JUDGMENT : Common Order: C.R.P. No.1056 of 2004 has been preferred by the respondent No.1 in I.A. No.2511 of 1998 in I.A. No.5107 of 1997 in O.S. No.4610 of 1997 on the file of the II Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No.4610 of 1997. He filed the suit for perpetual injunction against the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. Along with the suit the plaintiff filed I.A. No.5107 of 1997 for temporary injunction. In the said application the plaintiff pleaded that they were constructing bona fidely on their land as per the sanctioned plan by leaving set backs etc., and they were constructing the structure as per the provisions of the Rules and Regulations. Believing the said statement, the trial Court granted ad interim injunction against MCH on 25-11-1997. While granting interim injunction, the Court directed the petitioner to file photographs showing the stage of the existing construction by the next date and further directed that the petitioner shall not make any unauthorized construction against the sanctioned plan under the guise of the injunction order. 2. After considering the affidavits filed by the petitioner and respondents and also the photographs filed by the petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 the trial Court has modified its earlier interim injunction order and passed the following order: “Under these circumstances, it is ordered that the petitioner shall not make any construction in the suit premises until further orders excepting this modification, the injunction order granted earlier against MCH shall continue till further orders.” Subsequently, the first respondent herein filed I.A. No.2511 of 1998 under Order 39 Rule.2-A read with Section 151 of the Code of the Civil Procedure praying the trial Court to hold an enquiry and punish respondents 1 and 2 - plaintiffs by putting them in civil prison or by attaching their properties for violating the order of injunction passed by the Court in I.A. No.5107 of 1997 dated 25-11-1997 and modified through the order dated 01-05-1998 and direct the restoration of the building to its original position by demolishing the unauthorized and illegal structures raised by them and pleased to pass such other order as the Court deems fit. The application was resisted by respondents. The application was resisted by respondents. The lower Court, after making an enquiry, considered oral and documentary evidence and allowed the petition in part and directed the Office to issue arrest warrant on payment of process against first respondent for detaining him in civil prison for a term of one week as punishment and dismissed the rest of the claim. Being aggrieved by the order of the trial Court plaintiffs preferred C.M.A. No.114 of 2003 before the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the appeal was dismissed by confirming the order of the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the order of the appellate Court, the present revision petition has been filed. 3. In I.A. No.2511 of 1998 the petitioner-defendant No.2 pleaded as follows: Respondents 1 and 2 - plaintiffs have been accorded sanction by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for construction of only a part of ground floor, first floor and a part of second floor in the small area of 300 square yards admeasuring 45’ x 60’ with some conditions regarding set-backs and that the constructions shall be in accordance with the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1978. As per the sanctioned plan, the respondents shall keep five feet space on northern and southern sides open to sky; on the western side 10 feet space and on rear side 10 feet space open to sky shall be left as per the Rules and Regulations of the Municipality. Respondents 1 and 2 have started construction activity in violation of the sanctioned plan. The petitioner raised objection and got issued legal notice, but they continued their unauthorized construction with impunity. When the Municipal Corporation contemplated to demolish the unauthorized structure, respondents filed the suit and obtained temporary injunction restraining the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad from pulling down and removing the construction made in the suit schedule premises. Despite the orders of the Court, respondents 1 and 2 are proceeding with the illegal and unauthorized construction deliberately in total defiance of the Court orders. Respondents 1 and 2 have created unruly scenes and attacked the representatives of the petitioner when they were taking photographs for filing in the Court. Despite the orders of the Court, respondents 1 and 2 are proceeding with the illegal and unauthorized construction deliberately in total defiance of the Court orders. Respondents 1 and 2 have created unruly scenes and attacked the representatives of the petitioner when they were taking photographs for filing in the Court. The Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Vacation Civil Judge inspected the premises on 05-06-1998 and noticed that the structure for ground & four floors are under the construction and tiles and flooring slabs are lying on the ground and are being cut to sizes for fixing them to the floor. Pillars have been raised and brick walls between the pillar points also have been laid. The Commissioner also observed that no space open to the sky has been left around the building. The respondents left 11 ½ inches against 5 feet on the northern side, 13 ½ inches against 5 feet on southern side, four feet and 5 ½ inches against 10 feet on eastern side and 8 inches against 10 feet on western side, from the compound walls of the neighbours. The Respondents also prevented the Advocate Commissioner for carrying out the inspection work and the Commissioner was compelled to take Police assistance for inspecting the building. Respondents 1 and 2 have disobeyed and continuously disobeying injunction orders of the Court intentionally and deliberately. They have no respect to the Court and the action of respondents 1 and 2 constitute gross contempt, therefore requested the Court to punish respondents 1 and 2 as indicated above. 