JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. The short fact of the case is that the housewife Musstt. Rumija Begum was attacked in her house on 7-10-1999 at around 8 p.m. while her husband was offering prayer in the nearby mosque, by a young man accused-Halim Ali with a dagger inflicting injuries on several parts of her body including neck and hand. She was found lying in a pool of blood and was immediately rushed to Mangaldoi Civil Hospital. As her condition was serious, she was sent to Guwahati Medical College Hospital, who succumbed to her injuries on 9-10-1999 at 1.10 a.m. On the basis of a written Ejahar dated 8-10-1999 lodged by Md. Karim Ali. husband of the deceased, a crime being Sipajhar P.S. Case No. 138/1999 was registered under Section 448/326, I.P.C. Subsequently, offence under Section 302, I.P.C. was added thereto after the death of the injured Rumija Begum. On completion of Investigation charge-sheet was laid against the accused. On committal the trial proceeded in the Court of ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Darrang, Mangaldoi. Charges under Section 448/302, I.P.C. were framed against the accused-Halim Ali who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses but the defence examined none. The learned trial Court by judgment and order dated 29-3-2004 passed in Sessions Case No. 125 (DMFT)/01 convicted the accused under Section 445, I.P.C. for which he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to undergo another period of rigorous imprisonment for three months and also convicted under Section 302, I.P.C. for which he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 3,000/- in default to undergo another period of rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both the sentences should run concurrently. The present appeal is preferred against the aforesaid judgment and order. 3. We have perused the records of the case and the impugned judgment and order and heard Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant assisted by Mr. B.M. Choudhury and also heard Mr. B.B. Gogoi, learned Additional PP, Assam. The basic submission of Mr. The present appeal is preferred against the aforesaid judgment and order. 3. We have perused the records of the case and the impugned judgment and order and heard Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant assisted by Mr. B.M. Choudhury and also heard Mr. B.B. Gogoi, learned Additional PP, Assam. The basic submission of Mr. Choudhury is that the so called dying declaration, which finds no mention in the FIR was falsely introduced by the prosecution on the basis of the interested and enmical witnesses namely, P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7, and as such the impugned conviction and sentence are not sustainable under the law. 4. Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of prosecution witnesses particularly, P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 6 and P.W. 7. 5. P.W. 1, Karim Ali, husband of the deceased deposed that around 7 p.m. on the date of occurrence, when he was in the mosque to recite "namaz," he was informed by his nephew, Aminul (P.W. 3) and elder brother Ajak Ali that his wife was hacked. He rushed to his house and found his wife lying in an injured condition. He saw injury marks on the neck, belly and hands of his wife with fingers almost severed. When he asked his wife, she told him that Halim, son of Eunus had cut her. His younger brother Gafur (P.W. 7), Fakar Ali and niece Firiza (P.W. 2) took his wife to Mangaldoi Civil Hospital and thereafter shifted to GMC hospital where she died. In cross-examination, P.W. 1 stated that his wife could talk for about 10-15 minutes and after that she became unconscious. Ejahar was written by a petition writer, Aminul at his dictation but he did not get it incorporated in the Ejahar that deceased told him that it was accused-Halim who had hacked her. 6. P.W. 2, Firiza Begum, is the wife of Gafur Ali, brother of Karim Ali. She deposed that around 7 p.m. on the date of occurrence she was cooking rice in the kitchen and her husband was in the mosque. It was raining heavily. On hearing cry of Rumija, she rushed to the bedroom of Rumija and found her in a pool of blood. She found none Rumija could not talk properly because of her weaknesses but she was in her total senses. It was raining heavily. On hearing cry of Rumija, she rushed to the bedroom of Rumija and found her in a pool of blood. She found none Rumija could not talk properly because of her weaknesses but she was in her total senses. In the meantime Gafur, her husband and Karim (Rumija's husband) came and on their enquiry Rumija herself told them that accused-Halim had cut her. On being called by her husband, the village headman Modabbir Hussain (P.W. 4) also arrived and her husband told him that Halim had cut Rumija. 7. P.W. 7, Md. Gafur Ali, another elder brother of Karim Ali (P.W. 1), (husband of the deceased) deposed that at the time of occurrence he was also in the mosque. On being informed about the occurrence, he immediately came to Karim's house and found his wife in pool of blood in the varandah struggling for life. On his enquiry, Rumija told him that Halim had hacked her with a dagger. Immediately they took Rumija to Sipajhar hospital and then to Mangaldoi Civil Hospital from where she was referred to GMC hospital. They reached GMC hospital at around 2 a.m. but she succumbed there to her injuries. In his cross-examination, he stated that until the police took his statement, he did not tell anybody else about Rumija's disclosure that Halim Ali hacked her with a dagger. As a result of several injuries and heavy bleeding Rumija became weak but till going to Guwahati, Medical College Hospital, she could talk properly. She had been talking when she was taken to Mangaldoi Civil Hospital from Sipajhar Hospital. 