in deposit in addition to Rs.19,000/- available with the landladies under Ex.R6 and as such it cannot be said that the finding of wilful default reached against the tenant is sustainable and the said finding was arrived at by the courts below in ignorance of Ex.R6 and Ex.P1 and they have failed to draw proper inference from the said documents and as such the reasoning of both the courts below in rejecting these documents is perverse and liable to be interfered with. 12. One more document Ex.P7 needs to be referred on which also reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the tenant. The said document is a counter foil entry in the cheque book of the tenant showing that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the landladies vide cheque No. 9954 drawn on Central Bank of India in March, 1991. The entry shows that the original cheque was written in the name of first landlady and later it was corrected in the name of Mohd. Mominuddin who is saiu to be the father of the landladies. The entry shows that the original cheque was written in the name of first landlady and later it was corrected in the name of Mohd. Mominuddin who is saiu to be the father of the landladies. The said cheque for Rs.10,000/- is said to have been paid by the tenant and it is contended that the cheque had been encashed and it is also lying with the landladies in addition to Rs.19,000/- referred to above. There is, however, no proof of payment, inasmuch as neither a certificate of the bank which encashed the cheque nor the certificate of the tenant's bank showing that the said cheque had been encashed is produced in the court. A mere counter foil entry of having written a cheque by the tenant cannot be said to be sufficient to draw a presumption that the payment under the said cheque has been made to the payee. The said document, which was rightly rejected by the courts below, therefore, does not call for any interference in these revisions. 13. However, keeping in view the fact that both the courts below have committed error in rejecting EX.R6, needs to be interfered with and to that extent the finding of wilful default reached by the courts below against the tenant deserves to be set aside as it is in ignorance of the evidence on record and is perverse. Therefore, the revision preferred by the tenant deserves to be allowed. 14. So far as the ground of the tenant securing alternative accommodation which was rejected by the lower appellate court is concerned, the learned counsel for the landladies contends that a specific ground was raised in para-3 of the eviction petition that the tenant has already secured alternative accommodation in the same lane in which the schedule premises is situated and the municipal corporation record was produced along with the eviction petition in support of the said contention. In reply thereto, the tenant vide para-4 of his counter merely stated that he has nothing to do with the said business at the alternative premises and the document filed by the landladies was said to be of no relevance. During the evidence, however, the tenant tried to explain the alternative accommodation as belonging to his wife and son and claimed that they are separated from him as there are differences between him and his wife. During the evidence, however, the tenant tried to explain the alternative accommodation as belonging to his wife and son and claimed that they are separated from him as there are differences between him and his wife. The learned counsel for the landladies submits that the tenant has not controverted the said allegation in his pleadings and he is trying to make some improvements without there being any material. The learned counsel for the tenant supports the impugned order of the lower appellate authority and contends that it is sufficient that when once the tenant has denied in his counter that the alleged alternative premises belongs to his wife, the burden is on the landladies to establish that the tenant himself is carrying on business in the said alternative premises. The learned Rent Controller considered the said aspect in para-23 of his order by noticing that the' admitted case of the tenant is that his wife is carrying on business. However, to the extent of the tenant's explanation that there are differences between him and his wife and that she is residing separately with his daughters and son and is doing business in the alternative premises was found unbelievable in the absence of any proof that the tenant and his wife are separately residing. The lower appellate authority, while reversing the said finding, came to the conclusion that the tenant cannot be insisted upon to examine his wife with whom his relations are said to be strained and concluded that the premises secured by the wife of the tenant would be deemed to be alternative accommodation secured by the husband if the relationship is amicable, but not otherwise. The lower appellate authority found that there is no satisfactory and cogent evidence to hold that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation and the relations between him and his wife is amicable and the finding of the learned Rent Controller was accordingly set aside. 15. On the facts of this case, it is evident that alterative accommodation is admittedly being used by the wife of the tenant for running a business. It is not disputed that it is situated in the same lane where the schedule premises is situated. 