4. Respondents 1 and 2 - plaintiffs filed a counter in I.A. No.2511 of 1998 with the following averments in brief: O.S. No.4610 of 1997 was filed against the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for injunction. The petitioner got impleaded herself through I.A. No.1602 of 1998 as defendant No.2. The petitioner came on record at the time of the trial of the suit, therefore, she cannot file the application against respondents. O.S. No.4610 of 1997 was withdrawn by respondents, therefore I.A. stands dismissed. The first respondent obtained temporary injunction restraining them from raising construction on eastern and northern side of the site to the extent of 10 feet and 5 feet. On the plea that the respondents violated the injunction order, the petitioner filed the application preventing them from alienating the property. Initially, they submitted plans for construction of ground floor + two floors. On the plea that the respondents violated the injunction order, the petitioner filed the application preventing them from alienating the property. Initially, they submitted plans for construction of ground floor + two floors. While starting construction, they felt that sufficient accommodation for parking should be provided, therefore they submitted revised plan to MCH for construction of stilt + three floors. The Officers of MCH stated that there would not be any difficulty in sanctioning the revised plan, therefore under the bona fide impression they laid third floor leaving the ground floor as stilt. So far as open space is concerned, they left open space as per the sanctioned plan. The authorities did not permit respondents to construct balconies up to three feet, though rules permit such construction. The petitioner in the sale deed executed in favour of respondents mentioned that 10 feet space should be left on the eastern side and filed O.S. No.5144 of 1997 against respondents and obtained interim injunction to the extent of 10 feet on the eastern side and to the extent of 5 feet on the northern side. Whether the covenant prevails or Municipal Rules prevails is the issue in that suit. The petitioner is not at all concerned with the leaving of space on western and southern side and the fourth floor was laid by them in the good faith. The Court directed them on 01-05-1998 not to make any further construction. In compliance of the orders of the Court, they stopped construction. The fourth floor is left as it was on 01-05-1998 and completely stopped construction. They were asked to file photos and they filed the photos into the Court, but the petitioner moved the Vacation Court alleging that they violated the orders of the Court and sought for appointment of a Commissioner. The petitioner and his family members are intending to harass respondents to force them to enter into a compromise for payment of additional amount. The Commissioner unfortunately took sides with petitioner’s Advocate and wrote adverse report against respondents. They have also filed objections in detail to the report of the Commissioner. The Commissioner made false allegations that they abuse her and threatened them. There was no work in progress at the time of the visit of the Commissioner except the curing of the walls. The Commissioner unfortunately took sides with petitioner’s Advocate and wrote adverse report against respondents. They have also filed objections in detail to the report of the Commissioner. The Commissioner made false allegations that they abuse her and threatened them. There was no work in progress at the time of the visit of the Commissioner except the curing of the walls. The present application for contempt is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed and all the interlocutory applications filed in the suit stand dismissed when the suit was not pressed by them. 5. The petitioner in order to substantiate the contention that respondents violated the injunction order passed by the Court examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A1 to A5. The first respondent was examined as R.W.1 on behalf of respondents and no documents were marked. 6. The trial Court while allowing the petition observed that Exs.A1 to A9 and A12 are photos taken by P.W.1 prior to the order dated 01-05-1998. Ex.A1 was taken on 05-01-1998, which shows that centring work was being done for the roof of the fourth floor. P.W.2 took Ex.A10, A11 and A13 photographs. According to the evidence of P.W.2 at the time of taking photos there were about 10 to 15 workers. P.W.3 is a neighbour on the southern side. There is a compound wall between their houses. P.W.3 stated that respondents 1 and 2 started digging pits nearer to the compound wall and he objected for it. He took photos covered by Exs.A2 to A5 of the iron gates in the months of July, August and September, 1998. He filed the writ petition against M.C.H. in June, 1998 not to regularize the construction of respondents 1 and 2. The construction of the fourth floor was commenced in January, 1998 and the Court Commissioner came with the Police help and took measurements on 05-06-1998 and as on that date there were no iron gates to the compound wall. The construction of ground floor and four floors was laid by 04th April, 1998. The first plaintiff as R.W.1 admitted that he has not taken any photographs as directed by the Court on 25-11-1997 to show the stage of the structure of the construction. He further stated that Exs.B1 to B5 photographs were taken about 30 to 40 days earlier to 25-11-1997. The first plaintiff as R.W.1 admitted that he has not taken any photographs as directed by the Court on 25-11-1997 to show the stage of the structure of the construction. He further stated that Exs.B1 to B5 photographs were taken about 30 to 40 days earlier to 25-11-1997. He revealed that the iron gates were fixed after 01-07-1998 and the roof was commenced on 04-10-1997 for the ground floor. The lower Court observed that it cannot be said that the order of the Court dated 25-11-1997 is not disobeyed by respondents 