8. P.W. 6. Samsul Haque, an old man of 70 years, elder brother of P.W. 1 (husband of the deceased), in his deposition unfolded the motive of killing of deceased by the accused. He deposed that accused-Halim AH is his nephew. Prior to occurrence, he heard that accused-Halim and deceased-Rumija had a love affair and Halim gifted a ring to Rumija. When this fact was known to all they have solved the matter, Halim asked Rumija repeatedly to return him the ring which he gifted but she refused and over that matter, accused-Halim hacked Rumija to death. Being informed, Karim came to his house but as he rushed there Halim ran away and remained absconding for three days. When this fact was known to all they have solved the matter, Halim asked Rumija repeatedly to return him the ring which he gifted but she refused and over that matter, accused-Halim hacked Rumija to death. Being informed, Karim came to his house but as he rushed there Halim ran away and remained absconding for three days. After three days when he came back home the Police arrested him and Halim confessed his guilt. Accused-Halim Ali told Police that he had thrown away the "dao," by which he hacked the deceased-Rumija into the river. In cross-examination he stated that he came to know about the illicit relation between Rumija and Halim. These witnesses stated that everybody including Abdul Master, brother-in-law of Halim, knew about the same but he did not disclose it to anyone else. He did not tell the Police also about this illicit relationship. 9. The defence has cast suspicion on the fact of making of dying declaration by the deceased inasmuch as, the same is not mentioned in the FIR. We have to examine whether omission to mention about dying declaration in the FIR is so serious as to disbelieve the prosecution story. The FIR has disclosed the principle fact that the deceased was killed by the accused. The settled law is that the FIR need not disclose the minute details of the incident. The FIR is to set the investigation in motion. It is for the Investigating Agency to look for an eye-witness, circumstantial evidence or dying declaration to bring the culprit to book. 10. In the present case, as soon as the FIR was lodged, the Investigating Agency swung into action to find out incriminating materials and recording of statement of witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C. During investigation the evidence of making dying declaration was discovered from the witnesses and evidence was adduced at the trial. Situated thus, we are not prepared to accept the submission of Mr. Choudhury that the prosecution falsely introduced the story of making dying declaration by the deceased implicating the accused. 11. Having accepted the existence of oral dying declaration this Court is bound to examine whether the conviction and sentence so passed by the learned trial Court on the basis of oral dying declaration can be upheld. Choudhury that the prosecution falsely introduced the story of making dying declaration by the deceased implicating the accused. 11. Having accepted the existence of oral dying declaration this Court is bound to examine whether the conviction and sentence so passed by the learned trial Court on the basis of oral dying declaration can be upheld. The Apex Court in several cases, has already held that dying declaration itself can be treated as a substantial piece of evidence and can be the basis of the order of conviction and sentence even without corroboration provided such dying declaration brings forth a sense of confidence and trustworthiness in the minds of the Court. In other words, it must be wholly reliable and must inspire the confidence of the Court. 12. In the present case we find that the dying declaration was admittedly not recorded by any medical or Police Officer. No explanation was given why the fact of dying declaration made by the deceased was not mentioned in the FIR itself and why the witnesses had to await till arrival of the Police to disclose about the dying declaration. Here is a case of suspicion on the correctness of the dying declaration and the Court, therefore, is required to look for some corroborative evidence before recording an order of conviction and sentence. It is evident from record that the impugned conviction and sentence was not passed solely on the basis of the projected dying declaration but after exercising due care and circumspection. The persons before whom the dying declaration was said to have been made by the deceased have been produced by the prosecution as witnesses to prove the fact of making the dying declaration before them. P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 are such witnesses the prosecution examined for the said purpose. We are now to examine and find out whether the evidence of these witnesses are corroborating each other and could be acted upon their evidence for recording conviction and sentence. The evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 may be scanned from records for this purpose. 13. The evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 are found corroborated except some minor contradictions on the fact of making the dying declaration. The fact of making oral dying declaration by the deceased before her death has been proved by the prosecution. 