15. On the facts of this case, it is evident that alterative accommodation is admittedly being used by the wife of the tenant for running a business. It is not disputed that it is situated in the same lane where the schedule premises is situated. Except a few sentences in the examination of the tenant, there is no other material produced by the tenant to prove his case that there are differences between him and his wife and that they are not living together and that her business is entirely different and separate from that of the tenant's business. The burden of proof of relationship inter se between the tenant and his wife cannot be put on the landladies, as recorded by the lower appellate authority. It is for the tenant to explain the circumstances appearing against him as mentioned above. In the counter filed by the tenant except saying that he has no concern with the said alternative premises, no other aspect is pleaded nor is there any evidence on the part of the tenant in support of his explanation. A similar issue was considered by a learned single Judge of this Court in KVSSS Preasada Rao v. Godavari Bai and others and he held in paras 9 and 10 as follows, "9. Now the legal question arises for consideration of this Court; Whether it is the requirement of the law to evict the tenant from the tenanted premises, the tenant must secure alternative accommodation/building in his own name? 10. By reading Section 10 (2) (v) of the aforesaid Act, it is evident that the Legislatures have not used the word in the section that the tenant has secured alternative building in his own name. In the absence of the words "in his own name", it can be interpreted that the tenant must secure alternative building where he will have a legal right to stay that it is the requirement of law. In the present set of facts, the. tenant has secured alternative building though it was purchased in the name of his wife, the tenant has a right to stay along with his wife as the relations between them is cordial. In the present set of facts, the. tenant has secured alternative building though it was purchased in the name of his wife, the tenant has a right to stay along with his wife as the relations between them is cordial. Under these circumstances, this Court holds that the tenant did secure alternative building and ceased to occupy the building which was leased out to him by the landlords for continuous period of four months without reasonable cause." 16. The correctness of the above decision came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in CRP Nos. 3946 and 4291 of 2004, dated 24.6.2005. After referring to the decision of the learned single Judge referred to above, the Division Bench recorded its opinion in the following words, "In our view, wife had an independent right to acquire property and her property cannot be taken to be the property of the husband. But in peculiar Indian situation, where generally the women do not have their own source of income and are economically dependant on their husbands, it is often assumed that the property purchased in the name of a lady is purchased from the money of her husband. Keeping such notions in view, we think if a tenant's wife purchases property and it is shown by the landlord that the property has been purchased by the wife of the tenant, the onus should shift to the tenant to show that his wife purchased the property from her own income. Going through the evidence, we have not found any evidence that the wife of the tenant was an economically independent person and had income of her own. In such a situation, the presumption must be against the tenant. There can be cases where wife of a tenant is economically independent, has income of her own and can purchase properties out of her own income. In such a situation, it cannot be construed that the husband acquired alternative accommodation. But where the husband/tenant fails to show that his wife was economically independent and had income of her own to purchase the property, then the presumption would be that the property had been acquired by the husband in the name of his wife only to defeat the genuine claim of the landlord. But where the husband/tenant fails to show that his wife was economically independent and had income of her own to purchase the property, then the presumption would be that the property had been acquired by the husband in the name of his wife only to defeat the genuine claim of the landlord. Broadly stated, we do not find ourselves in disagreement with the judgment of this Court reported in KVSS Prasada Rao v. Godavari Bai and others." (8 supra). 17. Therefore, it has to be held that the said alternative accommodation which is in the same lane, as that of the schedule premises, was secured by the tenant and therefore Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act is attracted and the tenant is liable to be evicted on the said ground. The order of the lower appellate authority reversing the finding in favour of the landladies on the said point is, therefore, clearly unsustainable and is opposed to the legal position as settled by the above two decisions. As such the revision preferred by the landladies deserves to be allowed. 18. In the light of the above, the orders of the courts below in so far as they held the ground of wilful default against the tenant are set aside and CRP No. 1131 of 2005 preferred by the tenant is allowed. CRP No. 5759 of 2005 preferred by the landladies is also allowed and the order of the learned Rent Controller is restored so far as the ground of the tenant securing alternative accommodation is concerned. In the result, therefore, the eviction petition filed by the landladies is allowed on the ground of the tenant securing alternative accommodation. 19. However, to offset the hardship, if any, that may be caused to the tenant in vacating the petition schedule premises, I deem it appropriate to grant time to him till 30th April, 2009 to vacate the petition schedule premises subject to following conditions, (1) That the tenant shall file an undertaking before the Rent Controller on or before 15th November, 2008 that he shall vacate the schedule premises by or before 30th April, 2009, pay the arrears of rent, if any, and shall continue to pay the monthly rents to the landlord (sic. landladies) during the period of occupation and file the receipts thereof before the Rent Controller or deposit the rents to the credit of RCC before the Rent Controller; and he shall also undertake (a) That the tenant shall not alienate, transfer or otherwise part with the possession or create any third party interest over the schedule premises, and; (b) That the tenant shall handover peaceful and vacant possession of the schedule property to the landlord (sic. landladies) on or before 30th April, 2009; (2) That in default of fulfilling of any of the above conditions, the landlord (sic. landladies) shall be free to approach the executing court for execution of the decree;