1 and 2. As per order dated 25-11-1997 respondents 1 and 2 were directed by this Court not to make any unauthorized construction against the sanctioned plan. The Court found while passing order on 01-05-1998 that respondents 1 and 2 who have obtained for permission of ground floor, first floor and second floors have constructed third floor under the guise of ex parte injunction order. Respondents 1 and 2 were directed by the order not to make any construction in the suit premises until further orders. In the Advocate report it is clearly mentioned that 10 to 15 workers were on the spot engaged in various works at the time of inspection. She noted the existing balconies in the first and second floors apart from the measurements of the spaces left open to the sky on all the sides. She found the third floor, which is a plain big room with unfinished work. It consists of four bathrooms with drainage constructions. She also noted that fourth floor which is under construction open to the sky with 8 RCC pillars. The petitioner is the person who is aggrieved by the construction made by respondents 1 and 2 against sanctioned plan and against restricted covenant in the sale deed. It consists of four bathrooms with drainage constructions. She also noted that fourth floor which is under construction open to the sky with 8 RCC pillars. The petitioner is the person who is aggrieved by the construction made by respondents 1 and 2 against sanctioned plan and against restricted covenant in the sale deed. In view of the above material and arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 have violated the orders of the Court dated 25-11-1997 as modified through the order dated 01-05-1998, the trial Court, after considering various decisions cited by both parties, further observed that on perusal of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner is not entitled for any direction for restoring the original position by demolishing the unauthorized and illegal structures raised by the above said proviso for the reason that under the above proviso, the Court is empowered to punish respondents either by attaching their properties or by putting them in civil prison in addition to the attachment of their properties, if the court is satisfied that the respondents 1 and 2 have violated the above said orders. 7. The appellate Court while considering the case law placed by both parties and the facts of the present case held that the first respondent has committed breach of orders of the lower Court while the orders were in subsistence, therefore the fact that the said orders are not in existence due to withdrawal of the suit is not a defence for the appellants in an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure and there is no rule to interfere with the order of the lower Court holding that the appellant is liable for contempt. 8. In the light of the contentions of both parties and in the light of judgments rendered by Courts below the following are the points for consideration by this Court: (1) Whether Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is meant only for enforcing order? (2) Whether the revision petitioner cannot be punished under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure after withdrawal of the suit? (3) Whether there is violation of the approved plan or not is a matter to be considered by the Municipality? (2) Whether the revision petitioner cannot be punished under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure after withdrawal of the suit? (3) Whether there is violation of the approved plan or not is a matter to be considered by the Municipality? (4) When the Court passed conditional injunction order, Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 are not attracted if the condition is not complied by the plaintiff? Point No.1: 9. Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 reads as follows: 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.—Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise-- (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossessing of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.— (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise as the Court thinks fit. 2A. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise as the Court thinks fit. 2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.— (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.” Under the above order, the Court is empowered to grant temporary injunction and it can also impose a condition on the plaintiff to prevent him from violating the law under the guise of temporary injunction granted by the Court. The above provisions do not indicate that the injunction order is applicable only to the defendant, but not plaintiffs. The plaintiff can also be restrained from committing or omitting any act detrimental to the interests of the opposite party. The revision petitioner filed an affidavit before the Court at the time of granting interim injunction that when he is making constructions in accordance with the approved plan the municipal corporation is causing obstruction and is trying to demolish the building. From the Commissioner’s report it is disclosing that the construction was not in accordance with the plan approved by the Municipality. Open spaces left by the respondents-plaintiffs clearly indicate that they are not according to the building rules. From the Commissioner’s report it is disclosing that the construction was not in accordance with the plan approved by the Municipality. Open spaces left by the respondents-plaintiffs clearly indicate that they are not according to the building rules. Though it is for the Municipality to take action in case of any violation of the approved plan and they are entitled to demolish such building by following building rules and powers under the Municipal Corporation Act, it is the contention of the second defendant that the suit was filed while the construction was going on and an injunction order was passed by the Court that Ad-Interim Injunction restraining the respondent, its officers, employees, servants or any person or persons on behalf of the respondent from interfering in the construction work and from pulling down demolishing and removing the constructions made in the plaint schedule property till 04-12-1997. There was a further order that the petitioner shall file photographs showing stage of existing construction by the next date. The petitioner shall not make any unauthorized constructions against the sanctioned plan under the guise of this order. The order of the lower Court is very specific that the petitioner has to file photographs of the existing building as on the date of order and also directed that plaintiffs shall not make any construction against the sanctioned plan, but plaintiffs intentionally failed to file photographs being conscious that they need not care for the order of the Court and can complete construction without filing photographs as directed by the Court. 