13. The evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 are found corroborated except some minor contradictions on the fact of making the dying declaration. The fact of making oral dying declaration by the deceased before her death has been proved by the prosecution. No efforts have been made by the defence to disapprove this fact by adducing any cogent proof thereof and as such the said fact remained proved. Once the fact of making oral dying declaration is proved by corroborative evidence as aforesaid, the other question like why the dying declaration was not recorded by Medical or Police Officer, and why it was not mentioned in the FIR became irrelevant. It is not the rule that the dying declaration must be recorded by a Medical or Police Officer. Moreover, one must not be oblivious of the fact that all the family members at the relevant time were more concerned to save the life of the deceased than to recording her dying declaration and the simple rustic persons were not aware of or bothered about such legal formalities. It is enough if the evidence is led that the deceased was in conscious state at certain stages, fit for making statement before death. There is sufficient evidence on record in this case that the deceased at the time of arrival of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 and till shifting her to hospital could talk to her near and dear ones. 14. Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel for the accused-appellant strenuously argued that the evidence of dying declaration was given by the deceased only by her husband and relatives, and they being interested witnesses, their evidence is not reliable and trustworthy. This in our consideration, may be applicable to some cases, but not at least to this case. The reason is that, a dying person would always look for his nearest and dearest persons whom he can trust to say something in confidence before or at the moment of death. This was exactly done so by the deceased in the instant case. We cannot, therefore, brush aside the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 on the score of being interested ones. It is no doubt true that these witnesses are husband and close relations but after having gone through their evidence, we feel that the evidence regarding dying declaration is reliable and believable. We cannot, therefore, brush aside the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7 on the score of being interested ones. It is no doubt true that these witnesses are husband and close relations but after having gone through their evidence, we feel that the evidence regarding dying declaration is reliable and believable. It has also been proved that the moment the deceased was attacked she shouted as a result of which P.W. 2, who was busy cooking in the next room rushed to the place of occurrence and having found her in a pool of blood sent for her husband P.W. 7 and deceased’s' husband P.W. 1. Thus it was quite natural that the deceased had the occasion to make the oral dying declaration before these witnesses before arrival of other persons. The deceased need not repeat the dying declaration before others and naturally she did not do so and as such, some witnesses did not give any evidence on the oral dying declaration. 15. We have considered the question of credibility and acceptability of the oral dying declaration on the touchstone of Hon'ble Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Panchdeo Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 2002 CriLJ 973 and we deem it proper to quote para 3 below: 3. One of the latest pronouncements of this Court pertaining to the subject finds place in the decision of Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar wherein, this Court observed that apart from the care and caution factors as noticed earlier the dying declaration ought otherwise to be treated as trustworthy. The issue thus becomes as to whether the dying declaration has been able to bring about a confidence thereon or not - is it trustworthy or is it a mere attempt to cover up the laches of investigation; it must allure to the satisfaction of the Court that reliance ought to be placed thereon rather than a distrust; the confidence of the Court is the summons bonum and in the event of there being any affirmation thereto in the judicial mind, question of any disbelief or distrust would not arise. In the event however of there being some infirmity, howsoever negligible it be, the Court unless otherwise satisfied about the credibility thereof, ought to look for some corroboration, if however it is otherwise, question of requirement of a corroboration would not arise; dying declaration alluring confidence of the Court would be sufficient piece of evidence to sustain conviction. There is no format as such of dying declaration, neither the declaration need be of any longish nature and neatly structured. As a matter of fact, perfect wording and neatly structured dying declaration may bring about an adverse impression and create a suspicion in the mind of the Court since dying declarations need not be drawn with mathematical precision - the declarant should be able to recollect the situation resulting in the available state of affairs. 16. The learned trial Court, in our view, made correct approach in accepting the dying declaration by way of testing it through the corroborated evidence for ordering the conviction and sentence and we find no infirmity in it. No interference is, therefore, called for. 17. For the reasons given above, the contention of appellant fails. We find no merit in the instant appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 18. LCR may be sent down. Appeal dismissed