10. When defendants filed affidavits that plaintiffs did not stop construction after the injunction order, the Court, after perusing the photographs produced by defendants, passed the following order on 01-05-1998: “Under these circumstances, it is ordered that the petitioner shall not make any construction in the suit premises until further orders excepting this modification, the injunction order granted earlier against MCH shall continue till further orders.” This order clearly indicates that plaintiffs are totally restrained from making any type of construction to the building, but plaintiffs did not stop making construction. By the date of inspection of the Commissioner on 05-06-1998 the activity of construction was going on very hecticly and plaintiffs resorted to prevent the Court Commissioner from inspecting the premises and also prevented them from taking photographs and the Commissioner has to visit the premises with the assistance of the Police to note down the physical features. The report of the Commissioner clearly indicates that about 10 to 15 workers are attending to construction work. That clearly indicates the mind of plaintiffs that they have resorted to violate the orders of the Court without caring for the consequences and it is a deliberate action made by plaintiffs in proceeding with the construction not only against the building rules, but also against the order of the Court. They have also gone to the extent of misleading the trial Court for obtaining temporary injunction by representing that they are proceeding only according to the sanctioned plan. 11. The learned Counsel Sri M.R.K.Chowdhary representing the revision petitioner submitted that Order 39 Rule 2-A is not applicable since there is disobedience of the condition imposed by the Court only but not the injunction to attract Rule 2-A. The order of the lower Court is a clear indication that the plaintiffs are also restrained from making any further construction till further orders. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner further submitted that the order of injunction is subject to the condition imposed by the Court. If the petitioner failed to comply the order, the injunction order becomes inoperative, therefore in the absence of positive proof, plaintiffs cannot be held guilt of violation of the order of injunction and the subsequent withdrawal of the suit will make Order 39 Rule 2-A inapplicable. He further submitted that as Rule 2-A is punitive in nature, the strict proof of violation of the order is essential and unless there is positive proof that plaintiff is violated the orders of the Court, he cannot be punished. 12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner drew the attention of this Court to certain decisions in support of his contention. 13. 12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner drew the attention of this Court to certain decisions in support of his contention. 13. In STATE OF BIHAR v. SONABATI KUMARI ( AIR 1961 SC 221 ) the Supreme Court held as follows: “Though undoubtedly proceedings under O.39, R.2(3) Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect—as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order. This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. Order 21, R.32 sets out the method by which such decrees could be executed—and Cl. (1) enacts—“where the party against whom a decree………..for an injunction has been passed, has had an opportunity for obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced, in the case of a decree………for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property or by both.” Clauses 2 and 3 of this rule practically reproduce the terms of Cls.4 & 3 respectively of O.39, R.2, and the provisions leave no room for doubt that O.39, R.2(3) is in essence only the mode for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of injunction. While on the provisions of O.21, R.32, it may be pointed out that learned Counsel for the State does not contend that a State Government against whom a decree for a permanent injunction has been passed is not liable to be proceeded against under this provision of the Code in the event of the decree not being obeyed by them. No doubt the State Government not being a natural person could not be ordered to be detained in civil prison, on the analogy of Corporations for which special provision is made in O.39, R.5, but beyond that, both when a decree for a permanent injunction is executed and when an order of temporary injunction is enforced the liability of the State Government to be proceeded against appears to us clear.” 14. The learned counsel by relying on the above decision submits that Order 39 Rule 2 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure have a punitive effect and they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement or to execute the order. O.39, R.2(3) is in essence only the mode for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of injunction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Sub Rule (3) of Rule 2 made the above observation, but subsequently the above sub Rule was deleted and Rule 2-A has been introduced which was introduced through a specific object of taking the persons to task who violated the orders passed by the Courts. 15. In RACHHPAL SINGH v. GURDARSHAN SINGH (AIR 1985 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 299) a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court observed that from the combined reading of the provisions of Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 and Rule 2-A it appears that their purpose is the enforcement of the injunction and not to punish for its disobedience from the phraseology used in the said rule. It is further evident that detention in the civil prison and attachment of the property are to continue for a specified period and that too only during the continuance of the disobedience or the breach. No proceedings could be initiated or action taken against the person guilty of disobedience or breach of a interim injunction after its vacation. This decision rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on the basis of the principle laid down in SONABATI KUMARI’s case and the Court held as follows: “Once it is held that the provisions of R.2-A are not meant to punish the person guilty of disobedience and instead their purpose in substance is only to enforce an injunction, the answer to the question involved has to be that no intimation or continuation of the proceedings under the aforementioned rule would be competent after the ad interim injunction has been vacated.” 16. In LAKHBIR SINGH v. HARPINDER SINGH (AIR 2004 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 126) a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that when the main suit for injunction had been dismissed by the trial Court, in the absence of conclusive proof of violation of status quo order, order of detention and attachment of property of defendant is liable to be set aside. 17. 17. The learned Judge further observed that the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are quasi criminal in nature and since a person violating the injunction order passed by the civil Court or otherwise disregarding the same is liable to be detained in civil prison, therefore, the aforesaid violation or disregarding of injunction order has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts by the person complaining of such violation. The standard of proof required in such a case would, no doubt, be as is required in a criminal case, since the said act of the violator itself entails his detention in civil imprisonment. 18. In the present case there is sufficient evidence to show that the petitioner not only violated the Building Rules and the approved plan, but also proceeded with the construction disregarding the direction of the Court not to make any construction till further orders, therefore the principle laid down in the above decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. In SHEO KUMAR SAXENA v. ZILA SAHKARI VIKAS SANGH, GONDA AND OTHERS (AIR 1983 ALLAHABAD 180) a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench held that after vacation of a temporary injunction granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 it cannot be enforced or executed, therefore the punitive action for its breach cannot be taken under Order 39 Rule 2-A after its vacation. 20. Against the above case law the learned counsel for respondents relied on the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that Courts below were right in passing the orders under Rule 2-A for the disobedience of the first plaintiff in this matter. 21. In TAYABBHAI M.BAGASARWALLA v. HIND RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. ( AIR 1997 SC 1240 ) the Supreme Court held that when interim order of injunction was passed by the Court in a suit under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and when it is flouted and disobeyed by defendants, even though ultimately the civil Court found to have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the defendants can be punished for violation of the said interim orders. The Supreme Court further held as follows: “In the instant case the plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad interim injunction was granted. The Supreme Court further held as follows: “In the instant case the plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. In such circumstances holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the Courts. This is not even a case where a suit was filed in wrong Court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. The suit was filed in the Civil Court bona fide. In such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court’s decision on the question of jurisdiction.” 22. In SAMEE KHAN v. BINDU KHAN ( (1998) 7 SCC 59 ) the Supreme Court held as follows: “No doubt the wording as framed in Order 21 Rule 32(1) would indicate that in enforcement of the decree for injunction a judgment-debtor can either be put in civil prison or his property can be attached or both the said courses can be resorted to. But once the decree is enforced, the judgment-debtor is free from the tentacles of Rule 32. The whole operation is for enforcement of the decree. If the injunction or direction was subsequently set aside or if it is satisfied, the utility of Rule 22 gets dissolved. But the position under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. The whole operation is for enforcement of the decree. If the injunction or direction was subsequently set aside or if it is satisfied, the utility of Rule 22 gets dissolved. But the position under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2-A of Order 39 indicates that attachment will continue only till the breach continues or the disobedience persists subject to a limit of a one-year period. If the disobedience ceases to continue in the meanwhile, the attachment also would cease. Thus even under Order 39 Rule 2-A, the attachment is a mode to compel the opposite party to obey the order of injunction. But detaining the disobedient party in civil prison is a mode of punishment for his being guilty of such disobedience. The words “and may also” in Rule 2-A(1) cannot altogether be detached from the other words in the sub-rule. The principle of noscitur a sociis can profitably be used to construct the words “and may also” in the sub-rule. The word “also” has different attributes and its meaning is not to be confined to “furthermore”. In legalistic use, the word “also” can be employed to denote other meanings such as ‘as well’ or ‘likewise’. The word “and” has generally a cumulative sense, but sometimes it is by force of a context read as “or”. It need not necessarily be understood as denoting a conjunctive sense. Hence the words “and may also” in Rule 2-A cannot be interpreted in the context as denoting a step which is permissible only as additional to attachment of property of the opposite party. If those words are interpreted like that, it may lead to an anomalous situation. If the person who defies the injunction order has no property at all, the Court becomes totally powerless to deal with such a disobedient party. He would be immuned from all consequences even for any open defiance of a court order. No interpretation shall be allowed to bring about such a sterile or anomalous situation. If the person who defies the injunction order has no property at all, the Court becomes totally powerless to deal with such a disobedient party. He would be immuned from all consequences even for any open defiance of a court order. No interpretation shall be allowed to bring about such a sterile or anomalous situation. The pragmatic interpretation, therefore, must be this: it is open to the Court to attach the property of the disobeying party and at the same time the court can order him to be detained in civil prison also if the court deems it necessary. Similarly the court which orders the person to be detained in civil prison can also attach the property of that person. Both steps can be resorted to or one of them alone need be chosen. It is left to the court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.” 23. If the party willfully flouts an order of the Court then such a party can expect no equitable relief from the Court. Such a party must be made to bear the consequences of his action, otherwise all parties will ignore or flout the orders of the Court. When caught out they would then throw themselves at the mercy of the Court. In cases like this the party in default must not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of his action, therefore the action of the Courts below should sustain. In this case it is a clear breach of the injunction order by making construction by flouting and disobeying the order of the Court. The breach is willful and blatant. The extent to which the petitioner has gone is also indicated by the fact that despite two orders of the Court there was not only violation of the building plan, but also the violation of the order of the Court. From the material available on record it is very clear that the revision petitioner has absolutely no regard for the orders of the Court. However rich and influential the party may be, the flouting of the orders of the Court cannot be tolerated. 24. In the case covered by the above decision there was a dispute between parties in respect of small space of land used as a means of access (gali) which abuts the house of both the parties. However rich and influential the party may be, the flouting of the orders of the Court cannot be tolerated. 24. In the case covered by the above decision there was a dispute between parties in respect of small space of land used as a means of access (gali) which abuts the house of both the parties. The plaintiff filed the suit for ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from causing any obstruction to the use of the said space as a gali. The trial Court, which granted the temporary injunction order on 16-10-1984, required the defendant to maintain status quo in regard to the suit property and subsequently the ad interim order was made absolute. But within a month there of the plaintiff complained to the Court that the defendant had put up a brick wall in the disputed space in utter defiance of the injunction order and moved for initiating action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court found that the defendant has put up the obstruction wall in disobedience of the order of injunction and directed him to be detained in the civil prison for a period of one month. The said order was confirmed in appeal by the Civil Judge. The High Court exonerated the defendant from punishment on the ground that the obstruction caused has been subsequently removed and has tendered unconditional apology to the Court. Against the said order the plaintiff approached the Supreme Court. 25. In the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court as referred above which are subsequent to the SONABATI KUMARI’s case the order of the lower Court is sustainable and the Courts below were right in imposing the civil imprisonment for one week on the first plaintiff and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. 26. In the light of the above circumstances and position of law, C.R.P. No.1056 of 2004 is dismissed. So far as C.R.P. No.1916 of 2004 is concerned, under the light of the observations made in C.R.P. No.1056 of 2004, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the order passed by the lower Court for enhancement of civil imprisonment imposed on the first plaintiff and it is accordingly dismissed. So far as C.R.P. No.1916 of 2004 is concerned, under the light of the observations made in C.R.P. No.1056 of 2004, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the order passed by the lower Court for enhancement of civil imprisonment imposed on the first plaintiff and it is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be a direction to the first defendant to take appropriate steps for removal of the unauthorized construction of the building within one month from the date of receipt of this order, as the first defendant reported that the construction was made in violation of the Building Rules and approved plan. No order as to costs in both matters.